NOTICE: SLIP OPINION (not the court’s final written decision)
The opinion that begins on the next page is a slip opinion. Slip opinions are the written opinions that are originally filed by the court. A slip opinion is not necessarily the court’s final written decision. Slip opinions can be changed by subsequent court orders. For example, a court may issue an order making substantive changes to a slip opinion or publishing for precedential purposes a previously “unpublished” opinion. Additionally, nonsubstantive edits (for style, grammar, citation, format, punctuation, etc.) are made before the opinions that have precedential value are published in the official reports of court decisions: the Washington Reports 2d and the Washington Appellate Reports. An opinion in the official reports replaces the slip opinion as the official opinion of the court. The slip opinion that begins on the next page is for a published opinion, and it has since been revised for publication in the printed official reports. The official text of the court’s opinion is found in the advance sheets and the bound volumes of the official reports. Also, an electronic version (intended to mirror the language found in the official reports) of the revised opinion can be found, free of charge, at this website: https://www.lexisnexis.com/clients/wareports. For more information about precedential (published) opinions, nonprecedential (unpublished) opinions, slip opinions, and the official reports, see https://www.courts.wa.gov/opinions and the information that is linked there.
This opinion was filed for record at 8:
~--p~ ~onald R. Carpe~ter Supreme Court Clerk
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
) In the Matter of the Personal ) No. 88770-5 Restraint of ) (consolidated with ) No. 89992-4) YUNG-CHENG TSAI, ) ) Petitioner. ) _______________________) ENBANC ) In the Matter of the Personal ) Restraint of ) ) Filed: MAY 0 7 2015 MUHAMMADOU JAGANA, ) ) Petitioner. ) _______________________) YU, J.-As applied to Washington, the holding in Padilla v. Kentucky, 559
U.S. 356, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 176 L. Ed. 2d 284 (2010) is an affirmation of an old n1le
of state constitutional law- the duty to provide effective assistance of counsel
includes the duty to reasonably research and apply relevant statutes. However,
language in certain Washington appellate cases made it appear that this well- In re Pers. Restraint ofTsai, No. 88770-5 In re Pers. Restraint ofJagana, No. 89992-4
established rule did not apply to RCW 10.40.200. In superseding those cases,
Padilla significantly changed state law.
Muhammadou Jagana raises a claim that would have been rejected before
Padilla based on those superseded appellate cases. We therefore reverse the Court
of Appeals' order dismissing Jagana's personal restraint petition (PRP) and remand
to the trial court for an evidentiary hearing. However, Yung-Cheng Tsai's claim
was available before Padilla, and Tsai did in fact raise his claim with the assistance
of an attorney in 2008. That motion was denied based on an issue of law not
affected by Padilla, and Tsai did not appeal. We therefore affirm the Court of
Appeals' order dismissing Tsai 's PRP.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
A. Yung-Cheng Tsai
On July 27, 2006, Tsai pleaded guilty to one count of unlawful possession of
a controlled substance with intent to deliver (marijuana). On August 29, 2006, the
trial court sentenced him to 11 months in jail and 12 months of community
custody. Tsai did not appeal. On or about October 30, 2007, Tsai received a
notice to appear from the United States Immigration and Naturalization Services,
which informed him that he was subject to removal (also known as deportation)
based on his conviction.
2 In re Pers. Restraint ofTsai, No. 88770-5 In re Pers. Restraint ofJagana, No. 89992-4
On July 21, 2008, Tsai filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea under CrR
7 .8, alleging that his attorney wrongfully advised him he would not be deportable
if he accepted the State's plea offer and that this erroneous advice was prejudicial.
The trial court denied Tsai' s motion as time barred. The motion was filed over one
year after Tsai pleaded guilty, and the trial court held that equitable tolling did not
apply. The trial court did not transfer Tsai' s motion to the Court of Appeals for
consideration as a PRP. Tsai did not appeal or otherwise pursue his 2008 motion.
On May 18, 2011, Tsai again moved to withdraw his guilty plea under CrR
7.8 based on his attorney's alleged erroneous advice. Tsai argued his motion was
exempt from the one-year time bar in RCW 10.73.090(1) under RCW 10.73.100(6)
because Padilla and State v. Sandoval, 171 Wn.2d 163, 249 P.3d 1015 (2011)
(applying Padilla) effected a significant, material change in the law that applies
retroactively.
The trial court initially denied Tsai's 2011 motion, holding it was time
barred. On Tsai' s motion, the trial court vacated its holding and transferred the
motion to the Court of Appeals to be considered as a PRP. The Court of Appeals
denied Tsai's PRP as time barred, holding that Padilla and Sandoval do not apply
retroactively. We granted Tsai's motion for discretionary review and consolidated
his case with Jagana's. In re Pers. Restraint ofYung-Cheng Tsai, 180 Wn.2d
1014,327 P.3d 55 (2014).
3 In re Pers. Restraint ofTsai, No. 88770-5 In re Pers. Restraint ofJagana, No. 89992-4
B. Muhammadou Jagana
On June 7, 2006, Jagana pleaded guilty to one count of possession of a
controlled substance (cocaine). He was sentenced to three months of electronic
home monitoring. J agana did not appeal.
On November 4, 2010, Jagana moved to withdraw his guilty plea under CrR
7.8. Relying on Padilla, Jagana asserted that his attorney failed to investigate
Jagana's immigration status, did not advise him that his guilty plea could have
immigration consequences, and did not advise him to speak with an immigration
attorney. The trial court transferred Jagana's motion to the Court of Appeals to be
considered as a PRP.
The Court of Appeals initially filed a published opinion holding Jagana's
PRP was timely under RCW 10.73.100(6) and remanding the case to the trial court
for a reference hearing. In re Pers. Restraint ofJagana, 170 Wn. App. 32, 282
P.3d 1153 (2012). The Court of Appeals reasoned that Padilla was a significant,
material change in the law and that Padilla should apply retroactively because it
was not a new rule; it merely applied the standard analysis for ineffective
assistance of counsel to a new set of facts.
The State sought discretionary review, and we remanded to the Court of
Appeals for reconsideration in light of Chaidez v. United States, 568 U.S._, 133
S. Ct. 1103, 1107, 185 L. Ed. 2d 149 (2013), which held Padilla did announce a
4 In re Pers. Restraint ofTsai, No. 88770-5 In re Pers. Restraint ofJagana, No. 89992-4
new rule that does not apply retroactively to matters on collateral review. In re
Pers. Restraint ofJagana, 177 Wn.2d 1027, 309 P.3d 1186 (2013). On
reconsideration, the Court of Appeals withdrew its opinion and dismissed Jagana's
PRP as time barred. We granted Jagana's motion for discretionary review and
consolidated his case with Tsai' s. In re Pers. Restraint ofJagana, 180 Wn.2d
ISSUES
A. Are the PRPs exempt from the one-year time bar in RCW
10.73.090(1) under RCW 10.73.100(6)?
B. If the PRPs are not time barred, are the petitioners entitled to relief or
evidentiary hearings on the merits of their claims?
ANALYSIS
A. As applied to Washington, Padilla did not announce a new rule, but it did effect a significant change in the law under RCW 10.73.100(6)
1. The unreasonable failure to give any advice about the immigration consequences of a guilty plea was already deficient performance in Washington under the ordinary Strickland test
A criminal defendant's right to the assistance of counsel derives from the
Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 22 of the
Washington Constitution. Under these provisions, a criminal defense attorney has
the constitutional duty to provide assistance that is effective. Strickland v.
5 In re Pers. Restraint ofTsai, No. 88770-5 In re Pers. Restraint of.Jagana, No. 89992-4
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984). Where
a defense attorney makes "errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the
'counsel' guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment," the attorney's
performance is constitutionally deficient. !d. at 687. Where that deficiency
deprives the defendant of fair proceedings, the defendant has suffered prejudice
because there is "a breakdown in the adversary process that renders the result
unreliable." Id. Unreliable results caused by defense counsel's prejudicially
deficient performance are constitutionally intolerable.
When determining whether a defense attorney provided effective assistance,
the underlying test is always one of "reasonableness under prevailing professional
norms." Id. at 688. While simple to state in theory, this test can be complicated to
apply in practice. The court must engage in a fact-specific inquiry into the
reasonableness of an attorney's actions, measured against the applicable prevailing
professional norms in place at the time. Id. at 690. It is thus impossible to
"exhaustively define the obligations of counsel [ ]or form a checklist for judicial
evaluation of attorney performance." Id. at 688. Nevertheless, effective
representation "entails certain basic duties," such as
a duty of loyalty, a duty to avoid conflicts of interest[,] ... the overarching duty to advocate the defendant's cause and the more particular duties to consult with the defendant on important decisions and to keep the defendant informed of important developments in the course of the prosecution. Counsel also has a duty to bring to bear
6 In re Pers. Restraint ofTsai, No. 88770-5 In re Pers. Restraint of Jagana, No. 89992-4
such skill and knowledge as will render the trial a reliable adversarial testing process.
I d.
It is against this backdrop that we consider whether Padilla applies
retroactively under RCW 10.73.100(6) and Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 109 S.
Ct. 1060, 103 L. Ed. 2d 334 (1989). Under Teague, new constitutional rules of
criminal procedure usually apply only to matters on direct review, but old rules
apply to matters on both direct and collateral review. Whorton v. Bockting, 549
U.S. 406, 416, 127 S. Ct. 1173, 167 L. Ed. 2d 1 (2007). Because it is impossible to
exhaustively define a defense attorney's obligations under Strickland, cases that
merely apply the ordinary test for ineffective assistance of counsel to new facts do
not announce new rules for Teague purposes. Chaidez, 133 S. Ct. at 1107 (citing
Strickland, 466 U.S. 668). As applied to Washington law, Padilla is just such a
case.
In Chaidez, the Supreme Court held that Padilla did not merely apply the
ordinary test for ineffective assistance of counsel; it first considered the threshold
question of whether defense counsel has any constitutional duty to advise
noncitizen defendants about the immigration consequences of pleading guilty. I d.
at 1108. The notion that defense counsel has no such duty arose from a distinction
many courts have drawn between direct and collateral consequences. Padilla, 559
7 In re Pers. Restraint ofTsai, No. 88770-5 In re Pers. Restraint ofJagana, No. 89992-4
U.S. at 365 & n.9. Immigration consequences were usually considered collateral
and thus outside the scope of defense counsel's constitutional duty to advise. Id. at
364-65. Padilla did not fully reject the direct-versus-collateral distinction but held
it was not appropriate as applied to immigration consequences. Id. at 366.
This court first explicitly adopted the distinction between direct and
collateral consequences in a 1980 case holding that habitual criminal proceedings
were collateral consequences. State v. Barton, 93 Wn.2d 301,305, 609 P.2d 1353
(1980). Within three years of Barton, our legislature did what Padilla ultimately
did in 2010-it rejected the direct-versus~collateral distinction as applied to
immigration consequences, declaring that a noncitizen defendant must be warned
about immigration consequences before pleading guilty. 1 LAws OF 1983, ch. 199
§ 1(1), codified at RCW 10.40.200(1). To give effect to this statute, the standard
plea form in CrR 4.2 was promptly amended to include a statement warning
noncitizen defendants of possible immigration consequences. That warning
statement is not, itself, the required advice; it merely creates a rebuttable
1 Contrary to the dissent's suggestion, we are not holding that the legislature has the authority to define the scope of constitutionally effective counsel. Rather, we are giving effect to our own precedent, which holds that a defense attorney has a basic duty to know and apply relevant statutes and professional norms, and the unreasonable failure to fulfill that duty is constitutionally deficient. E.g., State v. Kyllo, 166 Wn.2d 856, 862,215 P.3d 177 (2009); see also Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 385, 106 S. Ct. 2574, 91 L. Ed. 2d 305 (1986) (deficient performance where counsel failed to file a timely suppression motion because he did not engage in any pretrial discovery and therefore was not aware of the evidence to be presented).
8 In re Pers. Restraint o.fTsai, No. 88770-5 In re Pers. Restraint ofJagana, No. 89992-4
presumption the defendant has been properly advised. RCW 10.40.200(2);
Sandoval, 171 Wn.2d at 173.
RCW 10.40.200's plain language gives noncitizen defendants the
unequivocal right to advice regarding immigration consequences and necessarily
imposes a correlative duty on defense counsel to ensure that advice is provided.
State v. Butler, 17 Wn. App. 666, 675, 564 P.2d 828 (1977) ("Beyond the
defendant's power oflmowledge and intelligence, the duty to protect the defendant
lies first and foremost with his attorney."). While defense counsel's duty to advise
regarding immigration consequences is imposed by statute, "[r]easonable conduct
for an attorney includes carrying out the duty to research the relevant law." State
v. Kyllo, 166 Wn.2d 856, 862, 215 P.3d 177 (2009) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at
690-91). In many cases 2 defense counsel's failure to fulfill his or her statutory
duty may be due to an unreasonable failure to research or apply RCW 10.40.200,
and there is no conceivable tactical or strategic purpose for such a failure.
Where an attorney unreasonably fails to research or apply relevant statutes
without any tactical purpose, that attorney's performance is constitutionally
deficient. See, e.g., id. at 865-69 (deficient performance where reasonably
2 There may be situations where defense counsel's failure to provide the advice required by RCW 10.40.200 is objectively reasonable and thus not deficient. See People v. Pozo, 746 P.2d 523, 529 (Colo. 1987). And of course, even if deficient, counsel's performance is not constitutionally ineffective unless it is also prejudicial. Kyllo, 166 Wn.2d at 862.
9 In re Pers. Restraint ofTsai, No. 88770-5 In re Pers. Restraint of Jagana, No. 89992-4
adequate research would have shown that a former pattern jury instruction
misstated the law on self-defense); State v. Aha, 137 Wn.2d 736, 745-46, 975 P.2d
512 (1999) (deficient performance where reasonably adequate research would have
prevented the possibility of conviction based on acts predating the relevant
statute's effective date). Cf State v. Paredez, 2004-NMSC-036, 136 N.M. 533,
101 P.3d 799, 805 (holding that the failure to advise a noncitizen defendant about
immigration consequences as required by N.M. CODER. 5-303(E)(5) could be
ineffective assistance); RPC 1.1 cmt. 2 ("Perhaps the most fundamental legal skill
consists of determining what kind of legal problems a situation may involve, a skill
that necessarily transcends any particular specialized knowledge."). Indeed, "[a]n
attorney's ignorance of a point of law that is fundamental to his case combined
with his failure to perform basic research on that point is a quintessential example
of unreasonable performance under Strickland." Hinton v. Alabama, 571 U.S._,
134 S. Ct. 1081, 1089, 188 L. Ed. 2d 1 (2014). The unreasonable failure to
research and apply RCW 10.40.200 is as constitutionally deficient as the
unreasonable failure to research and apply any relevant statute.
This resolves Padilla's threshold question as applied to Washington law.
Padilla thus becomes a "garden-variety application[ ] of the test in Strickland' that
simply refines the scope of defense counsel's constitutional duties as applied to a
specific fact pattern. Chaidez, 133 S. Ct. at 1107. Because Padilla did not
10 In re Pers. Restraint ofTsai, No. 88770-5 In re Pers. Restraint ofJagana, No. 89992-4
announce a new rule under Washington law, it applies retroactively to matters on
collateral review under Teague.
2. Padilla effected a significant change in Washington law
Whether a changed legal standard applies retroactively is a distinct inquiry
from whether there has been a significant change in the law. An old rule whose
new application significantly changes the law is unusual, but not impossible, as
this case demonstrates. Padilla's application of the old Strickland test significantly
changed state law by superseding Washington appellate cases that apparently
foreclosed the possibility that defense counsel's unreasonable and prejudicial
failure to fulfill his or her duties under RCW 10.40.200 could ever be
constitutionally ineffective.
(a) A "new" rule under Teague is not always the same as a "significant change" in the law under RCW 10.73.100(6)
There is unquestionably a substantial overlap between "new" Teague rules
and "significant changes" in state law, but they are two separate inquiries: "RCW
10. 73.1 00( 6) sets forth three conditions that must be met before a petitioner can
overcome the one-year time bar: (1) a [significant] change in the law (2) that is
material and (3) that applies retroactively." In re Pers. Restraint of Gentry, 179
Wn.2d 614, 625,316 P.3d 1020 (2014). While we have used the Teague analysis
and its definition of a "new" rule to determine whether a constitutional rule applies
11 In re Pers. Restraint ofTsai, No. 88770-5 In re Pers. Restraint of Jagana, No. 89992-4
retroactively, id. at 626, we have never imported Teague's definition of a new rule
into our analysis of whether there has been a significant change in the law.
In fact, we have always defined the two phrases differently. A significant
change in state law occurs "where an intervening opinion has effectively
overturned a prior appellate decision that was originally determinative of a material
issue." In re Pers. Restraint of Greening, 141 Wn.2d 687, 697, 9 P.3d 206 (2000).
By comparison, new rules for Teague purposes "are those that 'break[] new
ground or impose[] a new obligation on the States or the Federal government
[or] if the result was not dictated by precedent existing at the time the defendant's
conviction became final."' State v. Evans, 154 Wn.2d 438, 444, 114 P.3d 627
(2005) (alterations in original) (quoting Teague, 489 U.S. at 301). "If before the
opinion is announced, reasonable jurists could disagree on the rule of law, the
opinion is new." !d. (citing Beard v. Banks, 542 U.S. 406, 411, 124 S. Ct. 2504,
159 L. Ed. 2d 494 (2004)).
Using different definitions for a "significant change" in state law and a
"new" rule under Teague is not only fully supported by the plain language ofRCW
10.73.100(6) and our own precedent, it also makes good sense in light ofthe
different purposes these phrases serve in our analysis. The "significant change"
language is intended to reduce procedural barriers to collateral relief in the
interests of fairness and justice. Greening, 141 Wn.2d at 697 ("While litigants
12 In re Pers. Restraint o.fTsai, No. 88770-5 In re Pers. Restraint o.f.Jagana, No. 89992-4
have a duty to raise available arguments in a timely fashion and may later be
procedurally penalized for failing to do so ... they should not be faulted for having
omitted arguments that were essentially unavailable at the time."). Meanwhile,
Teague's broad definition of "new" rules that usually do not apply retroactively is
intended to strengthen procedural barriers to collateral relief in the interests of
finality and comity. Danforth v. Minnesota, 552 U.S. 264,279-81, 128 S. Ct.
1029, 169 L. Ed. 2d 859 (2008).
A "significant change" in state law and a "new" constitutional rule of
criminal procedure are different phrases with different meanings that serve
different purposes. We will not conflate them. Gentry, 179 Wn.2d at 625; cf
Commonwealth v. Sylvain, 466 Mass. 422, 433-34, 995 N.E.2d 760 (2013)
(retaining the general Teague framework but declining to adopt the expanded
definition of a "new" rule that was articulated after Teague).
(b) Padilla significantly changed Washington law
It is true that in most cases simply applying the ordinary Strickland test to
new facts will announce neither new rules nor significant changes in the law. See
In re Pers. Restraint ofTuray, 150 Wn.2d 71, 83, 74 P.3d 1194 (2003) (Where an
opinion "simply applies settled law to new facts, it does not constitute a significant
change in the law."). However, Washington appellate cases issued before Padilla
apparently foreclosed any possibility that the unreasonable, prejudicial failure to
13 In rePers. Restraint ofTsai, No. 88770-5 In re Pers. Restraint ofJagana, No. 89992-4
provide the advice required by RCW 10.40.200 could ever be ineffective assistance
of counsel. Padilla superseded these decisions, significantly changing state law.
The first appellate case to explicitly consider whether RCW 10.40.200 has
any implications on the constitutional effectiveness of defense counsel is State v.
Holley, 75 Wn. App. 191, 876 P.2d 973 (1994). In that case, the Court of Appeals
held that a reference hearing was required to determine whether the defendant's
guilty plea was entered in violation ofRCW 10.40.200. Id. at 200-01. Even
though it decided the case on statutory grounds, Holley chose to address the
constitutional implications ofRCW 10.40.200 and summarily stated in dictum that
there were none. ld. at 196-98. To support this proposition, Holley relied on State
v. Malik, 37 Wn. App. 414, 680 P.2d 770 (1984). Malik was based on facts
occurring before RCW 10.40.200's effective date and so did not consider the
impact of that statute on the duties of defense counsel. State v. Littlefair, 112 Wn.
App. 749, 767, 51 P.3d 116 (2002). As discussed above, with the enactment of
RCW 10.40.200, the unreasonable failure to research and apply that statute became
constitutionally deficient performance. Holley's dictum was thus erroneous.
The only decision of this court that touches on the issue presented here is In
re Personal Restraint ofYim, 139 Wn.2d 581, 588, 989 P.2d 512 (1999).
However, Yim dealt with a claim that the defendant received incorrect advice,
rather than no advice, regarding immigration consequences. !d. Padilla is not
14 In rePers. Restraint ofTsai, No. 88770-5 In re Pers. Restraint ofJagana, No. 89992-4
limited to incorrect advice; it explicitly holds that providing no advice regarding
immigration consequences is also deficient. Padilla, 559 U.S. at 370. Further, Yim
discussed only the voluntariness of the defendant's plea without reference to the
standard for determining ineffective assistance of counsel, and Yim did not
consider RCW 10.40.200. Yim, 139 Wn.2d at 588-90 (citing State v. Ward, 123
Wn.2d 488, 512-13, 869 P.2d 1062 (1994); Malik, 37 Wn. App. at 416). Yim's
analysis does not address the issues presented where a noncitizen asserts his or her
attorney unreasonably failed to provide any advice about the immigration
consequences of pleading guilty as required by RCW 10.40.200.
Nevertheless, Washington appellate courts have routinely rejected the
possibility that such a failure could ever be ineffective assistance of counsel. Each
of those decisions relies on cases analyzing guilty pleas entered before the
effective date ofRCW 10.40.200, Holley's erroneous dictum, or Yim's
distinguishable analysis. See State v. Jamison, 105 Wn. App. 572, 591-92, 595, 20
P.3d 1010 (2001) (citing Yim, 139 Wn.2d at 588; Holley, 75 Wn. App. at 198);
State v. Martinez-Lazo, 100 Wn. App. 869, 876-77,999 P.2d 1275 (2000) (citing
Yim, 139 Wn.2d at 588; Holley, 75 Wn. App. at 197; In re Pers. Restraint of
Peters, 50 Wn. App. 702, 704, 750 P.2d 643 (1988)), abrogation recognized by
Chaidez, 133 S. Ct. at 1109 n.8; Holley, 75 Wn. App. at 197-98 (citing Malik, 37
Wn. App. at 416-17); Peters, 50 Wn. App. at 705 (noting the guilty plea was
15 In rePers. Restraint ofTsai, No. 88770-5 In re Pers. Restraint o.f.Jagana, No. 89992-4
entered before RCW 10.40.200's effective date); see generally Littlefair, 112 Wn.
App. at 766-69 (discussing the history ofRCW 10.40.200, Malik, and its progeny).
Padilla superseded the theory underlying these decisions--that "anything short of
an affirmative misrepresentation by counsel of the plea's deportation consequences
could not support the plea's withdrawal." Sandoval, 171 Wn.2d at 170 n.1. This
was a significant change in Washington law.
B. Jagana is entitled to an evidentiary hearing on the merits
A significant, material, retroactive change in the law exempts a PRP from
RCW 10.73.090(1)'s one-year time bar for collateral attacks. RCW 10.73.100(6).
However, in light of the arguments currently presented for our review, only Jagana
is entitled to an evidentiary hearing on the merits of his PRP.
J agana alleges that his trial attorney unreasonably failed to ascertain
Jagana's immigration status and did not provide him with any guidance as to any
possible immigration consequences of his guilty plea, and further alleges that these
failures rendered Jagana's plea involuntary. These allegations, if true, would
establish that Jagana did not receive effective assistance of counsel in deciding
whether to plead guilty. As discussed above, Washington courts would have
rejected Jagana's claim before Padilla was issued. Jagana's failure to raise this
apparently unavailable argument cannot render his PRP procedurally barred.
Greening, 141 Wn.2d at 697. He is entitled to an evidentiary hearing.
16 In re Pers. Restraint ofTsai, No. 88770-5 In re Pers. Restraint ofJagana, No. 89992-4
However, Washington courts have long recognized that where a defendant
relies on his or her attorney's incorrect advice about the immigration consequences
of pleading guilty, the defendant's plea may be rendered involuntary and
withdrawn. Yim, 139 Wn.2d at 588. With the assistance of an attorney, Tsai filed
a motion to withdraw his guilty plea in 2008, alleging his guilty plea was
involuntary because his attorney incorrectly advised him about the immigration
consequences. The trial court denied this motion, not because it was legally
unav·ailable on the merits, but because the trial court decided it was untimely and
not subject to equitable tolling. Perhaps the trial court erred in 2008, but Tsai did
not appeal that decision and neither Padilla nor Sandoval addresses equitable
tolling. Based on the arguments currently presented for our review, Tsai has not
shown he is entitled to an evidentiary hearing on the merits of his PRP. See RAP
16.4(d); Greening, 141 Wn.2d at 697.
CONCLUSION
This case is not a faceless one that bears no consequences. Numerous
noncitizen defendants have benefited from the clear statutory requirement that
defense counsel has a duty to advise them about the immigration consequences of
pleading guilty. However, numerous meritorious claims that defense counsel
unreasonably failed to fulfill this duty have been rejected based on the mistaken
belief that RCW 10.40.200 has no constitutional implications. Now that this
17 In re Pers. Restraint ofTsai, No. 88770-5 In re .Pers. Restraint of Jagana, No. 89992-4
mistaken belief has finally been corrected, holding such meritorious claims are
procedurally barred would deprive many others of the opportunity to have the
merits of their constitutional claims reviewed. In light of the legislature's long-
standing commitment to ensuring noncitizen defendants understand the
immigration consequences of conviction and this court's long-standing
commitment to ensuring criminal defendants receive effective assistance of
counsel, such an outcome would be unjust and fall short of the values underpinning
our state statutory framework.
18 In rePers. Restraint ofTsai, No. 88770-5 In re Pers. Restraint of Jagana, No. 89992-4
WE CONCUR:
19
In re Pers. Restraint ofTsai In re Pers. Restraint of Jagana
No. 88770-5 (consolidated with No. 89992-4)
OWENS, J. (dissenting) - In 1992, we adopted the United States Supreme
Court's method for determining when a constitutional rule that arises out of new case
law may apply retroactively. In re Pers. Restraint of St. Pierre, 118 Wn.2d 321, 326-
27, 823 P.2d 492 (1992). The Court's method comes from Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S.
288, 310, 109 S. Ct. 1060, 103 L. Ed. 2d 334 (1989), and under that method only
settled constitutional rules apply retroactively. New constitutional rules of criminal
procedure do not apply retroactively. Id. In this case, both Tsai and Jagana ask that
we apply a constitutional rule that arose out of new case law-Padilla v. Kentucky,
559 U.S. 356, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 176 L. Ed. 2d 284 (2010)-retroactively to them.
In Padilla, the United States Supreme Court held that if a defendant's attorney
fails to advise the defendant of the immigration consequences of pleading guilty, it
violates the defendant's right to the effective assistance of counsel under the Sixth
Amendment to the United States Constitution. Id. at 374. Thus, the question under
our retroactivity framework is whether that holding constituted a new constitutional In re Pers. Restraint ofTsai, No. 88770-5 In re Pers. Restraint of Jagana, No. 89992-4 Owens, J., Dissenting
rule in Washington. To determine that, we must assess whether our courts interpreted
the Sixth Amendment to require attorneys to advise their clients of the immigration
consequences of pleading guilty prior to Padilla.
As I explain below, our case law shows that prior to Padilla, Washington
courts had held that if an attorney failed to advise his or her client of the immigration
consequences of pleading guilty, it was not a violation of the defendant's Sixth
Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel. Although some may disagree
with those holdings, that was the law in Washington prior to Padilla. Thus, Padilla
represented a new constitutional rule of criminal procedure in Washington. The
United States Supreme Court came to this same conclusion when it resolved this exact
question in the federal context. See Chaidez v. United States,_ U.S._, 133 S. Ct.
1103, 1113, 185 L. Ed. 2d 149 (2013). Because Padilla is a new constitutional rule of
criminal procedure, it cannot be applied retroactively to the petitioners.
The majority avoids this result by distorting the historical scope of Washington
constitutional law regarding ineffective assistance of counsel. The majority relies on
a Washington statute-RCW 10.40.200-to hold that Padilla represented a settled
constitutional rule in Washington, and that Padilla may therefore be applied
retroactively. That is mystifying, as Teague requires us to determine whether a
constitutional rule of criminal procedure is retroactive, not a statutory rule. RCW
10.40.200 tells us nothing about how the Sixth Amendment was interpreted in
2 In re Pers. Restraint ofTsai, No. 88770-5 In re Pers. Restraint ofJagana, No. 89992-4 Owens, J., Dissenting
Washington prior to Padilla. Although the majority may believe that Washington
courts should have interpreted the Sixth Amendment to require attorneys to advise
their clients of the immigration consequences of pleading guilty because ofRCW
10.40.200, that was not the reality of Washington constitutional law prior to Padilla.
It is understandable why the majority wants to avoid this difficult result, but it
is compelled by our precedent adopting the Teague analysis. Unless and until we
overturn our adoption of the Teague analysis, we are bound by it. Padilla represented
a new constitutional rule of criminal procedure in Washington. Thus, it cannot be
applied retroactively to the petitioners under Teague. I respectfully dissent.
1. Under Teague, New Constitutional Rules of Criminal Procedure Do Not Apply Retroactively
Under Teague, "[u]nless they fall within an exception to the general rule, new
constitutional rules of criminal procedure will not be applicable to those cases which
have become final before the new rules are announced." 489 U.S. at 310. "Only
when we apply a settled rule may a person avail herself of the decision on collateral
review." Chaidez, 133 S. Ct. at 1107. A rule is new '"when it breaks new ground or
imposes a new obligation' on the government." Id. (quoting Teague, 489 U.S. at
301 ). Put differently, "a case announces a new rule if the result was not dictated by
precedent existing at the time the defendant's conviction became final." Teague, 489
U.S. at 301.
3 In rePers. ofTsai, Restraint No. 88770-5 In re Pers. Restraint of Jagana, No. 89992-4 Owens, J., Dissenting
2. As the United States Supreme Court Has Held, Padilla Was a New Rule in Jurisdictions (Like Washington) That Previously Held That Advice about Immigration Consequences Was Categorically Removed from the Scope of the Sixth Amendment
Prior to Padilla, both federal courts and our courts had concluded that an
attorney's advice about the immigration consequences of pleading guilty was
categorically removed from the scope of the Sixth Amendment. As the United States
Supreme Court said, state and lower federal courts had "almost unanimously
concluded that the Sixth Amendment [did] not require attorneys to inform their clients
of a conviction's collateral consequences, including deportation." Chaidez, 133 S. Ct.
at 1109. Washington was one ofthose states. See State v. Martinez-Lazo, 100 Wn.
App. 869, 876-78, 999 P.2d 1275 (2000) (holding that Martinez-Lazo did not receive
ineffective assistance of counsel because "a defendant need not be advised of the
possibility of deportation," which is merely a collateral consequence). The United
States Supreme Court recently analyzed whether Padilla created a "'new rule"' under
Teague in Chaidez. 133 S. Ct. at 1107. Because our courts' interpretation of the
Sixth Amendment was the same as the federal courts, our Teague analysis should
mirror the United States Supreme Court's Teague analysis in Chaidez.
In Chaidez, Chaidez pleaded guilty to deportable offenses, but her attorney
failed to advise her ofthe immigration consequences of pleading guilty. !d. at 1106.
Her conviction became final in 2004. !d. In 2009, after immigration proceedings
4 In rePers. Restraint ofTsai, No. 88770-5 In re Pers. Restraint ofJagana, No. 89992-4 Owens, J., Dissenting
commenced against her, she filed a writ of coram nobis 1 in federal district court,
arguing ineffective assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment. !d. The Court
decided Padilla while Chaidez's petition was still pending, and the Court granted her
petition for certiorari to determine whether Padilla applied retroactively to her. Jd. at
1106-07.
In finding that Padilla created a new rule (and thus that it could not be applied
retroactively), the Court's analysis hinged on the distinction between defense
counsel's duty to inform clients about deportation consequences as a matter of
professional competence and defense counsel's requirements under the Sixth
Amendment. See id. at 1108. The Court noted that "had Padilla merely made clear
that a lawyer who neglects to inform a client about the risk of deportation is
professionally incompetent," then Padilla would not have created a new rule. !d.
Indeed, in Padilla, the Court noted that the plea form used by Kentucky trial courts
already "provides notice of possible immigration consequences" and that many other
states (including Washington) "require trial courts to advise defendants of possible
immigration consequences." 559 U.S. at 374 n.15. However, in Chaidez, the Court
1 Chaidez filed a writ of coram nobis instead of habeas relief because she was no longer "'in custody"' and therefore could not seek habeas relief. Chaidez, 133 S. Ct. at 1106 n.l (citing 28 U.S.C. §§ 2255, 2241). The Court assumed without deciding that nothing in the case turned "on the difference between a coram nobis petition and a habeas petition." !d.
5 In rePers. ofTsai, Restraint No. 88770-5 In re Pers. Restraint ofJagana, No. 89992-4 Owens, J., Dissenting
noted that "Padilla did something more." 133 S. Ct. at 1108. Padilla considered
whether "advice about deportation" was "'categorically removed' from the scope of
the Sixth Amendment right to counsel because it involved only a 'collateral
consequence' of a conviction, rather than a component of the criminal sentence." Id.
(quoting Padilla, 559 U.S. at 366). In other words, Padilla broke new ground by
determining that attorneys are required to inform their clients about the immigration
consequences of pleading guilty under the Sixth Amendment.
As discussed above, Washington courts, like the federal courts and many other
state courts prior to Padilla, "concluded that the Sixth Amendment [did] not require
attorneys to inform their clients of a conviction's collateral consequences, including
deportation." Id. at 1109; Martinez-Lazo, 100 Wn. App. at 876-78. Only Colorado
and New Mexico held that the Sixth Amendment required attorneys to inform their
clients of a conviction's collateral consequences. Chaidez, 133 S. Ct. at 1109 & n.9
(citing People v. Pozo, 746 P.2d 523, 527-29 (Colo. 1987); State v. Paredez, 2004-
NMSC-036, 136 N.M. 533, 539, 101 P.3d 799). Since our courts' interpretation of
the Sixth Amendment was the same as the federal courts, our Teague analysis here
should mirror the United States Supreme Court's Teague analysis in Chaidez. Thus,
like the Supreme Court, I would hold that Padilla created a new rule in Washington
and cannot be applied retroactively under Teague. The majority's conclusion to the
contrary is erroneously based on statutory authority, as explained below.
6 In rePers. ofTsai, Restraint No. 88770-5 In re Pers. Restraint of Jagana, No. 89992-4 Owens, J., Dissenting
3. The Majority Fundamentally Errs by Conflating Statutory and Constitutional Authority
As discussed above, Washington has long required trial courts and attorneys to
inform defendants of the immigration consequences of pleading guilty as a matter of
practice and professional competence pursuant to a statute. However, we never
required that practice under the Sixth Amendment until we decided State v. Sandoval,
171 Wn.2d 163, 249 P.3d 1015 (2011), in light of Padilla. The majority
fundamentally errs by giving a statutory attorney practice standard the same legal
authority as a constitutional attorney practice standard for Teague retroactivity
purposes. That is simply not correct under Teague. To determine retroactivity under
Teague, we must assess whether a constitutional rule of criminal procedure is settled
or new, not whether a statutory rule is settled or new.
In 1983, our legislature passed a bill requiring that defendants be advised of
immigration consequences before pleading guilty. LAWS OF 1983, ch. 199, § 1(2)
(currently codified as RCW 10.40.200(2)). That being said, our courts have
consistently held "that a deportation proceeding that occurs subsequent to the entry of
a guilty plea is merely a collateral consequence of that plea." In re Pers. Restraint of
Yim, 139 Wn.2d 581, 588, 989 P.2d 512 (1999). Accordingly, before Padilla and
Sandoval, our courts had concluded that the Sixth Amendment did not require
attorneys to inform their clients of a conviction's collateral consequences, including
7 In re Pers. Restraint ofTsai, No. 88770-5 In re Pers. Restraint of Jagana, No. 89992-4 Owens, J., Dissenting
deportation. See Martinez-Lazo, 100 Wn. App. at 876-78 (holding that Martinez-Lazo
did not receive ineffective assistance of counsel because "a defendant need not be
advised of the possibility of deportation," which is merely a collateral consequence).
As discussed above, we did not recognize that the Sixth Amendment required
attorneys to give competent advice about deportation consequences until Sandoval, in
light of Padilla. See Sandoval, 171 Wn.2d at 169-71.
The majority fundamentally errs by asserting that in 1983, "our legislature did
what Padilla ultimately did in 201 0-it rejected the direct-versus-collateral distinction
as applied to immigration consequences, declaring that a noncitizen defendant must be
warned about immigration consequences before pleading guilty." Majority at 8. The
legislature did not reject the "direct-versus-collateral distinction" in enacting what is
now RCW 10.40.200 because it did not (and does not) have the constitutional
authority to declare what the Sixth Amendment means for determining what
constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel-that is our job. Marbury v. Madison, 5
U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176, 2 L. Ed. 60 (1803) ("It is, emphatically, the province and
duty of the judicial department, to say what the law is."). Although the legislature can
set practice standards for attorneys, only Washington courts can determine whether an
attorney's violation of a legislative standard constitutes ineffective assistance under
the Sixth Amendment. And in Washington, as discussed above, our courts had decided
that an attorney failing to give advice about immigration consequences (as required by
8 In rePers. Restraint ofTsai, No. 88770-5 In re Pers. Restraint of Jagana, No. 89992-4 Owens, J., Dissenting
RCW 10.40.200) was categorically removed from the scope of the Sixth Amendment.
Martinez-Lazo, 100 Wn. App. at 876-78.
Despite the existence ofRCW 10.40.200(2), the Court of Appeals' decision in
Martinez-Lazo accurately reflected the scope of Washington constitutional law prior
to Padilla. Even Martinez-Lazo "acknowledge[ d) the general rule in Washington that
deportation is a collateral consequence"; instead, he argued that because "his
deportation [was] certain, [it was] therefore no longer a collateral consequence." !d.
at 87 6-77. Martinez-Lazo' s argument eschewing the distinction between direct and
collateral consequences in the deportation context was not recognized until Padilla
and Sandoval. Thus, although Washington statutory law provided that attorneys were
required to inform their clients of immigration consequences, it was not a
constitutional requirement under our state courts' interpretation of the Sixth
Amendment. That distinction should be dispositive of our Teague analysis-we are
determining whether a constitutional rule of criminal procedure is retroactive, not a
statutory rule.
It should be evident from the majority's own citations that it has no authority to
support its holding. The only pre-Padilla case the majority cites that actually held
that it was ineffective assistance of counsel for an attorney to fail to advise his or her
client of the immigration consequences of pleading guilty is from New Mexico.
Paredez, 136 N.M. 533. As noted above, that is one of the two states the United
9 In rePers. Restraint ofTsai, No. 88770-5 In re Pers. Restraint of Jagana, No. 89992-4 Owens, J., Dissenting
States Supreme Court discussed in Chaidez that did not consider deportation to be a
collateral consequence. 133 S. Ct. at 1109 & n.9.
Thus, I would conclude that Padilla created a new rule in Washington, and I
would therefore hold that the rule imposed by Padilla is not retroactive under Teague.
Accordingly, I would find the petitioners' personal restraint petitions time barred.
I recognize that "[t]his case is not a faceless one that bears no consequences."
Majority at 17. But we are a court of law, and we are required to faithfully apply our
precedent. Our cases have consistently applied the Teague analysis to decide whether
constitutional rules apply retroactively. Under a proper Teague analysis here, we do
not look to whether our courts should have been interpreting the Sixth Amendment to
require attorneys to inform their clients of the deportation consequences of pleading
guilty. Rather, we must assess how our courts actually interpreted the Sixth
Amendment and then decide whether Padilla broke new ground from our courts' prior
approach. Prior to Padilla, our courts had concluded that the Sixth Amendment did
not apply to an attorney's advice about the immigration consequences of pleading
guilty. Thus, Padilla created a new rule in Washington. I would therefore hold that
Padilla may not be applied retroactively under Teague. Accordingly, I would find
Tsai's and Jagana's personal restraint petitions time barred and affirm the Court of
Appeals.
10 In rePers. ofTsai, Restraint No. 88770-5 In re Pers. Restraint ofJagana, No. 89992-4 Owens, J., Dissenting