In Re Monsell

1930 OK 31, 285 P. 836, 142 Okla. 130, 1930 Okla. LEXIS 79
CourtSupreme Court of Oklahoma
DecidedJanuary 14, 1930
DocketNo. 20295
StatusPublished
Cited by19 cases

This text of 1930 OK 31 (In Re Monsell) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Oklahoma primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In Re Monsell, 1930 OK 31, 285 P. 836, 142 Okla. 130, 1930 Okla. LEXIS 79 (Okla. 1930).

Opinion

E.M. Monsell and George Magnien protested certain tax levies made by the excise board of Tulsa county for the fiscal year beginning July 1, 1928, as illegal and excessive. An appeal was taken by protestants from the judgment of the Court of Tax Review.

Protestants present two proposition, which we will consider in the inverse order of their presentation.

The second proposition is:

"The taxing officials, without any authority of law, arbitrarily added 10 per cent. of the amounts to be received from 1/4 mill state levy, gross production tax, gasoline excise tax and automobile license tax, and levied a tax therefor which resulted in an excessive levy of .2578 mill, which should be abated."

Where the estimated income to the county highway fund, together with the balance on hand in that fund, is sufficient to supply the needs of that fund, no tax levy is necessary for that fund, and a tax levy is required only where the balance on hand, together with the estimated income from other sources than ad valorem taxation, is sufficient to meet the needs of that fund. El Reno Wholesale Grocery Co. v. Taylor,87 Okla. 140, 209 P. 749; Hines v. Dalton, 90 Okla. 239, 217 P. 168. Where the estimated needs of the county highway fund are in excess of the amount of the balance on hand and the estimated income from sources other than ad valorem taxation, the excess can be supplied only by a tax levy. When a tax levy is necessary to be made, it may be made only in the manner provided by sections 9698 and 9699, C. O. S. 1921, which require an addition of 10 per cent. for delinquencies. That addition must be made without regard to the amount or the source of the estimated income from sources other than for ad valorem taxation.

The record in this case shows the balance on hand and the estimated income from other sources was not sufficient for the needs of the county highway fund and a tax levy was necessary for that fund. The amount of the levy was properly computed, and there was no error on the part of the Court of Tax Review. Its judgment on the second proposition is affirmed.

The first proposition is:

"It is the duty of the taxing officials in computing the tax levy for the ensuing fiscal year to make a true balance sheet statement as of June 30th for the preceding year, and in computing the assets to the credit of any particular fund they must ascertain the correct amount of surplus revenue or levy on hand, including taxes in process of collection, and before making their final tax levy they must deduct from the requirements the true amount of surplus on hand, including the correct amount of taxes in process of collection, and if their failure to make the reduction results in an understatement of the surplus and therefore an overstatement of the tax requirement, the taxpayer can recover on account of the excessive levy thereby caused.

"In this case the taxing officials arbitrarily *Page 132 and without cause failed to consider the proper amount of taxes in process of collection available, thereby understated the true surplus, and caused an excessive levy of .254 mill."

It is contended by the protestants that the financial statement and estimate shows approximately $60,000 of taxes in process of collection and that this item was not considered by the excise board in making the levies for the county highway fund. This court in Albrecht v. Jones, 130 Okla. 277,267 P. 270, held that the taxes in process of collection for the year in which the financial statement was made must be included and that the taxes in process of collection for prior years should not be included. The financial statement shows a net balance of $951.32 in this fund for the current year and protestants contend that this is erroneous in that $60,521.89, being 10 per cent. added for delinquent ad valorem taxes, was unlawfully deducted, and that a portion of that amount should have been considered as a "balance of levy." The appropriation for the preceding year was $605,218.95, to which was added 10 per cent., making a total of $665,740.84, and after the deduction of the balance on hand and estimated income for that year there was left a balance of $167,345.80, for which a tax levy was made. Protestants contend that 10 per cent. should not have been added to the "balance on hand and estimated income from other sources" at the beginning of the fiscal year, and that if the 10 per cent. had not been added to the balance on hand and estimated income, the deduction would not have been $60,521.89, but would have been only $15,213.25.

The theory outlined by protestants sounds reasonable, but when the rule announced in Albrecht v. Jones, supra, and the rule announced on the second proposition presented herein are applied thereto, the theory cannot be sustained.

As hereinbefore stated, in computing the amount of the tax levy, 10, per cent. must be added. That 10 per cent. must be deducted from the amount of uncollected taxes at the end of the year in order to ascertain the "surplus of revenue and levy" on hand for the next fiscal year. The addition of the 10 per cent. for delinquencies is justifiable only on the theory that approximately that proportion of the tax will not be collected during the fiscal year. An appropriation is made and indebtedness is authorized to be contracted to the amount of that appropriation. If the tax levy produced only an amount equal to that appropriated, failure to pay taxes would result in lawful indebtedness with no funds for the payment thereof. The 10 per cent. is added so that the tax levy will produce an amount 10 per cent. in excess of the amount of the appropriation to the end that there may be collected sufficient funds to pay the legal indebtedness. It would be a strange thing to permit the inclusion of this 10 per cent. in making the levy on the theory that it would not be collected and then at the end of the fiscal year estimate that it would be collected. That method of accounting would result in showing a surplus that did not exist. Of course, if any part of the 10 per cent. has been collected, it would appear as cash and not as uncollected taxes.

Section 9699, C. O. S. 1921, in so far as it is applicable to the question presented, provides:

"The excise board * * * after deducting from the total so computed the amount of any surplus balance of revenue or levy, ascertained to be on hand from the previous fiscal year or years, together with the amount of the probable income of each from all sources other than ad valorem taxation, * * *"

— and this court in construing that section, in Albrecht v. Jones, supra, held that the language "surplus balance" means "surplus balance estimated to be on hand." We cannot omit the word "surplus" from either this decision or the statute. It has a fixed and definite meaning, and was used advisedly. We hold that the word "surplus," as used in the statute, means an amount in excess of the legal indebtedness contracted during the previous fiscal year or years. If there remains no amount in excess of the legal indebtedness so contracted, there is no surplus.

When a valid appropriation is made, contracts may be entered into for the purpose for which the appropriation was made, aggregating an amount not in excess thereof. Threadgill v. Peterson, 95 Okla. 187, 219 P. 389. These contracts must be settled from that appropriation, and they cannot be carried over and paid from an appropriation for a subsequent year. Gulf Pipe Line Co. v. County Treasurer, 110 Okla. 163,

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Bluebook (online)
1930 OK 31, 285 P. 836, 142 Okla. 130, 1930 Okla. LEXIS 79, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-monsell-okla-1930.