In Re Objections of Loughmiller

120 N.E.2d 683, 3 Ill. App. 2d 146
CourtAppellate Court of Illinois
DecidedJanuary 4, 2008
DocketGen. 9,973
StatusPublished
Cited by4 cases

This text of 120 N.E.2d 683 (In Re Objections of Loughmiller) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Court of Illinois primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In Re Objections of Loughmiller, 120 N.E.2d 683, 3 Ill. App. 2d 146 (Ill. Ct. App. 2008).

Opinion

Mr. Presiding Justice Carroll

delivered the opinion of the court.

On August 4, 1953 the City Council of the City of Springfield, pursuant to the provisions of Article 60, chapter 24, Illinois Eevised Statutes, 1953 [Jones Ill. Stats. Ann. 21.1989 et seq.], passed an ordinance authorizing and providing for the issuance of $9,000,000 sewer revenue bonds for the purpose of defraying the cost of improving, extending and maintaining the sewerage system of said city. On August 5, 1953, said ordinance was published in a newspaper of general circulation in the City of Springfield. On December 29, 1953, the City Council passed an ordinance amending certain sections of the ordinance of August 4, 1953, which amended ordinance was published in accordance with law on December 30, 1953.

On January 26, 1954, or 28 days after the passage of the amendatory ordinance, petitions protesting the passage of said ordinance, which petitions contained the names of more than 8,000 electors of said city, were filed with the Clerk of the City of Springfield. Objections to the sufficiency of said petitions were filed with the City Clerk by the objectors herein. The petitions and objections were referred, as provided by statute, to the circuit court of Sangamon county. Eespondents filed an answer to the objections. Upon hearing the circuit court found “that the petitions filed with the City Clerk of the City of Springfield on January 26, A. D. 1954 and thereafter filed with the Clerk of the Circuit Court of Sangamon County, Illinois on February 2, A. D. 1954 are not sufficient in law to authorize a referendum of the electors of the City of Springfield, Illinois on the ordinance of December 29, A. D. 1953 of the City of Springfield, Illinois concerning the issuance of Sewer Revenue Bonds for the reasons that: (1) The petitions show on their face that they were not filed pursuant to Section 60 — 4 of Article 60, Revised Cities and Villages Act calling for a referendum on the question of constructing sewers and issuing sewer revenue bonds as therein provided and (2) even if the petitions were to be considered sufficient in form to satisfy the requirements of Section 60 — 4 of Article 60, Revised Cities and Villages Act aforesaid they were not filed within the period of 10 days after publication as required by statute” and entered its decree accordingly. From the decree of the circuit court respondents have prosecuted this appeal.

The facts are not in dispute, nor are there any questions raised on the pleadings.

The sole issue presented by this appeal is whether an ordinance providing for a sewerage system and for revenue bonds to finance that system, adopted pursuant to the authority conferred by Article 60, sections 60 — 1 through 60 — 12 of the Revised Cities and Villages Act [Ill. Rev. Stats. 1953, ch. 24, §§ 60 — 1 to 60 — 12; Jones Ill. Stats. Ann. 21.1989-21.2000], and adopted by a city operating under the Commission Form of Municipal Government, goes into effect ten days after its publication if no petition calling for a referendum is filed within ten days, as provided by section 60 — 4 of Article 60 of the Revised Cities and Villages Act [Ill. Rev. Stats. 1953, ch. 24, § 60 — 4; Jones Ill. Stats. Ann. 21.1992], or whether such an ordinance adopted by a City operating under that form of government is suspended in operation for a period of 30 days from its final passage and upon petition being filed in said 30 days is required to be reconsidered by the City Council and upon such reconsideration is required to be repealed or subjected to a referendum as provided in section 19 — 69 of Article 19 of the Revised Cities and Villages Act [Ill. Rev. Stats. 1953, ch. 24, § 19—69; Jones Ill. Stats. Ann. 21.1511].

It is the contention of respondents that section 19— 69 of Article 19, chapter 24, Illinois Revised Statutes, 1953 [Jones Ill. Stats. Ann. 21.1511] provides the only-method of procedure by which petitioners could protest passage of the ordinance in question; that said ordinance is not an exception to section 19 — 69 of Article 19 of the Cities and Villages Act; that the 10-day limitation on the filing of a petition as provided in section 60 — 4 of said Act is not applicable to respondents’ petitions since they did not seek a referendum on the ordinance in question, but merely sought to protest the passage thereof, which action would result in suspending the operation of the ordinance and reconsideration thereof by the City Council.

It is the objectors’ theory of the case that the statutory provisions as contained in section 19 — 69 of the Act under which respondents filed their petitions, have no application to the ordinance in question; that the petitions do not comply with the provisions of Article 60 of the Revised Cities and Villages Act under which the said ordinance was passed, and that the ordinance in question constitutes one of the exceptions to the method of protesting an ordinance as provided in section 19 — 69, Article 19 of the Act.

The pertinent provisions of section 19 — 69, Article 19, chapter 24, Illinois Revised Statutes, 1953 [Jones Ill. Stats. Ann. 21.1511] are as follows:

“19 — 69. Ordinances not effective for 30 days — Exceptions — Petition protesting passage — Submission to electors.) Except when otherwise required by the laws of the State, including this Act, and except local improvement ordinances, and except an ordinance for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health, or safety, which contains a statement of its urgency and is passed by a vote of at least four members of the council, no ordinance passed by the council shall go into effect before thirty days from the time of its final passage. If during this thirty day period a petition, signed by the electors of the municipality equal in number to at least ten per cent of the entire number of votes cast for the candidates for mayor at the last preceding general quadrennial municipal election, protesting against the passage of such an ordinance, is filed with the municipal clerk, the ordinance shall be suspended from going into operation, and the council shall reconsider the ordinance. If the ordinance is not entirely repealed, the council shall submit the ordinance as provided in subsection (b) of section 19 — 66, to a vote of the electors of the municipality, either at a general election or at a special election called for that purpose. If such a petition is filed, the ordinance shall not go into effect unless a majority of the electors voting on the ordinance vote in favor thereof. But if no such petition is filed, such an ordinance, subject to section 19 — 51, shall be in effect upon the expiration of the thirty day period. The signature, verification, authentication, inspection, certification, submission, and the manner of and jurisdiction for testing the sufficiency, of such a petition shall be the same as that provided for petitions under sections 19 — 58 to 19 — 60 inclusive, except that the petition shall be filed with the municipal clerk in all cases.”

The pertinent provisions of section 60 — 4, Article 60, chapter 24, Illinois Revised Statutes, 1953 [Jones Ill. Stats. Ann. 21.1992] are as follows:

“60 — 4.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

County of Cook v. Kempe
560 N.E.2d 1152 (Appellate Court of Illinois, 1990)
Gottlieb v. City of Milwaukee
279 N.W.2d 479 (Court of Appeals of Wisconsin, 1979)
State Ex Rel. Uhlman v. Melton
401 P.2d 631 (Washington Supreme Court, 1965)
Kochen v. Young
107 N.W.2d 81 (Supreme Court of Iowa, 1961)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
120 N.E.2d 683, 3 Ill. App. 2d 146, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-objections-of-loughmiller-illappct-2008.