In re Parentage of Jade J.

2025 IL App (1st) 241803

• Court: Appellate Court of Illinois
• Decided: December 30, 2025
• Docket: 1-24-1803
• Status: Published

Opinion

2025 IL App (1st) 241803 SECOND DIVISION December 30, 2025 No. 1-24-1803 ______________________________________________________________________________

IN THE APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS FIRST DISTRICT ______________________________________________________________________________ In re PARENTAGE OF JADE J., ) Appeal from the Circuit Court ) of Cook County. (Jasmine E., ) ) Petitioner-Appellant, ) No. 09 D 91417 ) v. ) Honorable ) James Kaplan and William Yu, Timothy J., ) Judges Presiding.

Respondent-Appellee).

PRESIDING JUSTICE VAN TINE delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion. Justice McBride concurred in the judgment and opinion. Justice McBride also specially concurred, with opinion. Justice Howse dissented, with opinion.

OPINION

¶1 Jasmine E. contends that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction to enter a 2017 order

modifying the child support obligations of her child’s father, Timothy J. In 2023, Jasmine filed a

section 2-1401 (735 ILCS 5/2-1401 (West 2022)) motion to vacate the 2017 child support

modification order for want of jurisdiction, and Timothy filed a motion for summary judgment 1-24-1803

contending that the circuit court had jurisdiction to modify his child support obligations. The

circuit court (1) found that it had jurisdiction to modify child support because Jasmine’s attorney

appeared at a court date in 2015 and represented Jasmine at that hearing without objection to

jurisdiction or the child support modification orders entered at that hearing, (2) granted Timothy’s

motion for summary judgment, and (3) dismissed Jasmine’s motion to vacate. For the following

reasons, we affirm.

¶2 I. BACKGROUND

¶3 Jasmine and Timothy have one child together, Jade J., who was born in Harvey, Illinois, in

July 2005 and is now 20 years old. In 2009, Jasmine chose to initiate these proceedings in Illinois,

even though neither she nor Timothy nor Jade ever resided in Illinois at any period relevant to this

appeal. Pursuant to the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act (UIFSA) (750 ILCS 22/101 et seq.

(West 2008)), she filed a petition for child support in the circuit court of Cook County. Jade’s birth

in Harvey provided the jurisdictional basis for filing the child support petition in this state. See id.

§ 201(a)(6). In 2012, Jasmine and Timothy resolved the child support dispute through two agreed

orders, which provided that Timothy would pay $3,500 per month in child support and deposit

$1,000 per month into a trust fund for Jade. Although Jasmine and Timothy never resided in

Illinois, the parties have never contested the Illinois circuit court’s jurisdiction to enter the

aforementioned initial child support orders.

¶4 Timothy is a former professional athlete whose career ended in 2015 due to injury. On

October 5, 2015, he filed a petition to modify child support and a petition to determine arrears,

alleging that he was unemployed and had no income.

¶5 On December 9, 2015, the court held a hearing on the petitions and issued three orders.

The record does not contain transcripts or a bystander’s report for the hearing. One order noted

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that “Attorney Christopher Clark appear[ed] on behalf of [Jasmine] and [sought] a continuance.”

The court granted Clark leave to file an appearance, granted Jasmine an extension of time to

respond to Timothy’s petitions, required that discovery issue within 45 days, and set a hearing on

Timothy’s petition for March 16, 2016. The circuit court also temporarily reduced Timothy’s child

support obligation to $1,000 per month and suspended his obligation to fund the trust account.

Another order set a hearing on Timothy’s petition to determine arrears. A third order from that day

was a uniform order for support modification in which the court found that it “has jurisdiction of

the parties and the subject matter.” None of the orders reflect an objection by Clark on Jasmine’s

behalf.

¶6 Clark did not follow up with filing an appearance, respond to Timothy’s petition, issue

written discovery, or appear at any other court dates. Neither he nor Jasmine appeared at the March

16, 2016, hearing. At that hearing, the circuit court found that Timothy (1) no longer had an

obligation to pay child support, (2) was current in his child support obligations, and (3) had

overpaid support by several thousand dollars. The court continued the case several more times, but

neither Jasmine nor Clark appeared at any of the hearing dates.

¶7 On July 25, 2017, the court issued a permanent order requiring Timothy to pay $265 per

month in child support from August 1, 2017, through June 1, 2023. The order noted that Timothy

was current in his child support payments. The order did not address Timothy’s obligation to fund

the child’s trust account, which the court had suspended in the December 9, 2015, order, when

attorney Clark was present and did not object. The court took the matter off call.

¶8 Jasmine continued to receive $265 per month through June 1, 2023, as the circuit court

ordered on July 25, 2017. Then, on June 21, 2023, nearly six years after the modification order

and 20 days after Timothy’s child support obligations terminated, Jasmine filed a section 2-1401

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(735 ILCS 5/2-1401 (West 2022)) motion to vacate the July 25, 2017, order modifying child

support. Jasmine argued that (1) the court did not have jurisdiction to enter the 2017 order

modifying child support and (2) she did not receive notice of any court dates or filings from 2015

through 2017. In response, Timothy argued, in relevant part, that the court had jurisdiction to enter

the July 25, 2017, modification order because Clark appeared on Jasmine’s behalf at the December

9, 2015, hearing. Jasmine’s reply argued that Clark’s appearance on her behalf did not equate to

her consenting to the court’s jurisdiction.

¶9 Before the circuit court could rule on Jasmine’s section 2-1401 motion to vacate, Timothy

filed a response to it and also filed a motion for summary judgment essentially reiterating the

arguments he set forth in his response to Jasmine’s motion to vacate. In response to the motion for

summary judgment, Jasmine admitted that Clark appeared on her behalf, claimed that she did not

ask him to and that he did not actually represent her, and highlighted that he never filed an

appearance.

¶ 10 The court held a hearing on Jasmine’s section 2-1401 motion to vacate concurrently with

Timothy’s motion for summary judgment on July 10, 2024, as the motion for summary judgment

was essentially a response to the section 2-1401 motion. No transcripts of those proceedings were

provided to the court. However, the court’s order resolving both motions recounts, in chronological

detail, the progression of the entire case as well as the July 10, 2024, hearing. According to that

order, “[d]uring the summary judgment argument, Jasmine’s counsel conceded that they [were]

not contesting jurisdiction but rather asserting due process arguments about notice Jasmine may

or may not have received.” Jasmine also “affirmatively stated that she agree[d] that the Court had

jurisdiction.” In addition, Jasmine argued “that the issue was a due-process issue, not a

jurisdictional issue.”

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¶ 11 Based on Jasmine’s attorney’s statements at the combined section 2-1401 and summary

judgment hearing, the circuit court, on August 12, 2024, simultaneously granted Timothy’s motion

for summary judgment and dismissed Jasmine’s section 2-1401 motion to vacate. As relevant here,

the court found that it “acquired jurisdiction over [Jasmine E.] (‘personal jurisdiction’) when Mr.

Clark appeared in Court on her behalf” on December 9, 2015, and did not object to jurisdiction.

The court found that Clark’s presence at that court date was an “action taken by a litigant which

recognize[d] the case being in Court” and was, therefore, “a general appearance unless such action

was for the sole purpose of objecting to jurisdiction over the person,” citing In re Estate of

Zoglauer, 229 Ill. App. 3d 394, 397 (1992). The court’s order did not address section 205 of the

UIFSA (750 ILCS 22/205 (West 2022)), which is at issue in this appeal.

¶ 12 Jasmine appeals the circuit court’s August 12, 2024, order and seeks to vacate the court’s

July 25, 2017, modification order.

¶ 13 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 14 On appeal, Jasmine argues that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction to enter the 2017 order

modifying Timothy’s child support obligations because she never “consented” to the court’s

jurisdiction to do so. Notably, Jasmine does not argue (as she did in the circuit court) that she did

not receive notice or service of Timothy’s filings.

¶ 15 Jasmine appeals from the circuit court’s grant of Timothy’s motion for summary judgment

and dismissal of her section 2-1401 motion to vacate. We review the circuit court’s rulings on both

motions de novo. Protein Partners, LLP v. Lincoln Provision, Inc., 407 Ill. App. 3d 709, 716

(2010) (citing People v. Vincent, 226 Ill. 2d 1, 18 (2007)); Andrews v. Carbon on 26th, LLC, 2025

IL 130862, ¶ 20. To the extent this case involves interpretation of the UIFSA, our review is de novo

as well. Collins v. Department of Health & Family Services ex rel. Paczek, 2014 IL App (2d)

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130536, ¶ 15. Ultimately, this case presents the threshold question of the circuit court’s

jurisdiction. We review de novo a circuit court’s determination regarding jurisdiction where, as

here, the court made such a determination without an evidentiary hearing. See Russell v. SNFA,

2013 IL 113909, ¶ 28. De novo review means we engage in the same analysis as the circuit court.

Xuedong Pan v. King, 2022 IL App (1st) 211482, ¶ 16.

¶ 16 Section 205 of the UIFSA (750 ILCS 22/205 (West 2022)) governs a circuit court’s

jurisdiction to modify a child support order where, as here, the parents do not live in the same state

as the court that issued the child support order, notwithstanding that this case has never been in

any court in any state other than Illinois. See Collins, 2014 IL App (2d) 130536, ¶ 17; see also

Zaabel v. Konetski, 209 Ill. 2d 127, 135 (2004). In general, “once the obligor, the obligee, and the

minor children who are subject to a support order no longer reside in Illinois, the issuing Illinois

court loses continuing exclusive jurisdiction to modify that order.” (Emphasis omitted.) Collins,

2014 IL App (2d) 130536, ¶ 24. However, section 205 provides that:

“(a) A tribunal of this State that has issued a child-support order *** shall exercise

continuing, exclusive jurisdiction to modify its child-support order if the order is the

controlling order and:

(1) at the time of the filing of a request for modification this State is the

residence of the obligor, the individual obligee, or the child for whose benefit the

support order is issued; or

(2) even if this State is not the residence of the obligor, the individual

obligee, or the child for whose benefit the support order is issued, the parties

consent in a record or in open court that the tribunal of this State may continue to

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exercise jurisdiction to modify its order.” (Emphasis added.) 750 ILCS 22/205

(West 2022).

¶ 17 When Timothy filed his 2015 petition to modify child support, neither he, nor Jasmine, nor

Jade resided in Illinois. Therefore, the circuit court had jurisdiction to modify child support in 2017

only if the parties “consent[ed] in a record or in open court that the tribunal of this State may

continue to exercise the jurisdiction to modify its order.” See id. § 205(a)(2). We have found no

Illinois authority addressing which actions or representation constitute explicit consent to

jurisdiction under section 205(a)(2). The only case to touch on that issue found that the petitioner

forfeited his argument that the opposing party consented to jurisdiction under section 205(a)(2) by

filing a response to his petition to modify child support. Collins, 2014 IL App (2d) 130536, ¶ 29.

That is, Collins did not substantively address consent under section 205(a)(2). Despite this lack of

authority, we must now consider whether, when, and how such consent occurred in this case.

¶ 18 Section 205 does not distinguish between personal jurisdiction and subject matter

jurisdiction. However, section 205(a)(2), which applies in this case, appears to address personal

jurisdiction because only personal jurisdiction can be established by a party’s voluntary

submission, i.e., consent, to the court’s jurisdiction. See Municipal Trust & Savings Bank v.

Moriarty, 2021 IL 126290, ¶ 25. There is no question that the circuit court had subject matter

jurisdiction to hear and determine matters of child support in general, as it was a domestic relations

court. See Department of Healthcare & Family Services ex rel. Nieto v. Arevalo, 2016 IL App (2d)

150504, ¶ 21. Moreover, “the failure to comply with a statutory requirement or prerequisite does

not negate the circuit court’s subject matter jurisdiction or constitute a nonwaivable condition

precedent to the circuit court’s jurisdiction.” LVNV Funding, LLC v. Trice, 2015 IL 116129, ¶ 37.

Therefore, the circuit court had subject matter jurisdiction over Timothy’s petition to modify child

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support, and the parties cannot earnestly contend otherwise. See In re Marriage of Steidl, 2025 IL

App (1st) 241111-U, ¶ 25; In re Marriage of Tronsrue, 2024 IL App (3d) 220125, ¶¶ 15-16;

Arevalo, 2016 IL App (2d) 150504, ¶ 21. In other words, the only question as to jurisdiction is

whether Jasmine, who did not reside in Illinois, consented to the court’s personal jurisdiction over

her when the court modified the previously entered agreed order for child support.

¶ 19 The circuit court found that it “acquired jurisdiction over [Jasmine E.] (‘personal

jurisdiction’) when Mr. Clark appeared in Court on her behalf” on December 9, 2015. In reaching

this conclusion, the court relied on the principle that “[a]ny action taken by a litigant which

recognizes the case as being in court will amount to a general entry of appearance unless such

action was for the sole purpose of objecting to jurisdiction over the person,” citing Zoglauer, 229

Ill. App. 3d at 397. The circuit court found that Clark’s actions on December 9, 2015, constituted

a “general appearance” that waived jurisdictional objections. We acknowledge that Zoglauer is no

longer good law, as a 2000 amendment to the Code of Civil Procedure (Code) (Pub. Act 91-145

(eff. Jan. 1, 2000) (amending 735 ILCS 5/2-301), abrogated the old rule that a general appearance

waives jurisdictional objections. See, e.g., KSAC Corp. v. Recycle Free, Inc., 364 Ill. App. 3d 593,

595 (2006). Although merely filing a general appearance no longer equates to acquiescing to

jurisdiction, we find there are nonetheless other significant bases in the record here for finding the

court had jurisdiction and finding that Jasmine consented to it. Attorney Clark appeared in court

and represented Jasmine at that hearing.

¶ 20 An attorney filing a written appearance and appearing in court at a hearing on a motion

constitutes voluntary submission to the circuit court’s personal jurisdiction and waives any

objections to personal jurisdiction. See Municipal Trust, 2021 IL 126290, ¶ 25; see also 1205

Milwaukee LLC v. Cole, 2025 IL App (1st) 241467-U, ¶ 39. Such a consent to personal jurisdiction

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is prospective only; it does not retroactively validate void orders entered prior to that date.

Municipal Trust, 2021 IL 126290, ¶ 25.

¶ 21 On December 9, 2015, Clark appeared in court and represented Jasmine, as indicated by

the entry of three orders entered in his presence. We find that Clark consented to the circuit court’s

jurisdiction on December 9, 2015, even though he never followed up by filing a written

appearance. The record reflects, through the three orders from that day, several undisputed facts

that establish Jasmine’s consent to jurisdiction. First, attorney Clark appeared in court on Jasmine’s

behalf. Jasmine’s written response to Timothy’s motion for summary judgment expressly admitted

as much. Clark did not object to the circuit court’s jurisdiction, as the circuit court recorded in its

final order. Rather, Clark sought and was granted leave to file his appearance. Further, when Clark

was present in court on Jasmine’s behalf on December 9, 2015, the circuit court set (1) a due date

for Jasmine’s response to the two pending petitions, (2) a date for both parties to issue written

discovery, and (3) a March 16, 2016, hearing date on the two pending petitions. The circuit court

presumably proceeded this way because Jasmine, through her attorney, was properly before the

court and was prepared to litigate the two pending petitions on the merits. Finally, the circuit court

entered an order temporarily modifying Timothy’s child support obligations while Jasmine’s

attorney, Clark, was present in court on December 9, 2015. Clark did not object to the circuit court

entering substantive orders on child support obligations, with one order expressly stating that the

court “has jurisdiction of the parties,” even though he was present in open court. These undisputed

facts are sufficient to establish Jasmine’s voluntary submission to the court’s personal jurisdiction

over her and, therefore, consent to the circuit court’s continuing jurisdiction under section

205(a)(2). We conclude that Jasmine consented in the record and in open court when her attorney

appeared on her behalf on December 9, 2015, as reflected in the court order entered on that day.

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¶ 22 We stress that the December 9, 2015, hearing was not a scenario in which Clark appeared

and only asked for a continuance to determine whether he would be representing Jasmine or

objecting to jurisdiction. If that had happened, we would likely find that the events of the December

9, 2015, hearing did not establish Jasmine’s consent to jurisdiction. But more than that happened

in court on December 9, 2015, as explained above. Everything about the parties’ and the court’s

actions on December 9, 2015, suggested that the parties were willing to proceed with the case on

the merits.

¶ 23 Although Jasmine later filed a section 2-1401 motion that challenged the circuit court’s

jurisdiction over her, that motion did not retroactively vitiate the consent to jurisdiction that

occurred on December 9, 2015. The section 2-1401 motion merely raised a challenge to whether

that consent occurred or not. We find that consent did occur on December 9, 2015, as explained

above.

¶ 24 Further, during summary judgment proceedings, Jasmine withdrew her jurisdictional

challenge and affirmatively agreed the court had jurisdiction. So, even if Jasmine’s section 2-1401

motion somehow withdrew her 2015 consent to jurisdiction, her summary judgment response

withdrew that withdrawal. We note that this concession did not retroactively create consent to

jurisdiction for the 2017 modification order. See id. Rather, it forfeited Jasmine’s challenge to

personal jurisdiction because she appeared in court through counsel and filed a response to

Timothy’s summary judgment motion that did not challenge personal jurisdiction. See Johnson v.

Ingalls Memorial Hospital, 402 Ill. App. 3d 830, 842 (2010) (a party forfeits all objections to the

court’s personal jurisdiction by filing a responsive pleading other than one seeking an extension

of time to answer or otherwise appear). Accordingly, we find that the circuit court had jurisdiction

to enter the 2017 order modifying Timothy’s child support obligations because Jasmine consented

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to the circuit court’s jurisdiction on December 9, 2015, and ultimately forfeited her challenge to

jurisdiction.

¶ 25 By this ruling, we do not seek to resurrect the use of special and general appearances in

Illinois. To be clear, we find that the trial court acquired jurisdiction over Jasmine because her

attorney, Clark, appeared in court on December 9, 2015, and the following events occurred when

he was present in court on that date: (1) Clark sought and was granted leave to file his appearance,

(2) Clark did not object to jurisdiction or indicate that he would do so, (3) the court entered

substantive orders temporarily modifying child support obligations without objection from

Jasmine’s attorney, (4) the circuit court set due dates for Jasmine’s response and issuance of

written discovery, and (5) the court set a hearing on the petition to modify child support and

petition to determine arrears. In short, the court entered substantive orders in the case, most notably

the reduction in child support and suspension of trust fund obligations, all in Clark’s presence.

This is telling because we find it highly unlikely that the circuit court would proceed to enter

substantive orders if Clark had objected to the court’s jurisdiction over Jasmine or had stated that

he was intending to do so in the future.

¶ 26 We emphasize that this decision concerns only section 205(a)(2) and no other jurisdictional

statute or issue. Specifically, we are interpreting only what “consent” in that statute means. We

hold that, in some limited circumstances, a party’s conduct may rise to consent under section

205(a)(2). Under the facts of this case, and with fairness and practicality in mind, we find that

Jasmine did consent to jurisdiction. We reject any interpretation that would allow a party to file a

petition in a state of that party’s choosing, although neither party resides there, then attend a

substantive hearing related to that petition in that very same state, observe the court reduce child

support obligations, miss several court dates, willingly receive drastically reduced support

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payments for approximately six years, and then, weeks after the support payments terminate, return

to a court in that same state, claim the reduction order was void for lack of personal jurisdiction,

and request back payment. This could not have been the legislature’s intent, and we reject such an

interpretation.

¶ 27 The dissent finds that Jasmine properly objected to the circuit court’s jurisdiction pursuant

to section 2-301 of the Code (735 ILCS 5/2-301 (West 2010)) by filing a section 2-1401 petition

on June 21, 2023. We agree that Jasmine’s section 2-1401 petition was a procedurally proper

objection to the circuit court’s jurisdiction because the petition was the first pleading she filed in

the child support modification proceedings at issue here. See id. § 2-301(a), (a-5); Deutsche Bank

National Trust Co. v. Hall-Pilate, 2011 IL App (1st) 102632, ¶ 15 (“Under section 2-301, an

objection to the court’s jurisdiction must be raised in the first pleading or motion filed, other than

a motion for an extension of time to answer or otherwise appear, but such objection may be raised

alongside other motions seeking relief on different grounds.”).

¶ 28 However, the dissent mistakenly interprets Jasmine’s section 2-1401 petition as the only

action she took with respect to jurisdiction. Almost eight years before Jasmine filed that petition,

on December 9, 2015, she consented to jurisdiction in open court through attorney Clark’s in-

person appearance, as explained above. Under section 205(a)(2) of the UIFSA, the circuit court

had jurisdiction over Jasmine from December 9, 2015, forward, unless and until she challenged its

¶ 29 Jasmine did challenge the circuit court’s jurisdiction in 2023, through her section 2-1401

petition. That was procedurally proper, as a party may challenge personal jurisdiction at any time.

See BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP v. Mitchell, 2014 IL 116311, ¶ 17. But, before the circuit

court could rule on Jasmine’s jurisdictional challenge, she withdrew it. During summary judgment

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proceedings on July 10, 2024, Jasmine stated that she was not contesting jurisdiction and agreed

the circuit court had jurisdiction over her. When Jasmine withdrew her jurisdictional objection, all

that remained was her consent to jurisdiction under section 205(a)(2). Jasmine’s consent to

jurisdiction under section 205(a)(2), which applies to this case specifically, controls over any

attempt to object to jurisdiction under the more general provisions of the Code. See Village of

Chatham v. County of Sangamon, 216 Ill. 2d 402, 431 (2005) (“[W]here there are two statutory

provisions, one of which is general and designed to apply to cases generally, and the other is

particular and relates to only one subject, the particular provision must prevail.”). While the dissent

may be correct that Jasmine followed the proper procedure in attempting to challenge the circuit

court’s challenge, she abandoned that attempt, and the circuit court never ruled on it. Therefore,

Jasmine’s consent to jurisdiction controls.

¶ 30 For these reasons, we affirm the circuit court’s August 12, 2024, order, which granted

Timothy’s motion for summary judgment and dismissed Jasmine’s section 2-1401 motion to

vacate the July 25, 2017, order.

¶ 31 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 32 We affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County.

¶ 33 Affirmed.

¶ 34 McBRIDE, J., specially concurring:

¶ 35 While I fully support the majority’s decision to affirm the trial court’s finding that Jasmine

consented on the record to the circuit court’s jurisdiction in 2015 under section 205(a)(2) of UIFSA

(750 ILCS 22/205(a)(2) (West 2014)) when her attorney Christopher Clark appeared in court on

her behalf, I write to specially concur, citing two additional grounds on which to affirm the circuit

court’s grant of summary judgment to Timothy and the earlier orders modifying support. See

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Philadelphia Indemnity Insurance Co. v. Pace Suburban Bus Service, 2016 IL App (1st) 151659,

¶ 21 (It is well established that the appellate court may affirm a circuit court’s judgment on any

basis appearing in the record.). First, Jasmine failed to provide this court with a complete record

on appeal supporting her complained-of errors, and second, Jasmine conceded that Judge Kaplan

had both subject matter and personal jurisdiction over her at the hearing on Timothy’s motion to

modify support payments.

¶ 36 To support a claim of error on appeal, Jasmine, as the appellant, has the burden of

presenting a sufficiently complete record. Foutch v. O’Bryant, 99 Ill. 2d 389, 391-92 (1984).

Without a sufficient record “the reviewing court must presume the circuit court had a sufficient

factual basis for its holding and that its order conforms with the law.” Corral v. Mervis Industries,

Inc., 217 Ill. 2d 144, 157 (2005). Any doubts arising from an incomplete record will be resolved

against the appellant. Foutch, 99 Ill. 2d at 392; In re Kenneth F., 332 Ill. App. 3d 674, 678 (2002)

(“The burden is on the appellant to present a sufficient record on appeal to substantiate any claims

of error. [Citation.] Any doubts arising as a result of omissions in the record must be resolved

against the appellant.”).

¶ 37 Additionally, Illinois Supreme Court Rule 321 (eff. Oct. 1, 2021) requires that the record

on appeal contain the “entire original common law record,” including “any report of proceedings

prepared in accordance with Rule 323.” “Where the issue on appeal relates to the conduct of a

hearing or proceeding, this issue is not subject to review absent a report or record of the

proceeding.” Webster v. Hartman, 195 Ill. 2d 426, 432 (2001). Any omissions or doubts arising

from the absence of a report or record of proceedings will be also resolved against the appellant.

See id.; Foutch, 99 Ill. 2d at 392.

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¶ 38 Although the judgment orders being appealed have been made part of the common law

record, the issues raised in this appeal directly relate to the trial court’s conduct at the relevant

hearings, which were held in open court, including proceedings from 2015 through 2017, and the

hearing on Timothy’s summary judgment motion. Accordingly, Jasmine was required to provide

this court with a report of the proceedings or an adequate substitute. Ill. S. Ct. R. 321 (eff. Oct. 1,

2021); R. 323(a), (c), (d) (eff. July 1, 2017); Webster, 195 Ill. 2d at 432. She has not done so.

¶ 39 The fact that a court reporter was not present does not excuse Jasmine from supplying this

court with an appropriate record or substitute. Rule 323 provides that a report of proceedings may

be a transcript prepared by court reporting personnel, or if no verbatim transcript is available, an

appellant may file a bystander’s report, or an agreed statement of facts instead. Ill. S. Ct. R. 323(a),

(c), (d) (eff. July 1, 2017). Without any transcript, or an appropriate substitute, Jasmine has not

supplied this court with a sufficient basis for the claimed errors, and she may not challenge how

those proceedings were conducted and claim that an error occurred because there is no basis to

substantiate those claims.

¶ 40 Jasmine intermittently claims that the attorney who appeared on her behalf at the

modification hearing in front of Judge Kaplan was not actually representing her. The order entered

on December 19, 2015, however, provides that attorney Christopher Clark was, in fact, “appearing

on behalf of [Jasmine] and seeking a continuance.” The court entered rulings on Timothy’s child

support obligations, granted attorney Clark “leave to file his appearance on behalf of [Jasmine],”

and granted Jasmine additional time to “answer/otherwise plead to the Petition to Review Child

Support and Petition to Determine Arrears.”

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¶ 41 Jasmine makes additional claims on the issue of both subject matter and personal

jurisdiction, again, despite the multiple orders issued by Judge Kaplan on December 19, 2015,

which provide that the court had “jurisdiction of the parties and the subject matter.”

¶ 42 Jasmine, in turn, impliedly suggests that this court should accept her unsworn statements

to find that circuit court had neither subject matter nor personal jurisdiction over her that day in

court. This we cannot and should not do, when Jasmine could have presented a sworn affidavit or

sworn testimony from the attorney who appeared on her behalf at the hearing or anything else to

support her claims of error, such as a bystander’s report or an agreed statement of facts. See 735

ILCS 5/2-301(a) (West 2024) (“Unless the facts that constitute the basis for the objection [to

jurisdiction] are apparent from papers already on file in the case, the motion must be supported by

an affidavit setting forth those facts.” (Emphasis added)).

¶ 43 Since there is no report of proceedings, no agreed statement of facts, and no bystander’s

report, we must presume that the trial courts’ orders conformed with law. The temporary orders

entered by Judge Kaplan beginning in 2015 and those entered in 2017 finally modifying the

previous support orders should therefore be affirmed on this additional ground. See Webster, 195

Ill. 2d at 432; Foutch, 99 Ill. 2d at 392.

¶ 44 As to the order entered by Judge William Yu in 2024, the record on appeal again lacks a

report of those proceedings or adequate substitute. As a result, the judge’s summary judgment

order should also be affirmed. Webster, 195 Ill. 2d at 432; Foutch, 99 Ill. 2d at 392.

¶ 45 As a second alternative ground for affirming, I would conclude that Jasmine abandoned or

waived any claim that Judge Kaplan lacked jurisdiction to enter any of the orders during the 2015

through 2017 proceedings. As discussed below, a procedural default occurred when Jasmine

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consented to the court’s jurisdiction by her counsel’s remarks during the oral arguments hearing

via Zoom on Timothy’s motion for summary judgment.

¶ 46 First, there is no doubt from the circuit court’s order entered on August 12, 2024, that a

hearing took place in open court via Zoom with both parties present. The circuit court judge’s

written order provided that “Counsel for [Jasmine] and Counsel for [Timothy]” both “appear[ed]

via Zoom” and the court heard “argument from both counsel.”

¶ 47 During that hearing, counsel for Jasmine advised Judge Yu that Jasmine was conceding

that Judge Kaplan had jurisdiction over the parties and that Jasmine was only claiming that her

due process rights to be heard were violated by the orders entered in 2015 through 2017. Judge

Yu’s written order explicitly memorializes this concession, stating, “During the summary

judgment argument, Jasmine’s counsel conceded that they are not contesting jurisdiction but rather

asserting due process arguments about notice Jasmine may or may not have received.”

¶ 48 Despite Jasmine’s irrefutable concession that the court had jurisdiction and her consent to

Judge Kaplan’s orders, Jasmine belatedly challenges the circuit court’s subject matter and personal

jurisdiction. There is no basis, however, to conclude that either subject matter or personal

jurisdiction is lacking.

¶ 49 Subject matter jurisdiction refers to the power of a court to hear and determine cases of the

general class to which the proceedings in question belong. Belleville Toyota, Inc. v. Toyota Motor

Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 199 Ill. 2d 325, 334 (2002). With one exception that is not relevant here, subject

matter jurisdiction originates from section 9 of article VI of the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const.

1970, art.VI, § 9), which grants circuit courts subject matter jurisdiction over all “justiciable

matters.” In re M.W., 232 Ill. 2d 408, 424 (2009). “Generally, a ‘justiciable matter’ is a controversy

appropriate for review by the court, in that it is definite and concrete, as opposed to hypothetical

17 1-24-1803

or moot, touching upon the legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests.” Belleville

Toyota, Inc., 199 Ill. 2d at 335.

¶ 50 “It is beyond dispute that dissolution of marriage actions present justiciable matters.”

Tronsrue, 2024 IL App (3d) 220125, ¶ 16; see In re Marriage of Panozzo, 93 Ill. App. 3d 1085,

1088 (1981) (“The issue of dissolution of marriage is justiciable so that the circuit court had

jurisdiction over the subject matter of the judgment.”). Here, there can be no question that these

dissolution proceedings originally began in Cook County, Illinois, and that when Timothy filed a

petition to modify child support, the circuit court of Cook County had subject matter of this

justiciable matter under the Illinois Constitution. See Belleville Toyota, Inc., 199 Ill. 2d at 335;

Tronsrue, 2024 IL App (3d) 220125, ¶ 16.

¶ 51 Section 205(a)(2) of UIFSA does not change that fact. That is because the failure to comply

with a statutory requirement or prerequisite like the statutory provision noted above cannot deprive

a circuit court of subject matter jurisdiction because subject matter jurisdiction is conferred entirely

by our state constitution. People ex rel. Alvarez v. $59,914 United States Currency, 2022 IL

126927, ¶ 18. In any event, and as we have already found, the circuit court complied with this

statutory requirement, and thus, the circuit court had continuing, exclusive jurisdiction to modify

its child support order because Jasmine consented in open court to the circuit court’s continuing,

exclusive jurisdiction.

¶ 52 Personal jurisdiction refers to the court’s power to bring a person into its adjudicative

process. In re M.W., 232 Ill. 2d at 415. Unlike subject matter jurisdiction, which is invoked by the

filing of a petition or complaint alleging the existence of a justiciable matter, personal jurisdiction

is “ ‘derived from the actions of the person sought to be bound.’ ” Id. at 426 (quoting Meldoc

Properties v. Prezell, 158 Ill. App. 3d 212, 216 (1987)). Thus, a petitioner or plaintiff submits to

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the jurisdiction of the court by filing a petition or complaint, thereby seeking to be bound to the

court’s resolution of the action. Id. A respondent or defendant may consent to personal jurisdiction

by his or her appearance, or they may have jurisdiction imposed upon them by effective service of

summons. Id.

¶ 53 Unlike subject matter jurisdiction, which can never be waived, objections to personal

jurisdiction may be waived (People v. Matthews, 2016 IL 118114, ¶ 18), which is what occurred

when counsel for Jasmine appeared on Jasmine’s behalf at the hearing before Judge Kaplan. When

a defendant chooses not to object to personal jurisdiction, or affirmatively waives that objection,

there is no jurisdictional basis on which to invalidate the resulting judgment.

¶ 54 As noted above, Jasmine waived any claim that the court did not have personal jurisdiction

over the parties when Jasmine’s attorney conceded in open court at the hearing before Judge Yu

that Judge Kaplan did have jurisdiction over Jasmine in the modification proceedings. Jasmine’s

attorney advised the court that Jasmine was only asserting a due process violation for not being

properly heard. Because of this concession to jurisdiction, Jasmine is now estopped from arguing

that the circuit court lacked personal jurisdiction over her. See In re Detention of Swope, 213 Ill.

2d 210, 217 (2004). As the supreme court held in Swope,

“The rule of invited error or acquiescence is a procedural default sometimes

described as estoppel. [Citation.] Simply stated, a party cannot complain of error

which that party induced the court to make or to which that party consented. The

rationale behind this well-established rule is that it would be manifestly unfair to

allow a party a second trial upon the basis of error which that party injected into the

proceedings.” Id.

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¶ 55 As the supreme court noted in Swope, a party may not attack a procedure to which she

agreed, “even though that acceptance may have been grudging.” Id. The rule of procedural default,

also called estoppel, plainly applies here. Id.

¶ 56 The dissent ignores Jasmine’s continuous efforts to obfuscate her attorney’s appearance in

open court on the day of critical importance to this appeal. One of Jasmine’s first unsupported

claims was that she did not have an attorney appear for her in court. At another point, she claimed

Clark was not representing her and did not appear on her behalf. Still at another time, she claimed

that her mother may have contacted a friend, who then had Clark appear. Despite all of Jasmine’s

efforts to confuse and blur the facts, attorney Clark did appear for, and was representing, Jasmine

at the hearing in December 2015, and Jasmine conceded jurisdiction.

¶ 57 The dissent, however, posits that Jasmine’s concession could only have been prospective.

However, that was not what occurred in open court before Judge Yu, when Jasmine, through her

attorney, who is at all times an officer of the court, stated that there was no question that Judge

Kaplan had personal jurisdiction at the time he modified the previously entered support order in

December 2015.

¶ 58 This concession was not prospective, and Judge Yu interpreted Jasmine’s concession for

what it was—an admission that Judge Kaplan had jurisdiction over the parties. In light of this

irrefutable concession, the rule about prospective-only jurisdiction does not apply here. First

announced in In re Marriage of Verdung, 126 Ill. 2d 542, 547 (1989), the rule is based on the

reasoning that if a party comes into a proceeding late because she had not been properly served, it

would be unfair to punish that party by retroactively validating all previous orders entered in the

case, before the court had jurisdiction over that party. See BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP, 2014

IL 116311, ¶ 28 (“The rule on prospective-only personal jurisdiction set forth in Verdung is,

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therefore, based on the due process concept of allowing the defendant his day in court before

entering judgment against him.”). The rule about prospective-only personal jurisdiction is

“intended to protect parties’ due process rights by preventing entry of a judgment without prior

notice and an opportunity to be heard.” Id.

¶ 59 To hold otherwise and impose a retroactive waiver would waive that party’s valid

jurisdictional argument the moment it was raised, thus defeating those due process rights to be

heard. This is not such a case, and Jasmine’s claims about the lack of notice and the right to be

heard fail because she did not appear late in these proceedings. She appeared early on through her

attorney Clark, and she had an opportunity to be heard.

¶ 60 While there is no question that due process rights may be violated by the lack of notice and

the right to be heard, that lack of notice does not render the court’s orders void. The orders are

only voidable, and the failure to give notice does not affect personal jurisdiction which was already

established. Rather, lack of notice is an error that, if timely raised, may require a remedy. In re

M.W., 232 Ill. 2d at 429. That is not what happened here because the circuit court’s jurisdiction

was established. Consequently, when Jasmine argued six years later that her due process rights

“may or may not” have been denied, the order was not void but merely voidable. Since Jasmine’s

claimed errors have been raised several years late, her section 2-1401 petition was untimely filed.

¶ 61 Although the dissent correctly cites cases interpreting section 2-301 of the Code, it ignores

the well-established rule we cited above that when two statutory provisions apply—one of which

is designed to apply to cases generally, and the other which relates to only one particular subject—

the particular provision must prevail. See Village of Chatham, 216 Ill. 2d at 431. Rather than

acknowledging that section 205(a)(2) of the UIFSA is the more particular provision, the dissent

claims we are creating a new rule. We are not creating a new rule but only interpreting the rule

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that applies in these particular circumstances, as the rules of statutory construction require us to

do. See id.

¶ 62 Finally, as the dissent must acknowledge, the parties are no strangers to the circuit court of

Cook County and appeared before the court numerous times before entering into an agreed order

providing for child support. This is not a situation where one of the parties is being called upon to

defend against an action in which they have just been made a party, the circumstance section 2-

301 of the Code contemplates and provides for.

¶ 63 Under section 206 of the UIFSA, the circuit court still has continuing, exclusive jurisdiction

to enforce its support orders. 750 ILCS 22/206 (West 2024). Further, the circuit court shall have

continuing and exclusive jurisdiction under section 205(a)(2) of the UIFSA (id. § 205(a)(2)) to

modify its orders of support if the order is controlling and if the parties consent in a record or in

open court, as they did here. These two statutes are not in conflict. By our decision, we have not

made them so.

¶ 64 For these additional reasons, the circuit court judgments should be affirmed.

¶ 65 JUSTICE HOWSE, dissenting:

¶ 66 I respectfully dissent. The majority has ostensibly found that Jasmine “consented” to

personal jurisdiction under section 205(a)(2) of UIFSA (750 ILCS 22/205(a)(2) (West 2014))

and effectively determined that Jasmine waived her right to contest personal jurisdiction under

our civil practice rules, in a decision that is contrary to Illinois law as to both conclusions. The

majority opinion and special concurrence create new law, despite claims to the contrary, and will

result in the resurrection of the use of special and general appearances, fail to abide established

case and statutory law, and upend well established law by effectively recognizing a retroactive

concession to personal jurisdiction.

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¶ 67 As an initial matter, the special concurrence contends that Jasmine has not supplied this

court with a sufficiently complete record to substantiate her claims and, under Foutch, this court

must presume that the circuit court had a sufficient factual basis for its holding and that its order

conforms with the law. Thus, the special concurrence finds that Jasmine “may not challenge how

[the] proceedings were conducted and claim that an error occurred because there is no basis to

substantiate those claims.” Supra ¶¶ 35, 39 (McBride, J., specially concurring).

¶ 68 The special concurrence’s reliance on Foutch is misplaced because the majority

mischaracterizes the nature of the proceedings. The majority finds that, “The court held a hearing

on Jasmine’s section 2-1401 motion to vacate concurrently with Timothy’s motion for summary

judgment on July 10, 2024, as the motion for summary judgment was essentially a response to

the section 2-1401 motion.” Supra ¶ 10.

¶ 69 This is incorrect, as the circuit court did not hold a hearing on Jasmine’s section 2-1401

motion concurrently with the motion for summary judgment, nor did the circuit court

recharacterize Timothy’s motion for summary judgment as a response to Jasmine’s motion.

¶ 70 On the contrary, the preamble to the circuit court’s order clearly demonstrates that it was

only deciding Timothy’s motion for summary judgment and there is no mention that the court

heard any evidence. The order states:

“THIS CAUSE comes before the Court on hearing of Respondent’s Motion for

Summary Judgment, Counsel for Petitioner and Counsel for Respondent

appearing via Zoom, the Court hearing argument from both counsel and

reviewing the pleadings, the Court having jurisdiction over the parties and subject

matter hereto and the Court being fully advised in the premises:”

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¶ 71 For further clarity, the circuit court, a few paragraphs later in the order on appeal, plainly

stated that,

“24. The only issue this Court is determining is whether Christoper Clark’s

appearance in Court, admitted by Jasmine in her response to Timothy’s Summary

Judgment Motion to be at her direction, constituted a waiver to the argument that

the Court had jurisdiction to enter all order[s] from December 9, 2015 through

and including July 25, 2017.”

¶ 72 The question of the circuit court’s jurisdiction presents a question of law based upon the

undisputed factual allegations in the motion for summary judgment. The majority agrees that the

court made the jurisdictional determination without an evidentiary hearing, such that our review

is de novo. Supra ¶ 15. Under the circumstances, Foutch does not require this court to affirm the

judgment of the lower court. Midstate Siding & Window Co., v. Rogers, 204 Ill. 2d 314, 319

(2003). There the court held:

“However, in the present case, we are not asked to determine whether the

evidence presented at trial was sufficient to support the trial court’s finding. See

Buckholtz v. MacNeal Hospital, 313 Ill. App. 3d 521, 526 (2000) (plaintiff

maintained that the record fails to establish that an expert witness’ deposition fee

was reasonable). Instead, we are asked to interpret a statute, the Credit Services

Act, and determine whether the statute regulates the transaction at issue. This is a

question of law, and the lack of a complete record does not bar our review.” Id.

¶ 73 The absence of a complete record does not hinder our review in this case, and the

argument that the summary judgment should be affirmed because there is no record in this

appeal of summary judgment is contrary to law. The record is sufficient to answer the questions

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before this court. The only issue decided by the court, as the court itself stated, was whether the

appearance of the attorney in 2015 waived Jasmine’s right to contest jurisdiction.

¶ 74 Timothy J. alleged in the motion for summary judgment that he was entitled to judgment

as a matter of law because Jasmine consented to the jurisdiction of the court when, at a 2015

hearing, her attorney requested leave to file an appearance and a continuance to file a response to

Timothy’s petition, neither of which was forthcoming. The issue of whether Timothy is entitled

to summary judgment on the ground the alleged actions of Jasmine’s attorney submitted to the

jurisdiction of the court under section 205(a)(2) or waived Jasmine’s objections to personal

jurisdiction can, and must, be answered from the trial court’s orders and the pleadings that are

and are not on file.

¶ 75 “[S]ummary judgment should be granted only where the pleadings, depositions,

admissions and affidavits on file, when viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving

party, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is

clearly entitled to judgment as a matter of law. [Citation.]” Pielet v. Pielet, 2012 IL 112064, ¶ 29.

This “formidable” standard (id. ¶ 54) has not been met in this case.

¶ 76 Instead, the majority and special concurrence rely on their own subjective inferences

(supra ¶ 21 (“The circuit court presumably proceeded this way because ***.”) (emphasis added);

supra ¶ 22 (“the parties’ and the court’s actions *** suggested that the parties were willing to

proceed with the case on the merits”) (emphasis added); supra ¶ 25 (“we find it highly unlikely

that the circuit court would proceed to enter substantive orders if Clark had objected to the

court’s jurisdiction”) (emphasis added)) and a statement by Jasmine’s counsel at argument on the

motion for summary judgment that her lawyer is withdrawing Jasmine’s contest to jurisdiction

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and allegedly “agreed the court had jurisdiction” (supra ¶ 24), neither of which are appropriate

bases on which to decide a motion for summary judgment.

“[T]he purpose of summary judgment is not to try questions of fact but simply to

determine if triable questions of fact exist. Summary judgment should not be

granted unless the moving party’s right to judgment is clear and free from doubt.

If the undisputed material facts could lead reasonable observers to divergent

inferences, or where there is a dispute as to a material fact, summary judgment

should be denied and the issue decided by the trier of fact.” Pielet, 2012 IL

112064, ¶ 53.

Coleman v. Provena Hospitals, 2018 IL App (2d) 170313, ¶ 15 (“Summary judgment

may be granted only where the facts are susceptible to a single reasonable inference.”).

¶ 77 Jasmine’s section 2-1401 motion argued that “[t]here is no evidence in the record or the

case that the parties ever consented for the State of Illinois to continue to exercise jurisdiction to

modify support ***.” Timothy’s motion for summary judgment argued that “Clark’s appearance

in open court without raising any objection to this Court’s jurisdiction to modify its June 18,

2012, Order is tantamount to Jasmine’s consent, in open court (pursuant to 750 ILCS 22/205),

that this Court retain continuing, exclusive jurisdiction to modify the order.” Timothy’s motion

for summary judgment does not argue that attorney Clark said or did anything else constituting

“consent in a record or in open court” to the circuit court’s continuing exclusive jurisdiction

other than appearing, requesting leave to file an appearance, seeking a continuance, and failing to

object to the circuit court’s orders. (Timothy’s motion also made an argument under the

revestment doctrine but he has abandoned that argument on appeal.) The summary judgment

order in this case found that the court “acquired jurisdiction over [Jasmine E.] (‘personal

26 1-24-1803

jurisdiction’) when Mr. Clark appeared in Court on her behalf.” The summary judgment order

erroneously relied on the principles stated in Zoglauer to support that conclusion.

¶ 78 Based on the trial court’s reliance on Zoglauer, we know that the trial court found that

Jasmine waived her objections to jurisdiction based on attorney Clark’s appearance. See In re

Estate of Zoglauer, 229 Ill. App. 3d 394, 397 (1992) (“Any action taken by a litigant which

recognizes the case being in court will amount to a general entry of appearance unless such

action was for the sole purpose of objecting to jurisdiction over the person.”). The only issue

before this court is whether, as a matter of law, seeking leave to file an appearance and a

continuance to answer the petition while not objecting to substantive orders is a waiver of

objection to jurisdiction as a matter of law. The fact that there may be other reasons to find that

the parties consented for Illinois to continue to exercise jurisdiction to modify support, and

dismiss Jasmine’s section 2-1401 motion, does not give this court license to affirm the summary

judgment order that is based on an erroneous application of the law. See Rayner Covering

Systems, Inc. v. Danvers Farmers Elevator Co., 226 Ill. App. 3d 507, 511 (1992). In that case,

the court stated:

“We also limit our consideration of Danvers’ arguments on appeal to those which

were also made to the trial court at the initial summary judgment hearing. See

Hux v. Raben (1967), 38 Ill. 2d 223, 225 (appellate court should not consider

different theories or new arguments if proof might have been offered to refute

them had they been presented at trial); Cardamone v. Allstate Insurance Co.

(1977), 49 Ill. App. 3d 435, 441 (the theory upon which a case is tried in the

lower court cannot be changed on review; an issue not presented to or considered

by the trial court cannot be raised for the first time on appeal).” Id.

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¶ 79 The majority and special concurrence allege that the statement in the summary judgment

order that during argument on the summary judgment motion an attorney for Jasmine stated that

Jasmine was not contesting jurisdiction is a reason to affirm the summary judgment order

because we may affirm the judgment for any reason contained in the record. However, that

summary judgment order on which they rely did not follow a hearing on Jasmine’s petition

alleging that she did not consent in a record or open court under UIFSA or to personal

jurisdiction generally; the order resulted from the argument that Attorney Clark’s request for

leave to file an appearance and time to plead and failure to object waived any objection to

personal jurisdiction. The doctrine that this court may affirm the summary judgment order on

any basis in the record does not apply because whether or not Jasmine’s attorney withdrew

Jasmine’s objection to jurisdiction, that statement does not support or refute the argument

Timothy made in the summary judgment motion or the basis of the circuit court’s summary

judgment order—that being that attorney Clark’s actions waived Jasmine’s objections to

jurisdiction. Jasmine’s attorney’s alleged statement addresses a completely different issue than

that raised and decided in the circuit court and creates a material question of fact concerning

consent in a record or open court. Therefore, this court should not address it, nor should it be

used to legitimize an erroneous trial court decision based on an authority superseded by statute

and case law. See id.

¶ 80 Furthermore, despite Timothy’s argument in the motion for summary judgment, the

circuit court did not decide whether these facts, accepting them as true, constitute “consent in a

record or in open court” pursuant to section 205(a)(2) of UIFSA. Nonetheless, the majority

concludes that the alleged facts constitute consent in a record and in open court pursuant to

section 205(a)(2) to affirm this summary judgment order. Supra ¶ 21. This court is reviewing the

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circuit court’s ruling on Timothy’s motion for summary judgment only, not Jasmine’s section 2-

1401 petition. The circuit court relied exclusively on the principles stated in Zoglauer, as

follows:

“25. [T]he Court also is cognizant that any action taken by a litigant which

recognizes the case being in Court will amount to a general appearance ***.

***

35. The Court acquired jurisdiction over [Jasmine E.] (‘personal jurisdiction’)

when Mr. Clark appeared in Court on her behalf. As noted above, this constituted

action by Jasmine at that time that the matter was in Court.”

¶ 81 The majority’s reliance on the fact Jasmine “agreed the circuit court had jurisdiction over

her” (supra ¶ 29; supra ¶¶ 47-48 (McBride, J., specially concurring)) is misplaced. The trial

court’s order granting Timothy’s motion for summary judgment finds:

“22. During the summary judgment argument, Jasmine’s counsel

conceded that they are not contesting jurisdiction but rather asserting due process

arguments about notice Jasmine may or may not have received.

25. While Jasmine waived this issue in her response to the Motion for

Summary Judgment wherein she admitted that Christoper Clark appeared on her

behalf, and further waived the issue in the argument against summary judgment

when she affirmatively stated that she agrees that the court had jurisdiction ***.”

¶ 82 Although the trial court made these observations, what is important in this case is that the

trial court did not rule for Timothy on the grounds that Jasmine waived her objections to

jurisdiction at the hearing on summary judgment. The trial court held that the mere appearance of

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the attorney in 2015 waived her objections to jurisdiction. This is the order appealed from. The

fact the trial court did not rule that Jasmine’s concession was the basis of his decision but instead

ruled the appearance in 2015 waived jurisdiction is controlling. This is the order appealed from

and the order we review de novo. The order was based on a case (Zoglauer) that was superseded

by statute, was not good law when the ruling was made, and is not good law now. If this order is

allowed to stand it will upset the protections of section 2-301 and lead to the reinstatement of

special appearances.

¶ 83 The majority opinion and special concurrence are based on a vague statement in the trial

court’s order, without the necessary context, that is subject to competing rational inferences

especially in light of the trial court’s express, erroneous reliance on Zoglauer. This makes

summary judgment inappropriate. See Coleman, 2018 IL App (2d) 170313, ¶ 15. The judgment

order on appeal and the trial court’s finding in paragraph 25 of that order came about a month

after the hearing wherein the alleged concession was made. But the trial court did not grant

summary judgment in favor of Timothy on the basis that Jasmine conceded that the circuit court

had jurisdiction, even though the alleged concession occurred only days earlier. The conclusion

that Jasmine willingly conceded at the hearing on the motion for summary judgment that the

circuit court had jurisdiction in December 2015 is far from “irrefutable” (supra ¶ 48 (McBride,

J., specially concurring)). Rather than demonstrating the absence of a genuine question of

material fact, the majority and special concurrence have amply demonstrated that questions of

fact remain that cannot be resolved on review of the trial court’s order granting summary

judgment simply by retreating to Foutch.

¶ 84 Whether Jasmine consented to the trial court’s continuing exclusive jurisdiction to

modify the trial support order pursuant to section 205(a)(2) was not the basis of the trial court’s

30 1-24-1803

summary judgment order nor is consent pursuant to section 205(a)(2) clearly established by “the

pleadings, and exhibits on file” in the proceedings. The conclusion that Jasmine consented to

continuing exclusive jurisdiction under UIFSA can only be made after an evidentiary hearing;

therefore, rather than affirming summary judgment due to an allegedly incomplete record, the

proper remedy is to reverse the grant of summary judgment. See Pielet, 2012 IL 112064, ¶ 53.

The majority has engaged in a desperate attempt to affirm the trial court’s order because it cannot

countenance the fact Jasmine initiated proceedings in Illinois, presumptively knew of ongoing

proceedings, and continued to accept child support payments based thereon, but only returned to

court to assert her rights after child support payments stopped. The adage “hard cases make bad

law” is fully at play here. See Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868, 899 (2009)

(Roberts, C.J., dissenting, joined by Scalia, Thomas, and Alito, JJ.) (“Extreme cases often test

the bounds of established legal principles. There is a cost to yielding to the desire to correct the

extreme case, rather than adhering to the legal principle. That cost has been demonstrated so

often that it is captured in a legal aphorism: ‘Hard cases make bad law.’ ”); People v. Chevalier,

131 Ill. 2d 66, 74 (1989). Jasmine acted within her rights.

¶ 85 For the following reasons, I would reverse the order granting appellee Timothy J.

summary judgment on appellant Jasmine E.’s motion to vacate the 2015 through 2017 orders,

modifying child support as void, because a review of the record does not clearly show that the

trial court had personal jurisdiction over Jasmine pursuant to section 205(a)(2) of UIFSA or this

court’s civil practice rules.

¶ 86 On October 5, 2015, Timothy filed a petition seeking to modify the 2012 child support

order entered by an Illinois court. When Timothy filed his petition to modify the Illinois support

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order, he resided in the State of Texas. The mother, Jasmine, and the minor child resided in the

State of Georgia.

¶ 87 Timothy never served Jasmine with a summons or service by publication but simply sent

notice of the hearing to Jasmine by United States mail to her address in Georgia. On December

9, 2015, a hearing was set on Timothy’s petition. Attorney Clark appeared at that hearing and

requested leave to file an appearance and additional time for Jasmine to respond to Timothy’s

petition. The trial court entered orders modifying Timothy’s child support obligation.

¶ 88 In June 2023, Jasmine filed her “Motion To Vacate Void Order Entered on July 25,

2017” pursuant to section 2-1401 of the Code and UIFSA. Jasmine’s motion argued that the

orders modifying child support must be vacated due to the lack of jurisdiction and due to

improper notice to Jasmine. Timothy filed a motion for summary judgment alleging that, as a

matter of law, an attorney’s appearance at the December 9, 2015, hearing to request a

continuance and time to answer or otherwise plead to the petition to modify child support

constituted a waiver of objections to personal jurisdiction and consent for the Illinois court to

modify the 2012 child support order.

¶ 89 The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Timothy, citing Zoglauer, 229 Ill.

App. 3d at 397, in support of its decision that the appearance in court by Jasmine’s attorney

waived objections to personal jurisdiction. Zoglauer held that any act recognizing a case as being

in court is a submission to personal jurisdiction. Id. The basis for the holding in Zoglauer had

been superseded by statute and case law when the court made its ruling. In re Marriage of

Schmitt, 321 Ill. App. 3d 360, 366 (2001).

¶ 90 Jasmine appealed. Jasmine, the appellant, argued that the trial court did not have subject

matter jurisdiction pursuant to section 205(a)(2) because she never willingly submitted herself to

32 1-24-1803

the court’s jurisdiction. Jasmine equated willing submission to personal jurisdiction with the

“consent” required by section 205(a)(2).

¶ 91 Jasmine argued that the trial court did not have personal jurisdiction during the 2015

through 2017 modification proceedings because (1) Jasmine did not admit that Clark attended

court “at her behest” and (2) even if Clark did appear at Jasmine’s request, that appearance was

“without legal effect” as to personal jurisdiction. Timothy argued that “the trial court acquired

personal jurisdiction over Jasmine when Attorney Clark appeared in court on her behalf.”

Timothy did not dispute that Jasmine’s consent pursuant to section 205(a)(2) must be established

by consent in open court. Timothy argued that “Jasmine consented to the court’s continuing,

exclusive jurisdiction through her affirmative action of having Attorney Clark appear in court on

her behalf.” Timothy further argued that “Attorney Clark’s appearance on behalf of Jasmine at

the December 9, 2015 hearing without objecting to the court’s jurisdiction, constituted her

consent in open court to the trial court’s jurisdiction.” To support his argument on appeal,

Timothy also relied on the principle stated in Zoglauer.

¶ 92 Jasmine argued that in granting summary judgment in favor of Timothy, the trial court

erroneously relied on the principles stated in Zoglauer. Jasmine correctly argued that the

principles stated in Zoglauer have been superseded by section 2-301 of the Code. The basis of

the trial court’s summary judgment order was incorrect. At that point, this court should find that

the trial court erred by relying on Zoglauer and that Jasmine did not file a responsive pleading or

motion prior to raising objections to jurisdiction and reverse the summary judgment order for the

trial court to consider other matters that may involve genuine disputes as to material facts.

Nonetheless, this court may affirm a trial court’s judgment on any basis supported by the record.

33 1-24-1803

Supra ¶ 35 (McBride, J., specially concurring). The bases of the majority and special

concurrence’s decisions are not supported by the record or applicable law.

¶ 93 Applying the correctly applicable law stated in section 2-301 of the Code, rather than

Zoglauer, Jasmine also argued on appeal that under section 2-301 a party waives an objection to

the trial court’s personal jurisdiction when that party “files a responsive pleading or a motion

(other than a motion for an extension of time to answer or otherwise appear) prior to the filing of

a motion” objecting to the court’s jurisdiction over the party’s person (735 ILCS 5/2-301(a-5)

(West 2014)) or if that party files an appearance and makes substantive arguments on the merits

without first objecting to personal jurisdiction (Municipal Trust & Savings Bank v. Moriarty,

2021 IL 126290, ¶ 25). Because any alleged voluntary submission to personal jurisdiction

occurred in 2015, the statute in effect at that time applies to this question. Jasmine argued that

because she filed no appearance, nor any responsive pleading, she never submitted herself to the

trial court’s personal jurisdiction under our civil practice rules. Jasmine then equated this lack of

voluntary submission to the “consent” required by section 205(a)(2) and argued that “[a]s such,

[(because she filed no appearance nor responsive pleading),] Jasmine never submitted herself to

the circuit court’s jurisdiction in 2015-2017 and never consented to the circuit court’s exercise of

subject matter jurisdiction over Timothy’s modification proceedings pursuant to 750 ILCS

22/205(a)(2).”

¶ 94 There are two questions: (1) did Jasmine voluntarily submit to the trial court’s personal

jurisdiction under our civil practice rules and (2) did Jasmine consent to the trial court’s

“continuing exclusive jurisdiction” to modify Timothy’s child support obligation pursuant to

section 205(a)(2) of UIFSA, either because she voluntarily submitted to the trial court’s personal

jurisdiction or otherwise.

34 1-24-1803

¶ 95 The trial court had subject matter jurisdiction over the justiciable matter of Timothy’s

petition to modify child support pursuant to the Illinois Constitution. Supra ¶ 50 (McBride, J.,

specially concurring). The first question Jasmine raised on appeal was whether Jasmine

voluntarily submitted to personal jurisdiction under our civil practice rules—and, therefore,

whether any such voluntary submission constituted consent under UIFSA. There is no dispute

that the answer to the question is “no.”

¶ 96 Jasmine’s attorney did not perform any act on December 9, 2015, that, under the statute,

would constitute a waiver of the right to contest personal jurisdiction and, therefore, would

constitute a voluntary submission to the circuit court’s personal jurisdiction. The record reveals

that, at the hearing, attorney Clark requested leave to file an appearance and time to file a

response to the petition. However, we can determine from the record, and there is no dispute, that

no appearance or response was ever filed. The trial court entered orders modifying the Illinois

child support order. Under the law as it existed on December 9, 2015, even though the trial court

entered orders adverse to the interest of his client, under the statute, attorney Clark was not

required to affirmatively object, file a special appearance, or notify the court that Jasmine was

objecting to jurisdiction.

¶ 97 Although the trial court entered substantive orders against the interest of his client,

attorney Clark did no more than what the statute stated he could do—appear to request a

continuance for time to respond—without waiving his client’s objections to personal jurisdiction.

His client’s objection to personal jurisdiction was not waived because (1) he did not file a

responsive pleading or motion before contesting jurisdiction and (2) general appearances had

been abolished by the legislature. Nothing placed the attorney on notice that he was required to

object to the trial court’s orders to preserve his client’s objection to personal jurisdiction pursuant

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to section 2-301(a-5) of the Code (735 ILCS 5/2-301(a-5) (West 2014)). Moreover, at oral

argument in this case, counsel for Timothy, under questioning, conceded that attorney Clark’s

actions were not sufficient to waive objections to personal jurisdiction pursuant to section 2-301.

¶ 98 Because Jasmine did not voluntarily submit to the circuit court’s jurisdiction under our

civil practice rules, the only question that remains is whether the record clearly shows Jasmine’s

consent pursuant to section 205(a)(2). It does not. Whether or not section 205(a)(2) “is the more

particular” jurisdictional provision (supra ¶ 61 (McBride, J., specially concurring)), that

provision is the purported basis of the majority’s decision, and the majority has, by its own

admission, created a new interpretation of the consent provision in that statute heretofore

unknown in our law (supra ¶ 17 (“We have found no Illinois authority addressing which actions

or representation constitute explicit consent to jurisdiction under section 205(a)(2).”)), to

Jamine’s detriment, based on a legally erroneous statutory construction.

¶ 99 “Consent in open court” is not defined for purposes of section 205(a)(2). “Consent” for

purposes of section 205(a)(2) must be affirmative. (Timothy’s argument concedes as much.) The

required “consent” by a party cannot be based on the party’s and the circuit court’s action or

inaction other than some affirmative manifestation in open court of consent to continuing

exclusive jurisdiction to modify the child support order. This court may not “read a statute in a

way that renders any part superfluous or meaningless. [Citation.] Rather, it should read the

statute as a whole and give effect to every word, clause, and sentence.” Mercado v. S&C Electric

Co., 2025 IL 129526, ¶ 20. The “consent *** in open court” requirement must mean something

more than a party’s or a party’s attorney’s appearance at the proceedings (without filing an

appearance—which attorney Clark did not do) and the entry of substantive orders. If all that was

36 1-24-1803

required to “consent in open court” was the party’s appearance in court without objecting, then

the requirement for “consent” in a record or in open court would be meaningless.

¶ 100 Furthermore, any other construction of section 205(a)(2) would place the statute

in conflict with both section 2-301 of the Code and sections 201 and 202 of UIFSA. “Even when

an apparent conflict between statutes exists, they must be construed in harmony with one another

if reasonably possible.” Knolls Condominium Ass’n v. Harms, 202 Ill. 2d 450, 459 (2002). Both

section 201 of UIFSA and section 2-301 of the Code relate to voluntary submission to personal

jurisdiction. Sections 201 and 202 of UIFSA read, in pertinent part, as follows:

“(a) In a proceeding to establish or enforce a support order ***, a tribunal

of this State may exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident individual ***

if:

(2) the individual submits to the jurisdiction of this State by consent, by

entering a general appearance, or by filing a responsive document having the

effect of waiving any contest to personal jurisdiction[.]” 750 ILCS 22/201(a)

(West 2014).

“Personal jurisdiction acquired by a tribunal of this State in a proceeding under

this Act or other law of this State relating to a support order continues as long as a

tribunal of this State has continuing, exclusive jurisdiction to modify its order or

continuing jurisdiction to enforce its order as provided by Sections 205, 206, and

211.” (Emphases added.) Id. § 202.

¶ 101 The applicable version of section 2-301 of the Code provided as follows:

37 1-24-1803

“(a) Prior to the filing of any other pleading or motion other than a motion

for an extension of time to answer or otherwise appear, a party may object to the

court’s jurisdiction over the party’s person ***. ***

(a-5) If the objecting party files a responsive pleading or a motion (other

than a motion for an extension of time to answer or otherwise appear) prior to the

filing of a motion in compliance with subsection (a), that party waives all

objections to the court’s jurisdiction over the party’s person.” 735 ILCS 5/2-

301(a)-(a-5) (West 2014).

¶ 102 Section 201(a) of UIFSA and section 2-301(a) of the Code contain similar language.

“Because the statutes deal with similar subject matter, we further assume that by using the same

language in [each], the legislature intended for [them] to be construed and applied similarly.”

In re Estate of Wilson, 238 Ill. 2d 519, 564 (2010). Construing all of these statutory provisions

harmoniously, consent in open court cannot be construed to mean that a party voluntarily

consents to the circuit court’s continuing, exclusive jurisdiction by appearing in court and failing

to object to substantive orders—without filing an appearance, a responsive pleading, or a

motion—because that construction puts section 205(a)(2) in conflict with existing law and

statutes. It is possible to construe section 205 and 202 of UIFSA harmoniously with section 201

of UIFSA and section 2-301 of the Code by, at minimum, construing “consent in open court” to

require something more than merely showing up in court and taking no further action than

requesting a continuance to answer or otherwise plead.

¶ 103 The fact that attorney Clark requested a continuance to answer Timothy’s petition, did

not file an appearance, and did not file any substantive motions, is discernible from the record.

There is no record of what attorney Clark said in open court in 2015. However, Timothy does

38 1-24-1803

not argue that attorney Clark did anything at the 2015 hearing to constitute a waiver to

jurisdiction other than request a continuance for time to plead. Significantly, as stated earlier,

Timothy conceded at oral argument that attorney Clark did nothing to submit to jurisdiction at

that hearing under section 2-301. Indeed, the only suggestion made by anyone in this case that

attorney Clark did something at the 2015 hearing other than ask for time to file a response came

from this court when it invoked Foutch. “Foutch does not stand for the proposition that a

reviewing court must affirm every time any portion of a trial record is not included on appeal.

Rather, an appellant need only include those portions of the record necessary ‘to support a claim

of error.’ Foutch, 99 Ill. 2d at 391-92.” People v. Colasurdo, 2020 IL App (3d) 190356, ¶ 40.

Even with a deficiency in the record, “[a] reviewing court must ascertain its jurisdiction before

proceeding in a cause of action, regardless of whether either party has raised the issue.” Secura

Insurance Co. v. Illinois Farmers Insurance Co., 232 Ill. 2d 209, 213 (2009). “Summary

judgment is a drastic means of disposing of litigation and, therefore, should be granted only

where the right of the moving party is clear and free from doubt.” Lewis v. Lead Industries Ass’n,

2020 IL 124107, ¶ 15. For the reasons explained above, nothing attorney Clark did or did not do,

and nothing the trial court did, waived Jasmine’s objections to personal jurisdiction or could

constitute the required consent under section 205(a)(2). Even construing the deficiency in the

record against Jasmine, the record is sufficient to support Jasmine’s claim of error because the

record does not clearly show that the trial court had personal jurisdiction over Jasmine.

Timothy’s right to summary judgment on Jasmine’s motion to vacate void orders is far from

clear and free from doubt.

¶ 104 Furthermore, any construction of the statute finding that what occurred in this case

constitutes “consent in open court” for purposes of section 205(a)(2) is a new construction of the

39 1-24-1803

statute that was never argued by the parties or considered by the trial court. The fundamental

requirements of due process are notice and an opportunity to present any objections. People v.

Cardona, 2013 IL 114076, ¶ 15. Creating this new rule in this manner takes away any

foreseeable opportunity for Jasmine to have challenged personal jurisdiction. If the court is to

create a new rule, it should not apply to Jasmine. GreenPoint Mortgage Funding, Inc. v.

Poniewozik, 2014 IL App (1st) 132864, ¶ 22 (“[A] procedural statute will not be applied

retroactively if it would have a retroactive impact, such that it: (1) impairs rights that a party

possessed when it acted ***.”). Under the law that existed at the time, Jasmine had a right to

appear in court without waiving her objection to personal jurisdiction, so long as she did not file

a responsive pleading or motion before objecting to personal jurisdiction. Neither Jasmine nor

her attorney had notice that they had to inform the trial court that Jasmine would object to

jurisdiction (in other words, file a special appearance) or object to the trial court’s adverse orders

to preserve Jasmine’s objection to personal jurisdiction. Affirming the trial court’s order granting

summary judgment in favor of Timothy under a new method of consenting pursuant to section

205(a)(2) or waiving objections to personal jurisdiction without notice to Jasmine and without an

opportunity to be heard on the new method of waiver and “consent” would deprive Jasmine of

her right to object, without due process of law. See Haswell v. Powell, 38 Ill. 2d 161, 164 (1967)

(the requirements of due process are met by giving notice and the opportunity to be heard).

¶ 105 The trial court’s order granting summary judgment in favor of Timothy on Jasmine’s

section 2-1401 motion should be reversed and the cause remanded for further proceedings. On

remand, the parties should be directed to conduct an evidentiary hearing on what occurred on

December 9, 2015, so that the court can determine whether attorney Clark made an affirmative

manifestation of consent to the circuit court’s continuing, exclusive jurisdiction to modify the

40 1-24-1803

child support order (conferring personal jurisdiction pursuant to section 202 of UIFSA through

section 205(a)(2) because such action constitutes “consent in open court”) or made any

substantive oral motions (waiving objections to jurisdiction pursuant to section 2-301).

¶ 106 The majority finds that the circuit court had jurisdiction pursuant to section 205(a)(2)

“because her attorney, Clark, appeared in court on December 9, 2015, and

the following events occurred when he was present in court on that date:

(1) Clark sought and was granted leave to file his appearance, (2) Clark

did not object to jurisdiction or indicate that he would do so, (3) the court

entered substantive orders temporarily modifying child support obligations

without objection from Jasmine’s attorney, (4) the circuit court set due

dates for Jasmine’s response and issuance of written discovery, and (5) the

court set a hearing on the petition to modify child support and petition to

determine arrears.” (Emphases in original.) Supra ¶ 25.

¶ 107 I disagree with the majority’s conclusions because, for the reasons explained above, I

believe that the majority’s construction of section 205(a)(2) is erroneous. The majority

acknowledges that attorney Clark did not file a written appearance—nor did he file a pleading or

a motion, make substantive arguments on the merits, or request relief other than an extension of

time to plead. Yet the majority finds that Jasmine, because attorney Clark did not object when

the court issued rulings adverse to his client, voluntarily submitted and consented to the circuit

court’s jurisdiction. This decision is clearly contrary to law. Section 2-301 of the Code (735

ILCS 5/2-301(a-5) (West 2014)) expressly allowed the attorney to do what he did in this case—

appear and request a continuance and time to respond—without waiving objections to personal

jurisdiction. The answer to the question of whether attorney Clark “consented in a record or in

41 1-24-1803

open court” to continuing exclusive jurisdiction is not clear and free from doubt, based on the

facts and the law.

¶ 108 The majority also asserts that when an attorney files a written appearance and appears in

court at a hearing on a motion, that appearance constitutes voluntary submission to the circuit

court’s personal jurisdiction and waives any objection to personal jurisdiction. Supra ¶ 20. In

support of its conclusion, the majority relied on Municipal Trust, 2021 IL 126290, ¶ 25, where

our supreme court held that the defendant “voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of the court

*** when he filed a written appearance and appeared in court on plaintiff’s motion to confirm

sale.” The court held that by doing so, the defendant “waived any objection to the circuit court’s

personal jurisdiction prospectively only; his appearance did not retroactively validate void orders

entered prior to” the voluntary submission. Id. (citing BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP v.

Mitchell, 2014 IL 116311, ¶ 44). Municipal Trust supports Jasmine’s argument.

¶ 109 In Municipal Trust, the hearing was for confirmation of a foreclosure sale, the defendant

filed a written appearance, and the defendant requested “that he be given 30 days to redeem the

property” in foreclosure. Id. ¶¶ 6-8. The circuit court granted the motion for confirmation, and

after that, the defendant filed a section 2-1401 petition arguing that the circuit court lacked

personal jurisdiction over him. Id. ¶¶ 8-9. The plaintiff argued that the defendant “voluntarily

submitted to the circuit court’s jurisdiction when he appeared, participated, and requested relief

at the hearing on plaintiff’s motion to confirm sale.” (Emphasis added.) Id. ¶ 24. In Municipal

Trust, it is clear that the supreme construed the statute on waiver of objections to personal

jurisdiction and determined that, in that case, an oral motion, rather than a written motion,

seeking substantive relief, satisfies the requirement of the statute that a substantive motion filed

before objecting to jurisdiction waives the objection. Although our supreme court construed the

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statute, that does not give the appellate court license to rule in direct contradiction to the statute

as the majority does here.

¶ 110 The majority’s holding also means that Jasmine should have objected or raised her

objection to jurisdiction sooner because the trial court made substantive rulings adverse to her.

However, the legislature has not put a time limit on when a party must file an objection to

personal jurisdiction. In fact, so long as the objection has not been waived, a party may raise an

objection to personal jurisdiction at any time. West Suburban Bank v. Advantage Financial

Partners, LLC, 2019 IL App (1st) 170831-U, ¶ 34 (“Objections to personal-jurisdiction can be

raised at any time *** but those objections may be waived by the defendant.” (Emphasis in

original.) (citing People v. Matthews, 2016 IL 118114, ¶ 18)).

¶ 111 The legislature has imposed time limits on objections to jurisdiction in other cases. For

example, in mortgage foreclosure cases, the legislature provided that a challenge to jurisdiction

must be filed within 60 days of participating in a hearing. GreenPoint Mortgage Funding, 2014

IL App (1st) 132864, ¶ 1 (“a motion to quash service of process in a residential foreclosure

action must be brought within 60 days of the date that the moving party files an appearance or

participates in a hearing without filing an appearance”). This limitation only applies in mortgage

foreclosure cases by statute; this court noted that without this specific law imposed by the

legislature, a litigant could object to personal jurisdiction even after a judgment was entered

against the party. Id. ¶ 21. There, the court held:

“Defendant may have expected that he would be able to challenge service of

process long after the foreclosure was complete, as would have been the case

when section 2-301 alone governed the process for objecting to the court’s

personal jurisdiction in foreclosure proceedings (735 ILCS 5/2-301 (West 2010)).

43 1-24-1803

Under section 2-301, because defendant had not filed a responsive pleading and

had only filed a motion for extension of time to answer, there would have been no

firm deadline for him to challenge service of process. See 735 ILCS 5/2-301(a),

(a-5) (West 2010).” Id.

¶ 112 The legislature chose not to include a time restriction on a litigant’s right to object to

personal jurisdiction pursuant to section 2-301 or prescribe the time in which an adverse party to

a motion pursuant to section 205(a)(2) had to consent to the circuit court’s continuing exclusive

jurisdiction or object. Because the legislature did not include any time restrictions in the statutes

at issue, only waiver provisions, the legislature did not intend for a timing requirement to apply.

Palos Community Hospital v. Humana Insurance Co., 2021 IL 126008, ¶ 33 (“The legislature

knows how to include explicit timing requirements into a statute when that is its intent. The

General Assembly’s decision not to include such language *** demonstrates that it did not

intend for the statute to contain that type of ‘protective measure.’ [Citation.]”).

¶ 113 The majority also finds that Jasmine forfeited her challenge to personal jurisdiction

“because she appeared in court through counsel and filed a response to Timothy’s summary

judgment motion that did not challenge personal jurisdiction.” Supra ¶ 24. That conclusion is

contrary to the law. The majority relies on Johnson v. Ingalls Memorial Hospital, 402 Ill. App.

3d 830, 842 (2010). However, based on the authorities, including Ingalls Memorial Hospital, it is

the timing of the responsive pleading that matters. “[S]ubsequent filings after an objection to

personal jurisdiction has been made do not result in forfeiture of the defendant’s jurisdiction

objection.” Cardenas Marketing Network, Inc. v. Pabon, 2012 IL App (1st) 111645, ¶ 26.

Jasmine’s response to Timothy’s motion for summary judgment followed Jasmine’s motion to

vacate for lack of jurisdiction. Jasmine’s pleadings after the filing of the motion to vacate do not

44 1-24-1803

“equate to a general appearance that would result in a waiver of the jurisdictional objection.”

Roberson v. SSM Health St. Mary’s Hospital, 2023 IL App (5th) 220746-U, ¶ 17; Schmitt, 321

Ill. App. 3d at 366 (“as long as the party files the motion or other responsive pleading after he or

she objects to the court’s jurisdiction over the party’s person, the party does not waive its

objections to the court’s jurisdiction over the party’s person”). Nor should it waive Jasmine’s

right to object on the ground that she did not consent pursuant to section 205(a)(2).

¶ 114 Furthermore, whether Jasmine stated in 2024 that she was no longer contesting

jurisdiction is irrelevant to the outcome of this appeal. The majority finds that “[w]hen Jasmine

withdrew her jurisdictional objection, all that remained was her consent to jurisdiction under

section 205(a)(2). Jasmine’s consent to jurisdiction under section 205(a)(2), which applies to this

case specifically, controls over any attempt to object to jurisdiction under the more general

provisions of the Code.” Supra ¶ 29.

¶ 115 First, as to any suggestion of forfeiture, Jasmine argued on appeal that attorney Clark’s

“mere attendance in court on one occasion would not give the [circuit] court personal jurisdiction

over Jasmine.” Jasmine specifically argued on appeal that she did not voluntarily submit herself

to the court’s jurisdiction. Our supreme court has held that “it is well settled that ‘[a] judgment,

order or decree entered by a court which lacks jurisdiction of the parties *** is void, and may be

attacked at any time or in any court, either directly or collaterally.’ ” Sarkissian v. Chicago

Board of Education, 201 Ill. 2d 95, 103 (2002) (quoting Barnard v. Michael, 392 Ill. 130, 135

(1945)). Therefore, Jasmine could collaterally attack the trial court’s judgment for lack of

jurisdiction in this appeal. Morey Fish Co. v. Rymer Foods, Inc., 158 Ill. 2d 179, 186-87 (1994)

(“a judgment rendered by a court which fails to acquire jurisdiction over either the parties or the

subject matter of the litigation may be attacked and vacated at any time or in any court”).

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Additionally, the court has an independent duty to determine its jurisdiction in any case. Secura

Insurance Co., 232 Ill. 2d at 213.

¶ 116 Second, as stated above, I disagree with the conclusion that it is irrefutable, or that the

record is clear and free from doubt, that Jasmine’s attorney made an unbidden statement that the

circuit court had jurisdiction in December 2015. Nor do I agree that attorney Clark voluntarily

submitted Jasmine to the circuit court’s jurisdiction in December 2015. Thus, arguendo, even if

Jasmine’s attorney’s statement is construed as a voluntary submission to personal jurisdiction in

2024, such submission only acts prospectively. “[O]ur supreme court recently reaffirmed that

‘ “a party who submits to the court’s jurisdiction does so only prospectively and the appearance

does not retroactively validate orders entered prior to that date.” ’ [Citations.]” John Isfan

Construction, Inc. v. Longwood Towers, LLC, 2016 IL App (1st) 143211, ¶ 42 (quoting BAC

Home Loans, 2014 IL 116311, ¶ 43). The special concurrence concludes that because Jasmine

admitted that the circuit court had jurisdiction in December 2015, the rule that her concession at

the summary judgment hearing operates only prospectively has no application in this case.

Because I disagree with the basis of that finding, I disagree with that conclusion. Instead, I would

follow the rule that any submission to jurisdiction in this case is prospective only.

¶ 117 In BAC Home Loans, our supreme court stated without limitation that “a party who

submits to the court’s jurisdiction does so only prospectively and the appearance does not

retroactively validate orders entered prior to that date.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) BAC

Home Loans, 2014 IL 116311, ¶ 43. Although the court cited Verdung in support of that

conclusion, our supreme court recognized that the amendment in 2000 to section 2-301 of the

Code controlled the question of whether a voluntary submission applies prospectively only. Id.

¶ 38 (“We conclude that the amended statute is ambiguous as to the effect of a party’s waiver on

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prior orders entered without personal jurisdiction.”). The court found that

“there is no indication from the legislative history that the amendment was

intended to alter the existing law on the effect of waiver of objections to personal

jurisdiction. The amendment to section 2-301 was intended to provide additional

protection of a defendant’s right to assert an objection to the court’s personal

jurisdiction by preventing unknowing waiver.” Id. ¶ 42.

¶ 118 Thus, while “the fundamental rationale of our rule providing for prospective-only

submission to the court’s jurisdiction, namely, to avoid ‘depriv[ing] the defendant of his day in

court’ [Citation.]” (id. ¶ 43) remained intact, the “amendment to section 2-301 was [also]

intended to provide additional protection of a defendant’s right to assert an objection to the

court’s personal jurisdiction by preventing unknowing waiver” (id. ¶ 42).

“When construing a statute, our primary objective is to ascertain and give

effect to the intent of the legislature. [Citation.] The most reliable indicator of

legislative intent is the statutory language, given its plain and ordinary meaning.

[Citation.] In determining the statute’s plain meaning, we consider the subject it

addresses and the legislature’s purpose in enacting it. [Citation.]” Id. ¶ 33.

¶ 119 “The statute does not state that the waiver is intended to validate orders entered prior to

service of process or the party’s voluntary submission to the court’s jurisdiction.” Id. ¶ 35. The

statute does not contain an exception for situations in which the party had notice of the

proceedings and an opportunity to be heard. Supra ¶ 59 (McBride, J., specially concurring)

(Jasmine “did not appear late in these proceedings. She appeared early on through her attorney

Clark, and she had an opportunity to be heard.”)). “A judgment rendered without service of

process, either by summons or by publication and mailing, where there has been neither a waiver

47 1-24-1803

of process nor a general appearance by the defendant, is void regardless of whether the defendant

had actual knowledge of the proceedings.” State Bank of Lake Zurich v. Thill, 113 Ill. 2d 294,

308 (1986). As found by our supreme court,

“The statute plainly provides that a party waives ‘all objections’ to the court’s

personal jurisdiction by filing a responsive pleading or motion before challenging

the court’s jurisdiction. Under section 2-301(a), the waiver of objections to

personal jurisdiction is comprehensive when a party submits to the court’s

jurisdiction by initially filing a responsive pleading or motion.” BAC Home

Loans, 2014 IL 116311, ¶ 34.

¶ 120 By limiting the ways in which a party waives all objections to personal jurisdiction to the

filing of a responsive pleading or motion or the making of a substantive argument on the merits,

the statute protects parties from inadvertently submitting to the circuit court’s jurisdiction by, for

example, appearing to request a continuance or simply remaining in the courtroom while the trial

court enters substantive orders without objecting. Id. ¶ 40 (discussing purpose behind eliminating

distinction between general and special appearance). Indeed, in a number of cases where a

defendant’s participation was greater than Jasmine’s attorney’s, courts have interpreted Illinois

law to hold that the participation in those cases did not waive objections to personal jurisdiction

because no pleading or motion was filed before the defendant objected to jurisdiction.

¶ 121 In KSAC Corp. v. Recycle Free, Inc., 364 Ill. App. 3d 593, 593-94, 597 (2006), the

defendant’s attorney filed an appearance and jury demand and participated in discovery before

asserting its objections to personal jurisdiction. The KSAC Corp. court found that neither “filing

a jury demand nor responding to a discovery request fits the description of either a pleading or a

48 1-24-1803

motion,” so the “defendant’s actions *** did not result in waiver of its objection to personal

jurisdiction.” Id. at 597.

¶ 122 In Larochelle v. Allamian, 361 Ill. App. 3d 217, 220 (2005), the defendant filed an

appearance, and the defendant’s first pleading was a motion for an extension of time and page

length regarding its expected motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction and for failure to

state a claim. The court found that the defendant did not waive a challenge to the trial court’s

personal jurisdiction. Id. at 220-21.

¶ 123 I disagree with the conclusion that “the circuit court’s jurisdiction was established”

(supra ¶ 60 (McBride, J., specially concurring)) because I disagree that the only reasonable

inference from the pleadings and record on file is that Jasmine voluntarily, irrefutably conceded

that the circuit court had jurisdiction in December 2015. See supra ¶ 19. Therefore, Jasmine’s

statements in 2024 cannot validate the trial court’s orders entered in 2015 through 2017 that were

without personal jurisdiction. See Bank of America, N.A. v. Beauvoir, 2014 IL App (1st) 130580-

U, ¶ 24 (“our supreme court put an end to the debate, holding that a party’s voluntary submission

to the circuit court’s personal jurisdiction is prospective-only and does not retroactively validate

prior orders entered without jurisdiction”). The majority’s claim that Jasmine’s later “concession

did not retroactively create consent to jurisdiction for the 2017 modification order” (supra ¶ 24)

is belied by its holding that Jasmine’s concession in 2024 forfeited Jasmine’s challenge to

personal jurisdiction in 2015. The finding that Jasmine waived any claim that the trial court did

not have personal jurisdiction in 2015, based on Jasmine’s attorney’s statement in 2024 that the

trial court did have personal jurisdiction in this case, works as a retroactive validation of prior

orders entered without personal jurisdiction, which is strictly forbidden. BAC Home Loans, 2014

IL 116311, ¶ 43 (“We, therefore, reaffirm the longstanding rule that ‘a party who submits to the

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court’s jurisdiction does so only prospectively and the appearance does not retroactively validate

orders entered prior to that date.’ [Citation.]”).

¶ 124 This decision will wreak havoc on Illinois law. As a consequence of this decision, wary

practitioners can no longer rely on the guarantee of the statute that objections to jurisdiction are

waived only if a responsive pleading or motion is filed before contesting jurisdiction because,

under this decision, this court or some other court can make up its own rules for when the

objection to jurisdiction is waived. Courts may not properly construe a statute by altering its

language in a way that constitutes a change in the plain meaning of the words actually adopted

by the legislature. U.S. Bank National Ass’n v. Clark, 216 Ill. 2d 334, 346 (2005).

¶ 125 I find that Jasmine did not consent to the circuit court’s jurisdiction pursuant to section

205(a)(2) on December 9, 2015, nor did she waive her objections to personal jurisdiction by

requesting a continuance for time to plead. Because Jasmine did not consent to the circuit court’s

continuing exclusive jurisdiction to modify its child support order on December 9, 2015, the

circuit court did not have personal jurisdiction over Jasmine on December 9, 2015, pursuant to

section 202 of UIFSA. Furthermore, because Jasmine did not waive her objection to the circuit

court’s personal jurisdiction by filing a responsive pleading or a motion, Jasmine did not

voluntarily submit to the circuit court’s jurisdiction under any rule of this state. I would reverse

the order granting summary judgment and remand for further proceedings on Jasmine’s motion.

¶ 126 I respectfully dissent.

50 1-24-1803

In re Parentage of Jade J., 2025 IL App (1st) 241803

Decision Under Review: Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County, No. 09-D- 91417; the Hon. James Kaplan and the Hon. William Yu, Judges, presiding.

Attorneys Myra A. Foutris, of Foutris Law Office, Ltd., of Chicago, for for appellant. Appellant:

Attorneys Matthew C. Arnoux, of Arnoux Sharma Standeford, LLC, of for Chicago, for appellee. Appellee: