In Re: Named Involuntary Steven Wayne Bonilla

• Court: United States Bankruptcy Court, E.D. California
• Decided: August 22, 2019
• Docket: 19-00202
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 NOT FOR PUBLICATION 3 4 UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT 5 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 7 8 9 In re ) Misc. File No. 19-202 ) 10 Named Involuntary Petitioner ) ) 11 STEVEN WAYNE BONILLA ) ) 12 ) 13 MEMORANDUM OPINION AND DECISION AFTER REVIEW OF RESPONSIVE PLEADINGS 14 FILED BY STEVEN WAYNE BONILLA 15 Steven Wayne Bonilla delivered to the Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of California 16 ninety-eight (98) Bankruptcy Form 105s (involuntary bankruptcy petition forms) (Dckt. 3-93, 101- 17 107), seeking to commence ninety-eight involuntary bankruptcy cases in the Eastern District of 18 California against various federal and state court judges and justices. Because of facially identified 19 issues relating to the Form 105s, including whether Mr. Bonilla had standing to commence such 20 involuntary cases, and no filing fee for the Form 105s presented being paid, the court issued an order 21 creating this miscellaneous case file, No. 19-202 (“Miscellaneous File”), in Mr. Bonilla’s name so 22 that all of the Form 105s could be docketed in one place. The Miscellaneous File also affords Mr. 23 Bonilla the opportunity to present a unified response, rather than ninety-eight separate responses. 24 Additionally, to the extent that Mr. Bonilla would disagree with whatever ruling was made by this 25 court, the creation of the Miscellaneous File and the unified response provides for a single appeal 26 which Mr. Bonilla would have the option of pursuing, rather than ninety-eight separate appeals. 27 In the Court’s Order to open the Miscellaneous File (Dckt. 1), it provided for Mr. Bonilla to 28 file responsive pleadings addressing the various issues in the Court’s Order. Mr. Bonilla has availed 1 himself of the opportunity and presented the court with the following pleadings: 2 A. Response to 6-19-19 Court Order, Dckt. 99 (“Response,” 37 pages). 3 B. Exhibits from State Court Proceedings, Dckt. 100 (“Exhibits,” 68 pages). 4 C. Addendum re “Honorary Obligation,” Dckt. 108 (“Addendum,” 15 pages). 5 D. Additional Grounds Statement, Dckt. 114 (“Additional Statement,” 3 pages). 6 E. Response re California Judicial Council, Dckt. 115 (“Response to Supplemental 7 Docketing Order,” 10 pages). 8 Applications to Proceed in Forma Paupris 9 Mr. Bonilla has filed five Applications to Proceed in Forma Pauperis. Dckt. 95–98. The 10 Application filed as Docket Number 95 is a partial document, consisting of only one page. Dckt. 95. 11 The other four Applications appear to be complete documents, with three being seven pages in length 12 and one (Dckt. 98) eight pages in length. In the attachments to these documents, Mr. Bonilla states 13 that he is not employed and currently has no income. Further, he has no spouse, no assets, and no 14 monthly expenses. 15 The eight-page Application has as its cover page one titled for the U.S. District Court or 16 Bankruptcy Court in the Eastern District of California. Dckt. 98 at 1. The second page of this 17 document is another “first page” of the Application which is titled as being made to the Bankruptcy 18 Court for the Central District of California, San Fernando Division. Id. at 2. 19 The Application filed as Dckt. 96 is titled as requesting the relief from the Bankruptcy Court 20 in the Central District, Riverside Division. 21 BANKRUPTCY COURT, BANKRUPTCY PROCEEDING, 22 AND FEDERAL JURISDICTION REGARDING BANKRUPTCY PROCEEDINGS 23 In beginning this review it is very important to put in context the position of the bankruptcy 24 court and bankruptcy judges. The bankruptcy court and bankruptcy judges have been created by 25 Congress pursuant to Article I of the United States Constitution. While organizationally part of the 26 United States district court, the bankruptcy court is not an Article III court under the United States 27 Constitution. The scope of a bankruptcy court proceeding and exercise of a bankruptcy judge’s 28 judicial authority exists only to the extent as provided in 28 U.S.C. § 1334 (federal court bankruptcy 1 jurisdiction) and § 157 (exercise of federal judicial power by a bankruptcy judge). This judicial 2 power may properly be exercised over bankruptcy cases and civil proceedings arising under the 3 Bankruptcy Code, as well as those arising in and related to a bankruptcy case. 4 Mr. Bonilla has provided the court with significant information concerning his state court 5 criminal proceeding, the asserted defects in the conviction, and various theories and authorities by 6 which he asserts his rights have been denied. That information is relevant to considering whether 7 standing exists for Mr. Bonilla asserting the right to commence the involuntary bankruptcy cases. 8 However, 28 U.S.C. § 1334 and § 157 limit the scope of an Article I bankruptcy judge’s exercise of 9 federal judicial power to those bankruptcy issues, and not to the full breadth of the federal judicial 10 power arising under Article III of the United States Constitution (for which it is the Article III District 11 Court judges, Court of Appeals judges, and Supreme Court justices whom may exercise that full 12 power). 13 The Response indicates that Mr. Bonilla appreciates this distinction and is seeking to present 14 the “bankruptcy law issues” to this Article I court and not attempting to have this court act outside 15 its jurisdiction and judicial power granted to it by Congress. To the extent the court has misread 16 Mr. Bonilla’s statements, this discussion has been included to explain the limitation on this court’s 17 powers with respect to the broader range of Mr. Bonilla’s issues with the judicial system. 18 Involuntary Bankruptcy Petition Provisions 19 Congress has provided a process under the Bankruptcy Code by which creditors of a person 20 may force that person into bankruptcy with the “mere” filing of an involuntary bankruptcy petition 21 by the creditors. In pertinent part to the matters now before the court, 11 U.S.C. § 303 (discussed in 22 greater detail infra) provides that three or more creditors of a person may commence an involuntary 23 bankruptcy case if they collectively hold at least $15,750.00 in liquidated, noncontingent, not subject 24 to bona fide dispute unsecured debt. If the person for whom the involuntary bankruptcy case is to 25 be commenced has less than twelve creditors with such claims, then a single creditor who meets the 26 above criteria may commence the involuntary bankruptcy case. 27 Here, it is only Mr. Bonilla who is filing the Form 105s as the sole creditor seeking to force 28 the Form 105 Targets into bankruptcy. Presumably, Mr. Bonilla is asserting that each of the 1 Form 105 Targets have less than twelve creditors each. The actual number of creditors holding 2 unsecured claims is unknown at this time. 3 FEE WAIVER/IN FORMA PAUPERIS REQUESTS 4 With the responsive pleadings Mr. Bonilla has included five fee waiver requests. As 5 discussed below, Mr. Bonilla is now seeking to pursue only ninety-eight involuntary bankruptcy 6 cases. Mr. Bonilla directs the court to the provision of 28 U.S.C. § 1930 (which specifies required 7 filing fees in bankruptcy cases) and asserts that the district court and the bankruptcy court are not 8 restricted in waiving the filing fees, so long as it is in accordance with Judicial Conference policy. 9 Response, pp. 28:23-28, 29:1-15; Dckt. 99. He then directs the court to consider 28 U.S.C. § 1915 10 which provides for Prisoner’s Application to Proceed in Forma Paupers. 11 Congress provides in 28 U.S.C. § 1930(a)(1)(A) the required filing fees for bankruptcy cases, 12 which for a Chapter 7 case is $245.00 (to which is added an administrative fee). In 28 U.S.C. 13 § 1930(f)(1) it is provided that the district court or the bankruptcy court may waive the Chapter 7 14 filing fee for an individual if he or she meets specified economic requirements. Such individual 15 entitled to seek a Chapter 7 fee waiver is further identified as “such debtors” in subparagraph (f)(2) 16 of § 1930, with additional waiver relief for “such debtors” who meet the requirements of 17 subparagraph (f)(1) of § 1930 for “other fees prescribed” under 28 U.S.C. § 1930(b)(additional 18 Judicial Conference fees) and (c)(notice of appeal fees). Mr. Bonilla in his Response clearly states 19 he is a “creditor,” and does not assert to be, and is not, a debtor. 20 In asserting his status as a creditor, Mr. Bonilla directs the court to 28 U.S.C. § 1930(f)(3), 21 which states, “(3) This subsection does not restrict the district court or the bankruptcy court from 22 waiving, in accordance with Judicial Conference policy, fees prescribed under this section for other 23 debtors and creditors.” He asserts that pursuant to the statutory enactment in 28 U.S.C. § 1915 24 providing for a prisoner’s right to proceed in forma paupers, that it is the “Judicial Council Policy” 25 upon which the district court or the bankruptcy court can waive a Chapter 7 filing fee for a creditor 26 seeking to file a Form 105. However, the Congressional enactment in 28 U.S.C. § 1915 is not the 27 Judicial Council Policy, as adopted by that Article III branch of the government, with respect to 28 bankruptcy fees. 1 The Federal Guide to Judiciary Policy § 610.70 and § 610.80 adopted by the Judicial Council 2 specifically provides for fee waivers of fees in and relating to bankruptcy cases providing: 3 § 610.70 Fee Waivers 4 Other than where expressly allowed in the fee schedules (e.g., Items 4 and 11 of the Bankruptcy Court Miscellaneous Fee Schedule) or by statute (see: § 610.80 and 5 Guide, Vol. 4, § 820), fee waivers are generally prohibited. Judicial Conference policy allows certain types of users to ask courts to exempt them from fees for Public Access 6 to Court Electronic Records (PACER). See: EPA fee schedule and § 630.20. 7 § 610.80 Applications to Proceed In Forma Pauperis 8 (a) Eligible parties may proceed without prepayment of fees under 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (district courts and courts of appeals).1 9 (b) The filing fee in a chapter 7 bankruptcy case may be waived in accordance 10 with 28 U.S.C. § 1930(f). Judicial Conference guidance on fee waivers in bankruptcy courts is posted on the judiciary’s public website. See: Guide, Vol. 11 4, § 820 (Chapter 7 Fee Waiver Procedures). 12 The Judicial Conference guidance referenced in § 610.80 above are summarized as set forth 13 below, with the entire Guide, Vol. 4, §§ 820 et seq., attached as Addendum “A” to this Order: 14 § 820 Chapter 7 Fee Waiver Procedures 15 The Judicial Conference promulgated these procedures to assist district courts and bankruptcy courts with implementing the fee waiver provisions set forth in 16 Section 418 of the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 (Pub. L. No. 109-8, 199 Stat. 23), and codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1930(f)(1)-(3). 17 JCUS-SEP 13, pp. 8-9. 18 § 820.10 Filing Fee Waiver Application and Initiation of the Chapter 7 Case 19 (a) In lieu of paying the prescribed chapter 7 filing fee or filing an installment application, an individual debtor may, along with the bankruptcy petition, 20 file an application to waive the filing fee. 21 (1) Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 1006(c) requires that the application conform substantially to Official Form 103B. 22 (2) A defective or otherwise deficient waiver application should be 23 processed according to the court’s standard operating procedures for processing deficient pleadings and papers. 24 (b) When a chapter 7 petition in an individual debtor case is accompanied by 25 an application to waive the filing fee, the court should initiate and process the case in the same manner as other individual chapter 7 cases. 26 27 1 This reference to 28 U.S.C. § 1915 is in connection with the district court and the 28 courts of appeals, not the bankruptcy courts. 1 Guide to Judicial Policy, Vol. 4, Ch 8: Bankruptcy Case Policies (emphasis added). 2 No provision is made in the Judicial Council Policy for the waiving of the Chapter 7 filing 3 fee for a creditor seeking to commence an involuntary bankruptcy case for another person. 4 The Supreme Court has enacted Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 1006 to expressly 5 address the filing fee in bankruptcy cases and the waiver of such fee. In Rule 1006(c) providing for 6 the waiving of the Chapter 7 filing fee, such waiver must be requested by the Debtor: 7 (c) Waiver of filing fee. A voluntary chapter 7 petition filed by an individual shall 8 be accepted for filing if accompanied by the debtor’s application requesting a waiver under 28 U.S.C. § 1930(f), prepared as prescribed by the appropriate Official 9 Form. 10 Fed. R. Bankr. P. 1006(c)(emphasis added). 11 The filing of an involuntary bankruptcy petition without the payment of the filing fee is 12 improper. There is no basis for the waiver of such a fee by a creditor seeking to place another person 13 in bankruptcy. 14 The failure to pay the filing fee is a basis for the Clerk of the Court not filing each of the 15 Form 105s as involuntary bankruptcy petitions. 16 BASIS ASSERTED BY MR. BONILLA FOR HAVING A “CLAIM” AND 17 ANALYSIS OF WHETHER THERE IS FACIALLY A BONA FIDE DISPUTE 18 In considering the original and responsive pleadings/documents, the court first notes that 19 Mr. Bonilla has been very clear and straightforward is presenting the asserted grounds for having 20 standing to commence involuntary cases against the now ninety-eight different Form 105 Targets. 21 The court appreciates his candor and strives to respond in the same clear manner. 22 The real basis for Mr. Bonilla wanting to file involuntary bankruptcy petitions against various 23 federal and state judges and justices appears to rise from his frustration over being unable to 24 successfully advance such challenges to his state court criminal conviction directly through the state 25 and federal judicial systems. The vast majority of his detailed legal arguments advanced in the 26 various response pleadings argue why his criminal conviction is improper, why he asserts that the 27 state court lacked jurisdiction to determine that he was guilty of a crime arising under state law 28 (rather than a “mere error” based on the law and evidence), and why the various Form 105 Targets 1 should be liable for not issuing judgments or orders that his criminal conviction is void. 2 Asserted Honorary Obligation 3 Claim 1 4 In his Addendum pleading (Dckt. 108) Mr. Bonilla first states that the debt he asserts is an 5 “honorary obligation debt” owed by each of the Form 105 Targets. Mr. Bonilla then provides the 6 court with the following definitions as are stated to apply to his Claim 1: 7 (1) Contract - an agreement between 2 or more persons which creates an OBLIGATION to do or not to do a particular thing. 8 (2) Equal Protection of Laws of a state is extended to the enforcement 9 of contracts under the 14th Amendment of the United States Constitution. 10 (2) [sic] Debt - a fixed and certain obligation to pay money or some 11 other valuable thing or things (such as the Petitioner’s liberty and freedom), in the present tor in the future. In a broad sense, that which 12 is due to respond to another in money, labor, or service, it may even mean a moral or HONORARY OBLIGATION. 13 (3). Honorary - As applied to public offices and other positions of 14 responsibility or trust. In other contents or usage, (as here), it means attached to or growing out of some honor or dignity or HONORABLE 15 OFFICE, or else it imports an OBLIGATION OR DUTY growing out of honor or trust only. 16 (4) Obligation - that which a person is bound to do or forbear; any duty imposed by 17 law, promise or contract, etc.. 18 Thus, an HONORARY OBLIGATION is a duty imposed by law on a public official, which creates an OBLIGATION, owe to Petitioner to declare the judgment 19 null and void. Which is a debt owed to the Petitioner that is enforceable under the Equal Protection of Law Claus [sic] of the 14th Amendment of the United States 20 Constitution. 21 Addendum, pp. 1:21-28, 2:1-24; Dckt. 108 (emphasis in original). 22 In considering the above, Mr. Bonilla is asserting that he is owed a debt arising from a public 23 official’s obligation to properly fulfill the duties of his or her office. While stating the contention, 24 the court is not presented with Mr. Bonilla’s assertion that a monetary obligation is owed by such 25 public official to Mr. Bonilla because Mr. Bonilla did not prevail in the proceedings or matters before 26 that official. 27 Further, while a definition is initially given for a contract, it is clear what Mr. Bonilla asserts 28 is not based on a bilateral contract with each of the Form 105 Targets, but an inchoate obligation for 1 a public official to fulfill the duties of his or her office. On its face, that duty flows to the “public” 2 and is not an obligation which is owed in a bilateral contract between Mr. Bonilla and each of the 3 Form 105 Targets. 4 In substance, Mr. Bonilla asserts a moral obligation to uphold the honor and dignity of that 5 person’s office. Mr. Bonilla contends that such honor has been violated because he, Mr. Bonilla, has 6 not been able to prevail in his contentions in his proceedings before those Form 105 Targets. 7 Claim 2 8 As grounds for his second claim, Mr. Bonilla asserts that the judgment for his conviction in 9 the state court criminal proceedings is void on the record in that state court proceeding. Id.. at 2:26- 10 18. Because Mr. Bonilla concludes that his criminal conviction is void, he then asserts that a duty 11 exists for the public official to agree with him and declare the conviction void. Id. at 3:1-5. 12 Thus, Mr. Bonilla argues that since he disagrees with the various public officials regarding 13 whether the state court criminal conviction is void, those public officials owe an honorary monetary 14 obligation to him. 15 Other than his statement of the above asserted principle, Mr. Bonilla offers no legal authority 16 showing that his disagreement over the outcome of a judicial or other proceeding births a monetary 17 obligation owed to him personally by the judicial officer–as opposed to giving rise to Mr. Bonilla’s 18 right to appeal the decision. 19 Claim 3 20 For a third basis for a claim against the various Form 105 Targets, Mr. Bonilla asserts that 21 based on the Honorary Obligation owed, for which money damages are owed for a conspiracy, 22 Mr. Bonilla has a right under the Equal Protection Clause to collect on the debts based on the 23 Honorary Obligations. 24 Mr. Bonilla states that he now seeks to “collect on debts that are owed to him, including ones 25 born out of an HONORARY OBLIGATION, via this Bankruptcy Court.” Id. at 3:11-14 (emphasis 26 in original). 27 This ties together the first two grounds for his claims, identifying these Form 105s being used 28 in lieu of the appropriate state court or district court complaints seeking to assert the enforcement of, 1 and recover damages from, such honorary obligations. 2 Relief Sought 3 Mr. Bonilla concludes, stating that this Bankruptcy Court has a duty to file the Form 105s and 4 commence involuntary bankruptcy cases as sought by Mr. Bonilla based on the above asserted 5 obligations stemming from alleged honorary obligations. Mr. Bonilla argues that the court, after 6 commencing the involuntary bankruptcy cases against the Form 105 Targets, can issue multiple 7 orders to show cause and then litigate with each of the Form 105 Targets the issue of proper federal 8 court jurisdiction. 9 While politely stated, this last demand is in the same nature of the “Honorary Obligations” 10 which are asserted to exist, and must be done because Mr. Bonilla so asserts. 11 SUBSTANCE OF RELIEF REQUESTED 12 Attached to the Addendum (Dckt. 108) is another pleading titled “Raising Jurisdictional 13 Question” (“Raising Pleading”). Id. (starting with a new page 1, which is the fourth page of this 14 pleading). The caption on this Raising Pleading is “In re: to the matter of Alameda County NEVER 15 ACQUIRED JURISDICTION.” Id. at 1:7-9 (emphasis in original). This does not appear to be a 16 pleading relating to any of the Form 105s, nor to the Miscellaneous File opened in this court in 17 Mr. Bonilla’s name. 18 In the Raising Pleading, Mr. Bonilla states that he seeks to commence an “INDEPENDENT 19 COLLATERAL SUIT.” Id. at 1:12 (emphasis in original). He argues that the Alameda Superior 20 Court never acquired jurisdiction over him, or the subject matter of the criminal proceedings in which 21 he was convicted. He asserts that certain evidence was not admitted, and argues under the California 22 Rules of Evidence, such evidence was not admitted in his criminal proceedings. 23 Mr. Bonilla then asserts that this is an independent collateral attack on the state court 24 conviction due to lack of jurisdiction, and not as a habeas corpus petition. He then discusses 25 extrinsic fraud upon a court and that when such fraud occurs, it may be attacked at any time or place. 26 Mr. Bonilla then provides extensive citations and legal arguments concerning void judgments, 27 lack of jurisdiction, and the impropriety of a judge proceeding with the adjudication of the matter. 28 This includes detailed factual allegations and legal conclusions drawn therefrom why Mr. Bonilla 1 asserts that his criminal conviction is void for the lack of jurisdiction. 2 This is consistent with Mr. Bonilla’s Response (Dckt. 99) in which his discussion does not 3 go in to why the various ninety-eight Form 105 Targets owe him a debt, but instead argues why a 4 court should declare his criminal conviction void based on Mr. Bonilla’s assertion that the state court 5 did not have subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate the state criminal law conviction.2 6 Mr. Bonilla demonstrates a keen understanding that there are limits to the exercise of judicial 7 power by a judge. Further, that when the exercise of such power is exceeded, it can result in the 8 judgment or ruling being void. 9 It is also clear that these Form 105s are filed as an alternative device to try and have further, 10 now Article I, judges conduct further review of his assertion that his criminal conviction is void. In 11 doing so with this court, Mr. Bonilla is asking the court to commit the sin which he accuses other 12 judges of having made–issuing rulings when the court does not have subject matter jurisdiction. 13 Bankruptcy judges have been created for the unique purpose of presiding over bankruptcy 14 cases and adjudicating proceedings arising under the Bankruptcy Code, in the bankruptcy case, and 15 related to the bankruptcy case. 28 U.S.C. §§ 151, 152, 157, 1334. This authority to exercise federal 16 judicial power is carefully circumscribed to limit the bankruptcy judge, who is appointed as an 17 Article I judge, in the exercise of that power to only the matters as specified by statute. This 18 authority is much narrower than those of an Article III District Court Judge, Court of Appeal Judge, 19 2 From the detailed and extensive discussion and analysis concerning Mr. Bonilla's 20 assertions that the California Superior Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate an 21 action brought for violation of California criminal law appears to center on the assertion that the subpoena for evidence used in the conviction was not admitted into evidence in his state court 22 criminal trial. Mr. Bonilla also asserts that it was admitted that such subpoena did not exist. 23 What Mr. Bonilla does not link is the law which would establish that the California 24 Superior Court did not have subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate an issue of California criminal law. The California Superior Court is the state court of general civil and criminal 25 subject matter jurisdiction. Thus it may appear that Mr. Bonilla is contending that the conviction was in error, but the assertion of lack of “subject matter jurisdiction” does not appear. 26 27 This court comments the above in a footnote are not purporting to making any ruling on the state court criminal conviction or applicable law, but only to note the issue stands out in 28 reviewing the detailed and extensive pleadings and documents filed by Mr. Bonilla. 1 or Supreme Court Justice. While appearing expansive in the exercise of federal court jurisdiction in 2 the bankruptcy corner of the federal judiciary, it is but a small slice of the federal judicial power 3 residing in the Article III judges. 4 Here, Mr. Bonilla seeks to commence an independent action to collaterally attack his criminal 5 conviction in state court. No legal basis is given for a bankruptcy judge to undertake such a 6 determination. This appears to be Mr. Bonilla’s dispute with the State of California, not any of his 7 Form 105 Targets.3 8 DENIAL OF REQUEST FOR WAIVER OF FILING FEES AND 9 DENIAL OF REQUEST FOR FILING OF INVOLUNTARY BANKRUPTCY 10 PETITIONS 11 As an initial point, the failure to present the court with the required filing fee precludes the 12 filing of any of the Form 105s. The filing fee is required and no authority exists for a bankruptcy 13 judge to waive such filing fee. Congress and the Supreme Court have set forth the statutory and 14 Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure grounds for the limited waiving of filing fees for voluntary 15 bankruptcy cases filed by the debtors themselves. 16 Next, based on the original filings, the Response (Dckt. 99), Exhibits (Dckt. 100), Addendum 17 (Dckt. 108), and Additional Statement (Dckt. 114), the court concludes that Mr. Bonilla does not 18 qualify as a creditor who has standing to have commenced involuntary against the ninety-eight 19 Form 105 Targets in this District. As stated previously, the court may, sua sponte, raise the issue of 20 standing at any time. The court has so raised the issue and afforded Mr. Bonilla the opportunity to 21 address the issue of whether jurisdiction exists–whether he is a creditor who may commence an 22 involuntary bankruptcy case. 23 The court has addressed in detail the requirements for commencing an involuntary bankruptcy 24 25 3 The court acknowledges that the majority of Mr. Bonilla’s pleadings consist of extensive discussion, arguments, legal citations, conclusions, and assertions as to why his 26 criminal conviction was void and why judges who have the jurisdiction to do so should declare it 27 void. This bankruptcy court does not discuss those extensive points and arguments, which, though read by this court to see what was applicable to the proper exercise of jurisdiction, raise 28 issues and seek relief that is clearly well outside the jurisdiction of this court. 1 case and the significance of commencing such a case, the immediate negative consequences (well 2 beyond those of a person merely filing a lawsuit in the district or state court) in the prior Order 3 establishing the Miscellaneous File for Mr. Bonilla and affording Mr. Bonilla the opportunity to 4 address that Order and issues before this court make its final determination. See Order to Open 5 Bankruptcy File for Steven Wayne Bonilla, Assignment of Miscellaneous File Number, and 6 Scheduling of Supplemental Pleadings to be Filed by Mr. Bonilla (“Order to Open Miscellaneous 7 File”), Dckt. 1. The court does not repeat that determination and the grounds stated therein, but 8 incorporates it, and that entire ruling, herein by this reference as part of this decision, with a copy of 9 the Order to Open Miscellaneous File attached hereto as Addendum “B.” 10 The statutory requirements for a person to qualify as a creditor to commence an involuntary 11 bankruptcy case are set forth in 11 U.S.C. § 303(b) and summarized as follows: 12 An involuntary case against a person is commenced by the filing with the bankruptcy court of a petition under chapter 7 or 11 of this title – 13 (1) There must be at least three or more entities, each of which is either: 14 (a) a holder of a claim against such person that is not contingent as to liability 15 or the subject of a bona fide dispute as to liability or amount, or an indenture trustee representing such a holder, 16 and 17 (b) if such noncontingent, undisputed claims aggregate at least $ 16,750 more 18 than the value of any lien on property of the debtor securing such claims held by the holders of such claims; 19 or 20 (2) if there are fewer than 12 such holders of claims or, excluding any employee or 21 insider of such person and any transferee of a transfer that is voidable under section 544, 545, 547, 548, 549, or 724(a) of the Bankruptcy Code, by one or more of such 22 holders that hold in the aggregate at least $ 16,750 of such claims; . . . . 23 The court addresses these elements below. 24 Monetary Obligation 25 For the court to commence an involuntary bankruptcy case against each of the ninety-eight 26 Form 105 Targets, it must be at least colorable (appearing on its face, but not required to be certain) 27 that Mr. Bonilla holds a claim for a monetary obligation against each of the ninety-eight Form 105 28 Targets against whom he wants to commence involuntary bankruptcy case. 1 On this point, while Mr. Bonilla makes reference to a contractual obligation in the nature of 2 an “Honorary Obligation,” which would therefore not appear to be contractual but somehow arising 3 under the law, he cannot cite the court to any legal authority for such obligation. While Mr. Bonilla 4 argues that each Form 105 Target has a duty to act for him personally, and when they do not act in 5 a matter consistent with what he demands that each owes him money, Mr. Bonilla shows no legal 6 authority for a contention that each of these persons in public office owe him a personal debt for not 7 acting as he requests. Further, as shown by Mr. Bonilla, there is a bona fide, colorable issue that each 8 of the persons he complains of may assert judicial immunity with respect to the acts taken or not 9 taken. 10 That is not Contingent 11 It appears that the Honorary Obligations asserted by Mr. Bonilla are not contingent, but are 12 alleged to be owed as of the time each of the Form 105 Targets failed to declare his state court 13 conviction void. 14 That is not Subject to Bona Fide Dispute as to Liability 15 On this point, Mr. Bonilla asserts that there can be no bona fide dispute because Mr. Bonilla 16 is correct that the state court judgment for his criminal conviction is void. It asserts that it is “void” 17 because the California Superior Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate an issue of 18 California criminal law. As briefly addressed above, the California Superior Court is the court of 19 general civil and criminal jurisdiction for California law and is the court that adjudicates California 20 criminal trials. In his various pleadings, Mr. Bonilla argues that this court of general criminal and 21 civil jurisdiction could not have jurisdiction for his criminal conviction because purported evidence 22 was improperly admitted. 23 Further, he argues that no judicial immunity can be claimed by any of the Form 105 Targets 24 failing to declare that the state court conviction is void because judicial immunity cannot be claimed 25 when a judge does not have jurisdiction. Mr. Bonilla conflates his assertion that the California 26 Superior Court did not have jurisdiction to adjudicate a California criminal law trial with asserting 27 that the various Form 105 Targets could not have jurisdiction, and thus could not assert judicial 28 immunity, in the various judicial proceedings that Mr. Bonilla has commenced or attempted to 1 commence in the various state and federal courts. 2 There was one judge who presided in the state court trial from which Mr. Bonilla’s conviction 3 arises. It is in that one state court trial that Mr. Bonilla asserts there was no subject matter 4 jurisdiction. Everyone else who is a Form 105 Target appears to be a member of the state or federal 5 judiciary that Mr. Bonilla asserts has failed to act and declare the state court conviction determined 6 void. 7 In seeking to have the various Form 105 Targets determine that the state court conviction was 8 void, Mr. Bonilla is necessarily admitting that each of those Form 105 Targets properly had 9 jurisdiction to make such a determination–even if such determination was to deny Mr. Bonilla the 10 relief he sought. 11 If Mr. Bonilla seeks to assert that the Form 105 Targets cannot assert judicial immunity 12 because they did not have jurisdiction to act, then he could not properly seek relief from them to 13 declare the state court conviction void. Thus, if Mr. Bonilla were correct that the various state and 14 federal judges did not have jurisdiction to act such that they could not raise a judicial immunity 15 defense, then there is no basis for Mr. Bonilla asserting that he has a claim against someone for 16 failing to act when they were not authorized to so act. 17 Clearly, there exists a bona fide dispute obvious on the face of Mr. Bonilla’s pleadings that 18 judicial immunity (an issue Mr. Bonilla raises in the documents presented to the court) is at issue. 19 That is not Subject to Bona Fide Dispute as to Amount 20 Mr. Bonilla has not provided the court with any computation of how he asserts a dollar 21 amount that is owed to him. There is no contract. There are no statutory damages. The obligation 22 amount is just an assertion that each of the Form 105 Targets owes Mr. Bonilla more than Three 23 Hundred Billion Dollars ($300,000,000,000.00).4 Such an amount is so huge, and there being no 24 explanation as how such would be computed under applicable law, that it demonstrates there being 25 a facial bona fide dispute as to amount. 26 27 4 In the seven later filed Form 105s (Dckts. 101-107), the amount asserted to be owed is lowered to Forty Seven Billion, Four Hundred Ninety One Million, Six Hundred Forty Six 28 Thousand, Four Hundred Fifty Two Dollars and Thirty-Eight Cents ($47,491,646,452.38). 1 Response to Judicial Council 2 On August 1, 2019, the court issued a Supplemental Order concerning the docketing of the 3 Form 105s (“Supplemental Docketing Order,” Dckt. 109). The court previously prepared an order 4 which included a chart identifying each of the Form 105s delivered to the court by Mr. Bonilla and 5 identifying each person named as the Form 105 Target in each Form 105. In the Order to Open 6 Miscellaneous File the court believed that the Clerk’s Office had been sufficiently directed as to how 7 to label the Form 105s on the Docket so as to not create any false impression that a Form 105 had 8 been “filed” (i.e. “commenced”). 9 It was brought to the court’s attention by an attorney appearing in open court who stated that 10 he was counsel for the California Judicial Council, that the docket entries for the Form 105s appeared 11 to have been entered in such a manner as to create the potential for confusion. In reviewing the 12 docket entries that appeared when reviewing the docket through the public Pacer access, as compared 13 to the internal court access version, the court concluded that some express direction to the Clerk’s 14 Office was necessary and the Supplemental Docketing Order was entered specifying the 15 methodology used to clearly identify each Form 105 docketed. 16 Mr. Bonilla filed a Response to the Supplemental Docketing Order on August 15, 2019. 17 Dckt. 115. In it, Mr. Bonilla states that he seeks a proper and fair adjudication of his verified claims. 18 Id. at 2:2-5. He states he asserts issues pertaining to “FRAUD, fraudulently/altered and forged 19 documentation by the prosecution/conspiracy in violation of [Mr. Bonilla’s] Right of Privacy, as a 20 matter of law...as well as fraud/criminal fraud committed upon the court and [Mr. Bonilla] by State 21 and Federal actors perpetrating KNOWN unlawful-unconstitutional violations wile acting under the 22 color of law.” Id. at 2:6-12 (emphasis added). 23 At this point, it well appears that Mr. Bonilla is seeking to “adjudicate” (i.e. litigate) various 24 state and federal law claims and rights he asserts to have against the various Form 105 Targets, not 25 already liquidated, not subject to bona fide dispute claims that are to be paid. 26 The Response to Supplemental Docketing Order continues, addressing issues as to why the 27 state court criminal conviction is void and must be vacated. 28 The Response to Supplemental Docket Order then plainly states the relief being sought from 1 this bankruptcy court by Mr. Bonilla (both in the response and it appears to be in filing the ninety- 2 eight Form 105s): 3 Relief Sought 4 (1). Declare the judgment [State Court criminal conviction] void or issue an order to show cause. 5 (2). Seven Wayne Bonilla is entitled to immediate release [from State incarceration 6 based on the criminal conviction]. 7 Dckt. 115, p. 3:21-23. 8 RULING 9 It has been demonstrated that Mr. Bonilla does not have standing to commence involuntary 10 bankruptcy cases for the Form 105 Targets, Mr. Bonilla not meeting the requirements to be a 11 petitioning creditor under 11 U.S.C. § 103. 12 Alternatively, if the mere assertion that one is a creditor is sufficient for Constitutional 13 standing, the court concludes that the documents and assertions of Mr. Bonilla do not show that he 14 has a claim (as defined under the Bankruptcy Code); to the extent he has a claim it is unliquidated 15 and the $100,000,000,000.00 claim subject to disputes as to the liability, including the defense of 16 judicial immunity, and the amount. 17 Further, as demonstrated in the original documents, the Response, Exhibits, Addendum, 18 Additional Statement, and Response to Supplemental Docketing Order, the actual relief sought 19 through the ninety-eight Form 105s is well outside of the limited jurisdiction of a bankruptcy judge 20 and that granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1334 – the determination that the state court judgment for 21 Mr. Bonilla’s criminal conviction is void and that Mr. Bonilla be released from his incarceration at 22 San Quintin Prison. 23 Therefore, the court determines that each of the Form 105s delivered to the court by 24 Mr. Bonilla shall be docketed, or continue to be if already docketed, in the Miscellaneous File, and 25 that involuntary bankruptcy cases not be commenced for each of the Form 105 Targets. 26 /// 27 /// 28 /// 1 This one order applies to all of the Form 105s presented to the court, which shall not be filed 2 as involuntary bankruptcy petitions. 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 1 ADDENDUM “A” 2 3 Guide to Judiciary Policy 4 Vol. 4: Court and Case Management 5 Ch. 8: Bankruptcy Case Policies 6 § 810 Overview 7 § 815 Applicability 8 § 820 Chapter 7 Fee Waiver Procedures § 820.10 Filing Fee Waiver Application and Initiation of the Chapter 7 Case 9 § 820.20 Judicial Determination of Filing Fee Waiver Applications § 820.30 Developments in the Case 10 § 820.40 Waiver of Additional Individual Debtor Fees 11 § 830 Guidance for Protection of Tax Information § 830.10 Debtor’s Duty to Provide Tax Information 12 § 830.20 Restricted Access to Tax Information § 830.30 Tax Information Disclosure Requests 13 § 830.40 Approved Access to Tax Information § 830.50 Required Redaction of Debtor Tax Information 14 § 810 Overview 15 This chapter contains national judiciary policies regarding bankruptcy cases that were adopted 16 either by the Judicial Conference of the United States or by the Director of the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts (AO). They include: 17 • Procedures adopted by the Judicial Conference regarding the chapter 7 fee waiver 18 provisions of the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 (BAPCPA) (see: § 820, below); and 19 • Director’s Guidance Regarding Tax Information under 11 U.S.C. § 521 (see: § 830). 20 Note: This guidance is available on uscourts.gov, to which local courts should direct the public 21 and members of the local bar. 22 § 815 Applicability 23 This chapter applies to the bankruptcy courts. 24 § 820 Chapter 7 Fee Waiver Procedures 25 The Judicial Conference promulgated these procedures to assist district courts and bankruptcy courts with implementing the fee waiver provisions set forth in Section 418 of the 26 Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 (Pub. L. No. 109-8, 199 Stat. 23), and codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1930(f)(1)-(3). JCUS-SEP 13, pp. 8-9. 27 28 1 § 820.10 Filing Fee Waiver Application and Initiation of the Chapter 7 Case 2 (a) In lieu of paying the prescribed chapter 7 filing fee or filing an installment application, an individual debtor may, along with the bankruptcy petition, file an application to waive 3 the filing fee. 4 (1) Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 1006(c) requires that the application conform substantially to Official Form 103B. 5 (2) A defective or otherwise deficient waiver application should be processed 6 according to the court’s standard operating procedures for processing deficient pleadings and papers. 7 (b) When a chapter 7 petition in an individual debtor case is accompanied by an 8 application to waive the filing fee, the court should initiate and process the case in the same manner as other individual chapter 7 cases. 9 § 820.20 Judicial Determination of Filing Fee Waiver Applications 10 (a) Standard of Eligibility 11 (1) Under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1930(f)(1-3), the district court or bankruptcy court may waive the 12 chapter 7 filing fee for an individual debtor who: 13 (A) has income less than 150 percent of the income official poverty line applicable to a family of the size involved; and 14 (Note: Since the Office of Management and Budget has never issued 15 official poverty thresholds, these procedures interpret this statutory language to refer to the poverty guidelines updated periodically in the 16 Federal Register by the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) under the authority of 42 U.S.C. § 9902(2). The Secretary of 17 Health and Human Services is required to update the poverty guidelines annually, and defines guidelines separate for the 48 contiguous states and 18 the District of Columbia, Alaska, and Hawaii. The DHHS does not define poverty guidelines for Puerto Rico, the U.S. Virgin Islands, American 19 Samoa, Guam, the Republic of the Marshall Islands, the Federated States of Micronesia, the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, and 20 Palau. For these areas, the guidelines for the 48 contiguous states and the District of Columbia may be used. See: DHHS guidelines.) 21 (B) is unable to pay that fee in installments. 22 (2) The DHHS does not publish a standard definition of income, leaving the determination 23 of that definition to individual program administrators. 24 (A) These procedures adopt a definition that is reasonable in the bankruptcy context. 25 (B) The income for comparison to the poverty guidelines is the .Total Combined 26 Monthly Income¡± as reported (or as will be reported) on Schedule I. 27 (C) Amounts received as non-cash government assistance must be deducted from the total amount reported on Schedule I for fee waiver consideration. 28 1 (3) “Family size” may be defined as the debtor(s), the debtor’s spouse (unless the spouses are separated and a joint petition is not being filed), and any dependents listed on 2 Schedule I. 3 Note: The DHHS uses the term “family unit” instead of .family size” but does not publish a standard definition of “family unit.” 4 (4) The district court or bankruptcy court should consider the totality of the circumstances 5 in determining whether the debtor is unable to pay the fee in installments as provided in 28 U.S.C. § 1930(f)(1). Official Form 103B elicits information relevant to this 6 determination. 7 (5) A debtor may qualify for a waiver of the filing fee even if the debtor has paid or promised to pay a bankruptcy attorney, bankruptcy petition preparer, or debt relief agency 8 in connection with the filing. 9 Note: In 2008, Fed. R. Bankr. P. 1006(b)(1) was amended to delete the sentence requiring a statement in the installment fee application that the debtor has not paid 10 an attorney or other person in connection with the case. In the installment fee application, debtors must certify they will not make additional payment or transfer 11 any additional property to an attorney or other person for services in connection with the case until the filing fee is paid in full. 12 (b) Initial Court Procedures 13 (1) Filing Fees, Fee Waiver Application, Notice 14 (A) “Filing fee” as defined at 28 U.S.C. 1930(f)(1), means the filing fee required 15 by § 1930(a) or any other fee prescribed by the Judicial Conference under §§ 1930(b) and (c) that is payable to the clerk upon the commencement of a case 16 under chapter 7. This includes Items 8 and 9 of the Bankruptcy Miscellaneous Fee Schedule. 17 (B) The court should promptly determine whether the fee waiver application 18 should be granted, denied, or set for early hearing, on notice to the United States trustee or bankruptcy administrator, the case trustee, the debtor, and, if applicable, 19 the attorney for the debtor. 20 (C) The order on the fee waiver should be transmitted to the United States trustee or bankruptcy administrator, the case trustee, the debtor, and, if applicable, the 21 attorney for the debtor. 22 (2) Denial of Fee Waiver 23 (A) Any order denying a filing fee waiver application may give the debtor a reasonable time in which to either pay the fee in full or begin making installment 24 payments. 25 (B) The order denying the fee waiver application should set forth an installment payment schedule. 26 (C) It also should advise the debtor that failure to pay the fee or make timely 27 installment payments may lead to dismissal of the case. 28 (D) A standard order is included with the Official Form. 1 (3) Conversion to Chapter 7 2 If a case is converted from another chapter to chapter 7, the court may waive any 3 unpaid balance on the filing fee if the conditions described in section (a)(1) are satisfied. 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 1 ADDENDUM “B” 2 3 Order to Open Bankruptcy File for Steven Wayne Bonilla, Assignment of Miscellaneous File Number, and Scheduling of 4 Supplemental Pleadings to be Filed by Mr. Bonilla; Dckt. 1 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 1 2 FOR PUBLICATION 3 4 UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT ° EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 FILED in| 8 9 |iIn re: ) Mise. File No. 19-202 “STANOSTHY □□ □□□□□□ 10 |INamed Involuntary Petitioner 11 |STEVEN WAYNE BONILLA 12 13 ORDER TO OPEN A BANKRUPTCY FILE FOR STEVEN WAYNE BONILLA, 14 ASSIGNMENT OF MISCELLANEOUS FILE NUMBER 15 || SCHEDULING OF SUPPLEMENTAL PLEADINGS TO BE FILED BY MR. BONILLA 16 Steven Wayne Bonilla, whose address is stated to be J-48500, 3-EY-13, San Quentin, 17 ||California, has delivered to the court ninety-one (91) Official Bankruptcy Form 105 Involuntary 18 Bankruptcy Petitions (“Form 105”). Each Form 105 names a different person (with the exception 19 llof several apparent duplicate Form 105s) as the person to be the bankruptcy debtor (“Form 105 20 |\Subject”) in an involuntary bankruptcy case that Mr. Bonilla seeks to commence. From the addresses 21 |jprovided by Mr. Bonilla on each Form 105, the court has identified the various Form 105 Subjects 22 be either a United States District Court Judge, United States Magistrate Judge, a California Court 23 llof Appeal Justice, California Superior Court Judge, or a person working at a California Superior 24 Court, District Court of Appeal, or U.S. District Court. 25 The court has been notified that Mr. Bonilla has filed Form 105s naming federal and state 26 judges and staff as the Form 105 Subjects in the Northern, Central, and Southern Federal 27 ||Districts of California. Those Form 105s in the other Federal Districts are the subject of separate 28 llorders issued by the Chief Bankruptcy Judges in those Districts. It appears that the total number of

1 |[Form 105s filed in the four Federal Districts in California are in excess of two hundred and twenty- 2 |\five (225) in number. 3 The Order of the Chief Bankruptcy Judge in the Central! District of California provides some 4 lladditional information concerning Mr. Bonilla and his court filing history. In the Central District of 5 California, Mr. Bonilla has been determined to be a “vexatious litigant” and an order has been 6 llentered in that District that no pro se petition or other document can be filed by the Clerk of the Court 7 |without there being a pre-filing review of the documents sought to be filed and the filing authorized 8 the federal judge (“Central District Vex Order”). Jn re Bonilla, CV-18-7603-DMG (JPR), 2018 9 | WL 5787128, at *6 (C.D. Cal. 2018). The Central District Vex Order addresses a series of forty-four 10 ||(44) petitions filed by Mr. Bonilla in the Central District of California seeking areview by that federal 11 of his state court murder conviction. /d. at *1, The Central District Vex Order cites to a prior 12 |lorder transferring one of the petitions to the Northern District of California, the Federal District in 13 |lwhich San Quentin Prison is located, and includes the following statement concerning Mr. Bonilla’s 14 filing practices: 15 As noted, Bonilla was convicted in Alameda County (see id. (noting, “Re: Alameda County Superior Court Case No. H-12210-A”) ); see also Bonilla v. Davis, No. 16 08-CV-471-YGR, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 88254, at *1 (N.D. Cal. July 7, 2015), and is housed at San Quentin in Marin County (see No. 5536, ECF No. | at I (listing 17 address) ). In an order transferring the Petition to the Northern District, in which both of those counties lie, see 28 U.S.C. § 84(a), this Court noted that Bonilla was a 18 “profligate filer” of “hundreds of lawsuits and habeas petitions throughout the Ninth Circuit in the past several years.” (No. 5536, ECF No. 3 at 1-2.)... 19 Despite the Court's detailed explanation about its lack of jurisdiction, Bonilla 20 subsequently filed 43 additional case-initiating documents in this District, all challenging his state murder conviction, and 24 of those cases have since been 21 terminated, He currently has 19 cases pending in this Court, all filed from August to October of this year... On September 10, 2018, this Court issued an Order to Show 22 Cause Why Plaintiff Should Not Be Declared a Vexatious Litigant. Since then, Bonilla has filed responses in each of the cases listed in the Order (see infra sec. 23 II.B.1) and numerous new case-initiating documents as well. 24 Each response to the Order to Show Cause contains the same baseless argument that “any judgment, order, or transfer by a court lacking subject matter jurisdiction is void 25 on its face; and the [rleviewing [cJourt's jurisdiction is LIMITED to reversing the trial court's void judgment.” (See, ¢.g., Bonilla v. Unknown, No. 18-CV-7603-DMG (JPR) 26 (C.D. Cal. filed Aug. 30, 2018), ECF No. 5 at 1; Bonilla v. Unknown, No. 18-CV-7606-DMG (JPR) (C.D. Cal. filed Aug. 30, 2018), ECF No. 5 at 1.) This same 27 argument is made in many of his initial complaints, (See, e.g., Compl. at 1-3, Bonilla vy. Rosenbluth, No. 18-CV-7696-DMG (JPR) (C.D. Cal. filed Sept. 5, 2018), ECF 28 No. 1 (noting that “this has [ Jnothing to do with prison issues, conditions nor

1 confinement[] ... the judgment is void on its face ... [nJo lawful jurisdiction of subject matter nor of person was, nor has been established on the record”).) Neither 2 Bonilla’s responses to the Order to Show Cause nor the new case-initiating documents provide any persuasive or legitimate reason why he should not be deemed a vexatious 3 litigant. To the contrary, they demonstrate why such an order is necessary. 4 *1-*2. 5 FEDERAL LAW GOVERNING COMMENCEMENT 6 OF AN INVOLUNTARY BANKRUPTCY CASE 7 Official Bankruptcy Form 105 has been adopted to be the required form for which creditors 8 lof a person may commence an involuntary bankruptcy case against such person. Congress has 9 |lenacted as part of the Bankruptcy Code the statutory basis and requirements for commencing an 10 |linvoluntary bankruptcy case. 11 U.S.C. § 303. As stated in COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, Sixteenth 11 j/Edition, § 303.01, 12 Filing an involuntary petition may have serious consequences for a debtor, 13 nonpetitioning creditors and petitioning creditors. Therefore, it is not surprising that section 303 [11 U.S.C. § 303] is replete with details regarding involuntary filings, 14 many of which safeguard against frivolous or malicious filings. 15 These consequences are much more significant and serious than the “mere” filing of a complaint 16 against some, causing the target of the involuntary petitions rights and interests to be immediately 17 lleffected without the opportunity for prior hearing. Jd While Congress determined that such 18 |limmediate consequences are warranted, the commencement of such a case in the court is subject to 19 review.' 20 □□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□ 21 ' An involuntary bankruptcy case is “commenced” by the filing of the involuntary petition. Some of the consequences of a bankruptcy case being commenced include: (1) creation 22 || of the automatic stay pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) working as an injunction against the 23 petitioning creditors and other third-parties of any act or actions against the person for whom the case has been commenced (and subjecting such third-parties to being held in contempt for such 4 || violations); (2) the automatic stay rendering void acts, actions, and transfers involving such third- parties; (3) imposition pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 363of restrictions, limitations, and statutory 25 |; requirements for the use, sale, lease, or transfer of any property of the bankruptcy estate; and 26 (4) creation of a bankruptcy estate pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 541 that consists of all of the real and personal property of the person put into the involuntary bankruptcy case. 27 If such events are to be put in motion, ex parte, without notice or opportunity of the target 28 || of the involuntary bankruptcy petition to address until after the fact, it is not unreasonable that

l As specified in 11 U.S.C. § 303(a) an involuntary bankruptcy case can be commenced only 2 |lunder Chapters 7 or 11 of the Bankruptcy Code. Here, the ninety-one (91) Form 105s have checked 3 the box for an involuntary Chapter 7 bankruptcy case. Such a case is for the liquidation of the assets 4 the person who is placed in the involuntary bankruptcy case. 5 The fundamental requirements for an involuntary bankruptcy case to be commenced are 6 |lspecified in 11 U.S.C. § 303(b) and are summarized as follows: 7 An involuntary case against a person is commenced by the filing with the bankruptcy court of a petition under chapter 7 or 11 of this title - 8 (1) There must be at least three or more entities, each of which is either: 9 (a) a holder of a claim against such person that is not contingent as to liability 10 or the subject of a bona fide dispute as to liability or amount, or an indenture trustee representing such a holder, 11 and 12 (b) ifsuch noncontingent, undisputed claims aggregate at least $ 16,750 more 13 than the value of any lien on property of the debtor securing such claims held by the holders of such claims; 14 or 15 (2) if there are fewer than 12 such holders of claims or, excluding any employee or 16 insider of such person and any transferee of a transfer that is voidable under section 544, 545, 547, 548, 549, or 724(a) of the Bankruptcy Code, by one or more of such 17 holders that hold in the aggregate at least $ 16,750 of such claims; .... 18 ||Thus, for the involuntary case to be commenced, the court has to be presented with the involuntary 19 |lpetition that appears to meet the above conditions. 20 As discussed in COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, for there to be an involuntary bankruptcy petition 21 and case commenced, the persons seeking the commencement of such involuntary case must be 22 |\creditors holding “claims” (obligations) owed by the person whom they seek to put into bankruptcy. 23 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, SIXTEENTH EDITION, ¢ 303.09. While the term “claim” is broadly defined 24 |lin 11 U.S.C. § 101(5), it must be based on a right to payment that is not contingent or subject to bona 25 dispute as to liability or amount. 11 U.S.C. § 303(b)(1). 26 |————_——_____—_——-—_ 97 || the Official Bankruptcy Form 105 documents appear to show that grounds exist for, and the person seeking to file the involuntary bankruptcy petition has standing to commence such federal 28 || case, such extraordinary relief/legal consequences.

1 In discussing the requirement for there to be claims not in bona fide dispute, COLLIER ON 2 |BANKRUPTCY discusses the unique, and potentially abusive, impact of the involuntary case filing, 3 lland how it can be used abusively by someone not entitled to seek such relief. Jd. § 303.11. 4 As part of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure adopted by the Supreme Court, Federal 5 of Bankruptcy Procedure 9011 requires and places on a party seeking to file any document with 6 court, in pertinent part, that: 7 [a] petition, pleading, written motion, or other paper, an attorney or unrepresented party is certifying that to the best of the person's knowledge, information, and belief, 8 formed after an inquiry reasonable under the circumstances,-- 9 (1) it is not being presented for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation; 10 (2) the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions therein are warranted by existing 11 law or by a nonfrivolous argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law or the establishment of new law; 12 (3) the allegations and other factual contentions have evidentiary support or, if 13 specifically so identified, are likely to have evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity for further investigation or discovery; and 14 (4) the denials of factual contentions are warranted on the evidence or, if specifically 15 so identified, are reasonably based on a lack of information or belief. 16 R. Bankr. P. 9011. 17 As addressed by the United States Supreme Court, the federal judicial process is not a GIGO 18 |l(garbage in-garbage out) system. In United Student Aid Funds, Inc. v. Espinosa, 559 U.S, 260, 130 19 Ct. 1367, 1381 n.14, 176 L. Ed. 2d 158, 173 n.14, 15 (2010), the Supreme Court directed the trial 20 |lcourt that even when there was no opposition, the court must conclude that based on the law and 21 llevidence presented that the relief requested was permissible under applicable law. See also Varela 22 Dynamic Brokers, Inc. (In re Dynamic Brokers, Inc.), 293 B.R. 489, 499 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2003) 23 24 * The bankruptcy court in Jn re William M. Risby, Petitioner, 2008 WL 116701 (Bankr, 25 || W.D. Ark. 2008), provides a detailed discussion of the serious effect of the mere filing of an 26 involuntary petition and the potential for misuse and abuse. The court incorporates in by this reference that very detailed discussion, rather than merely paraphrasing that decision. That 97 || discussion includes consideration of whether there appears to facially be a potential bona fide dispute as to the claim stated by the person seeking to commence the involuntary bankruptcy 28 || case.

1 |(citing Everett v. Perez (In re Perez), 30 F.3d 1209, 1213 (9th Cir. 1994)). 2 \Federal Law Regarding Prisoner Actions 3 The court’s review of the ninety-one (91) Form 105s is not a unique process. Congress 4 ||provides in 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a) that before docketing the court is to review a “complaint in a civil 5 llaction in which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a 6 governmental entity.” The court is to review the complaint and dismiss the complaint, or any portion 7 |Ithereof, that is determined to be “frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may 8 granted,” or “seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. 9 1915A(b). The statute defines “prisoner” to include “any person incarcerated or detained in any 10 |ifacility who is accused of, convicted of, sentenced for, or adjudicated delinquent for, violations of 11 |icriminal law... .” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(c). 12 While a Form 105 is not a “complaint,” as discussed above, the automatic, self-executing 13 |jresults by operations of law are of greater impact than a “mere” complaint. 14 Another analogy to which the filing of a Form 105 and commencing an involuntary 15 |lbankruptey case can be drawn is that of a temporary restraining order that is obtained ex parte and 16 ||without notice to person against whom the injunctive relief is sought. To obtain such extraordinary 17 |lrelief one must “clearly show that immediate and irreparable injury, loss, or damage will result before 18 adverse party can be heard in opposition... .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b). Further, to obtain such ex 19 |lparte, no notice relief, the requesting party must give security (commonly a bond) in an amount the 20 determines proper to pay costs and damages sustained by the other party ifthe injunctive relief 21 |lis determined to be wrongful. Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(c). 22 The bankruptcy court reviewing the Form 105s to see if they facially show the basic grounds 23 the petitioning creditor to have standing and to comply with the requirements of 11 U.S.C. § 303 24 |lis not inconsistent with this other well established federal law. 25 REVIEW OF FORM 105s DELIVERED BY MR. BONILLA 26 TO THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 27 With the exception of the Form 105 Subject’s name and address being different, each of the 28 |Ininety-one (91) Form 105s are the same. Each seeks to have the Form 105 Subject put into an

1 |involuntary Chapter 7 bankruptcy liquidation. 2 On each of the Form 105s, Mr. Bonilla does not state that the debts of the Form 105 Subject 3 |lare either primarily consumer or business debts. Interlineated on each of the Form 105s is the phrase, 4 I“STATUTORY LIEN - 633 F.2d 844.” 5 The federal case citation stated on the Form 105s is to a Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals 6 |Idecision, Rankin v. Howard, 633 F.2d 844 (9th Cir. 1980). In Rankin, the Ninth Circuit discussed 7 judicial immunity given for alleged violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (alleged civil rights violations) 8 |for judicial acts not taken “in the ‘clear absence of all jurisdiction.’” Rankin v. Howard, 633 F.2d at 9 1846. For the state court judge whose conduct was at issue in Rankin, the court considered whether 10 state court judge had jurisdiction over the person that was the subject of that court’s order and 11 |lwhether the act was one “normally performed by a judge.” /d. at 847. The Ninth Circuit panel in 12 Rankin concluded that since the state court judge knew that he had no personal jurisdiction over the 13 |subject of his order, then he could not claim judicial immunity. The Rankin decision acknowledges 14 ithe broad grant of judicial immunity that exists as discussed by the United States Supreme Court in 15 [Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978), which states: 16 The governing principle of law is well established and is not questioned by the parties. 17 As early as 1872, the Court recognized that it was "a general principle of the highest importance to the proper administration of justice that a judicial officer, in exercising 18 the authority vested in him, [should] be free to act upon his own convictions, apprehension of personal consequences to himself." Bradley v. Fisher, supra, at 347. 19 For that reason the Court held that "judges of courts of superior or general jurisdiction are not liable to civil actions for their judicial acts, even when such acts are in excess 20 of their jurisdiction, and are alleged to have been done maliciously or corruptly." 13 Wall., at 351. Later we held that this doctrine of judicial immunity was applicable 21 in suits under § 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, for the legislative record gave no indication that Congress intended to abolish this long-established 22 principle. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967). 23 Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 355-356 (1978). 24 It appears that the case citation included by Mr. Bonilla stands for the proposition that the 25 |lvarious judicial officers listed on the Form 105s would have a bona fide (though possibly disputed 26 Mr. Bonilla) defense as there is the issue of judicial immunity identified by Mr. Bonilla. 27 The Form 105s identifies the “debt” as the basis for Mr. Bonilla filing the Form 105s as being 28 |jan “obligation.” No other information is provided other than Mr. Bonilla stating that the “Obligation”

1 llis Three Hundred and Two Billion, Five Hundred and Nineteen Million, Five Hundred and Two 2 ||Thousand, and Nine Hundred and Thirteen Dollars and Eighty-Five Cents ($302,519,502,913.85) on 3 |leach of the Form 105s. 4 It is not clear whether it is asserted that the $302,519,502,913.85 Obligation stated is joint and 5 |iseveral liability of all the Form 105 Subjects or that each of the ninety-one (91) Form 105 Subjects 6 jin the Eastern District of California and the total amount asserted is that multiple of the 7 1$302,519,502,913.85. 8 The amount of the obligation (whether joint and several liability or multiple separate 9 |lliabilities) raises serious questions and puts in the spotlight whether it is an actual liability and not 10 |lsomething subject to bona fide dispute. To put the asserted Three Hundred and Two Billion, Five 11 |Hundred and Nineteen Million, Five Hundred and Two Thousand, and Nine Hundred and Thirteen 12 llDollars and Eighty-Five Cents ($302,519,502,913.85) in economic context, the total debts owed to 13 |lall of its creditors (including asserted fire victims) listed by Pacific Gas and Electric Company 14 ||(“PG&E”) on the attachment to its bankruptcy petition in its current bankruptcy case pending in the 15 |[Northern District of California is Fifty One Billion, Four Hundred Eleven Million Dollars 16 |($51,411,000,000.00) ~ which is a mere 16% of the obligation that Mr. Bonilla lists as being owed 17 |lto him only, Bankr. N.D. Cal. 19-30089; Dekt. 1 at 5. 18 On their faces, the Form 105s demonstrate that Mr. Bonilla is not presenting the court with 19 |\documents which may properly be filed as involuntary bankruptcy petitions. Rather, on their face 20 ||they create substantial doubt whether Mr. Bonilla qualifies as one to file one or more involuntary 21 bankruptcy cases against the Form 105 Subjects and, to the extent he asserts an obligation, and based 22 llon the citation to the Ninth Circuit Decision in Rankin, that a bona fide dispute is indicated. 23 STANDING TO COMMENCE AN 24 INVOLUNTARY BANKRUPTCY CASE 25 The federal courts are not a forum for the theoretical or one in which parties who do not have 26 |lrights attempt to litigate on behalf of others who are not before the court (with limited exceptions to 27 |Ithis rule, such as class action and other special representative proceedings authorized by Congress). 28 ||Standing must be determined to exist before the court can proceed with the case. Sacks v. Office of

1 |\Foreign Assets Control, 466 F.3d 764, 771. (9th Cir. 2006) 2 One of the first things that a law student learns about American Jurisprudence is that the law 3 not condone the “officious intermeddler.” One is not allowed to assert claims or rights in which 4 |lhe or she has no interest. In the federal courts, this is the Constitutional requirement of “standing.” 5 Article IIE of the Constitution confines federal courts to decisions of “Cases” or 6 “Controversies.” Standing to sue or defend is an aspect of the case-or-controversy requirement. (Citations omitted.) To qualify as a party with standing to litigate, a 7 person must show, first and foremost, “an invasion ofa legally protected interest” that is “concrete and particularized” and “actual or imminent.’ (Citations 8 omitted.),..Standing to defend on appeal in the place of an original defendant, no less than standing to sue, demands that the litigant possess ‘a direct state in the outcome.’ 9 (Citations omitted.) 10 |\Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 64, 117 S.Ct. 1055 (1997). 11 The court may raise the issue of standing sua sponte, Rule 12(h)(3), Federal Rules of Civil 12 Procedure? even if it is not raised by a party to the action. A person must have a legally protected 13 |linterest, for which there is a direct stake in the outcome. Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 14 ]520 U.S. 43, 64, 117 S.Ct, 1055 (1997). The Supreme Court provided a detailed explanation of the 15 ||Constitutional case in controversy requirement in Northeastern Florida Chapter of Associated 16 ||General Contractors of America v. City of Jacksonville Florida, 508 U.S. 656, 663, 113 S.Ct. 2297 17 ||(1993). The party seeking to invoke federal court jurisdiction must demonstrate (1) injury in fact, not 18 |lmerely conjectural or hypothetical injury, (2) a causal relationship between the injury and the 19 |ichallenged conduct, and (3) the prospect of obtaining relief from the injury as a result of a favorable 20 |lruling is not too speculative. Jd. In determining whether the plaintiff has the requisite standing and 21 court has jurisdiction, the court may consider extrinsic evidence. Roverts v. Corrothers, 812 F.2d, 22 11173, 1177 9th Cir. 1987). 23 The standing requirement is not merely a “procedural issue,” but a fundamental requirement 24 |larising under the Constitution. 25 Here, with the deficiencies in the information provided in the Form 105s, especially in light 26 27 >? As made applicable to this Adversary Proceeding by Federal Rules of Bankruptcy 28 || Procedure 7012 and 9014(c) by this Order.

1 jlof the ex parte, without an opportunity to defend or address prior to the involuntary case being 2 ||commenced, significant impact and potential harm on a Form 105 Subject with the commencement 3 an involuntary bankruptcy case, the identification of standing is even more significant. 4 MISCELLANEOUS FILE FOR THE FORM 105s 5 AND AFFORDING MR. BONILLA ACCESS TO THE COURT 6 Though the documents delivered by Mr. Bonilla raise significant doubts whether they should 7 filed, the court instructs the Clerk of the Court to open a bankruptcy court file for Mr. Bonilla, 8 ||which shall be assigned a miscellaneous file number so as to not make it appear that Mr. Bonilla has 9 |filed a bankruptcy case personally (“Miscellaneous File”). All of the Form 105s delivered by 10 Bonilla to date and in the future will be docketed in the Miscellaneous File opened for 11 Bonilla. 12 Mr. Bonilla may file supplemental pleadings to addresses his standing to file an involuntary 13 |[bankruptcy petition for each of the Form 105 Subjects, and other subjects of future Form 105s 14 |Ildelivered to the court by Mr. Bonilla. The supplemental pleadings, which shall be supported by 15 |lcompetent admissible evidences as provided under the Federal Rules of Evidence, shall include: 16 A. A statement of the legal and factual basis for the obligation asserted by Mr. Bonilla 17 against each of the Form 105 Subjects against whom Mr. Bonilla is seeking to file an involuntary bankruptcy case. This shall include any applicable law upon which such 18 obligation is asserted to exist. 19 B. Copies of the documents or other writings upon which Mr. Bonilla asserts that the obligation exists. 20 C. Such other documents and information Mr. Bonilla determines would be in support 21 of his standing to file an involuntary petition. 22 In establishing the Miscellaneous File for Mr, Bonilla, the court ensures that there is a clear 23 record of the involuntary bankruptcy cases he is attempting to have commenced. The court is also 24 |lcreating a vehicle for Mr. Bonilla to access the court and address the issues that arise given the 25 llamount of the asserted obligation(s), the legal authority he has cited, the potential bona fide defenses 26 ihe has identified, and the lack of information about the basis for such obligation(s). 27 Due to the limited information provided in the ninety-one (91) Form 105s, Mr. Bonilla should 28 assume that the issues identified in this Order are the universe ofall possible issues that may arise 10

1 an involuntary bankruptcy case. If such additional issues are identified, Mr. Bonilla will be 2 |jafforded the opportunity to address such issues, as he is now afforded the opportunity to address the 3 linitially identified issues. 4 |Required Filing Fees 5 The filing fee required to be paid when commencing a Chapter 7 bankruptcy case is specified 6 jlin 28 U.S.C. § 1930(a)(1)(A), plus administrative fees, to currently be $335.00. For a person filing 7 voluntary Chapter 7 case, the filing fee may be paid in installments. 28 U.S.C. § 1930(a)(7). The 8 ||Judicial Conference of the United States is permitted to authorize the waiving of the filing fee in a 9 Chapter 7 case for an individual based on the specified financial guidelines. 10 Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 1006 amplifies the requirement for the payment of a 11 fee when an involuntary bankruptcy petition is received by the court, providing that with respect 12 |Ito the waiver of the Chapter 7 filing fee: 13 (a) General requirement 14 Every petition shall be accompanied by the filing fee except as provided in subdivisions (b) and (c) of this rule. For the purpose of this rule, “filing fee” 15 means the filing fee prescribed by 28 U.S.C. § 1930(a)(1)-(a)(5) and any other fee prescribed by the Judicial Conference of the United States under 28 U.S.C. 16 § 1930(b) that is payable to the clerk upon the commencement of a case under the Code. 17 (b) Payment of filing fee in installments 18 (1) Application to pay filing fee in installments 19 A voluntary petition by an individual shall be accepted for filing, regardless 20 of whether any portion of the filing fee is paid, if accompanied by the debtor's signed application, prepared as prescribed by the appropriate 21 Official Form, stating that the debtor is unable to pay the filing fee except in installments. 22 Lee 23 (c) Waiver of filing fee 24 A voluntary chapter 7 petition filed by an individual shall be accepted for filing if accompanied by the debtor's application requesting a waiver under 25 28 U.S.C. § 1930(f), prepared as prescribed by the appropriate Official Form. 26 ||Fed. R. Bankr. P. 1006 (emphasis added), 27 As discussed in 1 Collier Practice Guide, { 14.14, citing to 28 U.S.C. § 1930 and Federal Rule 28 llof Bankruptcy Procedure 1006, the requirement for the payment of filing fees for an involuntary 11

1 |/bankruptcy case when the involuntary petition (the Form 105s at issue before the court) is presented 2. the court for filing: 3 [4] Filing Fees—-28 U.S.C. § 1930 Filing fees must be paid in full to the clerk of the bankruptcy court for all involuntary 5 cases. Installment payments are not permitted. . .. 6 With the ninety-one (91) Form 105s, Mr. Bonilla included a request with respect to the filing 7 stating, “Please send me a waiver form for any filing fee.” The filing fee waiver only applies 8 an individual filing a voluntary Chapter 7 bankruptcy case - not someone seeking to file a Form 9 105 involuntary bankruptcy petition. 10 In addition to supplemental pleadings provided by Mr. Bonilla to show he has standing and 11 the necessary requirements for filing an involuntary bankruptcy petition, Mr. Bonilla will have 12 ||to provide the court with the filing fee for each involuntary petition or provide a legal basis why such 13 not required. 14 ORDER 15 The court having reviewed the ninety-one (91) Form 105s (Official Bankruptcy Form 105, 16 |involuntary bankruptcy petition) delivered to the court by Steven Wayne Bonilla, the information 17 |lprovided in the Forms 105s, consideration of the Constitutional requirement for standing and the 18 |Inecessary conditions for a person to file an involuntary bankruptcy petition, the filing fees required 19 |pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1930 and Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 9006 for the filing of an 20 |linvoluntary Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition, and good cause appearing; 21 IT IS ORDERED that the Clerk of the Court shall open Miscellaneous File No. 19-00202 22 |\for Steven Wayne Bonilla, the Involuntary Petitioner, and place as separate docket entries therein each 23 |lof the ninety-one (91) Official Bankruptcy Form 105 involuntary bankruptcy petitions delivered to 24 the court by Mr. Bonilla, and related documents presented to the court at the time of this Order and 25 time thereafter unless otherwise provided by subsequent order. 26 Each Form 105 presented to the Clerk for filing by Mr. Bonilla shall be a separate docket entry 27 |litem in the Miscellaneous File. For the ninety-one (91) Form 105s delivered to the court at the time 28 Miscellaneous File for Steven Wayne Bonilla was opened, the Clerk of the Court shall place them 12

1 the docket in the order set forth in the List of Form 105s in the court’s separate docketing 2 linstruction issued in conjunction with this Order. 3 If future Form 105s are presented by Mr. Bonilla to the court, they will be docketed in the 4 |[Miscellaneous File when received, as the next open docket entry. 5 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that within thirty (30 days) of the date of this Order, Wayne 6 |[Steven Bonilla shall file Supplemental Pleadings, if any are so desired by him, to addresses his 7 |\standing to file an involuntary bankruptcy petition for each of the Form 105 Subjects, and other 8 |jsubjects of future Form 105s delivered to the court by Mr. Bonilla. The supplemental pleadings, 9 which shall be supported by competent, admissible evidences as provided under the Federal Rules 10 llof Evidence, shall include: 11 A. A written statement of the legal and factual basis for the obligation asserted by Mr. Bonilla against each of the Form 105 Subjects. This shall include any applicable 12 law upon which such obligation is asserted to exist. 13 B. The above written statement shall include the legal and factual basis by which Mr. Bonilla asserts he has standing to file the Form 105s against each Form 105 14 Subject. 15 C. Copies of the documents or other writings upon which Mr. Bonilla asserts that the obligation is based. D. Such other documents and information Mr. Bonilla determines would be in support 17 of his standing to file an involuntary petition with the court. 18 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Mr. Bonilla will pay to the court at the time any 19 llinvoluntary Chapter 7 petition (Official Bankruptcy Form 105) the filing fee for each such involuntary 20 |lpetition to be filed or provide the court with a legal basis why such is not required. Such legal basis 21 be presented with the Supplemental Pleadings specified above. 22 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that if no Supplemental Pleadings are timely filed, the Clerk 23 |lof the court may close this Miscellaneous File. 24 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that notwithstanding the closing of the Miscellaneous File, 25 Clerk of the Court shall docket any additional Form 105s and file any subsequent documents 26 \\delivered to the court by Steven Wayne Bonilla in the Miscellaneous File without reopening the file 27 Mr. Bonilla requesting the reopening of the Miscellaneous File. 28 Upon the filing of any additional pleadings or documents in the Miscellaneous File after the 13

1 |Ininety-one (91) Form 105s and the transmittal cover letters with them at the time the Miscellaneous 2 is opened, the Clerk of the Court shall notify the undersigned judge to whom the Miscellaneous 3 |Ifile is assigned that additional pleadings or documents have been docketed or filed, the docket entry 4 |Inumber for each such item, and the docket description for each such additional pleading or document. 5 |\Dated: June | 9, 2019 we

? RONAND H. SARGIS, Chis? Judge " 3 United States Bartkeuptey Court () 9 10 11 12 i 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 2] 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 14

Instructions to Clerk of Court 2 Service List - Not Part of Order/Judgment 3 Clerk of Court is instructed to send the Order/Judgment or other court generated document transmitted herewith fo the parties below. The Clerk of Court will send the document via the 4 |BNC or, if checked XXXX __, viathe U.S. mail. 5 6 Steven Wayne Bonilla J-48500, 3-EY-13 7 WSan Quentin, CA 94974 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28

UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

The undersigned deputy clerk in the office of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of California hereby certifies that a copy of the document to which this certificate is attached was mailed today to the following entities at the addresses shown below or on the attached list.

Steven Wayne Bonilla J-48500, 3-EY-13 San Quentin, CA 94974

DATED: 6/19/19 By: | wr te ZW a Deputy Clerk

EDC 3-070 (Rev. 6/28/10)

1 Instructions to Clerk of Court 2 Service List - Not Part of Order/Judgment 3 The Clerk of Court is instructed to send the Order/Judgment or other court generated document transmitted herewith to the parties below. The Clerk of Court will send the document via the 4 BNC or, if checked ____, via the U.S. mail. 5 Steven Wayne Bonilla 6 J-48500, 3-EY-13 San Quentin, CA 94974 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28