In re Milland

146 Misc. 2d 1, 548 N.Y.S.2d 995, 1989 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 800
CourtNew York City Family Court
DecidedDecember 8, 1989
StatusPublished
Cited by4 cases

This text of 146 Misc. 2d 1 (In re Milland) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering New York City Family Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In re Milland, 146 Misc. 2d 1, 548 N.Y.S.2d 995, 1989 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 800 (N.Y. Super. Ct. 1989).

Opinion

[3]*3OPINION OF THE COURT

Jeffry H. Gallet, J.

This child protective proceeding concerns an infant who was born suffering from Fetal Alcohol Syndrome (F.A.S.). At issue is whether a mother’s conduct prior to the birth of a special needs child may provide an evidentiary basis for a determination of neglect and if isolated, but uncontroverted, evidence of a father’s misuse of alcohol is sufficient to prove his potential for harmful behavior and establish neglect of that child.

THE FACTS

Natasha was born on January 11, 1989 and transferred to the Beth Israel Medical Center (B.I.M.C.) for treatment, suffering from F.A.S. That diagnosis is based, according to the testimony by Dr. Steven Kandall, a pediatrician at B.I.M.C. with a specialty in neonatology and extensive experience with drug- and alcohol-damaged babies, on the identification of a symptom in each of three groups — prenatal and postnatal growth problems, congenital malformations and psychoneurological behavioral dysfunction. Natasha’s low birth weight of 1,800 grams has been followed by continued poor growth and development. She suffers some facial malformations, a small head and congenital heart disease, all symptoms from the second group. Her psychoneurological dysfunction is extreme irritability — one of the worst cases that Dr. Kandall had ever seen. The child does not allow herself to be handled and she does not suck. Tube feedings were the only available means of nutrition for the child at the age of eight months.

Dr. Kandall testified that F.A.S. is caused by a woman’s consumption of alcohol during pregnancy, either by episodic binge drinking or the regular intake of 2 to 3 ounces of alcohol per day. He attributed the baby’s congenital malformations to the mother’s intake of alcohol during the first trimester and the infant’s psychoneurological behavior to alcohol consumption by her mother in the second and third trimesters of pregnancy. The mother’s own testimony confirms substantial alcohol use during those periods.

Natasha has significant special needs and requires a very supportive environment upon release from the hospital. Dr. Kandall opined a need for positive interaction with her caretakers, continuing rehabilitation therapy and medication for a very serious heart lesion. The caretakers would also need training in helping the child to develop her oral reflexes so [4]*4she can learn to eat normally and until that is achieved the caretakers would be required to continue tubal feeding. Because of her F.A.S., she has very specific special needs. Her caretakers must be sufficiently able, sufficiently organized, and sufficiently alert to meet those needs or the child will be at risk of substantial, if not fatal, injury.

The doctor’s prognosis for the child was guarded. He considered it likely that Natasha would suffer moderate retardation and have a need for open heart surgery.

This neglect petition was filed against the baby’s parents after a report of suspected child neglect was filed by a B.I.M.C. social worker, citing the postbirth admission of daily use of alcohol by both the mother and father.

Neither parent was enrolled in a rehabilitation program at the time of the filing of the petition.

ARGUMENTS

Petitioner argues that both parents misused alcohol to the point of the loss of control of their actions and that they present an imminent risk of impairment to the child because of their inability to provide proper supervision. (Family Ct Act § 1012 [¶] [i] [B].) The parents both maintain that the petitioner has failed to produce evidence of the misuse of alcohol that could be expected to create a loss of self-control.

Respondent father cites his never having the care or custody of the child and argues that testimony regarding two isolated incidents of inappropriate use of alcohol is insufficient to prove neglect. He relies on the hospital social worker’s negative response to whether she observed that the father was disoriented at the hospital interview to argue that petitioner has failed to show neglect by not establishing the father suffered a substantial state of stupor, unconsciousness, intoxication, disorientation or substantial impairment of judgment.

The respondent mother notes that most of the evidence before me of her misuse of alcohol refers to prenatal drinking. She argues that the statutory indicators of neglect must be pleaded and proved and cannot be presumed on the basis of her prenatal drinking. She maintains that the actual harm to the child was the result of prenatal conduct and that the petitioner has failed to connect that behavior with conduct that presently places the child at risk, citing Matter of Fletcher (141 Misc 2d 333 [Fam Ct, Bronx County 1988]) and [5]*5Matter of "Male” R. (102 Misc 2d 1 [Fam Ct, Kings County 1979]).

The Law Guardian argues that the same two cases, in effect, support a finding of the mother’s continued misuse of alcohol to an extent that she would place the child in imminent danger of impairment. In addition, the Law Guardian believes that proof of the mother’s failure to exercise a minimum degree of care during her pregnancy, that is her continued drinking, causing the physical, mental and emotional impairments to the child of F.A.S., also establish her neglect.

THE LAW

In General

Soon after her birth, Natasha was transferred to the Neonatal Intensive Care Unit (I.C.U.) at B.I.M.C. She remains in the Neonatal I.C.U. and has never been under the care or custody of either parent. This circumstance, however, does not effect whether a neglect finding can be made based on the potential for harm to a child that a parent’s behavior currently presents. (Family Ct Act § 1012 [¶] [i].)

As this court noted in Fletcher (supra, at 335): “[A]ctual custody of a child is not always required to find child neglect. For example, a failure to exercise a minimum degree of care may be established upon proof of the abuse or neglect of a sibling (Matter of Christina Maria C., 89 AD2d 855 [2d Dept 1982]; Family Ct Act § 1046 [a] [i]); or the developmental disabilities of the child (Matter of Alfredo HH., 84 AD2d 860 [3d Dept 1981]); or a parent’s incapacitating mental illness (Matter of Eugene G., 76 AD2d 781 [1st Dept 1980]). Nor would actual custody be necessary where there is proof of regular and excessive drug use before and after birth, in combination with the statutory evidentiary rule that repeated misuse of a drug or alcohol, to an extent that would be expected to produce an inability to provide supervision and care, establishes a prima facie case of neglect. (Matter of 'Male’ R., 102 Misc 2d 1 [Fam Ct, Kings County 1979]; Family Ct Act Section 1046 [a] [iii].)”

The Family Court Act defines a neglected child in relevant part as one:

“whose physical, mental or emotional condition has been impaired or is in imminent danger of becoming impaired as a result of the failure of his parent * * * to exercise a minimum degree of care * * *

[6]*6“(B) in providing the child with proper supervision or guardianship * * * or by misusing alcoholic beverages to the extent that he loses self-control of his actions”. (Family Ct Act § 1012 [¶] [i]; emphasis added.)

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Related

Matter of Sayeh R.
693 N.E.2d 724 (New York Court of Appeals, 1997)
Alfredo S. v. Nassau County Department of Social Services
172 A.D.2d 528 (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, 1991)
In re Tyesha C.
157 A.D.2d 322 (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, 1990)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
146 Misc. 2d 1, 548 N.Y.S.2d 995, 1989 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 800, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-milland-nycfamct-1989.