In Re: Named Involuntary Steven Wayne Bonilla

Opinion

1 2 NOT FOR PUBLICATION 3 4 UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT 5 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 7 8 In re ) Misc. File No. 19-202 9 ) Named Involuntary Petitioner ) 10 ) STEVEN WAYNE BONILLA ) 11 ) ) 12 MEMORANDUM OPINION AND DECISION ON OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 60(b) AND FEDERAL RULE OF 14 BANKRUPTCY PROCEDURE 9024 15 On August 22, 2019, this court entered its Order concerning the ninety-eight (98) Involuntary 16 Bankruptcy Petition Forms (Form 105s) delivered to this court by Steven Wayne Bonilla. Order, 17 Dckt. 121. The Form 105s name various federal and state judges and justices as the target debtors 18 (“Form 105 Targets”) for the involuntary bankruptcy cases Mr. Bonilla seeks to commence. The 19 court provided a thirty-nine (39) page Memorandum Opinion and Decision and Order thereon 20 addressing the Form 105s, the requirements for a person to qualify to commence involuntary 21 bankruptcy cases, and the non-bankruptcy issues Mr. Bonilla was presenting to the court. Dckt. 120. 22 On September 6, 2019, Mr. Bonilla filed with the court a document titled “In Response to The 23 Court Order Filed on August 22, 2019.” The court having issued its order on August 22, 2019, there 24 is no further briefing or arguing those issues with the court. Therefore, there is no “Response” to be 25 filed. 26 Reviewing this document, the court construes it to be in the nature of a Motion for Relief 27 From the Prior Order as permitted under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b), as incorporated by 28 Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 9024. The court considers this document as such a request 1 pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b).1 2 REQUIREMENTS FOR RELIEF PURSUANT 3 TO FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 60(b). 4 The court reconsidering or vacating a judgment or order is governed by Federal Rule of Civil 5 Procedure 60(b), as made applicable in this case by Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 9024, 6 which incorporates minor modifications that do not apply here. Grounds for relief from a final 7 judgment, order, or other proceeding are limited to: 8 (1) Mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; 9 (2) Newly discovered evidence that, with reasonable diligence, could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b); 10 (3) fraud (whether previously called intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or 11 misconduct by an opposing party; 12 (4) The judgment is void; 13 (5) The judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged; it is based on an earlier judgment that has been reversed or vacated; or applying in prospectively is no longer 14 equitable; or 15 (6) Any other reason that justifies relief. 16 Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b). The court uses equitable principles when applying Rule 60(b)Fed. R. Civ. P. 17 60(b). See 11 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2857 (3rd ed. 18 1998). A precondition to the granting of such relief is that the movant show that he or she has a 19 meritious claim or defense. See 12-60 MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE CIVIL § 60.24; Brandt v. 20 American Bankers Insurance Company of Florida, 653 F.3d 1108, 111 (9th Cir. 2011); Falk v. Allen, 21 739 F.2d 461, 462 (9th Cir. 1984) (“We agree with the Third Circuit that three factors should be 22 evaluated in considering a motion to reopen a default judgment under Rule 60(b): (1) whether the 23 plaintiff will be prejudiced, (2) whether the defendant has a meritorious defense, and (3) whether 24 culpable conduct of the defendant led to the default. See Gross v. Stereo Component Systems, 25 1 Though the Request for Relief was filed on September 6, 2019, due to the personal and 26 judicial commitments of the judge, as well as unanticipated judicial administrative matters for 27 the District, the court had not been able to dedicate focused time to consider what Mr. Bonilla has provided until late in September 2019. As with the Memorandum Opinion and Decision and 28 Order Thereon (Dckt. 120), the issues are complex and have been given proper consideration. 1 700 F.2d 120, 122 (3d Cir. 1983) ("Gross"); see also United Coin Meter v. Seaboard Coastline R.R., 2 705 F.2d 839, 845 (6th Cir. 1983)(adopting Third Circuit test.)”). 3 Additionally, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has instructed in Aurich American Insurance 4 Company v. International Fibercom, Inc. (In re International Fibercom, Inc.) 503 F.3d 933, 941 5 (9th Cir. 2007): 6 We have stated in the past that Rule 60(b)(6) should be "liberally applied," Hammer, 940 F.2d at 525, "to accomplish justice." Yanow v. Weyerhaeuser S.S. Co., 7 274 F.2d 274, 284 (9th Cir. 1959) (quoting Klapprott v. United States, 335 U.S. 601, 615, 69 S. Ct. 384, 93 L. Ed. 266 (1949)). At the same time, "[j]udgments are not 8 often set aside under Rule 60(b)(6)." Latshaw v. Trainer Wortham & Co., 452 F.3d 1097, 1103 (9th Cir. 2006). Rather, Rule 60(b)(6) should be "'used sparingly as an 9 equitable remedy to prevent manifest injustice' and 'is to be utilized only where extraordinary circumstances prevented a party from taking timely action to prevent 10 or correct an erroneous judgment.'" United States v. Washington, 394 F.3d 1152, 1157 (9th Cir. 2005) (quoting United States v. Alpine Land & Reservoir Co., 984 F.2d 11 1047, 1049 (9th Cir. 1993)). Accordingly, a party who moves for such relief "must demonstrate both injury and circumstances beyond his control that prevented him 12 from proceeding with . . . the action in a proper fashion." Cmty. Dental Servs. v. Tani, 282 F.3d 1164, 1168 (9th Cir. 2002). 13 GROUNDS STATED IN SEPTEMBER 8, 2019 14 FILED MOTION TO RECONSIDER “RESPONSE” 15 Mr. Bonilla’s Motion to Reconsider “Response” document is eighty-two (82) pages in length. 16 The first twenty (20) pages are his arguments, which are then supported by sixty-two (62) pages of 17 exhibits. The court summarizes Mr. Bonilla’s arguments as follows: 18 A. The relief sought from this bankruptcy court by Mr. Bonilla is stated to be: 19 “When the [Form 105 Targets] are required to perform an act of which the law recognizes as a duty the creditors have a legal right to seek a 20 remedy for the breach of those duties, as well as a remedy for damages, under contract Law. Which this Honorable Court is required 21 to enforce under the Equal Protection of Law Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.” 22 Response at p. 2:7-13, Dckt. 123. 23 B. With respect to the issues between Mr. Bonilla and the From 105 Targets, Mr. Bonilla 24 states: 25 Pursuant to case Law holdings in Macmillan v. Griffin, 99 Cal.App. 26 2d 523, 222 P.2d 69; 1950 Cal. App. LEXIS 1740] , the law clearly recognizes the duty of the judge to declare a judgment void, if the 27 parties admit or stipulate, or fail to object to the evidence of the facts showing a lack of jurisdiction, it is then established that the judgment 28 is void as effectively as though shown by the record; and whenever 1 such fact is brought to the attention of the judge, it is the judge’s duty to declare the judgment void as a matter of law. 2 Id., p. 2:14-22. 3 C. Mr. Bonilla states that the law provides that where the parties have stipulated or 4 admitted facts showing a lack of jurisdiction, an order is void, and when that is 5 brought to the attention of a judge, it is the judge’s duty to declare the order void as 6 a matter of law. Id. at p. 2:23-26. 7 D. Thus, Mr. Bonilla concludes that because he believes that all of the federal and state 8 judges and justices were shown that the State Court which issued his conviction was 9 “without jurisdiction,” each had an obligation to declare that conviction void. Id. at 10 pp. 2:27-28, 3:1. This is based on Mr. Bonilla having sent each of the judges a copy 11 of the FBI agents admission that there was no federal grand jury subpoena. Id. at p. 3: 12 2-4. 13 E. Based on the above assertion that there was no subpoena, then the State Court had no 14 jurisdiction to enter his conviction for violation of the State criminal laws. Id. at 15 p.3:4. When presented with this FBI “admission,” each federal and judge and justice 16 had an obligation to declare his criminal conviction void. Id. at p. 3:6-13. 17 F. Additionally, Mr. Bonilla asserts that he provided each of the Form 105 Targets with 18 the State Attorney General’s admission that the alleged federal grand jury subpoena 19 was not made a part of the State Court trial record in the case which resulted in his 20 conviction, which shows a lack of jurisdiction of the State Court. Id. at p. 3:14-20. 21 G. Because there was a lack of State Court jurisdiction in the action in which his criminal 22 conviction was entered, the various state and federal judges and justices who are the 23 Form 105 Targets have, 24 [c]learly violated statutory law, my Constitutional rights, their oath of 25 office, due to them being bias/prejudice, against pro se, indigent, minority prisoners, are the reasons why they are being forced into 26 bankruptcy to do the specific performance of declaring the judgment void or declaring the state judge’s order void, as a duty recognized by 27 by [sic] law that is owed to the Petitioner, Steven Wayne Bonilla/me.” 28 Id. at p. 3:21-28, 4:1-2. 1 H. Mr. Bonilla asserts that he is not requesting that the court order him released or to 2 vacate the State Court conviction. Id. at p. 4:3-4. Further, Mr. Bonilla is asserting 3 that he is not requesting that this bankruptcy court declare his State Court conviction 4 void. Id. at p. 4:20-23.2 5 6 2 This statement is contradicted by the demands for relief asserted in the further pleading filed by Mr. Bonilla on September 23, 2019, which is the subject of a separate Memorandum 7 Decision and Order of this court. In that pleading for “Expedited Review of Fraud Committed 8 on the Court” (Dckt. 126), Mr. Bonilla expressly requests that the judge of the Bankruptcy Court to (identified by the paragraph number in the pleading): 9 “(4) The [bankruptcy court] to grant damages against all actors to include 10 performance of the owning debtors/judges, and/or order actors/agents to abide by 11 the law/as a matter of law and declare the judgment [the State Court criminal conviction] void.” Dckt. 126, p. 6. 12 “(5) The [bankruptcy court] to order [Mr. Bonilla’s] immediate release, due to the 13 verified factors put forth in this petition, as a matter of well established law and in 14 the interest of justice or make it part of the relief owed to the Petitioner by the debtors/judges.” Id. 15 “(7) The [bankruptcy court] to order the proper investigation into all afore stated 16 unlawful/unconstitutional violations, while acting under the Color of 17 Law/Authority.” Id. 18 “(8) To grant any and all further relief/damages which are fair-just and proper by this [bankruptcy court] for the false imprisonment of [Mr. Bonilla] for the past 23 19 years.” Id. 20 “(1) To declare [the State Court criminal conviction] VOID and grant [Mr. 21 Bonilla’s immediate release.” Id., p. 10. 22 “(2) To investigate and prosecute BIAS/PREJUDICE actors of the Conspiracy.” Id. 23 24 “(1) To declare the [State Court criminal conviction] VOID and grant [MR. Bonilla’s immediate release.” Id., Dckt. p. 13. 25 “(2) To investigate and prosecute the BIAS/PREJUDICE defendants/judges.” Id. 26 27 As clearly stated by Mr. Bonilla, he is seeking to have this bankruptcy court adjudicate his assertions that the criminal conviction is improper and void, issue mandatory injunctions for the 28 Form 105 targets to declare the State Court criminal conviction void, issue a mandatory 1 I. The state and federal judges and justices who failed to declare his State Court 2 conviction void have “[f]ailed/refused or neglected to do their statutory, contractual 3 duty was a breach of contract or a duty arising out of a statutory law, is the reason for 4 the action raised in the Bankruptcy Court.” Id. at p. 4:11-14. 5 J. Mr. Bonilla asserts that the state and federal judges and justices that are the Form 105 6 Targets had a statutory duty to act based on his showing of a lack of jurisdiction for 7 the State Court action in which his conviction was entered. Id. at p. 5:10-12. 8 K. With respect to his assertion that a defense of judicial immunity cannot be asserted 9 against his claims, 10 “To clarify this misunderstanding of my claim, I will start by citing Case law [51 Ariz. 220, 75 P.3d 689], a judge must act within 11 his jurisdiction as to the subject matter and person to entitle him to immunity for his actions. 12 Citing Case Law, [552 F.3d 172], judicial immunity is 13 available only where the judge has jurisdiction. Although immunity exists when jurisdiction is present even though the judge acts in excess 14 of that jurisdiction, it is not available when he acts in clear absence of all jurisdiction.” 15 Id. at p. 6:9-17. 16 L. That if a judge does not have subject matter jurisdiction, then a trial judge has no 17 power to act and any judgment or order entered by such judge without subject matter 18 jurisdiction is void. Id. at p. 6:10-26. 19 M. Mr. Bonilla continues, asserting that a reviewing judge, of a proceeding conducted in 20 another court, has only limited jurisdiction to reverse3 the other court’s judgment, but 21 22 injunction for the State of California to release him from incarceration, and either issue a 23 mandatory injunction for others to undertake, or this bankruptcy court itself to undertake, the investigation and prosecution of all persons that Mr. Bonilla believes have violated his rights. 24 Such are well beyond the limited scope of jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court and the bankruptcy judges as established by Congress in 28 U.S.C. § 1334 and § 157. 25 26 27 3The court reads the reference to “reverse,” which is what an appellate court would do, to 28 be declare void. 1 does not have “subject matter” jurisdiction for the proceeding in which the review is 2 sought. Id. at pp. 6:26-28, 7:1-4. 3 N. Further, since the various state and federal judges and justices from whom Mr. Bonilla 4 has sought relief cannot show that there was a subpoena or that it was admitted as an 5 exhibit, cannot claim judicial immunity if they fail to exercise their limited 6 jurisdiction to declare the State Court conviction void. 7 O. Mr. Bonilla discusses for several pages the fraud he asserts was committed on the 8 State Court in the action in which his criminal conviction was entered. Further, this 9 alleged fraud “VITIATES EVERYTHING.” (emphasis in original). 10 P. Mr. Bonilla further asserts that the state and federal judges and justices who are the 11 Form 105 Targets “[i]ntentionally made erroneous rulings with the specific intent to 12 deprive [Mr. Bonilla] of due process, due to them being BIAS/PREJUDICE against 13 pro se, indigent, minority prisoners, like [Mr. Bonilla].” Id. at pp. 10:26-28, 11:1. 14 Q. For his claims against the Form 105 Targets, he summarizes (provided in greater 15 detail in the petition attached to the Response) that: 16 1. Since the State Court conviction is void for lack of jurisdiction, 17 2. And the state and federal judges and justices shown that there was a lack of 18 State Court jurisdiction for his conviction. 19 3. And shown that there was a civil conspiracy to defraud the State Court. 20 4. Each of the Form 105 Targets have a duty to declare the conviction void. 21 5. If a judge lacks jurisdiction or in violation of valid statutes or case law, he/she 22 loses judicial immunity. Mr. Bonilla cites to Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. 335 23 (1871). The Supreme Court in Bradley concludes with the following 24 statement concerning judicial immunity: 25 The exemption of judges of the superior courts of record from liability to civil suit for their judicial acts existing when there 26 is jurisdiction of the subject-matter, though irregularity and error attend the exercise of the jurisdiction, the exemption 27 cannot be affected by any consideration of the motives with which the acts are done. The allegation of malicious or corrupt 28 motives could always be made, and if the motives could be 1 inquired into judges would be subjected to the same vexatious litigation upon such allegations, whether the motives had or 2 had not any real existence. Against the consequences of their erroneous or irregular action, from whatever motives 3 proceeding, the law has provided for private parties numerous remedies, and to those remedies they must, in such cases, 4 resort. But for malice or corruption in their action whilst exercising their judicial functions within the general scope of 5 their jurisdiction, the judges of these courts can only be reached by public prosecution in the form of impeachment, or 6 in such other form as may be specially prescribed. 7 Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. 335, 354 (1871). If jurisdiction existed for the 8 matter before the court (such as here, where Mr. Bonilla states that the court 9 has the jurisdiction to declare his state court conviction void), such decision 10 if disagreed with is not the basis for attacking the judge civilly, but must be 11 remedied as provided by law - here an appeal. 12 6. If a judge acts in the exercise of “unconferred jurisdiction” then that subjects 13 him or her to personal liability, citing Turner v. Raynes, 611 F.2d 92, 95 14 (5th Cir. 1980). Id. at p. 12:12-25. The holding in Turner is consistent with 15 that in Bradley, with the Fifth Circuit applying the broad reach of judicial 16 immunity even to a state justice of the peace, even when the plaintiff was 17 asserting a civil rights violation over being convicted of a “nonexistent 18 crime.” The Fifth Circuit considered the “unconferred jurisdiction” as being 19 one in which someone with the title of judge acted outside of the jurisdiction 20 of his or her judgeship, stating: 21 Searching for clues to the Court's position, however, we cannot ignore another possible reading of footnote 7: that only 22 a clearly inordinate exercise of unconferred jurisdiction by a judge one so crass as to establish that he embarked on it either 23 knowingly or recklessly subjects him to personal liability. Probate judges, bankruptcy judges, and like special-purpose 24 magistrates presumably should know, without being driven to fine distinctions, that they are not to sit in criminal matters. 25 Turner v. Raynes, 611 F.2d 92, 95 (5th Cir. 1980). Thus, if the judge has the 26 power to act, then immunity exists, even when the judge determines not to 27 28 1 grant the relief requested.4 2 7. Mr. Bonilla repeatedly cites the court to the argument that when the judge 3 “has NO Jurisdiction at all in the particular case” then the judge can be liable 4 for damages to the person against whom the judicial power was exercised if 5 the judge had no jurisdiction. See Id. at pp. 12:26, 13:1-3. 6 8. Mr. Bonilla’s arguments circle back to his assertion that since the subpoena 7 had not been introduced into evidence, then necessarily the trial judge in his 8 State Court criminal matter could not have had jurisdiction to enter the 9 conviction therein and all other judges have no jurisdiction to do anything 10 other than declare that the criminal conviction is void. He continues to argue 11 that other rights he has have been violated. See Id. at pp. 13:24-28, 14:1-11. 12 9. Mr. Bonilla then seeks to assert claims arising under federal law (cited as 13 18 U.S.C. § 04), asserting that the various judges have committed the crime 14 of misprison of a felony by allowing the asserted fraud upon the court in his 15 State Court criminal conviction to go unaddressed. He further asserts that 16 such is “TREASON TO THE CONSTITUTION.” Id. at pp. 16:19-28, 17:1-8 17 (emphasis in original). 18 10. Mr. Bonilla then asserts that since he has brought to the attention of the 19 various judges and justices the alleged violation of 18 U.S.C. § 04, their 20 failure to act causes each of the judges to be liable to him. Further, that the 21 failure to exercise jurisdiction as he has demanded is actionable5. Id. 22 11. Mr. Bonilla asserts that Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 1006 allowing 23 24 4It is interesting that the case Mr. Bonilla cites expressly recognizes that certain judges, like bankruptcy judges, have a more limited scope of the exercise of federal court jurisdiction, as 25 opposed to district court judges in the federal system and superior court judges (who are the true 26 expansive general jurisdiction judges for state law matters) in the California judicial system. 27 5 By this Mr. Bonilla is again admitting that the various Form 105 Targets had jurisdiction to act, and as such, were still clothed with judicial immunity notwithstanding their 28 failure to agree with Mr. Bonilla. 1 for waiving of a filing fee for the filing of a voluntary bankruptcy petition by 2 an individual does not by negative implication mean that the fee cannot be 3 waived for an involuntary petition. Mr. Bonilla cites the court to 28 U.S.C. 4 § 1915 for the waiving of a filing fee for an indigent prisoner. Id. at pp. 5 18:19-28, 19:1-4. 6 12. Mr. Bonilla further asserts a violation of federal criminal law 18 U.S.C. § 241 7 arises due to the conspiracy to deprive him of his federal Constitutional 8 Rights. Id. at p. 19:19-28, 20:1-10. 10 The court has considered the request to determine what error, if any, was made in the prior 11 order to not file the ninety-eight (98) involuntary bankruptcy petitions. The court has not identified 12 any error. 13 As is clear in this Motion to Reconsider, as was in his original Response, Mr. Bonilla is 14 seeking to have this court adjudicate his assertions that the State Court conviction is void for lack of 15 jurisdiction. This is the fundamental legal issue at the claims he tries to construct. As the Fifth 16 Circuit Court of Appeals has stated, judges in speciality courts exercising a narrower scope of federal 17 court jurisdiction need to “stay in their lanes.” 18 Beginning with the assertion by Mr. Bonilla that he has standing to commence ninety-eight 19 (98) involuntary bankruptcies, the court reviewed in the prior Memorandum Opinion and Decision 20 and Order Thereon (Dckt. 120) the basic statutory requirements found in 11 U.S.C. § 303(b). Mem. 21 Op. and Dec., p. 12:10-23. To have standing to commence an involuntary case the creditor must have 22 a claim (obligation to be paid money) that is: 23 (1) Not contingent as to liability 24 (2) Not subject to bona fide dispute as to liability 25 (3) Not subject to bona fide dispute as to amount 26 While Mr. Bonilla argues passionately that there can be no bona fide dispute and no claim of 27 judicial immunity because all of the judges and justices lacked jurisdiction to no act, but only had 28 jurisdiction to issue the order he demanded, he admits that they had jurisdiction to act. He 1 necessarily admits that they can assert judicial immunity as a defense to such claims as he seeks to 2 assert. Further, there is no amount identifiable as being owed, but only the $3,000,000,000 amounts 3 asserted. 4 The more strenuously Mr. Bonilla argues that there can be no bona fide dispute because all 5 of the ninety-eight (98) judges and justices cannot claim judicial immunity because they each lacked 6 jurisdiction to do anything other than grant the relief he demanded, the more Mr. Bonilla highlights 7 that there is necessarily a bona fide dispute as demonstrated by the court’s denying the relief 8 requested. If jurisdiction exists, it exists to grant or not grant relief requested. 9 Additionally, as is well shown by Mr. Bonilla’s arguments in the Motion to Reconsider, he 10 is seeking to have this court adjudicate that his State Court criminal conviction is void and must be 11 set aside. That is well beyond the scope of a federal bankruptcy judge. Framing it as having civil 12 claims based on the assertion that the criminal conviction is void necessarily would require this court 13 to go beyond the jurisdiction of the federal bankruptcy court and adjudicate criminal law issues. 14 Non-Waiver of Involuntary Bankruptcy Filing Fees 15 Mr. Bonilla directs the court back to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, asserting that when the Supreme Court 16 in Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 1006 limited the fee waiver to voluntary cases by an 17 individual such does not really limit such when it comes to an indigent prisoner. While referencing 18 this general provision relating to filing fees, Mr. Bonilla misses the specific statute enacted by 19 Congress with respect to filing fees in bankruptcy cases and the waiving thereof - 28 U.S.C. § 1930. 20 In 28 U.S.C. § 1930(a)(1) Congress first states that parties commencing a bankruptcy case 21 shall (not may) pay the filing fee of $245.00 for commencing a Chapter 7 case. Congress then creates 22 an exception to the above shall requirement, providing that the Judicial Conference of the United 23 States shall proscribe the procedures by which a district court or a bankruptcy court may waive the 24 filing fee for: 25 (1) an individual; 26 (2) if that individual has an income less than 150 percent of the income official 27 poverty line, and the individual cannot pay in installments; and 28 (3) that the court may waive for such debtor other fees proscribed under 28 U.S.C. 1 § 1930(b) and (c). 2 28 U.S.C. § 1930(f). This is the specific statute directly on point. The court addressed in the prior 3 Memorandum Opinion and Decision and Order Thereon (Dckt. 120) the various rules, regulations, 4 and procedural requirements that tie the waiver to the individual debtor filing a voluntary bankruptcy 5 case. Merely citing back to a general fee statute does not change that analysis. See RadLAX Gateway 6 Hotel, LLC v. Amalgamated Bank, 566 U.S. 639, 645 (2012): 7 A well established canon of statutory interpretation succinctly captures the 8 problem:“[I]t is a commonplace of statutory construction that the specific governs the general.” Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 384, 112 S. Ct. 2031, 9 119 L. Ed. 2d 157 (1992). That is particularly true where, as in §1129(b)(2)(A), “Congress has enacted a comprehensive scheme and has deliberately targeted specific 10 problems with specific solutions.” Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 519, 116 S. Ct. 1065, 134 L. Ed. 2d 130 (1996) (Thomas, J., dissenting); see also HCSC-Laundry 11 v. United States, 450 U.S. 1, 6, 101 S. Ct. 836, 67 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1981) (per curiam) (the specific governs the general “particularly when the two are interrelated and closely 12 positioned, both in fact being parts of [the same statutory scheme]”). 13 Congress expressly provides that it is under the procedures proscribed by the Judicial Conference, 14 and the statute does not further state “and any other statute enacted by Congress,” and only those 15 procedures, that a district court or bankruptcy court may waive the filing fees - which do not include 16 the waiving of the fees for commencing an involuntary Chapter 7 bankruptcy case. Relief from the 17 prior order denying Mr. Bonilla’s request for waiver of the ninety-eight (98) involuntary bankruptcy 18 petition filing fees is denied. 19 In concluding, the court notes that the extremely detailed, well articulated contentions and 20 arguments advanced by Mr. Bonilla demonstrate that his desire to commence involuntary bankruptcy 21 cases against the judges and justices who are not granting the relief he seeks in their exercise of their 22 federal and state court jurisdiction clearly documents that they are a backdoor attempt to have a 23 limited scope jurisdiction federal speciality court adjudicate his assertion that the State Court 24 conviction is void for lack of jurisdiction. While that is his desire, jurisdiction arising under 25 28 U.S.C. § 1334 as exercised by this bankruptcy court does not go that far. 26 The Motion for Relief From the Prior Order of this Court (Dckt. 120) is denied. 27 This Memorandum Opinion and Decision, which incorporates herein the prior Memorandum 28 Opinion and Decision and Order Thereon (Dckt. 120) by this reference, constitutes the court’s 1 Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law in denying the present Motion. 2 The court shall issue a separate order consistent with this Ruling. 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 1 Instructions to Clerk of Court 2 Service List - Not Part of Order/Judgment 3 The Clerk of Court is instructed to send the Order/Judgment or other court generated document transmitted herewith to the parties below. The Clerk of Court will send the document via the 4 BNC or, if checked _XX__, via the U.S. mail. 5 Steven Wayne Bonilla 6 J-48500, 3-EY-13 San Quentin, CA 94974 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28