FILE THIS OPINION WAS FILED FOR RECORD AT 8 A.M. ON IN CLERK’S OFFICE SEPTEMBER 25, 2025 SUPREME COURT, STATE OF WASHINGTON SEPTEMBER 25, 2025 SARAH R. PENDLETON SUPREME COURT CLERK
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
No. 103672-8 In the Matter of the Personal Restraint En Banc of JOHN H. SCHOENHALS, Filed: September 25, 2025 Petitioner.
PER CURIAM 1 — In 1986, John H. Schoenhals received a mandatory
sentence of life in prison without the possibility of parole (LWOP). In the opinions
that follow, the court unanimously holds that Schoenhals’ personal restraint petition
(PRP) is timely and should be granted because his 1986 mandatory LWOP sentence
for aggravated first degree murder committed at age 20 is unconstitutional.
However, the opinions differ in their reasoning.
In the lead opinion, four justices—Whitener, J., González, J., Montoya-Lewis,
J., and Mungia, J.— reason as follows: (1) This court’s decision in In re Personal
Restraint of Monschke, 197 Wn.2d 305, 482 P.3d 276 (2021) (plurality decision),
announced a new substantive constitutional rule that meets the “significant change
in the law” retroactive exemption to the one-year time bar on collateral relief
1 This court may issue a per curiam opinion summarizing the votes of the justices in a plurality decision, preceding the lead opinion. Wash. Sup. Ct. Internal R. II-8(B).
1 contained in RCW 10.73.100(7). (2) A Monschke violation per se satisfies an actual
and substantial prejudice requirement. (3) A personal restraint petitioner can
establish actual and substantial prejudice by a preponderance of the evidence if they
can show that Monschke is material to their sentence.
In a concurring opinion, four justices—Madsen, J., Stephens, C.J., Johnson,
J., and Yu, J.— reason as follows: (1) Based on State v. Carter, 3 Wn.3d 198, 548
P.3d 935 (2024), Schoenhals’ judgment and sentence is facially invalid and thus
exempt from the time bar under RCW 10.73.090(1). (2) It is therefore unnecessary
to analyze whether Monschke constitutes a significant change in the law under RCW
10.73.100(7) and what a petitioner must show to demonstrate actual and substantial
prejudice.
In a separate concurring opinion, Gordon McCloud, J., agrees with aspects of
the analysis in both the lead opinion by Whitener, J., and the concurring opinion by
Madsen, J., that Schoenhals’ sentence is exempt from the time bar for collateral
attacks and that his sentence is unconstitutional.
The PRP is granted, and the case is remanded to the trial court for a new
sentencing hearing.
2 FILE THIS OPINION WAS FILED FOR RECORD AT 8 A.M. ON IN CLERK’S OFFICE SEPTEMBER 25, 2025 SUPREME COURT, STATE OF WASHINGTON SEPTEMBER 25, 2025 SARAH R. PENDLETON SUPREME COURT CLERK
In the Matter of the Personal Restraint of No. 103672-8
JOHN H. SCHOENHALS, En Banc
Petitioner.
Filed: September 25, 2025
WHITENER, J. – In 1986, John H. Schoenhals received a mandatory life
without parole (LWOP) sentence for aggravated first degree murder he committed
when he was 20 years old. In 2021, we held that defendants convicted of aggravated
first degree murder who were 18 to 20 years old at the time of the offense and
sentenced to mandatory LWOP are entitled to resentencing, where the sentencing
court must consider mitigating evidence of the defendant’s youth. In re Pers.
Restraint of Monschke, 197 Wn.2d 305, 306-07, 326, 482 P.3d 276 (2021) (plurality
opinion). Schoenhals argues that Monschke constitutes a “significant change in the
law” exception to the one-year time bar for collateral relief under RCW
10.73.100(7). We agree. In re Pers. Restraint of Schoenhals, No. 103672-8
We grant Schoenhals’ personal restraint petition (PRP) and remand to the trial
court for a new sentencing hearing. Under Monschke, Schoenhals’ LWOP sentence
is unconstitutional because the original sentencing court did not have discretion to
consider the mitigating qualities of Schoenhals’ youth when it imposed a mandatory
LWOP sentence for aggravated murder committed when he was 20 years old.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
I. Factual Background
John Schoenhals was 20 years old in 1985 when he burglarized the home of
the Wallace family. During the burglary, he stole firearms and other items in the
home, and fatally stabbed Mark Wallace, a 14-year-old boy. In 1986, a jury
convicted Schoenhals of aggravated first degree murder. RCW 10.95.020. At the
time of Schoenhals’ sentencing, LWOP was the mandatory sentence required under
the law. RCW 10.95.030(1).1 When he imposed the mandatory sentence, the original
sentencing judge stated that “[t]he law as written gives the Court no alternative, and
I hereby sentence the defendant Mr. John Schoenhals to life imprisonment without
possibility of parole.” Pet’r Schoenhals’ Suppl. Br. at 21-22 (alteration in original).
Schoenhals has been incarcerated for 40 years.
1 RCW 10.95.030(1) has been amended since Schoenhals’ conviction in 1986. Because these amendments do not impact the statutory language relied on by this court, we refer to the current version of the statute. 2 In re Pers. Restraint of Schoenhals, No. 103672-8
II. Procedural History
In 1986, a sentencing court imposed on Schoenhals the statutorily mandated
LWOP sentence. The Court of Appeals affirmed Schoenhals’ conviction and LWOP
sentence. The mandate was issued on December 7, 1988.
In March 2023, Schoenhals filed a motion for resentencing in King County
Superior Court based on this court’s decision in Monschke. 197 Wn.2d at 306, 326.
He argued that his motion was exempt from the one-year time limit on collateral
relief because his sentence is unconstitutional and because there had been a
significant change in the law. RCW 10.73.100(2), (7). The superior court transferred
the motion to Division One of the Court of Appeals for treatment as a PRP pursuant
to CrR 7.8(c)(2). The Court of Appeals issued an order certifying the PRP to this
court for direct consideration pursuant to RCW 2.06.030(d), and we accepted review
on the merits.
ISSUES
1. Is Monschke a “significant change in the law” under the exemption to the one-
year time bar for collateral relief under RCW 10.73.100(7)?
2. What must Monschke petitioners show to demonstrate they were actually and
substantially prejudiced in order to obtain collateral relief?
3 In re Pers. Restraint of Schoenhals, No. 103672-8
ANALYSIS
I. Monschke represents a “significant change in the law” under the one-
year time bar for collateral relief under RCW 10.73.100(7)
Appellate courts are generally barred from considering PRPs one year after a
criminal judgment becomes final, unless the petition is based on one of the
enumerated statutory exemptions in RCW 10.73.100. In re Pers. Restraint of Bonds,
165 Wn.2d 135, 139-40, 196 P.3d 672 (2008) (plurality opinion); RCW 10.73.090,
.100. The one-year time bar for collateral relief is exempted when a petition is based
on a significant change in the law. RCW 10.73.100(7). To obtain relief, a petitioner
must show (1) a significant change in the law (2) that is material and (3) that applies
retroactively. In re Pers. Restraint of Kennedy, 200 Wn.2d 1, 21, 513 P.3d 769
(2022); see also In re Pers. Restraint of Colbert, 186 Wn.2d 614, 619, 380 P.3d 504
(2016). There is no requirement in statute or case law that these three elements must
be considered in a specific order. In re Pers. Restraint of Light-Roth, 191 Wn.2d
328, 333, 422 P.3d 444 (2018).
RCW 10.73.100(7) states that the time bar does not apply if
[t]here has been a significant change in the law, whether substantive or procedural, which is material to the conviction, sentence, or other order 4 In re Pers. Restraint of Schoenhals, No. 103672-8
entered in a criminal or civil proceeding instituted by the state or local government, and either the legislature has expressly provided that the change in the law is to be applied retroactively, or a court, in interpreting a change in the law that lacks express legislative intent regarding retroactive application, determines that sufficient reasons exist to require retroactive application of the changed legal standard. The State contends that Schoenhals’ petition should be dismissed because it
is time barred. Schoenhals disagrees and argues that Monschke constitutes a
“significant change in the law” exemption to the one-year time bar. RCW
10.73.100(7).
1. Monschke represents a “significant change in the law”
A “significant change in the law” occurs “when an intervening appellate
decision overturns a prior appellate decision that was determinative of a material
issue.” State v. Miller, 185 Wn.2d 111, 114, 371 P.3d 528 (2016). An “intervening
appellate decision that ‘settles a point of law without overturning prior precedent’ or
‘simply applies settled law to new facts’ does not constitute a significant change in
the law.” Id. at 114-15 (quoting In re Pers. Restraint of Turay, 150 Wn.2d 71, 83,
74 P.3d 1194 (2003)). A “significant change in the law” is likely to have occurred if
the defendant was unable to argue the issue in question before publication of the
intervening decision. Id. at 115; see also Light-Roth, 191 Wn.2d at 333-34.
5 In re Pers. Restraint of Schoenhals, No. 103672-8
Monschke did not overturn a prior appellate decision that was determinative
of a material issue. 197 Wn.2d at 326 n.17 (stating that this court does not overturn
State v. Grisby, 97 Wn.2d 493, 497, 647 P.2d 6 (1982), which held that a
“particularized consideration” of individual circumstances is not required for an
LWOP sentence for most criminal defendants). However, Monschke did more than
just apply existing law to new facts. Monschke’s significance lies in the fact that it
interpreted RCW 10.95.030(1) for the first time in light of the Washington
Constitution’s prohibition on cruel punishment and the “individualized sentencing”
approach espoused in Miller v. Alabama. 197 Wn.2d at 329; WASH. CONST. art. I, §
14; Miller, 567 U.S. 460, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 183 L. Ed. 2d 407 (2012).
Prior to Monschke, a sentencing court had no discretion in imposing a
sentence other than LWOP under RCW 10.95.030, and it was not required to
consider evidence of youth if the offender committed the offense between the ages
of 18 and 20 years old. After Monschke, defendants convicted of aggravated first
degree murder, aged 18 to 20 years old at the time of the offense, and sentenced to
mandatory LWOP sentences are entitled to resentencing, where the sentencing court
must consider mitigating evidence regarding the defendant’s youth. 197 Wn.2d at
325-29 (Gordon McCloud, J., lead opinion), 329 (González, C.J., concurring). In
State v. Carter, a majority of this court embraced Monschke’s roots in our state
6 In re Pers. Restraint of Schoenhals, No. 103672-8
constitution’s prohibition on cruel punishment. 3 Wn.3d 198, 211, 219, 548 P.3d
935 (2024); WASH. CONST. art. I, § 14. Carter also severed the mandatory language
in the sentencing statute, RCW 10.95.030, and replaced it with permissive language
so that the statute would read that any person convicted of the crime of aggravated
first degree murder may be sentenced to life imprisonment. Id. at 219. In a nutshell,
a mandatory LWOP sentence for a 20-year-old offender convicted of aggravated
first degree murder, absent consideration of the mitigating factors of youth in
sentencing, is an unconstitutional sentence. Monschke, 197 Wn.2d at 329; Carter, 3
Wn.3d at 231-32.
Schoenhals was 20 years old when he committed aggravated murder. He was
then sentenced to LWOP without consideration of his youth. His original sentencing
judge accurately stated on the record that he had no alternative but to apply an LWOP
sentence. Pet’r Schoenhals’ Suppl. Br. at 21-22. Prior to Monschke, even if a
sentencing judge sua sponte discussed the defendant’s youth in sentencing, that court
had no discretionary authority to impose any sentence other than an LWOP sentence.
In addition, that court was not required to consider evidence of the offender’s youth
as is required post-Monschke.
The State contends that Monschke cannot constitute a significant change in
the law because it failed to announce binding law both on the merits of the 7 In re Pers. Restraint of Schoenhals, No. 103672-8
petitioner’s claim and on the timeliness issue. This argument ignores that Monschke
held, with five votes, that mandatory LWOP sentences under RCW 10.95.030 are
unconstitutional when applied to 18- to 20-year-old offenders because they fail to
allow for consideration of youth, in violation of our constitution’s prohibition on
cruel punishment. 197 Wn.2d at 306-07, 326 (Gordon McCloud, J., lead opinion),
329 (González, C.J., concurring) (stating that “I concur with the lead opinion that
the petitioners are entitled to a new sentencing hearing to determine whether their
ages at the time of their crimes are a mitigating factor justifying a downward
departure from the standard sentence.”). Additionally, Monschke’s holding was
reaffirmed by a majority of this court in Carter. 3 Wn.3d at 205-11. Even if the State
was correct that Monschke did not announce binding law on the issue of whether
Schoenhals’ sentence is unconstitutional or not, this argument following State v.
Carter is meritless.
In Monschke, this court was fractured on the timeliness issue. As a result,
Monschke’s lead opinion did not announce binding law on the timeliness issue for
collateral relief. State v. Patton, 167 Wn.2d 379, 391, 219 P.3d 651 (2009) (stating
that where no majority is reached, the holding of the court is the position taken by
those concurring on the narrowest grounds); Monschke, 197 Wn.2d at 309-11
(Gordon McCloud, J., lead opinion), 329 (González, C.J., concurring), 334-35
8 In re Pers. Restraint of Schoenhals, No. 103672-8
(Owens, J., dissenting) (four justices agreed in the lead opinion that the RCW
10.73.100(2) exemption to the time bar applied, one justice in concurrence said that
former RCW 10.73.100(6) (1989) (now RCW 10.73.100(7)2) applied, and four
justices in dissent disagreed that RCW 10.73.100(2) applied). Carter did not resolve
the timeliness issue that fractured this court in Monschke, and Carter did not
announce a clear holding as to which exemptions Monschke petitioners may use to
overcome the one-year time bar for collateral relief. 3 Wn.3d at 225. It is inapposite
whether this court announced binding law on the timeliness of Schoenhals’ PRP.
The relevant inquiry here is whether we announced binding law on the merits of
Schoenhals’ petition, in other words, whether his sentence is constitutional. A
question we answered affirmatively. We held that sentences such as Schoenhals’ are
unconstitutional. Monschke, 197 Wn.2d at 326.
The State argues that Monschke is not a significant change in the law by
challenging Monschke’s and Carter’s discussion of the developmental
characteristics of juveniles and young adults. Suppl. Br. of Resp’t at 23-27. We need
not revisit the merits of our reasoning, which has already been adopted by a majority
of this court. Monschke, 197 Wn.2d at 306, 321-25; Carter, 3 Wn.3d at 205-11.
2 LAWS OF 2024, ch. 118, § 8. 9 In re Pers. Restraint of Schoenhals, No. 103672-8
Monschke constitutes a significant change in the law because in Schoenhals’
original sentencing hearing he could not have argued that the court was required to
exercise discretion in his sentencing nor could he have argued that the court was
required to consider evidence of his youthfulness in sentencing.
2. Monschke is material to Schoenhals’ sentence
To grant relief to Schoenhals, Monschke must be “‘determinative of a material
issue’” at his sentencing. Kennedy, 200 Wn.2d at 21 (quoting Miller, 185 Wn.2d at
114). Schoenhals at the age of 20 years old committed the crime of aggravated first
degree murder. He was convicted and was sentenced to a mandatory LWOP
sentence. Under Monschke and Carter, Schoenhals’ sentence is unconstitutional.
Carter, 3 Wn.3d at 217. At a new sentencing hearing, the court must follow
Monschke: it would be required to consider evidence of the mitigating qualities of
Schoenhals’ youth and it would be required to have discretionary authority in
sentencing. In re Pers. Restraint of Ali, 196 Wn.2d 220, 235, 474 P.3d 507 (2020)
(finding that a case was material to petitioner’s sentence because it would have
allowed the sentencing judge discretion in applying the weapon enhancements
concurrently or to consider the petitioner’s youth). Monschke is material to
Schoenhals’ sentence because his original sentencing judge was barred from
considering mitigating evidence of youth. 10 In re Pers. Restraint of Schoenhals, No. 103672-8
The State argues that Monschke cannot be material to Schoenhals’ sentence
because Schoenhals denied killing Mark Wallace. The State argues that based on
Schoenhals’ defense theory, the sentencing court has no basis to consider whether
Schoenhals’ youth was a mitigating factor in the aggravated murder. Suppl. Br. of
Resp’t at 22. This position is unpersuasive. As discussed in Carter, sentencing courts
applying Monschke consider many different factors in determining the impact of the
offender’s youth, and they are permitted discretion when considering evidence of
rehabilitation. 3 Wn.3d at 220-24 (citing State v. Ramos, 187 Wn.2d 420, 387 P.3d
650 (2017)).
The State also cites Kennedy, 200 Wn.2d at 4-5, for authority that Monschke
is not material to Schoenhals’ PRP. We rejected a similar argument by the State in
Carter. 3 Wn.3d at 205-11. We repeat our reasoning here. In Kennedy, Monschke
was immaterial to the petitioner’s case because that petitioner was never subject to
a mandatory LWOP sentence. 200 Wn.2d at 5. By contrast, Schoenhals is presently
serving a mandatory LWOP sentence for the conviction of aggravated first degree
murder, which he committed when he was 20 years old. Schoenhals’ sentencing
judge had no discretion to impose any other sentence than LWOP. Monschke is
determinative to a material issue in Schoenhals’ sentence because it renders his
11 In re Pers. Restraint of Schoenhals, No. 103672-8
sentence unconstitutional and because it allows the court to consider mitigating
evidence of youth in sentencing, something it did not and could not do before.
3. Monschke applies retroactively to Schoenhals’ sentence
Another factor in the significant change in the law test is whether the change
in the law applies retroactively. Id. at 21. Washington courts follow the test set out
in Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 109 S. Ct. 1060, 103 L. Ed. 2d 334 (1989) (partial
plurality opinion), overruled by Edwards v. Vannoy, 593 U.S. 255, 141 S. Ct. 1549,
209 L. Ed. 2d 651 (2021), to determine whether a rule applies retroactively. Colbert,
186 Wn.2d at 623-26. Under Teague, a new rule applies retroactively on collateral
review only if it is a new substantive rule of constitutional law or a watershed rule
of criminal procedure. 3 Id. Here, Monschke announced (a) a new rule (b) of
constitutional magnitude (c) that is substantive. Monschke applies retroactively.
3 Even if we were to find that Monschke is a procedural rule, Teague does not prevent us from concluding that Monschke can apply retroactively. Teague provides the floor for when a new criminal procedure must be applied retroactively. States are free to adopt their own broader test for requiring the retroactive application of a new federal or state constitutional rule. Danforth v. Minnesota, 552 U.S. 264, 280-81, 128 S. Ct. 1029, 169 L. Ed. 2d 859 (2008) (“[T]he Teague rule of nonretroactivity was fashioned to achieve the goals of federal habeas while minimizing federal intrusion into state criminal proceedings. It was intended to limit the authority of federal courts to overturn state convictions—not to limit a state court's authority to grant relief for violations of new rules of constitutional law when reviewing its own [s]tate's convictions.”). Other state supreme courts, including those of Connecticut, Wyoming, and Idaho, have recognized the same. See, e.g., Casiano v. Comm'r of Corr., 317 Conn. 52, 115 A.3d 1031 (2015); State v. Mares, 2014 WY 126, 335 P.3d 487 (2014); Rhoades v. State, 149 Idaho 130, 139, 233 P.3d 61 (2010).
12 In re Pers. Restraint of Schoenhals, No. 103672-8
a. Monschke is a new rule
Whether a rule is “new” under Teague is a distinct inquiry from whether there
has been a significant change in the law. In re Pers. Restraint of Yung-Cheng Tsai,
183 Wn.2d 91, 103-05, 351 P.3d 138 (2015). A new rule is one that breaks new
ground or imposes a new obligation, or “‘if the result was not dictated by precedent
existing at the time the defendant's conviction became final.’” Id. at 104 (emphasis
and internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting State v. Evans, 154 Wn.2d 438, 444,
114 P.3d 627 (2005)). “If before the opinion is announced, reasonable jurists could
disagree on the rule of law, the rule is new.” Evans, 154 Wn.2d at 444. Monschke
imposed a new obligation on sentencing courts applying RCW 10.95.030 for
offenders aged 18 to 20 years old. Sentencing courts are now required to exercise
discretion in sentencing after considering mitigating evidence of the offender’s
youth. Monschke, 197 Wn.2d at 306, 321-25. This is a new obligation imposed on
sentencing courts that did not exist when Schoenhals’ conviction became final. Thus,
Monschke announced a new rule.
b. Monschke’s new rule is of constitutional magnitude
Monschke is rooted in our state constitution’s prohibition on cruel
punishment. 197 Wn.2d at 326; Carter, 3 Wn.3d at 219. Monschke also explained
that its decision followed in the progeny of Miller’s “individualized sentencing” 13 In re Pers. Restraint of Schoenhals, No. 103672-8
principle. 197 Wn.2d at 327-28 (reasoning that “we repeat the Miller approach
today” and that the decision “‘flow[ed] straightforwardly’” from “‘the principle
of Roper, Graham, and our individualized sentencing cases that youth matters for
purposes of meting out the law's most serious punishments.’” (emphasis omitted)
(alteration in original) (quoting Miller, 567 U.S. at 483)). Miller held that mandatory
LWOP for defendants under 18 years old violates the Eighth Amendment of the
federal constitution. Similarly, Monschke prohibits a category of mandatory
punishment (mandatory LWOP) for a class of defendants (defendants aged 18 to 20
years old at the time of the offense) convicted of aggravated first degree murder
under our state constitution’s prohibition on cruel punishment. Id. Courts applying
Monschke now protect these defendants’ constitutional right to be free from “cruel
punishment” by recognizing the defendant’s youthfulness and allowing sentencing
courts to exercise discretion in sentencing. Id. at 311-12. In Carter, we reaffirmed
Monschke’s state constitutional prohibition against cruel punishment. 3 Wn.3d at
205. Monschke announced a new rule firmly rooted in our state constitution.
c. Monschke announced a substantive rule
“‘Substantive rules ... set forth categorical constitutional guarantees that place
certain criminal laws and punishments altogether beyond the State's power to
impose’” and include “‘rules prohibiting a certain category of punishment for a class 14 In re Pers. Restraint of Schoenhals, No. 103672-8
of defendants because of their status or offense.’” Ali, 196 Wn.2d at 237 (alteration
in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Montgomery v. Louisiana,
577 U.S. 190, 201, 198, 136 S. Ct. 718, 193 L. Ed. 2d 599 (2016)). “Procedural rules,
in contrast, are designed to enhance the accuracy of a conviction or sentence by
regulating ‘the manner of determining the defendant's
culpability.’” Montgomery, 577 U.S. at 201 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Schriro v.
Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 353, 124 S. Ct. 2519, 159 L. Ed. 2d 442 (2004)).
Washington State’s constitutional prohibition on cruel punishment is violated
when a mandatory LWOP sentence is imposed under RCW 10.95.030 for offenders
aged 18 to 20 years old, without consideration of the offender’s youth. Monschke,
197 Wn.2d at 311-12. This court announced a substantive rule that requires
sentencing courts, before imposing an LWOP on a class of defendants under RCW
10.95.030, to consider mitigating evidence of the offender’s youth. Id. The
substantive nature of this rule stems from the requirement of individualized
sentencing, which ensures that punishment is proportional to culpability and
therefore consistent with our state’s prohibition on cruel punishment. Carter, 3
Wn.3d at 219-20 (discussing how the “promise of individualized discretion cannot
be illusory” and how individualized sentencing is central to ensuring mandatory
LWOP as applied to a subset of 18- to 20-year-old defendants is not “cruel
15 In re Pers. Restraint of Schoenhals, No. 103672-8
punishment”); see also State v. Finch, 137 Wn.2d 792, 975 P.2d 967 (1999)
(plurality opinion) (recognizing the importance of individualized sentencing in
ensuring that death penalty sentences do not violate the Eighth Amendment).
The State asserts that because Monschke contains a procedural requirement, it
must mean that it is a nonretroactive procedural rule. Schoenhals disagrees and
argues that Monschke’s substantive rule must have retroactive effect because the rule
mirrors Miller’s substantive rule, which under Montgomery has retroactive effect.
Pet’r Schoenhals’ Suppl. Br. at 6-8; see also Montgomery, 577 U.S. at 208-09
(reasoning that a procedural requirement to consider youth does not transform the
substantive rule into a procedural one). Schoenhals argues that just as Miller held
that a particular sentence applied to a class of defendants is “cruel and unusual”
punishment under the federal constitution’s Eighth Amendment, Monschke similarly
held that a category of punishment to a class of defendants is cruel punishment under
our state constitution. Pet’r Schoenhals’ Suppl. Br. at 7. Schoenhals is partially
correct; Monschke and Miller share a similar logic. However, in our state, the class
of offenders Monschke applies to exceeds the holding of Miller.
We now hold that Monschke is a substantive rule with retroactive effect.
Under RCW 10.95.030, Monschke requires courts to consider the youth of an
offender aged 18 to 20 years old before imposing an LWOP sentence. The rule does 16 In re Pers. Restraint of Schoenhals, No. 103672-8
not prevent courts from imposing a sentence of LWOP. However, it does prevent
courts from automatically imposing LWOP sentences to offenders between the ages
of 18 and 20 years old without first meaningfully considering the offender’s youth.
Thus, the substantive nature of this rule stems from its call for individualized
sentencing for a select class of defendants. This ensures that sentences of LWOP on
that class of defendants are consistent with the prohibition against cruel punishment.
The fact that a sentencing court may reimpose an LWOP sentence after a
resentencing hearing where the court meaningfully consider mitigating evidence of
youth does not render Monschke a procedural rule. Montgomery, 577 U.S. at 208-
09. Individualized sentencing is what guarantees the constitutionality of imposing
an LWOP sentence under RCW 10.95.030 to a select group of offenders. Monschke,
197 Wn.2d at 327-28 (holding that our decision relies on the “individualized
sentencing” principle espoused in Miller and our state constitution’s prohibition on
cruel punishment); WASH. CONST. art. I, § 14. Automatically imposing an LWOP
sentence on an offender between the ages of 18 and 20 years old without
consideration of the offender’s youth is different from sentencing that same offender
to LWOP after consideration of the mitigating evidence of their youth, even where
the result is the same. Justice requires meaningful consideration of the character and
record of the individualized offender as a constitutionally indispensable part of the
17 In re Pers. Restraint of Schoenhals, No. 103672-8
process of inflicting certain penalties such as the death penalty, so, too, is
consideration of the offender’s youth before sentencing them to cruel LWOP
sentences. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304, 96 S. Ct. 2978, 49 L. Ed.
2d 944 (1976) (plurality opinion) (imposing the death penalty without individualized
sentencing considerations violates the Eighth Amendment). Monschke held that
there was an “unacceptable risk” that youthful defendants will receive a cruel LWOP
sentence under the statute’s rigid cutoff age at 18 and its mandatory language. 197
Wn.2d at 325. It is individualized sentencing that alleviates this risk by ensuring that
LWOP sentences served under RCW 10.95.030 are not cruel punishment.
The State contends that Monschke petitioners, in order to qualify for relief,
must show there was a “substantive error” in their sentencing. In other words, the
State wants petitioners to prove that their LWOP sentences were a “constitutionally
disproportionate punishment.” Suppl. Br. of Resp’t at 15. Simply showing only a
procedural rule violation, the State argues, cannot be a basis for retroactive relief.
Id. The State finds authority for this argument in a line of cases relying on this court’s
decision in State v. Houston-Sconiers, 188 Wn.2d 1, 391 P.3d 409 (2017). According
to the State, “[j]ust like the rule of Houston-Sconiers, retroactive resentencing is
precluded unless Schoenhals can show a substantive error (constitutionally
disproportionate punishment).” Suppl. Br. of Resp’t at 15. We previously clarified
18 In re Pers. Restraint of Schoenhals, No. 103672-8
that Houston-Sconiers procedural violations alone are not independently reviewable
in an untimely collateral attack. In re Pers. Restraint of Hinton, 1 Wn.3d 317, 330-
31, 525 P.3d 156 (2023) (holding that Houston-Sconiers’ substantive rule applies
retroactively but not its procedural rule).
We reject the State’s argument as it rests on a false equivalence between
Monschke class members and petitioners who seek relief for disproportionate
sentences under Houston-Sconiers. Monschke personal restraint petitioners are
different from Houston-Sconiers personal restraint petitioners. The nature of the
substantive errors in both PRPs are different. Houston-Sconiers held that the Eighth
Amendment requires sentencing courts to exercise discretion in order to protect
children from disproportionate punishment. Ali, 196 Wn.2d at 237 (explaining that
Houston-Sconiers’ substantive rule was based on Miller and its progeny and the
Eighth Amendment to the federal constitution). If no disproportionate sentence is
imposed, then there is no substantive rule violation. The Eighth Amendment is
violated only when a juvenile who possesses diminished culpability is mandatorily
sentenced to an adult standard range or enhancement. In re Pers. Restraint of
Forcha-Williams, 200 Wn.2d 581, 588-89, 520 P.3d 939 (2022). Houston-Sconiers’
separation between substantive errors (disproportionate sentences) and procedural
errors (failure by the trial court to consider mitigating evidence of youth) cannot be
19 In re Pers. Restraint of Schoenhals, No. 103672-8
meaningfully transposed to Monschke PRPs. In Houston-Sconiers PRPs, there exists
the possibility that a petitioner suffered a procedural error (the court failed to
consider mitigating evidence of youth), but not a substantive error (the court did not
choose an adult standard range sentence). The same is not true for Monschke PRPs,
where under RCW 10.95.030 the trial court was statutorily mandated to sentence the
petitioner to one sentence: LWOP.
The State further argues that because Monschke announced only a procedural
rule, petitioners must prove by a preponderance of evidence that their sentences
would have been shorter if the judge had discretion to consider mitigating evidence
of youth. In re Pers. Restraint of Meippen, 193 Wn.2d 310, 316, 440 P.3d 978
(2019). In Meippen, we held that a petitioner alleging a procedural Houston-
Sconiers’ violation must also prove “by a preponderance of the evidence that his
sentence would have been shorter” if the sentencing judge had complied with
Houston-Sconiers’ dual mandates. Id. at 312. Later, in Forcha-Williams, this court
held that “together, Meippen, Ali, and Domingo-Cornelio show us there are
numerous factors to consider in determining whether a Houston-Sconiers error is
prejudicial: whether the judge was presented with and considered the mitigating
qualities of the offender's youth; whether the judge understood their discretion,
where the imposed sentence falls within the standard range; and whether the judge
20 In re Pers. Restraint of Schoenhals, No. 103672-8
articulated that they would have imposed a lower sentence if they could.” 200 Wn.2d
at 604. The automatic nature of an LWOP sentence for Monschke petitioners
precluded the original sentencing court from exercising any discretion or considering
any mitigating evidence of youth at sentencing. RCW 10.95.030. It would be
illogical to require these petitioners to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that
the original sentencing court would have lowered the offender’s sentence if they had
the chance to consider mitigating evidence of youth. The original sentencing court
had no discretion in sentencing under RCW 10.95.030.
II. Monschke is a substantive rule with retroactive effect. What must
Monschke petitioners show to demonstrate they were actually and
substantially prejudiced?
In order to obtain collateral relief, Schoenhals must show by a preponderance
of the evidence that he was actually and substantially prejudiced by the error in
sentencing and that there are no other adequate remedies available in order to obtain
relief. RAP 16.4(d); In re Pers. Restraint of Davis, 152 Wn.2d 647, 671-72, 101 P.3d
1 (2004). To show constitutional error by a preponderance of the evidence,
Monschke petitioners can show that no judge has exercised discretion in sentencing
them under the aggravated murder statute. In other words, if a petitioner can show
21 In re Pers. Restraint of Schoenhals, No. 103672-8
that Monschke is material to their sentence, then they can show they were actually
and substantially prejudiced by their mandatory LWOP sentence.
The State argues that in order to show actual and substantial prejudice,
Monschke petitioners, like petitioners alleging a Houston-Sconiers violation, must
show that the trial court would have imposed a lesser sentence than an LWOP
sentence. Suppl. Br. of Resp’t at 37; Forcha-Williams, 200 Wn.2d at 599-601
(holding that we required more than a mere possibility that the trial court would have
departed from the Sentencing Reform Act of 1981 (SRA), ch. 9.94A RCW, in light
of Houston-Sconiers). In Forcha-Williams, this court held that in determining
whether a trial court would have departed from the SRA in light of Houston-
Sconiers, we look at whether the judge was presented with and considered the
mitigating qualities of the offender’s youth, whether the judge understood their
discretion to impose a sentence below what the SRA mandates, whether the sentence
imposed falls within the standard range, and whether the judge articulated that they
would have imposed a lower sentence if they could. 200 Wn.2d at 604. The error in
the State’s argument here is that none of these considerations are applicable to
Monschke petitions and imposing such a requirement on Monschke petitioners
ignores the mandatory and automatic nature of RCW 10.95.030. Monschke, 197
Wn.2d at 309 n. 4. In Monschke petitions, the sentencing judge had authority to
22 In re Pers. Restraint of Schoenhals, No. 103672-8
impose only one type of sentence, a LWOP sentence. It is nonsensical to require a
review of the sentencing court record to ascertain how the judge would have
considered the offender’s youth when they were not required to; or whether the
sentencing judge understood their discretion, when they had no discretion; or
whether they imposed a sentence within the standard range, where an LWOP was
the only sentence authorized for the offense. Monschke petitioners did not have the
benefit of Monschke’s ruling at the time of their sentencing. The arguments that
Schoenhals can now raise were not legally tenable at the time of his original
sentencing, and the sentencing court had no authority to depart from the statutorily
mandated sentence.
Simply put, the distinction between Houston-Sconiers petitioners and
Monschke petitioners lies in the fact that Houston-Sconiers violations are not always
prejudicial, as those petitioners may have been subjected to procedural errors but not
substantive errors, whereas Monschke violations are per se prejudicial. Monschke
petitioners should not be required to show the impossible, that the original
sentencing judge would have lowered their sentences had they had the ability to
exercise discretion and consider mitigating evidence of the offender’s youth.
Monschke petitioners show that they were actually and substantially prejudiced by
showing that Monschke is material to their sentence.
23 In re Pers. Restraint of Schoenhals, No. 103672-8
CONCLUSION
Monschke, as affirmed in Carter, announced a new substantive constitutional
rule that meets the significant change in the law exemption to the one-year time bar
for collateral relief. RCW 10.73.100(7). In addition, actual and substantial prejudice
can be established by a preponderance of the evidence for a Monschke petitioner
who can show that Monschke is material to their sentence. We grant Schoenhals’
PRP and remand to the trial court for a new sentencing hearing.
_____________________________
WE CONCUR.
24 In re Pers. Restraint of Schoenhals (John H.)
No. 103672-8
MADSEN, J. (concurring)—John H. Schoenhals was convicted of aggravated first
degree murder, a crime he committed when he was 20 years old. He received a
mandatory life without parole (LWOP) sentence. In State v. Carter, 3 Wn.3d 198, 548
P.3d 935 (2024), we held that mandatory LWOP sentences for defendants who are
convicted of aggravated first degree murder and are between 18 to 20 years old are
unconstitutional. The majority in Carter relied on In re Personal Restraint of Monschke,
197 Wn.2d 305, 482 P.3d 276 (2021), which was a plurality opinion, to reach this
conclusion.
There is no dispute that based on this court’s holding in Carter, Schoenhals’
original sentence is unconstitutional. However, I write separately because I believe
Schoenhals’ personal restraint petition is timely under RCW 10.73.090(1). Accordingly,
we need not decide whether one of the exceptions to the time bar applies.
Under RCW 10.73.090(1), “[n]o petition or motion for collateral attack on a
judgment and sentence in a criminal case may be filed more than one year after the No. 103672-8 Madsen, J., concurring
judgment becomes final if the judgment and sentence is valid on its face.” Here,
Schoenhals’ judgment and sentence is not valid on its face considering our decision in
Carter. “A judgment and sentence is facially invalid if the trial court lacked authority to
impose the challenged sentence.” In re Pers. Restraint of Snively, 180 Wn.2d 28, 32, 320
P.3d 1107 (2014). Carter, which was not a plurality opinion, held that pursuant to
Monshke, RCW 10.95.030 is unconstitutional when applied to 18- to 20-year-old
offenders because the statute denies sentencing courts the discretion to consider
mitigating qualities of youth when imposing LWOP sentences. 3 Wn.3d at 205. In light
of Carter, the trial court in this case exceeded its authority in sentencing Schoenhals, a
20-year-old, to life without the possibility of parole without considering the mitigating
qualities of youth. Schoenhals’ sentence was unauthorized by law, making his judgment
and sentence facially invalid. 1 See In re Pers. Restraint of Coats, 173 Wn.2d 123, 135,
267 P.3d 324 (2011) (“we have found judgment and sentences invalid when the trial
judge has imposed an unlawful sentence”); In re Pers. Restraint of Cook, 114 Wn.2d 802,
810, 792 P.2d 506 (1990) (a petitioner must show actual and substantial prejudice to
obtain relief from error based on constitutional grounds).
Based on Carter, there is no doubt that Schoenhals was actually and substantially
prejudiced when he received a mandatory sentence of LWOP. Therefore, it is
1 The concurrence by Justice Gordon McCloud indicates that this concurrence views Monschke as compelling the conclusion that Schoenhals’ sentence is unconstitutional. Concurrence at 1. That is incorrect. Monschke was a plurality decision and cannot compel such a conclusion. However, because the majority in Carter interpreted Monschke as precedential, Carter compels the conclusion that Schoenhals’ sentence is unconstitutional. 2 No. 103672-8 Madsen, J., concurring
unnecessary for the lead opinion to both analyze whether Monschke constitutes a
significant change in the law under RCW 10.73.100(7) and what a petitioner must show
to demonstrate actual and substantial prejudice, especially in light of the fractured
opinion in Monschke. See In re Pers. Restraint of Kennedy, 200 Wn.2d 1, 24, 513 P.3d
769 (2022); In re Pers. Restraint of Davis, 200 Wn.2d 75, 81-83, 514 P.3d 653 (2022);
Carter, 3 Wn.3d at 233 (Madsen, J., dissenting).
RCW 10.73.090(1) provides Schoenhals with an exemption to the one-year time
bar on collateral attacks; thus, to provide Schoenhals with relief, I would apply that
exemption as opposed to the exemption under RCW 10.73.100(7).
With these considerations in mind, I respectfully concur.
_________________________________
________________________________
3 In re Pers. Restraint of Schoenhals (John H.)
No. 103672-8 GORDON McCLOUD, J. (concurring)—In 1986, petitioner John H.
Schoenhals received a mandatory sentence of life in prison without possibility of
release or parole for crimes he committed at age 20. “In 2021, we held in
Monschke that the life without release mandate from RCW 10.95.030 is
unconstitutional when applied to 18- to 20-year-old offenders because it denies
discretion to consider the mitigating qualities of youth in imposing sentences, in
violation of constitutional cruel and unusual punishment principles.” State v.
Carter, 3 Wn.3d 198, 205, 548 P.3d 935 (2024) (emphasis added) (citing In re
Pers. Restraint of Monschke, 197 Wn.2d 305, 306-07, 326, 482 P.3d 276 (2021)
(plurality opinion)).
I therefore agree with both the lead opinion and the concurrence by Justice
Madsen that pursuant to Monschke and Carter, Schoenhals’ sentence is
unconstitutional.
I also agree with both the lead opinion and the concurrence by Justice
Madsen that Schoenhals’ personal restraint petition (PRP) is timely. As the lead
opinion explains, Monschke constitutes a significant, material, retroactive change
1 In re Pers. Restraint of Schoenhals (John H.), No. 103672-8 (Gordon McCloud, J., concurring)
in the law within the meaning of RCW 10.73.100(7); Schoenhals’ PRP is therefore
exempt from the usual one year time limit under that statute. And as the
concurrence by Justice Madsen explains, Schoenhals’ judgment and sentence
(J&S) shows that his sentence violates the Monschke decision, making his J&S
invalid on its face within the meaning of RCW 10.73.090; his PRP is therefore
exempt from the usual one year time limit under that statute, also.
Because I agree with both the lead opinion and the concurrence on each of
these points, I respectfully concur.
__________________________