SILVER, J.
[¶ 1] The adoptive mother of Natasha S. appeals from a judgment entered by the District Court (Fort Kent, Daigle, J.) terminating her parental rights pursuant to 22 M.R.S. § 4055 (2007). The adoptive mother contends that the court erred in admitting the Interstate Compact on Placement of Children (ICPC) home study for purposes other than showing compliance with the ICPC. We agree that the court erred in admitting the ICPC study for purposes beyond those permitted by statute, and we therefore must vacate the court’s judgment and remand for further proceedings.1
I. BACKGROUND
[¶2] Janice S. is the maternal grandmother and adoptive mother of Natasha and lives in Boston, Massachusetts. Natasha is a ten-year-old girl with multiple mental health diagnoses, including post-traumatic stress disorder, oppositional defiant disorder, reactive attachment disorder, and attention deficit hyperactivity disorder, combined type. Natasha’s biological mother had serious, untreated substance abuse issues, and Janice adopted Natasha in September 2000 after her biological mother’s parental rights were terminated.
[¶ 3] In October 2002, Janice brought Natasha to an emergency services team for a medical evaluation because of Natasha’s disturbing behaviors. Natasha had reportedly exhibited cruel behavior toward animals and had also been smearing feces, eating food from the trash bin, stealing [604]*604other children’s lunches in school, and hoarding food in her room. Natasha’s deteriorating behaviors prompted Janice to send Natasha to live in Maine with her biological mother. Janice made this decision because she believed the biological mother was no longer abusing substances so she felt that the biological mother deserved a chance to take care of and raise Natasha.
[¶ 4] The biological mother brought Natasha to a child psychiatric unit at Northern Maine Medical Center in August 2004, after she found Natasha trying to hang a kitten. In the process of examining Natasha, the medical staff discovered significant bruising on Natasha. Natasha said her biological mother caused the bruising by hitting her with a belt.
[¶ 5] In November 2004, the District Court found that Natasha would be in circumstances of jeopardy if left in Janice’s care. By agreement of the parties, jeopardy was adjudicated as “threat of failure to protect, due to allowing her child to return to her biological mother’s care where the child was subsequently physically abused.” The Maine Department of Health and Human Services assumed custody of Natasha. For the purposes of reunification, the court ordered Janice to “participate in counseling with Natasha, sign all releases, and participate in visitation with her daughter up to twice a month.”
[¶ 6] During the next two years, four uncontested judicial review hearings were held. In all four review orders, the court reaffirmed the placement of Natasha in the Department’s custody and found that the Department had made reasonable efforts to reunify and rehabilitate the family. With regard to Janice’s compliance with the case plan, the court found on the first three judicial reviews that her compliance was “good,” but on the fourth found that her compliance had been “fair.” In the judicial review order generated with the termination order, the court found that her compliance was “unacceptable.”
[¶ 7] On May 10, 2006, the Department filed a petition to terminate Janice’s parental rights. The Department alleged that Janice had not demonstrated that she had gained the skills necessary to effectively parent Natasha on a daily basis and that she continued to have difficulty understanding the scope of Natasha’s disabilities. The Department also alleged that Natasha’s significant behavioral and emotional deficits required that she be placed in a permanent and stable living environment where all of her needs could be managed appropriately.
[¶ 8] At the hearing on the termination petition, the Department offered an Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children home study report from the State of Massachusetts as an exhibit.2 Janice objected to the offer on the ground that, pursuant to 22 M.R.S. § 4007(4) (2006),3 it [605]*605was inadmissible for any purpose other than to show compliance with the ICPC. The court admitted the exhibit over Janice’s objection.
[¶ 9] Termination of parental rights was not strongly advocated by the guardian ad litem, the social worker, or the therapist. The guardian reluctantly supported the petition for termination:
This reluctance is due to the affection that Natasha has for Janice ... There is a bond between them. I believe Janice ... has Natasha’s best interests at heart and that she believes she can manage Natasha’s needs as well as her own. History, and the ongoing needs of Natasha strongly suggest that she will not be able to do so....
[¶ 10] The social worker observed that Natasha “is developing a more secure attachment with [Janice] and that to interrupt that in a total way would be ... [contrary to her interests],” “that [termination] could be significantly traumatic,” and that it would “have greater deleterious effect tha[n][he] may ... even be able to predict.” The therapist expressed concern for Janice’s ability to independently apply skills of parenting to her home setting if Natasha returned to her custody. Yet, rather than endorsing termination, the therapist encouraged “[appropriate ongoing (preferably wrap-around) service supports,” and “at least extended and comprehensively planned home-based services.”
[¶ 11] After a one-day hearing, the court entered an order terminating Janice’s rights to Natasha. The court found that (1) Janice is unwilling or unable to protect Natasha from jeopardy and the circumstances are unlikely to change within a time frame reasonably calculated to meet Natasha’s needs, and (2) termination of Janice’s parental rights is in the best interest of Natasha so that she may be made available for adoption and permanency placement.
[¶ 12] Janice filed this timely appeal, challenging the court’s admission of the ICPC home study for purposes other than showing compliance with the ICPC.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Standard of Review
[¶ 13] We have not previously had the opportunity to address the admissibility of a home study report generated pursuant to the ICPC. Whether the substance of the home study report is admissible in evidence pursuant to 22 M.R.S. § 4007(4) is a question of law that we review de novo. See In re Scott S., 2001 ME 114, ¶ 10, 775 A.2d 1144, 1148. “In construing a statute, we first look to the plain meaning of the statutory language to give effect to legislative intent; only if the meaning of the statute is unclear will we examine other indicia of legislative intent.” State v. Moulton, 1997 ME 228, ¶ 14, 704 A.2d 361, 365. The relevant statutory language provides: “a report submitted pursuant to the compact is admissible in evidence for purposes of indicating compliance with the compact and the court may rely on evidence to the extent of its probative value.” 22 M.R.S. § 4007(4) (emphasis added.)
[¶ 14] The issue is whether the italicized language provides for the admissibility of evidence contained in the report that goes beyond the issue of compliance with the ICPC.
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SILVER, J.
[¶ 1] The adoptive mother of Natasha S. appeals from a judgment entered by the District Court (Fort Kent, Daigle, J.) terminating her parental rights pursuant to 22 M.R.S. § 4055 (2007). The adoptive mother contends that the court erred in admitting the Interstate Compact on Placement of Children (ICPC) home study for purposes other than showing compliance with the ICPC. We agree that the court erred in admitting the ICPC study for purposes beyond those permitted by statute, and we therefore must vacate the court’s judgment and remand for further proceedings.1
I. BACKGROUND
[¶2] Janice S. is the maternal grandmother and adoptive mother of Natasha and lives in Boston, Massachusetts. Natasha is a ten-year-old girl with multiple mental health diagnoses, including post-traumatic stress disorder, oppositional defiant disorder, reactive attachment disorder, and attention deficit hyperactivity disorder, combined type. Natasha’s biological mother had serious, untreated substance abuse issues, and Janice adopted Natasha in September 2000 after her biological mother’s parental rights were terminated.
[¶ 3] In October 2002, Janice brought Natasha to an emergency services team for a medical evaluation because of Natasha’s disturbing behaviors. Natasha had reportedly exhibited cruel behavior toward animals and had also been smearing feces, eating food from the trash bin, stealing [604]*604other children’s lunches in school, and hoarding food in her room. Natasha’s deteriorating behaviors prompted Janice to send Natasha to live in Maine with her biological mother. Janice made this decision because she believed the biological mother was no longer abusing substances so she felt that the biological mother deserved a chance to take care of and raise Natasha.
[¶ 4] The biological mother brought Natasha to a child psychiatric unit at Northern Maine Medical Center in August 2004, after she found Natasha trying to hang a kitten. In the process of examining Natasha, the medical staff discovered significant bruising on Natasha. Natasha said her biological mother caused the bruising by hitting her with a belt.
[¶ 5] In November 2004, the District Court found that Natasha would be in circumstances of jeopardy if left in Janice’s care. By agreement of the parties, jeopardy was adjudicated as “threat of failure to protect, due to allowing her child to return to her biological mother’s care where the child was subsequently physically abused.” The Maine Department of Health and Human Services assumed custody of Natasha. For the purposes of reunification, the court ordered Janice to “participate in counseling with Natasha, sign all releases, and participate in visitation with her daughter up to twice a month.”
[¶ 6] During the next two years, four uncontested judicial review hearings were held. In all four review orders, the court reaffirmed the placement of Natasha in the Department’s custody and found that the Department had made reasonable efforts to reunify and rehabilitate the family. With regard to Janice’s compliance with the case plan, the court found on the first three judicial reviews that her compliance was “good,” but on the fourth found that her compliance had been “fair.” In the judicial review order generated with the termination order, the court found that her compliance was “unacceptable.”
[¶ 7] On May 10, 2006, the Department filed a petition to terminate Janice’s parental rights. The Department alleged that Janice had not demonstrated that she had gained the skills necessary to effectively parent Natasha on a daily basis and that she continued to have difficulty understanding the scope of Natasha’s disabilities. The Department also alleged that Natasha’s significant behavioral and emotional deficits required that she be placed in a permanent and stable living environment where all of her needs could be managed appropriately.
[¶ 8] At the hearing on the termination petition, the Department offered an Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children home study report from the State of Massachusetts as an exhibit.2 Janice objected to the offer on the ground that, pursuant to 22 M.R.S. § 4007(4) (2006),3 it [605]*605was inadmissible for any purpose other than to show compliance with the ICPC. The court admitted the exhibit over Janice’s objection.
[¶ 9] Termination of parental rights was not strongly advocated by the guardian ad litem, the social worker, or the therapist. The guardian reluctantly supported the petition for termination:
This reluctance is due to the affection that Natasha has for Janice ... There is a bond between them. I believe Janice ... has Natasha’s best interests at heart and that she believes she can manage Natasha’s needs as well as her own. History, and the ongoing needs of Natasha strongly suggest that she will not be able to do so....
[¶ 10] The social worker observed that Natasha “is developing a more secure attachment with [Janice] and that to interrupt that in a total way would be ... [contrary to her interests],” “that [termination] could be significantly traumatic,” and that it would “have greater deleterious effect tha[n][he] may ... even be able to predict.” The therapist expressed concern for Janice’s ability to independently apply skills of parenting to her home setting if Natasha returned to her custody. Yet, rather than endorsing termination, the therapist encouraged “[appropriate ongoing (preferably wrap-around) service supports,” and “at least extended and comprehensively planned home-based services.”
[¶ 11] After a one-day hearing, the court entered an order terminating Janice’s rights to Natasha. The court found that (1) Janice is unwilling or unable to protect Natasha from jeopardy and the circumstances are unlikely to change within a time frame reasonably calculated to meet Natasha’s needs, and (2) termination of Janice’s parental rights is in the best interest of Natasha so that she may be made available for adoption and permanency placement.
[¶ 12] Janice filed this timely appeal, challenging the court’s admission of the ICPC home study for purposes other than showing compliance with the ICPC.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Standard of Review
[¶ 13] We have not previously had the opportunity to address the admissibility of a home study report generated pursuant to the ICPC. Whether the substance of the home study report is admissible in evidence pursuant to 22 M.R.S. § 4007(4) is a question of law that we review de novo. See In re Scott S., 2001 ME 114, ¶ 10, 775 A.2d 1144, 1148. “In construing a statute, we first look to the plain meaning of the statutory language to give effect to legislative intent; only if the meaning of the statute is unclear will we examine other indicia of legislative intent.” State v. Moulton, 1997 ME 228, ¶ 14, 704 A.2d 361, 365. The relevant statutory language provides: “a report submitted pursuant to the compact is admissible in evidence for purposes of indicating compliance with the compact and the court may rely on evidence to the extent of its probative value.” 22 M.R.S. § 4007(4) (emphasis added.)
[¶ 14] The issue is whether the italicized language provides for the admissibility of evidence contained in the report that goes beyond the issue of compliance with the ICPC. Similar language is found in section 4007(2), which deals with the admissibility of interviews with children and states: “[t]he court may admit and consider oral or written evidence of out-of-court statements made by a child, and may rely on that evidence to the extent of its probes [606]*606tive value.” 22 M.R.S. § 4007(2) (2006) (emphasis added). Aided by the word “that,” the italicized clause clearly modifies the previous clause and does not confer an independent or separate basis for the admission of evidence beyond what the previous clause allows. Thus, although the clause at issue in the present case lacks the word “that,” it seems likely that the Legislature intended for it to have the same effect. However, as written, the meaning of subsection 4007(4) is arguably ambiguous, so we may choose to look at other indicia of legislative intent.
[¶ 15] The only relevant legislative history is the Statement of Fact that provides: “reports produced as a result of an interstate compact request will be admissible in evidence without testimony from the out-of-state compact administrator for the limited purposes of indicating compliance with the compact.” L.D. 21666, Statement of Fact (111th Legis.1984).4 This statement confirms that, in the absence of testimony from the Massachusetts administrator, the home study report is admissible solely to show compliance with the ICPC. We must therefore conclude that the trial court erred by admitting the report for purposes beyond those related to compliance with the act, and using the report in its determination of parental fitness and best interests of the child.
B. Harmless Error
[¶ 16] We must next determine whether the error caused was harmless. In re Rachel J., 2002 ME 148, ¶ 14, 804 A.2d 418, 423. In the context of a termination of parental rights proceeding, we have stated:
[T]he State has the burden of persuading us that it is highly probable that the error did not prejudice the parents or contribute to the result in the case. The State’s burden of persuasion is high. Any doubt will be resolved in favor of the parent.
Thus, ... we review the entire record to determine whether the error prejudiced the parents in the presentation of their case or had the potential to affect the outcome of the case. In the absence of substantial certainty, that is, a determination that it is highly probable, that the error had no prejudicial effect and did not affect the outcome, we will vacate the judgment.
Id. (quoting In re Michelle W., 2001 ME 123, ¶ 12, 777 A.2d 283, 286) (emphasis added).
[¶ 17] In In re Elijah R., we found that error was harmless where the court relied on the inadmissible evidence, but the information was duplicated by other sources in the record. 620 A.2d 282, 285-86 (Me.1993). Contrary to the Department’s contention that the evidence from the report relied upon by the trial court is cumulative and therefore harmless, there is no evidence in the record to support that view, particularly in light of the standard of proof required by In re Rachel J., 2002 ME 148, ¶ 14, 804 A.2d at 423. The only source of information regarding the social services provided by Massachusetts and Janice’s response are from the reports made pursuant to the ICPC. Further, Janice’s apparent inability to make appropriate use of the services as proof of her inability or unwillingness to care for Natasha figured prominently in the court’s final analysis.
[607]*607[¶ 18] In its order, the court made multiple references to the contents of the home study report in its findings of fact:
9. Massachusetts Department of Social Services completed an ICPC home study in January 2006. The report of that study indicates that Janice ... has made few, if any, changes in her life to evidence her ability to access services in a timely manner for herself, even those services which address basic needs such as health care and fuel assistance. Said report did not recommend that Natasha be placed with [Janice] in Massachusetts.
10. In addition to making little progress toward the rehabilitation and reunification in this Maine child protection case since August 12, 2004, the date of the Preliminary Protection Order, to August 22, 2006, the date of the hearing on the Petition for Termination of Parental Rights, there was evidence presented that Janice ... received home-based services and individual therapy to assist [Janice] to meet Natasha’s needs for a two year period from the Massachusetts Department of Social Services. In spite of services provided to her for a total of a four-year period, jeopardy has not been ameliorated in this case, nor is there any objective indication that jeopardy will be ameliorated in the near future.
12. Janice ... has demonstrated her inability to be a consistent nurturing parent for Natasha, or to provide a stable placement for her, with consistent structure, and to provide effective positive discipline for her, or to prevent her from mental health crises.
18. Although Janice ... has been offered and participated in services at least to a certain extent both through the State of Massachusetts Department of Social Services, and the State of Maine Department of Health and Human Services over a four year period, she has not gained the ability to provide for Natasha’s needs as her primary caretaker, nor is there any evidence to suggest that she will gain that ability in the foreseeable future.
(Emphasis added.)
[¶ 19] There are several examples in the court’s findings where the ICPC findings were intertwined with other evidence in the record. The court did not hear any testimony from any therapist, social worker, or other individual who had visited the mother’s home or evaluated her in Boston. Instead, the court appears to have relied on the ICPC home study report, which included records from The House for Little Wanderers, a social services organization in Roslindale, Massachusetts that provided in-home supports to Janice, to make findings about Janice’s home and ability to parent Natasha.
[¶ 20] Pamela Dubois, the Maine DHHS worker, testified that her concerns about Janice’s ability to parent Natasha were based on the ICPC study. She testified that “Janice struggled with disorganization. She had lost her Massachusetts health benefits because she kept her bills in a box. She hadn’t opened them. She had not applied for heating assistance — for last winter. She had no source of income. She had not followed up on her disability claim.” The exact language regarding these concerns in the ICPC report is as follows:
On 6/27/2003, Janice obtained an application for Social Security Disability Insurance. She claimed to have completed the application, but as of this writing, she is not receiving that support. Janice said that her application was denied. However, she has not followed through with the appeals process to date.... [608]*608Again, her inability to either find or complete paperwork has led to her insurance (Mass Health) being shut off. As of 12/2005 she had not yet applied for Fuel Assistance.... Janice has a box of bills in her bedroom that she has been unable to pay.
Dubois did not provide a basis for this portion of her testimony other than the ICPC report. No other witnesses testified to Janice’s ability to access these specific services.
[¶21] Despite Janice’s testimony that she currently does have health insurance from the state of Massachusetts, Dubois testified that she had no knowledge of Janice’s health insurance status and had not asked about it recently, even though seven months had passed since Massachusetts conducted its assessment. Janice testified that she has a claim pending for Social Security Supplemental Security Income and has secured the services of an attorney to pursue the appeal. She also testified that she is now enrolled in the state’s heating assistance program for the upcoming winter. The court, however, did not mention any of Janice’s progress in meeting her own needs in its findings, which appear to have been based largely on the ICPC report, that she was unable to “access services in a timely manner.”
[¶ 22] Finally, the court’s finding about Janice’s inability to be a “nurturing” parent appears to have no basis in the record other than the following language in the ICPC report:
... Janice is not very affectionate towards Natasha.... Natasha has always tried to express affection to Janice. During these encounters, Janice would sometimes lean away from Natasha or ask her to stop hugging her, etc. Whether or not it is still the case, when this family was involved with DSS, Natasha was a child that needed affection in some form. Natasha’s therapist and this worker were sometimes concerned that Janice was unable to satisfy this need of Natasha’s....
In direct contrast, Dubois testified that she had the opportunity to observe interactions between Janice and Natasha and described them as “very appropriate. They’re very loving towards one another.” Natasha’s social worker testified similarly: “I believe there has been enough sign of nurtwrance and affection between [Janice] and [Natasha] that if she were to feel that she lost contact indefinitely with her, that, yes, that would be traumatic.” (Emphasis added.) Not one witness testified that Janice failed to meet Natasha’s needs for affection. This finding therefore appears to be based primarily, if not solely, on the ICPC report. Such a negative characterization of Janice, moreover, is highly prejudicial and therefore not harmless.
[¶ 23] Because the court relied upon and accorded substantial weight to the information contained in the home study report for its findings and conclusions of law, there can be no substantial certainty that the error did not have prejudicial effect and that it did not affect the outcome. Evaluating the extent of the harm is merely speculative and we are therefore'bound to resolve this doubt in favor of the mother. In re Rachel J., 2002 ME 148, ¶ 14, 804 A.2d at 423. Accordingly, we conclude that the error was not harmless and vacate the judgment of the trial court. In making this decision we do not intend, as the dissent argues, to offer any view or suggestion of the extent to which witnesses offering opinions may rely on otherwise inadmissible evidence to support their opinion.
[¶ 24] We acknowledge that there may be sufficient evidence in the record, absent the ICPC report, for the trial court to make the findings required to support an [609]*609order of termination of Janice’s parental rights. We therefore remand and direct the trial court to act within its discretion to either: (1) consider the record without the ICPC findings, or additional testimony, within 30 days; or, (2) hold a new hearing within 30 days if it deems additional testimony to be necessary, without admitting the ICPC findings; and issue a new ruling.
The entry is:
Judgment vacated and remanded to the District Court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.