In Re Parmalat Securities Litigation

594 F. Supp. 2d 444, 2009 WL 179920
CourtDistrict Court, S.D. New York
DecidedJanuary 27, 2009
DocketMaster Docket 04 MD 1653(LAK)
StatusPublished
Cited by17 cases

This text of 594 F. Supp. 2d 444 (In Re Parmalat Securities Litigation) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In Re Parmalat Securities Litigation, 594 F. Supp. 2d 444, 2009 WL 179920 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM OPINION

LEWIS A. KAPLAN, District Judge.

Parmalat Finanziaria, S.p.A., Parmalat S.p.A. and their affiliates (collectively, “Parmalat”) collapsed upon the discovery of a massive fraud that reportedly involved the understatement of Parmalat’s debt by nearly $10 billion and the overstatement of its net assets by $16.4 billion. 1 Plaintiffs, purchasers of Parmalat securities between January 5, 1999 and December 18, 2003 (the “Class Period”), seek damages against Parmalat’s accountants, banks and others. In a series of decisions, the Court granted in part and denied in part various motions to dismiss. It certified a class consisting of domestic parties who purchased or otherwise acquired Parmalat securities during the Class Period. 2 The matter now is before the Court on the motions of De-loitte Touche Tohmatsu (“DTT”), Deloitte & Touche LLP (“DT-US”), and James Copeland (collectively, the “Deloitte defendants”) for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

Facts

The class plaintiffs represent a class of individuals who purchased ordinary Par-malat shares and bonds during the Class Period. They sue the Deloitte defendants *447 and others under Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 3 (the “Exchange Act”) and Rule 10b-5 thereunder. 4

Deloitte’s Structure

Defendant DTT, a Swiss verein 5 headquartered in New York, 6 is a professional services organization of member firms, which sometimes are referred to collectively as a “global firm.” 7 These member firms, including defendants Deloitte & Touche, S.p.A. (“Deloitte Italy”) and DT-US, generally are organized as limited liability entities under the laws of their respective jurisdictions. 8

Accounting and auditing standards and regulation of the accounting profession often are country specific. In addition to complying with any locally applicable rules, however, Deloitte firms follow general professional standards and auditing procedures promulgated by DTT. Member firms regularly cross check each other’s work to ensure quality, 9 and they cooperate and join together under the direction of a single partner to provide audit services for international clients. 10 Partners and associates of member firms participate in global practice groups and attend DTT meetings. 11

Although disclaimers on DTT’s website assert the legal separateness of DTT and its members, DTT’s goal, as expressed by its chief executive officer, James Copeland, was for clients to “get[ ] consistent seamless service across national boundaries.” 12 Member firms therefore use the Deloitte name when serving international clients “in order to project the image of a cohesive international organization.” 13

The Parmalat Scandal and Deloitte Italy

The claims against the Deloitte defendants all rest on the premise that they are vicariously hable for the alleged fraud of Deloitte Italy, one of Parmalat’s former auditors, which has not joined in the motion. The motion itself seeks dismissal only on the ground that the Deloitte defendants are not vicariously liable. It does not dispute that Deloitte Italy itself is primarily liable for the alleged fraud. Accordingly, it suffices for present purposes to outline briefly plaintiffs’ allegations with respect to the Parmalat scandal generally and Deloitte Italy’s role.

In the early 1990s, Parmalat, an Italian dairy conglomerate known for its long shelf-life milk, pursued an aggressive growth strategy financed largely by debt. Its expansion into South America, however, turned out to be ill-advised, and it began to lose hundreds of millions of dol *448 lars there. 14 The company needed constant infusions of cash to cover these losses, service its massive debt, and hide the personal diversion of funds by Parmalat chief executive officer Calisto Tanzi and his family. 15 But cash could be obtained only so long as Parmalat appeared to be a sound investment. To this end, insiders at Parmalat and Grant Thornton S.p.A. 16 (“GT-Italy”) concocted a scheme involving misleading transactions and off-shore entities that created the appearance of financial health. 17 One such transaction, for example, involved a fictitious sale of 300,-000 tons of powdered milk to Cuba for $620 million. 18 Loans obtained on the basis of this transaction were used to service debt and obtain more loans. 19 In short, Parmalat and its confederates were operating something akin to a Ponzi scheme.

Italian law obliged Parmalat to switch auditors in 1999. Concerned that new auditors would discover and disclose the fraud, Parmalat and GT-Italy moved the allegedly fictitious financing transactions to Bonlat, a new company incorporated in the Caribbean that would continue to be audited by Grant Thornton. 20 Parmalat then hired Deloitte Italy as its auditor. Deloitte offices in numerous countries audited Parmalat and its subsidiaries and affiliates as part of this worldwide engagement. 21 Despite the company’s fear that new auditors would not continue to acquiesce in the fraud, the Deloitte defendants allegedly discovered or recklessly ignored the fraud, yet certified the company’s financial statements as substantially accurate. 22

*449 By late 2003, the scheme became unsustainable. Parmalat had a liquidity crisis, and the ensuing collapse was rapid. In early December, Parmalat could not pay certain maturing bonds. 23 By December 11, the company’s stock had lost half its value. 24 Trading was suspended for days by Italian regulators. 25 Parmalat’s bonds rapidly lost value as well. 26 On December 19, the company announced that a Bank of America account allegedly held by its Bon-lat affiliate that supposedly contained $4.9 billion did not exist. 27

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
594 F. Supp. 2d 444, 2009 WL 179920, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-parmalat-securities-litigation-nysd-2009.