IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA
2022-NCSC-90
No. 195A21
Filed 15 July 2022
IN THE MATTER OF: M.R., A.R., M.R.
Appeal pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1001(a1)(1) (2019) from order entered on 9
April 2021 by Judge Resson O. Faircloth in District Court, Harnett County. This
matter was calendared in the Supreme Court on 1 July 2022 but determined on the
record and briefs without oral argument pursuant to Rule 30(f) of the North Carolina
Rules of Appellate Procedure.
Duncan B. McCormick for petitioner-appellee Harnett County Department of Social Services.
Mobley Law Office, P.A., by Marie H. Mobley, for appellee Guardian ad litem.
Peter Wood for respondent-appellant mother.
David A. Perez for respondent-appellant father.
BERGER, Justice.
¶1 Respondent-parents appeal from an order terminating their parental rights
to M.R. (Michael)1, A.R. (Alice), and M.R. (Mary). For the reasons stated below, we
affirm.
Factual and Procedural Background
1 Pseudonyms are used in this opinion to protect the juveniles’ identity and for ease of reading. IN RE M.R., A.R., M.R.
Opinion of the Court
¶2 Michael and Alice (the twins) were born in June 2009. On May 17, 2017, the
Harnett County Department of Social Services (DSS) obtained nonsecure custody of
the twins and filed petitions alleging they were neglected juveniles. The petitions
alleged the following: respondent-mother had failed to appear for a court date and
was in contempt of court for charges related to truancy; Alice was suffering from a
yeast infection or urinary tract infection and respondent-mother failed to seek
medical care; Alice had not been taken to a dentist although her teeth were rotting
and aching; the twins were required to repeat kindergarten because they had missed
forty-five days of school the prior year; respondent-mother did not have stable
housing; and the twins reported sleeping on a sofa with men that respondent-mother
invited into the home.
¶3 The petitions further alleged that despite periodically living with a family
friend, respondent-mother and the twins were homeless. In addition, personal effects
belonging to the twins and respondent-mother were dirty and kept in trash bags, and
the twins’ clothing was “so small that it hurt them” to wear. Moreover, the petition
explained that Alice had been found unaccompanied at a bus stop, stating that she
had not eaten dinner and was hungry. The twins were often late for school because
respondent-mother was working late and leaving them with other caretakers.
Eventually, respondent-mother voluntarily placed the twins with the maternal IN RE M.R., A.R., M.R.
grandmother. In February 2017, DSS developed an In-Home Family Services
Agreement with respondent-mother.
¶4 The petitions also alleged that on February 24, 2017, respondent-mother
moved into a residence of her own. The twins were to remain in a temporary safety
provider placement for two weeks while respondent-mother got settled into her home,
but respondent-mother took them from the safety provider placement prematurely
without notifying DSS. DSS home visits revealed multiple people in the home, and
Michael complained about “not being able to rest because of all the people.”
Respondent-mother could not maintain utilities in the home, and she was evicted on
April 17, 2017. During this time, Alice complained “about her private area hurting,”
but respondent-mother failed to seek medical attention to address Alice’s complaints.
¶5 On April 20, 2017, respondent-mother was arrested on outstanding warrants
for obtaining a controlled substance, identity theft, and trafficking in opiates.
Respondent-mother was also charged with possession of drug paraphernalia and
possession with intent to manufacture, sell, and distribute heroin. She was released
from custody on May 9, 2017, after using Alice’s social security benefits to assist with
her bond. Respondent-father had been incarcerated since the twins were a few
months old and was scheduled to be released in August 2017.
¶6 On September 8, 2017, the trial court entered an order following a hearing
adjudicating the twins neglected juveniles. The court ordered respondent-mother to IN RE M.R., A.R., M.R.
complete a number of objectives related to her substance abuse, parenting skills,
housing, and employment. The court ordered respondent-father to comply with the
terms and conditions associated with life in the halfway house he was residing at and
complete several directives related to housing, employment, and parenting skills.
Respondent-parents were granted one hour of weekly supervised visitation.
¶7 On December 15, 2017, the trial court entered a permanency planning order
finding respondent-mother: had missed scheduled visits with the twins in September
and November of 2017; had not made progress on her case plan; had failed to complete
a parenting course; had not obtained employment; did not cooperate with a substance
abuse assessment or show for a scheduled drug screen in October 2017; and had
tested positive for cocaine in December 2017.
¶8 Respondent-father had been released from prison in August 2017 but had not
visited the twins consistently. He cooperated with a drug screen in December 2017,
and tested negative, and reported that he had obtained housing in Fayetteville and
employment at a construction company. The trial court set the primary permanent
plan to guardianship, with concurrent secondary plans as custody with a relative or
other suitable person and reunification with respondent-parents. The trial court also
suspended respondent-mother’s visitation until she could produce two consecutive
negative drug screens. IN RE M.R., A.R., M.R.
¶9 On March 23, 2018, the trial court entered a permanency planning order
finding that the twins had been placed with the paternal great-grandmother since
January 29, 2018. Respondent-mother failed to appear for a scheduled drug screen
in February 2018 and again when it was rescheduled for March 2018. DSS reported
observing respondent-father helping the twins with homework during a visitation,
and the paternal great-grandmother reported that respondent-father assisted the
twins before and after school.
¶ 10 Mary was born in May 2018, and on June 5, 2018, DSS obtained nonsecure
custody after filing a juvenile petition alleging she was a neglected juvenile. The
petition alleged that Mary had tested positive for cocaine, marijuana, and opiates at
birth and was treated for withdrawal symptoms including tremors, feeding issues,
and abnormal muscle tone. Respondent-mother admitted to taking Percocet daily
and using cocaine and marijuana during her pregnancy. Following her discharge
from the hospital on May 28, 2017, respondent-mother had only visited Mary twice
before being arrested for multiple drug-related offenses. DSS also alleged that
respondent-father had not made significant progress in complying with his family
services agreement.
¶ 11 On July 13, 2018, the trial court entered a permanency planning order as to
the twins, finding that the paternal great-grandmother had asked that they be
removed from her home on June 8, 2018. The twins were subsequently placed in a IN RE M.R., A.R., M.R.
licensed foster home. The trial court found that respondent-mother had failed to
cooperate with drug screens, had not visited the twins since December 2017, and was
incarcerated in the Harnett County jail for numerous drug-related charges from 2017
and 2018. Respondent-father had not contacted DSS to schedule visitation with the
twins since they were removed from the paternal great-grandmother’s home, and
DSS had been unsuccessful in attempts to contact him to schedule drug screens. The
trial court concluded that “reunification efforts with the parents clearly would be
unsuccessful [and] should be ceased,” and changed the primary permanent plan to
adoption, with a secondary plan of guardianship.
¶ 12 On July 6, 2018, the trial court entered an order adjudicating Mary a neglected
juvenile. Neither respondent had entered into family services agreements as to Mary.
The trial court suspended respondent-mother’s visitation with Mary until she could
produce two consecutive negative drug screens. The court granted respondent-father
one hour of weekly supervised visitation. The court ordered respondent-mother to
enter into a family services agreement containing a host of directives related to her
release from jail and cooperation with substance abuse and mental health
treatments. Respondent-father was ordered to enter into a family services agreement
containing directives related to obtaining and maintaining stable housing, complying
with drug screens, and completing parenting classes. IN RE M.R., A.R., M.R.
¶ 13 The trial court held a hearing regarding Mary on October 12, 2018 and entered
a permanency planning order finding that respondent-mother was still incarcerated
and had not had any negative drug screens or visits. Neither respondent had entered
into out of home family services agreements regarding Mary. At the time of the
hearing, respondent-father’s whereabouts were unknown and he had not been in
contact with DSS since DSS filed the juvenile petition on June 5, 2018. The trial
court ceased respondents’ visitations with Mary and set the primary permanent plan
to adoption, with concurrent secondary permanent plans of guardianship and
reunification.
¶ 14 On the same day, the trial court entered a permanency planning order as to
the twins finding that respondent-mother had not made any progress since the June
29, 2018, hearing and failed to complete any of her case plan objectives. The trial
court also determined that respondent-father had not participated in any services
since the June 29, 2018, hearing and failed to complete any of his case plan objectives.
¶ 15 On October 16, 2018, DSS filed a motion to terminate respondents’ parental
rights to the twins pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(1), (2), and (3). (2021). DSS
further alleged that respondent-father had willfully abandoned the twins under
N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(7) (2021).
¶ 16 On June 13, 2019, DSS filed a motion to terminate respondents’ parental rights
in Mary under N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(1) and (3). In addition, DSS alleged that IN RE M.R., A.R., M.R.
respondent-father had not undertaken any actions required of him to legitimate Mary
and had willfully abandoned her pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(5) and (7).
¶ 17 Following hearings on August 16, 2019, the trial court entered permanency
planning orders as to all the children finding that respondent-mother had pled guilty
to multiple drug-related charges. Respondent-mother’s active term of imprisonment
had been suspended, and as a term of her probation, she was required to complete
the Triangle Residence Options for Substance Abusers (TROSA) program.
¶ 18 Respondent-mother enrolled in TROSA in February 2019. She was compliant
with the TROSA program, participating in parenting, anger management, and
rational behavior classes, but would not be eligible for day visits with her children
until she had completed eighteen months of the program. Respondent-father had not
made or documented any progress since the October 2018 hearing.
¶ 19 Following four hearings held in November 2019 and January, February, and
July 2020, the trial court entered an order on April 9, 2021, terminating respondents’
parental rights to all three children. The court adjudicated the existence of grounds
to terminate respondent-mother’s parental rights in the twins under N.C.G.S. § 7B-
1111(a)(1) and (2) and in Mary under N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(1). The court adjudicated
the existence of grounds to terminate respondent-father’s parental rights in the twins
under N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(1), (2), (3), and (7) and in Mary under N.C.G.S. § 7B-
1111(a)(1), (5), and (7). The court also concluded that it was in the children’s best IN RE M.R., A.R., M.R.
interests that respondents’ parental rights be terminated. See N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110(a)
(2021). Respondents timely filed notice of appeal.
Standard of Review
¶ 20 “We review a trial court’s adjudication under N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111 ‘to determine
whether the findings are supported by clear, cogent and convincing evidence and the
findings support the conclusions of law.’ ” In re E.H.P., 372 N.C. 388, 392, 831 S.E.2d
49, 52 (2019) (quoting In re Montgomery, 311 N.C. 101, 111, 316 S.E.2d 246, 253
(1984)). This Court limits its review of the findings of fact to “only those findings
necessary to support the trial court’s determination that grounds existed to terminate
respondent’s parental rights.” In re T.N.H., 372 N.C. 403, 407, 831 S.E.2d 54, 58–59
(2019). “A trial court’s finding of fact that is supported by clear, cogent, and
convincing evidence is deemed conclusive even if the record contains evidence that
would support a contrary finding.” In re B.O.A., 372 N.C. 372, 379, 831 S.E.2d 305,
310 (2019). “Findings of fact not challenged by respondent are deemed supported by
competent evidence and are binding on appeal.” In re T.N.H., 372 N.C. at 407, 831
S.E.2d at 58. We review the trial court’s conclusions of law de novo. In re C.B.C., 373
N.C. 16, 19, 832 S.E.2d 692, 695 (2019).
¶ 21 “If [the trial court] determines that one or more grounds listed in section 7B-
1111 are present, the court proceeds to the dispositional stage, at which the court
must consider whether it is in the best interests of the juvenile to terminate parental IN RE M.R., A.R., M.R.
rights.” In re D.L.W., 368 N.C. 835, 842, 788 S.E.2d 162, 167 (2016) (citing In re
Young, 346 N.C. 244, 247, 485 S.E.2d 612, 614–15 (1997); N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110 (2021)).
A trial court’s best interests determination “is reviewed solely for abuse of discretion.”
In re A.U.D., 373 N.C. 3, 6, 832 S.E.2d 698, 700 (2019) (citing In re D.L.W., 368 N.C.
at 842, 788 S.E.2d at 167). “An abuse of discretion results where the court’s ruling is
manifestly unsupported by reason or is so arbitrary that it could not have been the
result of a reasoned decision.” In re T.L.H., 368 N.C. 101, 107, 772 S.E.2d, 451, 455
(2015) (cleaned up).
¶ 22 In determining whether termination of parental rights is in the best interests
of a juvenile:
The court may consider any evidence, including hearsay evidence as defined in [N.C.]G.S. 8C-1, Rule 801, that the court finds to be relevant, reliable, and necessary to determine the best interests of the juvenile. In each case, the court shall consider the following criteria and make written findings regarding the following that are relevant:
(1) The age of the juvenile.
(2) The likelihood of adoption of the juvenile.
(3) Whether the termination of parental rights will aid in the accomplishment of the permanent plan for the juvenile.
(4) The bond between the juvenile and the parent.
(5) The quality of the relationship between the juvenile and the proposed adoptive parent, guardian, custodian, or other permanent placement. IN RE M.R., A.R., M.R.
(6) Any relevant consideration.
N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110(a) (2021).
Respondent-Mother’s Appeal
¶ 23 Respondent-mother challenges the trial court’s adjudication of the existence of
grounds to terminate her parental rights in the twins under N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(1)
and (2) and in Mary under N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(1). She also contends the trial court
abused its discretion in determining that it was in the twins’ best interests that her
parental rights be terminated.
¶ 24 A trial court may terminate parental rights if it concludes the parent has
neglected the juvenile within the meaning of N.C.G.S. § 7B-101. N.C.G.S. § 7B-
1111(a)(1). A neglected juvenile is defined, in pertinent part, as a juvenile “whose
parent, guardian, custodian or caretaker . . . [d]oes not provide proper care,
supervision, or discipline[;] . . . [or c]reates or allows to be created a living
environment that is injurious to the juvenile’s welfare.” N.C.G.S. § 7B-101(15) (2021).
¶ 25 “[E]vidence of neglect by a parent prior to losing custody of a child—including
an adjudication of such neglect—is admissible in subsequent proceedings to
terminate parental rights,” but “[t]he trial court must also consider any evidence of
changed conditions in light of the evidence of prior neglect and the probability of a
repetition of neglect.” In re Ballard, 311 N.C. 708, 715, 319 S.E.2d 227, 232 (1984).
The “determinative factors” in assessing the likelihood of a repetition of neglect are IN RE M.R., A.R., M.R.
“the best interests of the child and the fitness of the parent to care for the child at the
time of the termination proceeding.” In re Z.G.J., 378 N.C. 500, 2021-NCSC-102, ¶ 26
(quoting In re Ballard, 311 N.C. at 715, 319 S.E.2d at 232).
¶ 26 Respondent-mother does not contest the fact that the children were previously
adjudicated neglected. Instead, she challenges the trial court’s conclusion that there
was a likelihood of future neglect, specifically arguing that the court based this
determination on her “behavior in the distant past” and failed to acknowledge her
compliance with the case plan after entering TROSA in February 2019.2 She also
argues the trial court erred in concluding that grounds existed to terminate her
parental rights under N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(1).3
¶ 27 Here, the trial court’s conclusion that there was a likelihood of future neglect
if the children were returned to respondent-mother’s care is supported by its
unchallenged findings of fact demonstrating respondent-mother’s inability to provide
proper care, supervision, discipline, and a living environment not injurious to their
welfare at the time of the adjudication portion of the termination hearing. The court’s
2 We note that the trial court labeled its determinations that respondent-mother neglected the children, and grounds exist to terminate respondent-mother’s parental rights as findings of fact. These determinations are more properly classified as conclusions of law. In re J.O.D., 374 N.C. 797, 807, 844 S.E.2d 570, 578 (2020). “[F]indings of fact [which] are essentially conclusions of law . . . will be treated as such on appeal.” State v. Sparks, 362 N.C. 181, 185, 657 S.E.2d 655, 658 (2008) (alterations in original). 3 Respondent-mother also challenges findings of fact 156 and 162 and conclusion of
law 6. Because they are not necessary to support the trial court’s determination that grounds existed to terminate respondent-mother’s parental rights under N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(1), we do not address these challenges. IN RE M.R., A.R., M.R.
unchallenged findings further show that the family’s history with DSS began in 2015
when respondent-mother was unable to provide stable housing for herself or the
twins, the twins were frequently late to school and picked up early from school, and
the twins had to repeat kindergarten. DSS was involved with the family again in
2016 after respondent-mother and the twins were regularly homeless and the twins
often showed up late for school wearing ill-fitting clothing.
¶ 28 Uncontested findings establish that in February 2017, respondent-mother
developed an in-home family services agreement with DSS but failed to meet its goals
and objectives prior to the filing of the May 17, 2017, juvenile petitions. In 2017,
respondent-mother had multiple people in her home, Michael complained about being
unable to rest, and Alice complained about her “private area hurting her again.”
Respondent-mother was unable to maintain utilities in her home and was served with
an eviction notice in April 2017. On April 20, 2017, she was arrested at the twins’
school and charged with multiple drug-related offenses. The court awarded DSS
nonsecure custody of the twins on May 17, 2017. Respondent-mother did not
complete a parenting course, failed to appear for multiple drug screens, tested
positive for cocaine in December 2017, and continued to use illegal drugs during her
pregnancy with Mary. Respondent-mother did not obtain prenatal care for Mary, and
Mary tested positive for cocaine, marijuana, and opiates at birth. On June 5, 2018,
DSS obtained nonsecure custody of Mary. IN RE M.R., A.R., M.R.
¶ 29 The court also made unchallenged findings that respondent-mother was
incarcerated from May 2018 to January 2019. In January 2019, she pleaded guilty
to drug-related offenses and was sentenced to consecutive terms of eleven to twenty-
three months and eight to nineteen months of imprisonment. Her sentence was
suspended, she was placed on probation subject to a condition that she enroll in and
complete TROSA, an “intensive, residential substance abuse treatment and behavior
modification program.” The court found that respondent-mother had made no
progress between May 2017 and February 2019, when she enrolled in TROSA. While
respondent-mother was compliant with the TROSA program, she was not scheduled
to complete TROSA until February 2021 and would only be “eligible for day visits
with her children after completing 12, 14, 16, and 18 months” and for “off-campus
overnight visits after she has been in the program for 21 months.”
¶ 30 Respondent-mother asserts that her compliance with the case plan after
entering TROSA “only supported a finding that it was unlikely for the children to be
neglected again.” While we recognize the progress she made in complying with her
case plan, “a parent’s compliance with his or her case plan does not preclude a finding
of neglect.” In re J.J.H., 376 N.C. 161, 185, 851 S.E.2d 336, 352 (2020) (citing In re
D.W.P., 373 N.C. 327, 339–40, 838 S.E.2d 396, 406 (2020)). As the trial court found,
respondent-mother only began complying with her case plan in February 2019, nearly
twenty-one months after the twins were taken into DSS custody. She continued to IN RE M.R., A.R., M.R.
use illegal drugs through May 2018 and did not engage in substance abuse treatment
or parenting classes until February 2019. At the time of the termination hearing,
respondent-mother was not scheduled to complete the TROSA program until
February 2021 and would not be eligible for off-campus, overnight visits until
November 2020.
¶ 31 Respondent-mother lacked the ability to provide proper care, supervision,
discipline, and a living environment not injurious to the children’s welfare at the time
of the termination hearing despite having ample opportunity and time to overcome
the obstacles preventing her from doing so. Thus, the trial court did not err in
determining that future neglect was likely if the children were returned to her care,
and we affirm the trial court’s determination that respondent-mother’s parental
rights in the children were subject to termination pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-
1111(a)(1). We therefore need not reach respondent-mother’s challenge to the trial
court’s conclusion that grounds existed to terminate her parental rights to the twins
under N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(2). In re M.A., 374 N.C. 865, 875, 844 S.E.2d 916, 924
(2020) (“[T]he existence of a single ground for termination suffices to support the
termination of a parent’s parental rights in a child.”).
¶ 32 Next, respondent-mother contends the trial court abused its discretion in
determining it was in the twins’ best interests that her parental rights be terminated. IN RE M.R., A.R., M.R.
Respondent-mother first challenges dispositional findings 8, 10, and 15 as being
unsupported by the evidence:
8. The juveniles are adoptable. Notwithstanding the likelihood that the adoption is high the foster parents want to adopt the juveniles after completing adoption proceedings on another child in their care.
...
10. The foster parents of the twins are willing to adopt.
15. Termination of parental rights will aid in the accomplishment of the primary permanent plan of adoption.
¶ 33 A review of the record, however, demonstrates that these challenged findings
are supported by competent evidence. A DSS social worker testified that the twins
had been placed in a pre-adoptive foster home since January 2018 and that the foster
parents were willing to adopt the twins. The DSS social worker further testified that
the twins were adoptable, adoption was likely, and termination of parental rights
would clear a “major barrier” in accomplishing the primary plan of adoption.
Accordingly, we reject respondent-mother’s challenges to these dispositional findings
of fact.
¶ 34 Next, respondent-mother contends that the trial court erred in concluding that
termination was in the twins’ best interests when three factors weighed against
termination: the bond between the twins and respondent-mother, including the twins’ IN RE M.R., A.R., M.R.
wishes to stay with her; the likelihood of adoption of the twins; and respondent-
mother’s continued success in complying with her case plan.4
¶ 35 We emphasize that it is within the trial court’s discretion “to weigh the various
competing factors in N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110(a) in arriving at its determination of the
child’s best interests.” In re N.C.E., 379 N.C. 283, 2021-NCSC-141, ¶ 30. “[T]he bond
between parent and child is just one of the factors to be considered under N.C.G.S. §
7B-1110(a), and the trial court is permitted to give greater weight to other factors.”
In re Z.L.W., 372 N.C. at 437, 831 S.E.2d at 66. In addition, “while the trial court is
entitled to consider the children’s wishes in determining whether termination of their
parents’ parental rights would be appropriate, their preferences are not controlling
given that the children’s best interests constitute ‘the polar star’ of the North Carolina
Juvenile Code.” In re M.A., 374 N.C. 865, 879, 844 S.E.2d 916, 926–27 (2020) (quoting
In re T.H.T., 362 N.C. 446, 450, 665 S.E.2d 54, 57 (2008)).
¶ 36 Here, the trial court’s findings demonstrate that it considered the dispositional
factors set forth in N.C.G.S. section 7B-1110(a) and “performed a reasoned analysis
weighing those factors.” In re Z.A.M., 374 N.C. 88, 101, 839 S.E.2d 792, 801 (2020).
The trial court found that the twins were eleven years old and that they were
4 Specifically, respondent-mother challenges dispositional finding of fact 53 and conclusion of law 2 which both provide as follows: “It is in the best interests of the twins to terminate the parental rights of the parents.” Although the trial court labeled this determination a finding of fact, it is a conclusion of law, and we review it accordingly. See Sparks, 362 N.C. at 185, 657 S.E.2d at 658. IN RE M.R., A.R., M.R.
adoptable. The likelihood of adoption was high, and their foster parents wanted to
adopt the twins after completing adoption proceedings on another child that was in
their care. While the trial court found that the twins had a bond with respondent-
mother, they had a “strong parent-child bond” with their foster parents as well,
referring to them as “mom and dad.” The trial court also made findings detailing
their consideration of respondent-mother’s compliance with the TROSA program.
¶ 37 Here, the trial court made sufficient dispositional findings and performed a
reasoned analysis of the relevant factors. The trial court’s decision is not “manifestly
unsupported by reason or is so arbitrary that it could not have been the result of a
reasoned decision.” In re T.L.H., 368 N.C. 101, 107, 772 S.E.2d, 451, 454 (2015).
Thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in concluding it was in the twins’
best interests to terminate respondent-mother’s parental rights. The trial court’s
order terminating respondent-mother’s parental rights in the children is affirmed.
Respondent-Father’s Appeal
¶ 38 Respondent-father’s sole argument on appeal is that the trial court abused its
discretion in determining it was in the twins’ best interests to terminate his parental
rights. While acknowledging that the trial court made extensive dispositional
findings, “addressing far more than just the five factors specified in [N.C.G.S.] § 7B-
1110(a),” he argues that the trial court did not properly consider the issue of whether
the twins would consent to their own adoptions and that the twins were not in a IN RE M.R., A.R., M.R.
position to be immediately adoptable. He contends that the trial court “improperly
weighed the evidence” to such a degree that its decision amounted to an abuse of
discretion.5
¶ 39 As respondent-father points out, N.C.G.S. § 48-3-601 (2021) provides that a
juvenile over the age of twelve must consent to an adoption. While we note that the
twins were eleven years old at the time of the termination hearing, N.C.G.S. § 48-3-
601 governs adoption, rather than termination of parental rights proceedings. Also,
N.C.G.S. § 48-3-603(b) provides that a trial judge may dispense with the requirement
that a child who is twelve years of age or older consent to an adoption “upon a finding
that it is not in the best interest of the minor to require the consent.” N.C.G.S. § 48-
3-603(b)(2) (2021). Hence, any refusal on the part of the twins to consent to a
proposed adoption would not preclude their adoption. Even assuming that the twins
were not in a position to be immediately adoptable, “the absence of an adoptive
placement for a juvenile at the time of the termination hearing is not a bar to
terminating parental rights.” In re A.J.T., 374 N.C. 504, 512, 843 S.E.2d 192, 197.
Thus, respondent-father’s arguments are unavailing. The order of the trial court is
affirmed.
5 Like respondent-mother, respondent-father challenges dispositional finding of fact 53 and conclusion of law 2 which determine that it is in the twins’ best interests to terminate his parental rights. As stated above, although the trial court labeled this determination as a finding of fact, it is more properly classified as a conclusion of law, and we review it as such. IN RE M.R., A.R., M.R.