In Re Oliver

222 B.R. 272, 40 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d 725, 1998 Bankr. LEXIS 823, 1998 WL 388990
CourtUnited States Bankruptcy Court, E.D. Virginia
DecidedMay 13, 1998
Docket19-70334
StatusPublished
Cited by19 cases

This text of 222 B.R. 272 (In Re Oliver) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Bankruptcy Court, E.D. Virginia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In Re Oliver, 222 B.R. 272, 40 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d 725, 1998 Bankr. LEXIS 823, 1998 WL 388990 (Va. 1998).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM OPINION

MARTIN V.B. BOSTETTER, Jr., Chief Judge.

Today we consider the Chapter 13 Trustee’s (the “Trustee”) motion for guidance^ Mr. Gerald O’Donnell was appointed Trustee in this Chapter 13 case that was filed by the debtor, Victor Oliver, on May 9, 1997. On January 29, 1998, the Trustee moved to dismiss the case pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§ 1307(c)(6) and (c)(8). This Court granted the motion and the order dismissing the case was entered on February 17, 1998. A plan was never confirmed in this case prior to dismissal.

This court has jurisdiction over the parties and subject matter of this core proceeding pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(A). Venue is proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1409.

Currently, the Trustee holds funds in the amount of $10,876.04 that were paid by the debtor to the Trustee pending confirmation of a plan. The case was dismissed prior to the Trustee making any payments because a plan was never confirmed. An order was signed by this Court simultaneously with the order of dismissal granting the debtor’s counsel an award of attorney’s fees and expenses to be paid from the funds. Following the order of dismissal, but prior to the closing report and return of such payments to the debtor, the Trustee was served with a Garnishment summons in Case NO. CL96-849 in the Circuit Court of Fairfax County where the case Bricks, Blocks & Concrete Co., Inc. v. Victor Oliver was pending. Thereafter, the Trustee moved this court for guidance under 11 U.S.C. § 1326(a)(2) as to the disposition of the funds that were never paid out under a plan.

The issue raised by this case is whether the money held by the Trustee should be returned to the debtor or distributed to the debtor’s creditors, and whether the debtor’s attorney should be paid her attorney’s fees and expenses from the funds.

Section 1326(a)(2) provides:

A payment made under this subsection shall be retained by the trustee until confirmation or denial of confirmation of a plan. If a plan is confirmed, the trustee shall distribute any such payment in accordance with the plan. If a plan is not confirmed, the trustee shall return any such payment to the debtor, after deducting any unpaid claim allowed under section 503(b) of this title.

11 U.S.C. § 1326(a)(2) (1994) (emphasis added).

It is well settled that in matters of statutory construction, courts should look to the plain meaning of the statute and should only go beyond the literal meaning if it appears that the outcome would be contrary to the purpose of the statute. United States v. Ron Pair Enterprises, Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 242, 109 S.Ct. 1026, 103 L.Ed.2d 290 (1989). Here, the language of the statute is clear, the Trustee shall return any payment to the debtor if the plan is not confirmed after paying administrative expenses. 11 U.S.C. § 1326(a)(2).

Many courts interpreting this section have reached the conclusion that when a Trustee is holding undistributed funds paid by a debt- or, the plain meaning of the statute dictates that the funds be returned to the debtor. In re Walter, 199 B.R. 390, 391-92 (Bankr.C.D.Ill.1996); Smith v. Strickland, 178 B.R. *274 524, 526 (Bankr.M.D.Fla.1995); In re Clifford, 182 B.R. 229, 231 (Bankr.N.D.Ill.1995).

We first address whether the debtor’s counsel should receive payment from these funds. Section 1326(a)(2) clearly states that if a plan is not confirmed, funds being held by the Trustee shall be returned to the debt- or “after deducting any unpaid claim allowed under section 503(b) of this title.” 11 U.S.C. § 1326(a)(2) (emphasis added). Section 503(b)(2) provides “[a]fter notice and a hearing, there shall be allowed administrative expenses ... including compensation and reimbursement awarded under section 330(a) of this title....” 11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(2). Section 330(a)(4)(B) provides “[i]n a ... chapter 13 case in which the debtor is an individual, the court may allow reasonable compensation to the debtor’s attorney representing the interests of the debtor in connection with the bankruptcy case based on a consideration of the benefit and necessity of such services to the debtor....” 11 U.S.C. § 330(a)(4)(B).

This court determined that the attorney’s fees and expenses were reasonable, necessary and benefitted the debtor in connection with the bankruptcy case. Accordingly, on February 17, 1998, this court entered the order directing the fees and expenses to be paid from the funds held by the Trustee.

Reading sections 1326(a)(2), 503(b)(2) and 330(a)(4)(B) together, we conclude that the debtor’s attorney’s fees and expenses are administrative expenses which are properly payable by the Trustee prior to the return of the remaining funds to the debtor pursuant to section 1326(a)(2).

We now turn to whether the creditor is entitled to receive the funds. This case is substantially similar to In re Walter, 199 B.R. 390 (Bankr.C.D.Ill.1996) and In re Clifford, 182 B.R. 229 (Bankr.N.D.Ill.1995). In both instances, the Chapter 13 case was dismissed prior to any plan being confirmed and the trustee held funds that had not been distributed to creditors. Prior to any funds being returned to the debtor pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 1326(a)(2), a creditor claimed an interest in the funds.

In Clifford, the Illinois Department of Revenue obtained a statutory lien on the funds held by the Chapter 13 Trustee that had not been distributed under a plan. After the case was dismissed, the Illinois Department of Revenue served a levy on the Trustee attempting to seize the funds. The court was required to decide whether the federal statute, 11 U.S.C. § 1326(a)(2) preempted or superseded the Illinois statute. Clifford, 182 B.R. at 231. The Clifford court concluded that section 1326(a)(2) was unambiguous, and the plain language of § 1326(a)(2) required the Trustee to ton over all funds to the debtor. It further found that the statutes were not in conflict because the statutory lien would continue to be imposed on the funds even though they are returnable to the debt- or.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
222 B.R. 272, 40 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d 725, 1998 Bankr. LEXIS 823, 1998 WL 388990, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-oliver-vaeb-1998.