Filed 6/6/16 CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FIVE
In re NOAH G., et al., Persons Coming B268442 Under the Juvenile Court Law. (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. DK01921)
LOS ANGELES COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
A.R.,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Daniel Zeke Zeidler, Judge. Affirmed. Joseph T. Tavano, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Mary C. Wickham, County Counsel, R. Keith Davis, Acting Assistant County Counsel, Stephen D. Watson, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent. I. INTRODUCTION
The mother, A.R, appeals from the September 29, 2015 order terminating her
parental rights. She argues the juvenile court should have applied the beneficial parent-
child relationship exception pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code1 section 366.26,
subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i). The juvenile court reasonably concluded the mother failed to
show her relationship with the children outweighed the benefits of adoption. We affirm
the order.
II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On October 22, 2013, the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family
Services (the department) filed a section 300 petition. The petition was filed on behalf of
four-year-old Noah G. and newborn Jose G. The petition alleges the children are
dependents of the juvenile court under section 300, subdivision (b). The petition alleges:
the mother has a history of illicit drug abuse, including marijuana and methamphetamine;
this drug use renders her incapable of providing the children with proper care and
supervision; the mother used illicit drugs throughout her pregnancy with Jose; the mother
tested positive for methamphetamine at Jose‟s birth on October 16, 2013; and the
1 Future statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
2 mother‟s drug abuse endangered the children‟s health and safety and placed them at risk
of physical harm and damage.
At the October 22, 2013 detention hearing, the juvenile court found the department
made a prima facie showing that the children were described by section 300, subdivision
(c). The juvenile court released the children to the mother over the department‟s
objection. The department was ordered to: provide family maintenances services to the
mother and father; refer the family to family preservation services; make unannounced
home visits; and refer the parents for weekly random and on demand drug testing.
At the March 4, 2014 adjudication and disposition hearing, the juvenile court
sustained the amended petition under section 300, subdivision (b). The children were
placed in the home of the parents under the supervision of the department. The parents
were ordered to participate in individual, drug and alcohol counseling, random alcohol
and drug testing, and parenting classes.
On August 4, 2014, the department filed a supplemental petition pursuant to
section 387. The section 387 petition alleges the parents tested positive for drugs and
failed to regularly participate in a substance abuse treatment program. The parents‟
failure to comply with the juvenile court‟s orders endangered the children‟s health and
safety and placed them at risk of physical harm. At the detention hearing on the
supplemental petition, the juvenile court detained the children. The juvenile court
ordered the department to provide the family with family reunification services. The
parents were granted monitored visits at least twice a week with the department having
discretion to liberalize visits and to release the boys to a parent.
3 At the September 19, 2014 jurisdiction and disposition hearing, the juvenile court
sustained the allegations in the section 387 petition. The juvenile court ordered the
children placed with their maternal grandmother. The department was ordered to provide
the family with reunification services. The parents were granted monitored visits at least
twice a week for at least one hour with the department having discretion to liberalize.
The parents were ordered to participate in: individual, alcohol and drug counseling;
random alcohol and drug testing; and parenting classes. At the May 4, 2015 six-month
review hearing, the juvenile court found the children‟s return to the parents‟ custody
would create a substantial risk of detriment to the youngsters‟ well-being. The juvenile
court found the parents were not in compliance with the case plan and terminated family
reunification services.
At the section 366.26 hearing on September 29, 2015, the juvenile court found by
clear and convincing evidence that the children would likely be adopted. The juvenile
court found the beneficial parent-child relationship exception did not apply and
terminated parental rights. The juvenile court explained: “It is clear that the parents have
had regular consistent visitation and contact and do have a parental role and relationship
in the children‟s lives, but they have participated in no programs in over a year. [¶] The
younger child has lived with them less than half of his life. The case law and code
discussed two different things; one is the extent to which the parental role and
relationship outweighs the benefit of permanence to adoption, which I don‟t think the
parents have shown, especially in light of their failure to participate in anything in the last
year and the fact that they still have monitored visits. [¶] The limited amount of time
4 that Jose has lived with them and Noah being out of their care for over a year. Second
issue is whether it would be emotionally detrimental to the children to terminate the
parental role and relationship, and at this point there‟s been no showing that it would be
emotionally detrimental to the children, especially to Jose. [¶] The children enjoy
visiting with their parents and having the parents over, would like to be able to live with
their parents, if they could, but that is impossible. Even the extent to which the mother
discusses Noah being unhappy when she leaves at the end of the day, really didn‟t show
that being to the level of emotional detriment.”
The mother filed her notice of appeal on September 29, 2015.
III. EVIDENCE
-
A. October 22, 2013 Detention Report
On October 16, 2013, the department received a referral alleging the mother and
Jose tested positive for amphetamines. The mother did not receive prenatal care during
her pregnancy with Jose. She started using methamphetamine and marijuana 10 years
ago, using drugs on the weekends or on a monthly basis. The mother began using drugs
because of the pressure of taking care of the maternal great-grandmother. She used
methamphetamine from January to June 2013 because she did not think she was
pregnant. The mother stopped using methamphetamine in June but admitted she used
drugs in August and on October 13, 2013. The children were released to the father. The
5 parents and the children‟s social worker agreed the father and the children would move in
with the maternal grandmother, Pamela R.
B. Jurisdiction and Disposition Report
The March 4, 2014 jurisdiction and disposition report states the children remained
in the care and custody of the parents. The children were bonded with the parents. The
parents agreed they would benefit from the substance abuse treatment programs. They
also agreed to comply with all court-order services including random drug testing. But
the parents failed to appear for drug tests. The parents also had not participated in any
drug treatment program but reported they would start soon.
C. August 4, 2014 Detention Report
On July 30, 2014, the children were detained after the mother tested positive for
methamphetamine and amphetamine. The mother tested positive for cannabinoids on
March 10, 2104. Of the 14 random drug tests from March 25 to July 14, 2014, the
mother missed 12 tests. The mother tested positive for methamphetamine and
amphetamine on July 23, 2014, when she came for intake at a substance abuse treatment
program. The father failed to appear for any drug tests after he tested positive for
cannabinoids on March 11, 2014, while in treatment. The father stopped coming to
treatment and was discharged from the drug treatment program on April 4, 2014.
6 According to the detention report, the mother appeared overwhelmed and did not
follow up on family preservation services offered by the department social worker. The
parents failed to take Noah for tutoring and for speech therapy evaluation. Mona Raya
from the Duarte child center stated: “[I]t has been a real, real struggle to work with them.
The child is always late. Mom knows that the child will be going to kinder, but the child
is never here in school. He was supposed to be tested for services, but since the child is
never here, they already missed 2 appointments. I always call mom and she never picks
up.” The parents admitted they were not in compliance with the court orders and had no
excuse. The parents reported they were “„lacking motivation‟” to do anything.
D. Status Review Reports
The August 13, 2014 interim review report indicates the children were placed with
the maternal grandmother on August 8, 2014. The maternal grandmother resides in a two
bedroom, two bathroom apartment in the same apartment complex as the parents. The
maternal grandmother lives with Terri R., a sister. Also residing in the maternal
grandmother‟s apartment are Terri‟s two adult daughters, Amore R. and Megan R. They
converted one of the bedrooms into the children‟s room with a bed for Noah and a crib
and changing table for Jose. The maternal grandmother was retired and could be home to
take care of both of the children. The maternal family had a close relationship with the
children and saw them every single day. The maternal family stated they would comply
7 with the court orders and limit the parents to visitation hours as if the children were in
placement.
The March 19, 2015 status review report states: the children continue to thrive in
the maternal grandmother‟s home; the parents live nearby and were a daily presence in
the children‟s lives; the mother reported seeing the boys almost every day and helping to
care for them; both parents had a very close relationship with the children; the maternal
grandmother reported the visits went very well; the parents did not participate in any
substance abuse treatment program and failed to appear for any drug tests; and the
parents missed all 11 drug tests from August 2014 to February 2015. The department
was unable to determine if the parents were drug free because they both continued to
refuse to test after results came back positive. The maternal grandmother stated she was
“„more than willing to adopt‟” the children if the parents failed to reunify with the boys.
E. Section 366.26 Report
The September 29, 2015 section 366.26 report states: the children were bonded
with the parents and maternal grandmother; the parents live in the same apartment
complex as the children and visited them regularly; all visits were monitored by the
maternal grandmother ; and family reunification services for the parents were terminated
on May 4, 2015. The parents failed to comply with the court orders. According to the
report, the parents failed to drug test and complete a narcotics treatment program.
According to the social worker, the parents admitted they lacked the motivation to obey
8 court orders or begin court-ordered programs. The department recommended termination
of parental rights with adoption as the permanent plan.
F. Testimony at Section 366.26 Hearing
On September 29, 2015, the section 366.26 hearing was held. Children‟s social
worker Priya Chakrabarti testified the mother saw the children every day according to the
maternal grandmother. The mother‟s visits were monitored by the maternal family. The
mother would come over and drop Noah off to school with two of the maternal relatives.
Then she would return to the maternal grandmother‟s apartment and spend time with Jose
while Noah was at school. The mother would bathe Jose and prepare and feed him food.
Ms. Chakrabarti had seen the mother bring groceries over to the maternal grandmother‟s
home. The mother would pick up Noah from school with Megan R. or Amore R. and
attended school events. In addition, the mother helped Noah with his homework after
school. The mother visited Noah when he was in the hospital and attended his most
recent medical appointment. Noah and Jose were bonded with the mother and the
maternal family. Ms. Chakrabarti stated both Noah and Jose recognized the mother as
their “mom.”
The mother testified on her own behalf. The mother went to the grandmother‟s
home every day at 7:15 a.m. to help Noah get ready for school. She helped Noah comb
his hair, brush his teeth and dress for school. The mother made Noah breakfast and
dropped him off to school with her family. She visited Noah‟s school twice, for the first
9 day of school and the “back to school” night. The mother testified she and the maternal
family helped Noah with his homework. The mother stated: “We all do it together. I
mean one day I‟ll do it or my mom will do it. The next day it‟s kind of joined together.
We all participate.” The mother attended some of Noah‟s medical appointments. The
mother visited Noah every day during visiting hours when Noah spent a week at the
hospital. She would go home after 8 p.m. while the maternal grandmother stayed with
Noah at the hospital. Noah had a followup visit after he was discharged from the hospital
but the mother did not attend the medical appointment. When the mother was asked who
made the decision to take Noah to the hospital, the mother replied: “My mom‟s, of
course, and you know basically everybody. You know we wanted what was best for him,
you know.” The mother testified the maternal grandmother asked for the mother‟s input
when Noah was sick. The mother stated, “She asked me if I would just go to the hospital
with them. I said absolutely.”
The mother testified she spent time with Jose during the day while monitored by
the maternal family. She played and did activities with Jose including watching Disney
learning shows and “Frozen” with him. The mother prepared food, fed Jose and bathed
him. She also attended some of Jose‟s medical appointments.
The mother stated Noah enjoyed spending time with her. She testified: “[H]e tells
me how much he wants to come home and how much he wants to be with me. When I
have to leave, he does not want me to leave.” The mother added, “I usually leave around
8:15, try to put him to sleep at night, but he is frustrated because I have to go.” The
10 mother put Noah to bed four days out of the week. The mother testified Jose would cry
when she left for the night.
The juvenile court asked the mother, “So you‟re basically there all of the time?”
The mother answered, “As much as I can be.” The court queried, “Well if you‟re there
all of the time, when do you go to your drug program?” The mother replied, “I have not
started, sir.”
IV. DISCUSSION
At a section 366.26 hearing, the juvenile court selects and implements a permanent
plan for the dependent child. (In re Celine R. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 45, 52-53; In re Marilyn
H. (1993) 5 Cal.4th 295, 304.) Our Supreme Court has summarized the juvenile court‟s
options at the section 366.26 hearing: “In order of preference the choices are: (1)
terminate parental rights and order that the child be placed for adoption (the choice the
court made here); (2) identify adoption as the permanent placement goal and require
efforts to locate an appropriate adoptive family; (3) appoint a legal guardian; or (4) order
long-term foster care. (§ 366.26, subd. (b).) Whenever the court finds „that it is likely
the child will be adopted, the court shall terminate parental rights and order the child
placed for adoption.‟ (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1).)” (In re Celine R., supra, 31 Cal.4th at p.
53; In re K.H. (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 406, 414; In re Hector A. (2005) 125 Cal.App.4th
783, 790-791.)
11 One exception to adoption is the beneficial parental relationship exception. This
exception is set forth in section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i) which states: “[T]he
court shall terminate parental rights unless either of the following applies: . . . [¶] (B)
The court finds a compelling reason for determining that termination would be
detrimental to the child due to one or more of the following circumstances: [¶] (i) The
parents have maintained regular visitation and contact with the child and the child would
benefit from continuing the relationship.” (In re K.P. (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 614, 621.)
The mother has the burden of proving her relationship with the children would outweigh
the well-being they would gain in a permanent home with an adoptive parent. (In re G.B.
(2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 1147, 1165; In re K.P., supra, 203 Cal.App.4th at p. 621.)
Evidence of frequent and loving contact is not enough to establish a beneficial parental
relationship. (In re Marcelo B. (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 635, 645; In re Bailey J. (2010)
189 Cal.App.4th 1308, 1315-1316.) The mother also must show she occupies a parental
role in the children‟s lives. (In re G.B., supra, 227 Cal.App.4th at p. 1165; In re K.P.,
supra, 203 Cal.App.4th at p. 621.)
Appellate courts have adopted differing standards of review for the parental
relationship exception determination. Many courts review for substantial evidence. (In
re G.B., supra, 227 Cal.App.4th at p. 1165; In re S.B. (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 289, 297;
In re Christopher L. (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 1326, 1333-1334; In re Autumn H. (1994)
27 Cal.App.4th 567, 576.) Other courts have applied an abuse of discretion standard of
review. (In re Aaliyah R. (2006) 136 Cal.App.4th 437, 449; In re Jasmine D. (2000) 78
Cal.App.4th 1339, 1351.) More recently, courts have adopted both the substantial
12 evidence and abuse of discretion standards of review. (In re Anthony B. (2015) 239
Cal.App.4th 389, 395; In re J.C. (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 503, 530; In re K.P., supra, 203
Cal.App.4th at pp. 621-622; In re Bailey J., supra, 189 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1314-1315.)
In evaluating the juvenile court‟s determination as to the factual issue of the existence of
a beneficial parental relationship, these courts review for substantial evidence. (In re
Anthony B., supra, 239 Cal.App.4th at p. 395; In re J.C., supra, 226 Cal.App.4th at p.
530; In re K.P., supra, 203 Cal.App.4th at p. 622; In re Bailey J., supra, 189 Cal.App.4th
at p. 1314.) But whether termination of the parental relationship would be detrimental to
the child as weighed against the benefits of adoption is reviewed for abuse of discretion.
(In re Anthony B., supra, 239 Cal.App.4th at p. 395; In re J.C., supra, 226 Cal.App.4th at
pp. 530-531; In re K.P., supra, 203 Cal.App.4th at p. 622; In re Bailey J., supra, 189
Cal.App.4th at p. 1315.) No error occurred under any of these standards of review.
It is undisputed the mother maintained regular visitation and contact with the
children. The mother visited the children daily. She helped Noah get ready for school,
prepared him breakfast, took him to and from school, and helped him with homework. In
addition, the mother took daily care of Jose by preparing and feeding him food, bathing
him and playing with him. The children were bonded with their parents and the maternal
family. The juvenile court found, “It is clear that the parents have had regular consistent
visitation and contact and do have a parental role and relationship in the children‟s
lives. . . .”
But the trial court concluded the mother failed to show termination of her parental
relationship would be detrimental to the children when weighed against the benefits of
13 adoption. The mother challenges this ruling. She contends the juvenile court should
have ordered a permanent plan of legal guardianship, rather than adoption, given the
strong beneficial parental relationship she has with the children. The mother asserts the
juvenile court erred by focusing on the parents‟ failure to comply with reunification
services and inability to provide a home for the children. The mother‟s contentions are
without merit.
The mother fails to show her beneficial relationship with the children would
outweigh the well-being they would gain in a permanent home with the maternal
grandmother. (In re G.B., supra, 227 Cal.App.4th at p. 1165; In re K.P., supra, 203
Cal.App.4th at p. 621.) The mother did not occupy a parental role such that termination
of her parental rights would be detrimental to the children. When the children were first
detained in October 2013, they were released to the mother‟s custody over the
department‟s objection. During the time the children were in the mother‟s custody, she
appeared overwhelmed and did not follow up on family preservation services. The
mother failed to take Noah for tutoring and for speech therapy evaluation. Ms. Raya
from the Duarte child center reported: “[I]t has been a real, real struggle to work with
them. The child is always late. Mom knows that the child will be going to kinder, but
the child is never here in school. He was supposed to be tested for services, but since the
child is never here, they already missed 2 appointments. I always call mom and she
never picks up.” On July 30, 2014, the children were detained again after the mother
tested positive for methamphetamine and amphetamine. While the mother visited
frequently and participated in the children‟s care after they were placed with the maternal
14 grandmother, the mother‟s visits were monitored. The maternal grandmother was the
children‟s primary caregiver. The maternal grandmother took Noah for speech therapy
evaluation and ensured his educational needs were met. The maternal grandmother also
made medical decisions for the children. The mother testified the maternal grandmother
decided to take Noah to the hospital when he was sick and stayed overnight with him
when he was there for a week. The mother acknowledged the children were doing
“wonderful” under the maternal grandmother‟s care. The mother stated she was grateful
Noah had a set school schedule and structure in his life.
Furthermore, the juvenile court could properly focus on the mother‟s unresolved
substance addiction issues because the children became dependents of the court due to
her drug abuse. It is undisputed the mother failed to comply with court orders to attend
individual, alcohol and drug counseling, parenting classes and narcotics testing. The
mother tested positive for cannabinoids on March 10, 2104. Of the 14 random drug tests
from March 25, 2014 to July 14, 2014, the mother missed 12 tests. The mother tested
positive for methamphetamine and amphetamine on July 23, 2014 when she came for
intake at a substance abuse treatment program. After the positive drug test, the mother
missed all 11 drug tests from August 2014 to February 2015. The department was unable
to determine if the mother was drug free because she refused to test after the July 2014
positive drug test. The mother admitted she had no excuse. She stated she lacked
motivation to start the court-ordered programs. The section 366.26 report states, “Mother
and father appear to have done nothing towards rectifying the situation which led to
15 [department] involvement . . . .” Further, the mother admitted at the section 366.26
hearing that she had not started her drug treatment program.
The mother relies on In re S.B. (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 289, 298-301 (S.B.) to
support her contention that the beneficial parental relationship outweighs any need for
adoption. The mother‟s reliance is misplaced. In S.B. the father admitted to using
methamphetamine “on and off” for 30 years. (S.B., supra, 164 Cal.App.4th at p. 293.)
The child was removed from the father‟s custody. Thereafter, the father complied with
every aspect of his case plan including maintaining his sobriety. (Ibid.) The department
reported the father made “„consistent efforts to alleviate and or mitigate the reasons his
family was brought to the attention of the court.‟” (Id. at p. 294.) In concluding the
beneficial parental relationship applied, the Court of Appeal reasoned the father‟s full
compliance with the case plan evidenced complete devotion to the child‟s welfare. (Id. at
pp. 300-301.)
In a later case, In re Jason J. (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 922, 937, the same appellate
court limited S.B. to its particular facts. (See In re J.C., supra, 226 Cal.App.4th at p.
530.) In Jason J., the Fourth Appellate District, Division One explained: “In [S.B.], this
court reversed an order terminating the father‟s parental rights over his daughter, S.B.,
under the parent-child beneficial relationship exception to adoption. The parties agreed
the father maintained regular, consistent and appropriate visitation with S.B., and the
evidence showed he was S.B.‟s primary caretaker for three years; when she was removed
from his custody he immediately acknowledged his drug use was untenable, started
services, maintained his sobriety, sought medical and psychoanalytic services and
16 complied with every aspect of his case plan; after a year apart S.B. continued to display a
strong attachment to her father; and she loved her father and wanted their relationship to
continue. (Id. at p. 298.) This court concluded the „record here fully supports the
conclusion [the father] continued the significant parent-child relationship despite the lack
of day-to-day contact with S.B. after she was removed from his care.‟ (Id. at p. 299.) The
opinion states, „S.B. loved her father, wanted their relationship to continue and derived
some measure of benefit from his visits.‟ (Id. at pp. 300–301.) The S.B. opinion must be
viewed in light of its particular facts. It does not, of course, stand for the proposition that
a termination order is subject to reversal whenever there is „some measure of benefit‟ in
continued contact between parent and child.” (In re Jason J., supra, 175 Cal.App.4th at
p. 937.)
In the case of In re C.F. (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 549, 558-559, the same appellate
court stressed: “[W]e once again emphasize that S.B. is confined to its extraordinary
facts. It does not support the proposition a parent may establish the parent-child
beneficial relationship exception by merely showing the child derives some measure of
benefit from maintaining parental contact.” (See In re J.C., supra, 226 Cal.App.4th at p.
530.) In C.F., the Fourth Appellate District, Division One rejected the mother‟s reliance
on S.B. because the facts were readily distinguishable. (In re C.F., supra, 193
Cal.App.4th at p. 558.) The Court of Appeal explained, “[The mother] did not maintain
her sobriety. She resumed drug use and lost custody of her children after the
reunification period ended. She made no showing the termination of parental rights
would cause the children any detriment.” (Ibid.)
17 Like the parent in C.F., the mother did not comply with the court ordered case
plan. The mother did not start her substance abuse treatment program and repeatedly
failed to undergo drug testing. As in C.F., the mother did not maintain her sobriety and
lost custody of her children after she resumed drug use. Like In re C.F., the facts here are
readily distinguishable from S.B. The father in S.B. fully complied with his case plan
while the mother here disregarded the court orders.
In her reply brief, the mother asserts there is no evidence she continued using
drugs after her positive test on July 23, 2014. Although there is no direct evidence of
continued drug use, the mother missed all 11 drug tests after her July 2014 positive test.
Under these circumstances, the juvenile court could reasonably infer the mother‟s failure
to comply with a court-ordered drug test may be considered as a positive test. (In re
Lana S. (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 94, 104 & fn. 5; see also In re N.M. (2003) 108
Cal.App.4th 845, 857 [parents obligated under case plan to prove abstinence from illegal
drugs].) This is not a case where there is a reasonable explanation for missing a test; e.g.
a parent gets off work late and belatedly arrives at a testing facility. A juvenile court,
under those manifestly innocent circumstances, could decline to view the failure to
appear for a drug test as a sinister effort to evade responsibility. However, the juvenile
court could reasonably conclude that common sense suggests a parent who consistently
fails to appear for drug tests does so because of a consciousness of guilt. (People v.
Roberts (1992) 2 Cal.4th 271, 310-311 [no error occurred because the trial court
instructed the jury it could infer a consciousness of guilt from the defendant‟s refusal to
take a blood test]; People v. Municipal Court (Gonzales) (1982) 137 Cal.App.3d 114,
18 118-119 [evidence of a refusal to undergo a blood alcohol test is evidence of a
consciousness of guilt]; People v. Roach (1980) 108 Cal.App.3d 891, 893 [refusal to
undergo a narcotics test in a driving under the combined influence of alcohol and drugs
prosecution is evidence of consciousness of guilt].) Moreover, the mother's long-
standing drug abuse is in stark contrast to that in S.B. And her drug abuse is evidence
continuing the parent-child relationship would not be beneficial. The juvenile court,
under any standard of review, could conclude the evidence was insufficient to
demonstrate termination of the mother‟s parental rights would be detrimental to the
children.
V. DISPOSITION
The order terminating parental rights is affirmed.
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION
TURNER, P. J.
I concur:
KUMAR, J.*
* Judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.
19 In re Noah G., et al. B268442
BAKER, J., Concurring
I join the majority‟s opinion, except its discussion of the circumstances in which a trial court may consider a missed drug test to be equivalent to a positive drug test. In my view, we need not opine on the circumstances under which a trial court may infer consciousness of guilt from the failure to submit to drug testing in order to resolve the issues before us. Rather, it is mother A.R.‟s failure to seek treatment for a longstanding drug problem, including drug testing that is customarily a core component of such treatment, that stands this case in stark contrast to In re S.B. (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 289 and undercuts the showing mother attempted to make in support of invoking the beneficial parent relationship exception.
BAKER, J.