In re Netflix, Inc. Securities Litigation

CourtDistrict Court, N.D. California
DecidedJanuary 5, 2024
Docket4:22-cv-02672
StatusUnknown

This text of In re Netflix, Inc. Securities Litigation (In re Netflix, Inc. Securities Litigation) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, N.D. California primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In re Netflix, Inc. Securities Litigation, (N.D. Cal. 2024).

Opinion

1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 7 FIYYAZ PIRANI, Case No. 22-cv-02672-JST

8 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO 9 v. DISMISS

10 NETFLIX, INC., et al., Re: ECF No. 31 Defendants. 11

12 13 Before the Court is Defendants Netflix, Inc. (“Netflix” or the “Company”), Reed Hastings, 14 Ted Sarandos, Spencer Neumann, and Gregory Peters’s motion to dismiss the consolidated 15 amended class action complaint (“CAC”). ECF No. 31. The Court will grant the motion. 16 I. BACKGROUND1 17 Lead Plaintiff Fiyyaz Pirani, as a trustee of Imperium Irrevocable Trust, brings this action 18 individually and on behalf of all other persons and entities that purchased or otherwise acquired 19 Netflix common stock between January 19, 2021 and April 19, 2022, inclusive (“Class Period”). 20 ECF No. 30 ¶¶ 1, 25 . Pirani alleges that Netflix and certain of its officers—Hastings (co-founder 21 and co-Chief Executive Officer), Sarandos (co-Chief Executive Officer), Neumann (Chief 22 Financial Officer), and Peters (Chief Operating Officer) (collectively “Individual Defendants”)— 23 violated Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (“Exchange Act”) and 24 United States Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) Rule 10b-5 by making false and 25 misleading statements and omissions about Netflix’s business, operations, and prospects that 26 artificially inflated the price of Netflix stock during the Class Period. Id. ¶¶ 213–223. 27 1 Netflix is an entertainment company that primarily operates a subscription-based streaming 2 service offering a wide array of television, film, and mobile games in over 190 countries. Id. ¶ 36. 3 Netflix derives its revenue principally from its streaming service’s monthly membership fees. Id. 4 ¶ 38. Unlike some of its competitors, Netflix does not derive its subscription-based streaming 5 service’s revenue from advertisers. Id. ¶ 47. Thus, its revenue depends on its ability to acquire 6 and retain subscribers. Id. 7 During the Class Period, Netflix would issue quarterly guidance regarding the expected 8 “paid net membership additions or ‘paid net adds.’” Id. ¶ 39. The paid net adds were calculated 9 by subtracting the memberships that were cancelled during a quarter from the number of paid new 10 memberships added during a quarter, “or more simply acquisition minus churn.” Id. Netflix also 11 reported information regarding user engagement with its service. Until the end of 2021, Netflix 12 measured user engagement “by the number of accounts that viewed a title.” Id. In 2022, Netflix 13 measured engagement by “the number of hours viewed per title.” Id. Netflix “considered 14 acquisition, churn, and engagement important metrics to gauge the health of the business.” Id. 15 ¶ 40. 16 During and before the Class Period, Netflix’s guidance and reports categorized its 17 members into four geographic regions: (1) the United States and Canada (“UCAN”); (2) Europe, 18 the Middle East, and Africa (“EMEA”); (3) Latin America (“LATAM”); and (4) Asia-Pacific 19 (“APAC”). Id. ¶ 41. Additionally, during the Class Period, Netflix estimated that its total 20 addressable market (“TAM”) outside of China was approximately 800 million to 900 million 21 broadband households, and “the TAM in the UCAN was estimated to be approximately 125 22 million broadband households.” Id. 23 Pirani’s allegations center around account sharing, which occurs when a paying Netflix 24 member shares their account credentials (username and password) with a non-paying user who 25 does not reside in the subscriber’s household so that the non-paying user can access and use 26 Netflix’s platform. Netflix’s members engaged in account sharing before and during the Class 27 Period. Id. ¶ 48. Between 2013 and 2018, Hastings, Peters, and other Netflix officers dismissed 1 growth. See, e.g., id. ¶ 49 (Hastings stating in 2013 that Netflix “really [did not] think that there[] 2 [was] much going on of the ‘I’m going to share my password with a marginal acquaintance’”); id. 3 ¶ 50 (then-CEO David Wells stating in 2013 that account “sharing is not quite as large as has been 4 . . . floated out there”); id. ¶ 55 (Wells stating in 2016 that Netflix did not “feel like [account 5 sharing was] a material inhibitor to [its] growth” (emphasis omitted)); id. ¶ 59 (Peters stating in 6 2017 that “password sharing isn’t a huge issue for us right now” (emphasis omitted)). 7 In January 2019, Cybersecurity Insiders reported that “Netflix has decided to use 8 Synamedia’s Credential Sharing behavioral analytics and machine learning software to keep a tab 9 on the sharing activity across its streaming services.” Id. ¶ 62. Synamedia’s product was believed 10 to be capable of differentiating between “legitimate” account sharing (sharing within a household) 11 and “illegitimate” account sharing (sharing with people outside of the member’s household). Id. 12 ¶ 63. Cybersecurity Insiders’ article also stated that this product was “capable of viewing habits 13 and location habits of a user to identify when non-paying viewers log into an account”; 14 “detect[ing] whether a user is ‘viewing at their main home’ or a ‘holiday home’”; and “detect[ing] 15 if a subscriber has ‘grown-up children who live away from home’ so streaming services won’t 16 punish the wrong people for account sharing.” Id. Netflix never publicly confirmed that it was 17 using this product, but in October 2019, Peters did state that Netflix “continue[s] to monitor” 18 account sharing, but it has “no big plans to announce at this point in time in terms of doing 19 something differently there.” Id. ¶ 64 (emphasis omitted). Additionally, a former employee 20 (“FE2”), who worked at Netflix as a narrative and product designer from 2019 until 2022, stated 21 that “Netflix was tracking the various IP addresses used to determine the location of different 22 users on the same account,” which allowed Netflix “to determine password sharing was 23 happening.” Id. ¶ 191. 24 In 2019 and 2020, analysts and market observers estimated how pervasive account sharing 25 was, as well as its impact on streaming services’ revenue. Id. ¶ 61 (January 2019 Yahoo! Finance 26 article stating that “[f]reeloading off other people deprives Netflix (NFLX) of at least $2.3 billion 27 in revenue each year”); id. ¶ 65 (July 2019 MoffetNathanson research indicating that “about 14% 1 (June 2020 Wall Street Journal article reporting that “[o]ne-third of subscribers to services like 2 Netflix share their password with someone outside their household, according to a February 3 survey of 2,235 subscribers by Magid, a market-research company”). Netflix purported to have 4 “created guardrails to prevent abuse,” but the only apparent “guardrail” it had implemented was 5 curbing the number of simultaneous streams allowed per member. Id. ¶ 66. A former employee 6 (“FE1”), who served as the Director of Program Management from January 2018 to March 2021, 7 stated the problem of account sharing was discussed during his tenure at the Company. Id. ¶¶ 32, 8 67. However, any efforts to “crack[]down” on the problem were paused during early 2020 9 because of the COVID-19 pandemic. Id. ¶ 67. FE1 recalled that this approach was outlined in a 10 Company-wide internal memorandum, id., and that Hastings stated that Netflix “did not want to 11 appear as if they were taking something away” during the pandemic “when people were losing so 12 much at that time (e.g., health, jobs, housing),” id. ¶ 68 (emphasis omitted). Netflix’s 2020 Form 13 10-K filed with the SEC on January 28, 2021 described “account sharing” as “multi-household 14 usage” and added language discussing “efforts to restrict multi-household usage,” specifically 15 adding the phrase to its risk disclosure regarding account sharing: “if our efforts to restrict multi- 16 household usage are ineffective.” Id. ¶ 82 (emphasis omitted) .

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In re Netflix, Inc. Securities Litigation, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-netflix-inc-securities-litigation-cand-2024.