In re Nemerov

149 Misc. 797, 268 N.Y.S. 588, 1933 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 1424
New York Supreme Court·Decided December 18, 1933·Published·Cited by 8 cases

Opinion

Frankenthaler, J.

This is an application by one Joseph Nemerov, an attorney, for permission “ to bring such actions at law or suits in equity as he may see fit in such courts of competent jurisdiction as he may select on behalf of the holders of guarantees and/or certificates issued and created by the New York Title and Mortgage Company to appoint a successor trustee of the underlying collateral against which said certificates are outstanding, in place of the New York Title and Mortgage Company, for the benefit of the certificate holders.” Similar applications are made by [800] Nemerov with respect to the Lawyers Title and Guaranty Company and Lawyers Mortgage Company.

Each, of these three motions is based upon an affidavit by Nemerov. The contents of each affidavit are exactly the same, triplicate originals being used — one for each motion. The affidavit states that Nemerov “ is the attorney for a large number of certificate holders who own in the aggregate many millions of dollars of guaranteed mortgage certificates of these companies.” It goes on to allege that the payment of such certificates is secured by bonds, mortgages and other collateral owned by the certificate holders and forming no part of the individual assets of the three companies; that the agency powers conferred upon the companies by the terms of their guaranties were conditioned upon their continued performance of such guaranties; and that George S. Van Schaick, the Superintendent of Insurance, despite the termination of these agency powers as the result of defaults upon the guaranties, continues to exercise dominion and control over said collateral. On the theory that “ the Superintendent of Insurance has no legal right to deprive the certificate holders of their property,” Nemerov asks that he be permitted to bring such actions or proceedings as he may deem advisable for the appointment of suitable trustees over such property of the certificate holders in the place of each company, and to restrain said Van Schaick from interfering with such property of the certificate holders in any way, shape or manner.” The reason assigned for seeking this court’s permission is that the orders of the court which directed the Superintendent of Insurance to take charge of the companies for the purpose of rehabilitation restrain the holders of such guaranteed certificates from bringing or prosecuting any actions at law, suits in equity, special or other proceedings against any of the companies or against the Superintendent of Insurance of New York, or in any way interfering with the Superintendent of Insurance of the State of New York in his conduct of any of said companies.” The claim is made that these injunctive provisions are illegal and void (a) because the orders were obtained without notice to the certificate holders and other creditors of the companies, and (b) because they deprive such certificate holders and other. creditors of collateral security which belongs to them, and not to the companies.

The contention that the restraining provisions above referred to are invalid for lack of notice to the certificate holders is without merit. Subdivision 2 of section 410 of the Insurance Law expressly provides that the court “ may at any time during a proceeding under this article [the article includes rehabilitation proceedings] issue such * * * injunctions or orders as may be deemed necessary [801] to prevent interference with the superintendent or the proceeding, or waste of the assets of the insurer, or the prosecution of any actions, or the obtaining of preferences, judgments, attachments or other hens, or the making of any levy against the corporation or against its assets or any part thereof.” Section 409 of the Insurance Law provides that notice of an application “ in any proceeding -under this article shah be served upon the insurer,” or if such service cannot be made, “ in such manner as the court or justice * * * shall direct.” The injunctive orders here involved were obtained upon proper notice to the respective companies and in full compliance with these statutory provisions. The statute contains no requirement that notice be given to all certificate holders and other creditors. Such a requirement would prove impracticable in view of the large number of certificate holders and other creditors and their wide distribution.

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In re Nemerov, 149 Misc. 797, 268 N.Y.S. 588, 1933 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 1424 (N.Y. Super. Ct. 1933).

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