In re M.J.

Opinion

COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA

IN RE M.J., ET AL. :

: No. 116380 Minor Children :

:

[Appeal by S.J., Mother] :

JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION

JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED

RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: September 3, 2026

Civil Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas Juvenile Division

Case Nos. AD23905105 and AD23905106

Appearances:

Sylvester Summers, Jr., Co., LPA and Sylvester Summers, Jr., for appellant.

Michael C. O’Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting Attorney, and Joseph C. Young, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee CCDCFS.

EILEEN T. GALLAGHER, P.J.:

Appellant S.J. (“Mother”) challenges the judgment of the juvenile court terminating her parental rights and awarding permanent custody of her children, M.J.1 and M.J.2 (both d.o.b. 7/13/2018), to the Cuyahoga County Division of

Children and Family Services (“CCDCFS” or “agency”). She raises one assignment of error for our review:

The trial court erred in awarding permanent custody to the CCDCFS as the CCDCFS failed to show by clear and convincing evidence that adequate grounds existed for a grant of permanent custody and therefore such decision was contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence.

After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we find that the juvenile court’s decision was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. We overrule Mother’s sole assignment of error and affirm the judgment of the juvenile court.

I. Factual and Procedural History A complaint by CCDCFS was filed on April 27, 2023, alleging that the children were dependent and seeking temporary custody of them. The complaint alleged that Mother had mental-health issues that interfered with her ability to care for the children.1 It further stated that Mother recently had a mental-health crisis that required her to be hospitalized and that police had to intervene on multiple occasions. In addition, the complaint noted that the home in which the children resided with Mother was unsanitary and lacked adequate food.

A hearing was held where Mother appeared and stipulated to the amended allegations of the complaint. The children were adjudicated to be

1 Paternity has never been established with the alleged father of the children; this appeal relates solely to Mother.

dependent. They were later committed to the temporary custody of the agency; the temporary-custody orders were extended twice.

CCDCFS eventually moved to modify temporary custody to permanent custody of the children. The court held a hearing before a magistrate on the agency’s motion for permanent custody. CCDCFS presented the testimony of the caseworker assigned to the matter, Valerie Goodrum (“Goodrum”).

Goodrum was assigned to the case in May 2023. (Tr. 9.) A month prior, one of Mother’s neighbors had called the police to report that Mother was having a manic episode. (Tr. 11.) The police arrived and observed the condition of Mother’s residence — there was spoiled food on the tables, the house had a foul odor, and bottles of alcohol were seen around the home. (Id.) At the time the police were there, Mother was unconscious outside of the home. (Id.)

The children were placed in the emergency custody of the agency in April 2023; they have remained in agency custody since that time. (Id.) A case plan was developed for Mother that included services for substance abuse, mental health, parenting, along with basic needs of housing and income. (Tr. 13.)

Mother engaged in substance-abuse services twice; she received a certificate in July 2023. (Tr. 32.) In October or November 2024, Mother had a mental-health crisis, and when agency representatives went to her house, they saw wine bottles on the floor. (Tr. 57.) She had not engaged in treatment since April 2024. (Tr. 19.) After Mother reengaged with treatment in May 2025, she was supposed to attend group and individual counseling at The Centers, but she was

“sporadic” with her involvement. (Tr. 14 and 32.). Per her case plan, Mother was to abstain from using alcohol and drugs, but she disclosed occasional alcohol use. (Tr. 34 and 51.) She tested positive for alcohol approximately six weeks prior to the trial but subsequently tested negative. (Tr. 17 and 33.) Goodrum asked Mother via text message to screen for alcohol each month from May 2025 through October 2025. (Tr. 52-53.) She finally did so in November 2025. (Tr. 52.) Goodrum stated that it had been recommended that Mother engage in “a higher level of treatment, which is inpatient.” (Tr. 14.)

Mother was diagnosed with bipolar disorder and alcohol-use disorder.

(Tr. 15.) Mother received medication via monthly injections at The Centers for her bipolar disorder. (Tr. 35-36.) Goodrum was uncertain as to whether Mother was still attending mental-health counseling sessions at The Centers because she had only received an update regarding substance abuse, not Mother’s mental health. (Tr. 36-37.)

Mother had been in consistent housing since 2023. (Tr. 38.) The Centers had provided Mother with new furniture, including bunk beds; however, Mother was struggling with basic needs including obtaining food and household supplies. (Tr. 22 and 38.) Goodrum stated that she had not been inside the home since September 2024 because Mother had not allowed her to enter. (Tr. 22.) At the visitation that had occurred the day before trial, the children stated that they wanted to go home with Mother. (Tr. 22.) Goodrum said that she would be willing to go to Mother’s home but Mother declined. (Id.)

Mother completed parenting classes through The Centers and had a supportive visitation coach, but Goodrum testified that there had been no change in Mother’s parenting. (Tr. 19-20 and 40.) Mother did several virtual visits with the children, but she was supposed to have in-person visitation with them every other week on Mondays at a library for two hours. (Tr. 23.) Mother visited the children in person once in October 2024 and not again until November 2025. (Tr. 24 and 55.) During this time, Mother was “absent from the children’s life.” (Tr. 24.) At the first visit after the long absence, in November 2024, Mother did not have any food for the children and did not have money to procure any food. (Tr. 23.)

In November 2024, M.J.2 was hospitalized for two weeks for respiratory issues; Mother did not visit her at the hospital. (Tr. 55.) The agency did not hear from Mother again until May 2025. (Tr. 55-56.) Goodrum testified that prior to her extended absence Mother had been doing “really well” and was going to be moved to “the next level of unsupervised visitation.” (Tr. 56.)

The children had initially been placed in the care of their maternal uncle; however, the agency later substantiated that physical abuse had occurred by the uncle against one of the children. (Tr. 26.) The agency was concerned that Mother had minimized the physical abuse when one of the children had asked about the uncle during a visit. (Tr. 27.) The children were later placed with a teacher but that placement was disrupted because of concern over certain sexual behaviors and severe emotional-behavioral issues. (Tr. 45-46.) When asked if the agency had identified other relatives as possible caregivers, Goodrum stated that the children’s grandmother had approached the agency and said she was willing to care for them. (Tr. 29.) However, the grandmother lives out of state and resides in a senior-living apartment building that would not permit her to have the children. (Tr. 29-30.)

At the time of trial, the children were residing in separate foster homes along with other unrelated children. (Tr. 27 and 42.) Goodrum testified that they both “have severe behavior problems . . . exhibit sexual behaviors . . . [and] have cognitive delays.” (Tr. 27.) Both children have also been diagnosed with PTSD, ADHD, and autism. (Tr. 27-28.) Because of their behaviors and needs, the agency was unable to find a placement that would take both children. (Tr. 28.) Goodrum was asked if there was concern about placing the children with foster placements that had other children. (Tr. 46.) Goodrum testified that there was no concern because the issue had been identified before they had been placed and that the foster parents were aware of the children’s past behaviors and knew “what to look for.” (Tr. 46.)

Goodrum was also asked how the children have adjusted and how they were doing in their foster homes. She stated that M.J.1 was doing well, progressing, and thriving. (Tr. 28.) M.J.2 initially had an issue where she attacked her teacher at her new school, but she had not had trouble since then and had been doing really well. (Id.) The children have appointments for therapy and services along with meetings about their Individualized Education Plans (“IEP”) that Mother had never attended, although Goodrum testified that the agency had not communicated the appointments to Mother. (Tr. 29 and 49.)

M.J.1 is deaf in both ears and uses hearing aids; M.J.2 is hearing impaired in her right ear but did not qualify for a hearing aid. (Tr. 47.) Both children are supposed to wear glasses but do not always wear them. (Id.) Speech therapy is going to be added to their IEPs. (Tr. 47-48.)

Goodrum stated that if permanent custody were granted to the agency, there would be “immediate” placement changes for the children because the agency would want them to stay together. (Tr. 30.) Goodrum testified that, at the time of trial, Mother had not remedied the conditions that led to the removal of the children and that she could not provide a safe, stable, and permanent home. (Id.)

Mother did not present any evidence or testimony.

The guardian ad litem (“GAL”) submitted a report recommending permanent custody to the agency. In her report, she noted that the children were unable to clearly express their wishes related to custody but that they both had expressed a desire to remain in their foster placements.

At the end of the hearing, the GAL reiterated the recommendation from her report, stating:

While mother has worked to engage in services, I think it’s been a real struggle for her. She very much loves her children. I saw them recently in a visit. And she was able to engage appropriately with them, brought an activity, brought appropriate food for them, so that they could engage. They were — the visit actually occurred at a library on the west side.

Unfortunately, because of some of the struggles mother has had and the experiences these two children have had, they can’t even at this point in time be placed together because of their interaction and the potential for physical harm to the children.

So at this point they are placed separately. And I think it would be very difficult to place them back with mother together when they can’t even be managed together with supportive services and other supports built around them to address their needs.

You know, mother has — I’ve know[n] mom for quite some time, this is not my first interaction with the family in this case. Mom does what she can, but unfortunately, with her mental health issues, it’s a real struggle for her. So at this point, I don’t think the children can safely be reunified in part because of their issues and mother’s issues.

I just — I know she’s tried, but it’s very — these are two challenging children now.

(Tr. 66.)

The magistrate issued decisions recommending that each child be placed in the permanent custody of CCDCFS. Mother filed objections to the decisions. The court overruled the objections and adopted the decision of the magistrate. Mother’s parental rights were terminated, and permanent custody of the children was awarded to the agency.

Mother then filed the instant appeal.

II. Law and Analysis

We take our responsibility in reviewing cases involving the termination of parental rights and the award of permanent custody very seriously. A parent has a “fundamental liberty interest . . . in the care, custody, and management of [his or her child].” Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982). The “‘termination of parental rights has been described as the family law equivalent of the death penalty in a criminal case.’” In re J.B., 2013-Ohio-1704, ¶ 66 (8th Dist.), quoting In re Hoffman, 2002-Ohio-5368, ¶ 14. Thus, “‘parents must be afforded every procedural and substantive protection the law allows.’” In re Hayes, 79 Ohio St.3d 46, 48 (1997), quoting In re Smith, 77 Ohio App.3d 1, 16 (6th Dist. 1991).

Nevertheless, a parent’s right to the care and custody of his or her child is not absolute. In re L.G., 2022-Ohio-529, ¶ 49 (8th Dist.). “‘The natural rights of a parent are always subject to the ultimate welfare of the child, which is the polestar or controlling principle to be observed.’” In re L.D., 2017-Ohio-1037, ¶ 29 (8th Dist.), quoting In re Cunningham, 59 Ohio St.2d 100, 106 (1979).

“‘All children have the right, if possible, to parenting from either natural or adoptive parents which provides support, care, discipline, protection and motivation.’” In re J.B. at ¶ 66, quoting In re Hitchcock, 120 Ohio App.3d 88, 102 (8th Dist. 1996). When parental rights are terminated, the goal is to create “a more stable life for the dependent children and to facilitate adoption to foster permanency for children.” In re N.B., 2015-Ohio-314, ¶ 67 (8th Dist.), citing In re Howard, 1986 Ohio App. LEXIS 7860, *5 (5th Dist. Aug. 1, 1986).

“‘Ohio statutes governing child custody and protection appropriately reflect the need to balance . . . [the] parents’ . . . interest in the custody, care, nurturing, and rearing of their own children, and the state’s parens patriae interest in providing for the security and welfare of children under its jurisdiction[.]’” In re P.S., 2023-Ohio-144, ¶ 26 (8th Dist.), quoting In re Thompson, 2001 Ohio App. LEXIS 1890, *19 (10th Dist. Apr. 26, 2001).

In her sole assignment of error, Mother argues that the trial court’s decision to terminate her parental rights and grant permanent custody of the children to the agency was not supported by clear and convincing evidence and was against the manifest weight of the evidence.

The Ohio Supreme Court has stated that “the sufficiency-of-the-

evidence and/or manifest-weight-of-the-evidence standards of review are the proper appellate standards of review of a juvenile court’s permanent-custody determination, as appropriate depending on the nature of the arguments that are presented by the parties.” In re Z.C., 2023-Ohio-4703, ¶ 11.

When reviewing for manifest weight, the appellate court must weigh the evidence and all reasonable inferences, consider the credibility of the witnesses, and determine whether, in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the finder of fact clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the judgment must be reversed and a new trial ordered. [Eastley v. Volkman, 2012-Ohio-2179, ¶ 20.] “In weighing the evidence, the court of appeals must always be mindful of the presumption in favor of the finder of fact.” Id. at ¶ 21. “The underlying rationale of giving deference to the findings of the trial court rests with the knowledge that the trial judge is best able to view the witnesses and observe their demeanor, gestures and voice inflections, and use these observations in weighing the credibility of the proffered testimony.” Seasons Coal Co., Inc. v. Cleveland, 10 Ohio St.3d 77, 80 (1984). “‘If the evidence is susceptible of more than one construction, the reviewing court is bound to give it that interpretation which is consistent with the verdict and judgment, most favorable to sustaining the verdict and judgment.’” Id. at fn. 3, quoting 5 Ohio Jurisprudence 3d, Appellate Review, Section 603, at 191-192 (1978).

Id. at ¶ 14.

R.C. 2151.414 provides a two-prong analysis to be applied by the juvenile court in adjudicating a motion for permanent custody. In re S.C., 2018-

Ohio-2523, ¶ 20 (8th Dist.), citing R.C. 2151.414(B). The first prong authorizes the juvenile court to grant permanent custody of a child to the public agency if, after a hearing, the court determines, by clear and convincing evidence, that any of the following factors apply: (a) the child is not abandoned or orphaned, but the child cannot be placed with either parent within a reasonable time or should not be placed with the child’s parents; (b) the child is abandoned; (c) the child is orphaned, and there are no relatives of the child who are able to take permanent custody; (d) the child has been in the temporary custody of one or more public children services agencies or private child placing agencies for 12 or more months of a consecutive 22- month period; or (e) the child or another child in the custody of the parent or parents from whose custody the child has been removed has been adjudicated an abused, neglected, or dependent child on three separate occasions by any court in this state or another state. R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a)-(e). “Only one of the factors must be present to satisfy the first prong of the two-part analysis for granting permanent custody to an agency.” In re D.H., 2021-Ohio-3821, ¶ 27 (8th Dist.), citing In re L.W., 2017- Ohio-657, ¶ 28 (8th Dist.).

Under the second prong of R.C. 2151.414, when any one of the above factors exists, the juvenile court must then analyze whether, by clear and convincing evidence, it is in the best interest of the child to grant permanent custody to the agency pursuant to R.C. 2151.414(D). “‘Clear and convincing evidence’ is evidence that ‘will produce in the mind of the trier of facts a firm belief or conviction as to the allegations sought to be established.’” In re T.B., 2014-Ohio-2051, ¶ 28 (8th Dist.), quoting Cross v. Ledford, 161 Ohio St. 469, 477 (1954).

A. First Prong – R.C. 2151.414(B)

With regard to the first prong of the permanent-custody analysis, the court determined that the children were abandoned and had been in the custody of the agency for 12 or more months of a consecutive 22-month period.

Mother does not dispute these findings, and they are supported by the record — at the time of trial in December 2025, the children had continuously been in custody of the agency since July 2023. Further, Mother was absent from the children’s lives from October 2024 to November 2025. Under R.C. 2151.011(C), “a child shall be presumed abandoned when the parents of the child have failed to visit or maintain contact with the child for more than ninety days, regardless of whether the parents resume contact with the child after that period of ninety days.”

The court further made findings that Mother failed to remedy the conditions that caused the removal of the children and demonstrated a lack of commitment to the children. Mother contends that these findings were not based upon all of the competent, credible evidence presented. She argues that she had substantially completed her case-plan services, including those related to substance abuse and parenting. She also asserts that her bipolar disorder has been properly addressed with medication and that she has had consistent housing since 2023. Mother further maintains that she has been visiting with the children and that they want to live with her.

We cannot find that Mother has “substantially” completed her case plan. Regardless, significant or even substantial compliance with case-plan services is not, in and of itself, “dispositive” and “does not preclude a grant of permanent custody to a social services agency.” In re J.B., 2013-Ohio-1704, at ¶ 90 (8th Dist.), citing In re C.C., 2010-Ohio-780, ¶ 25 (8th Dist.); see also In re R.D., 2022-Ohio- 4519, ¶ 59 (8th Dist.). Simply because a parent completes the services identified in a case plan does not mean he or she has achieved the objectives of the case plan related to those services or has substantially remedied the conditions that caused the child to be removed from the home. In re J.B. at ¶ 90. “‘The issue is not whether the parent has substantially complied with the case plan, but whether the parent has substantially remedied the conditions that caused the child’s removal.’” Id., quoting In re McKenzie, 1995 Ohio App. LEXIS 4618, *11 (9th Dist. Oct. 18, 1995). Thus, even if Mother had completed her case plan, such a plan is “a means to a goal, but not the goal itself.” In re C.C., 2010-Ohio-780, ¶ 25 (8th Dist.).

Nevertheless, because only one factor is needed, and it is undisputed that the children had been in agency custody for 12 of the last 22 months, we need not address the court’s other findings. We find that the first prong of the two-part analysis is satisfied.

B. Second Prong – Best Interest of the Child Having determined that competent and credible evidence existed to support the first prong, we now turn to the second prong of our analysis. This prong requires the court to determine, by clear and convincing evidence, whether the order granting permanent custody of the children to the agency pursuant to R.C. 2151.414(D) is in the children’s best interest.

In determining the best interest of the children under R.C. 2151.414(D)(1), the juvenile court must consider all relevant factors, including but not limited to (1) the interaction and interrelationship of the children with the children’s parents, siblings, relatives, foster parents, and out-of-home providers, and any other person who may significantly affect the children; (2) the wishes of the children as expressed directly by the children or through the children’s GAL; (3) the custodial history of the children; (4) the children’s need for a legally secure placement and whether that type of placement can be achieved without a grant of permanent custody to the agency; and (5) whether any factors in R.C. 2151.414(E)(7) through (11) are applicable.

Although a trial court is required to consider each of the R.C. 2151.414(D)(1) factors in making its permanent-custody determination, “[t]here is not one element that is given greater weight than the others pursuant to the statute.” In re Schaefer, 2006-Ohio-5513, ¶ 56. Moreover, only one factor needs to be resolved in favor of permanent custody in order to find that permanent custody is in the children’s best interest. In re S.C., 2015-Ohio-2410, ¶ 30 (8th Dist.), citing In re Moore, 2000 Ohio App. LEXIS 3958 (8th Dist. Aug. 31, 2000), citing In re Shaeffer Children, 85 Ohio App.3d 683 (3d Dist. 1993).

R.C. 2151.414(D)(1) does not require a juvenile court to expressly discuss each of the best-interest factors in R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(a) through (e).

“Consideration is all the statute requires.” In re A.M., 2020-Ohio-5102, ¶ 31. And, as previously stated, only one factor needs to be resolved in favor of permanent custody in order to find that permanent custody is in the child’s best interest.

Here, the juvenile court indicated that it had considered the (D)(1)

factors in determining that permanent custody was in the best interest of the children. The court ultimately found that the children’s return to Mother’s home would be contrary to their best interest and that they needed a permanent, safe, and secure environment. Specifically, the court found that the children could not be placed with Mother within a reasonable time or should not be placed with her.

Mother does not dispute any specific finding regarding the children’s best interest and essentially just argues that she could have provided a stable environment for the children if she had had more time. We note that the record does not reflect that Mother sought an additional extension of temporary custody; regardless, more time was not an option in this matter. “R.C. 2151.415(D)(4) prevents a court from ordering temporary custody to continue beyond two years after the date on which the complaint was filed.” In re A.C., 2026-Ohio-1661, ¶ 52 (8th Dist.). The complaint in this matter was filed on April 27, 2023. Thus, at the time of trial, the children been in temporary custody for over two and a half years.

Our review of the record reveals that the children had been doing well in their respective foster placements. They provide a supportive environment for them, particularly considering the physical and emotional needs of each child. In addition, the record does not reflect that Mother has remedied the issues that caused the children’s removal, and their return to her home would not be in their best interest.

Following careful consideration of the evidence presented at the permanent-custody hearing, we cannot find that the juvenile court erred in concluding that granting permanent custody of the children to the agency was in their best interest.

We cannot say that the juvenile court lost its way in its resolution of evidentiary conflicts and created a manifest miscarriage of justice. The juvenile court’s judgment entry granting permanent custody of the children to the agency reflects that the court properly considered the factors outlined in R.C. 2151.414(D)(1), and the court’s findings are supported by competent, credible evidence.

Mother’s sole assignment of error is overruled, and the judgment of the juvenile court is affirmed.

It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed.

The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the common pleas court, juvenile division, to carry this judgment into execution.

A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

EILEEN T. GALLAGHER, PRESIDING JUDGE

ANITA LASTER MAYS, J., and KATHLEEN ANN KEOUGH, J., CONCUR