In Re Naron & Wagner, Chartered

88 B.R. 85, 1988 Bankr. LEXIS 1147, 18 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 18, 1988 WL 78299
CourtUnited States Bankruptcy Court, D. Maryland
DecidedJuly 26, 1988
Docket19-12622
StatusPublished
Cited by13 cases

This text of 88 B.R. 85 (In Re Naron & Wagner, Chartered) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Bankruptcy Court, D. Maryland primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In Re Naron & Wagner, Chartered, 88 B.R. 85, 1988 Bankr. LEXIS 1147, 18 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 18, 1988 WL 78299 (Md. 1988).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM OPINION

E. STEPHEN DERBY, Bankruptcy Judge.

In this Chapter 11 case the Debtor has sought to sell all of its operating assets before it has had a plan of reorganization confirmed, and in fact before it has even filed a plan. The Debtor has advised the Court that it intends to file a plan of liquidation within the exclusive period provided to the Debtor by 11 U.S.C. Section 1121.

The Debtor, Naron & Wagner, Chartered, is a local accounting firm. Its principal operating assets were an accounting practice, associated office leases and equipment, and a wholly owned subsidiary known as Business Computer Group (“BCG”), which is engaged in the business of distributing computer hardware and software and providing various related services.

This Court previously approved the sale of Debtor’s accounting practice and related assets, including the amendment, assumption and assignment of certain leases, on *87 motion and after notice to all creditors and parties in interest pursuant to 11 U.S.C. Sections 363(b) (1) and 365 and Bankruptcy Rules 6004 and 6006. The Court concluded, based on the evidence proffered without objection at the hearing, that there were “good business reason[s]” for granting Debtor’s motions. In re Lionel Corp., 722 F.2d 1063, 1071 (2 Cir.1983). The Debtor was unable to continue its accounting practice profitably or with adequate personnel; the accounting practice was an intangible asset dependent on client good will and, if not timely sold, would quickly lose all of its realizable value for the bankruptcy estate because clients whom Debtor could not service would retain new accountants; preservation of the accounting practice by its sale to another accounting firm would facilitate Debtor’s collection of over $600,000 of accounts receivable which it retained, because clients would continue to receive uninterrupted accounting services; and the amendment, assumption and assignment of leases which were an integral part of the sale transaction would avoid or minimize additional claims against the bankruptcy estate.

Presently before the Court is Debtor’s motion for approval of the private sale of all the assets of BCG free and clear of liens, encumbrances, claims and interests. BCG is the Debtor’s last operating asset. The purchaser is ProVAR, Inc., a Maryland corporation. The principals of ProVAR are the current management of BCG, namely, the president and a vice president. There is no creditors’ committee in this case, no objections have been filed, and the United States Trustee has not taken any position, although the Section 341 first meeting of creditors has been held.

This matter raises several issues. First, under what circumstances, if any, should the Court approve a Chapter 11 debtor’s sale of substantially all its operating assets prior to confirmation of a plan of reorganization. Second, what protections must be afforded to creditors and other parties in interest before such a sale may be approved by the Court. Third, have the necessary protections been afforded here to creditors and other parties in interest. Finally, do circumstances exist in this case which justify approval of the sale of Debt- or’s last major operating asset. It is appropriate for the Court to consider these issues because the Court’s approval has been sought by the Debtor and because sale of all assets of BCG, a non-debtor but wholly-owned subsidiary corporation of the Debt- or, will directly govern the realizable value of Debtor’s 100% ownership interest. Cf. In Re Equity Funding Corporation of America, 492 F.2d 793 (9 Cir.1974), cert. denied, Herman Invest. Co. v. Loeffler, 419 U.S. 964, 95 S.Ct. 224, 42 L.Ed.2d 178 (1974). Further, Debtor’s approval of this sale appears required under Maryland law because Debtor is the sole shareholder of BCG, and substantially all of the assets of BCG are being sold. Md.Corps. & Ass’ns Code Ann. § 3-105 (1985 Repl. Vol.).

As to the first question, the Court concludes that a Chapter 11 debtor may in certain circumstances sell all or substantially all of its assets, or a substantial asset, pursuant to 11 U.S.C. Section 363(b) prior to confirmation of a plan of reorganization. Such a sale may even be made, as here, prior to filing a plan of reorganization. However, before such a sale can be approved, the court must “... expressly find from the evidence presented before [it] at the hearing a good business reason to grant such an application.” In re Lionel Corp., supra, 722 F.2d at 1071. In other words, the court should not approve such a sale unless it is able, based on the evidence, “... to articulate sound business justifications for [its] decisions.” Id. at 1066. In Lionel the Court of Appeals reversed approval of a Chapter 11 debtor’s preconfirmation sale of an 82% common stock interest in a profitable subsidiary because the objector’s evidence demonstrated there was not a good business reason for the sale. The subsidiary was less subject than other companies to wide market fluctuations; there was no reason why those interested in purchasing the stock would not be just as interested in six months; and the stock was being sold only because the unsecured creditors’ committee insisted, although *88 debtor preferred to retain its ownership interest.

This court adopts the rationale of the Lionel case. It will not follow White Motor Credit Corporation, 14 B.R. 584 (Bkrtcy.N.D. Ohio 1981). There is no requirement that only an emergency will permit a Chapter 11 debtor’s preconfirmation use of Section 363(b), but a Chapter 11 debtor may not use Section 363(b) without establishing a good business reason for such use. See also Stephens Industries, Inc. v. McClung, 789 F.2d 386 (6 Cir.1986). The Chapter 11 plan confirmation process provides numerous protections to parties in interest, and a debtor should not be allowed to “... use § 363(b) to sidestep the protection creditors have when it comes time to confirm a plan of reorganization,” or inappropriately to establish the terms of a plan sub rosa through use of Section 363(b). In re Continental Air Lines, Inc., 780 F.2d 1223, 1227 (5 Cir.1986). See also In re Braniff Airways, Inc., 700 F.2d 935 (5 Cir.1983). The sale proposed here is not a sub rosa plan because it seeks only to liquidate assets, and the sale will not restructure rights of creditors, as in the Braniff case, supra.

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Bluebook (online)
88 B.R. 85, 1988 Bankr. LEXIS 1147, 18 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 18, 1988 WL 78299, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-naron-wagner-chartered-mdb-1988.