In Re: Mh 2025-012702

Opinion

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

IN RE: MH 2025-012702

No. 1 CA-MH 26-0022

FILED 09-10-2026

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County No. MH 2025-012702

The Honorable Terri L. Clarke, Judge Pro Tempore

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Maricopa County Legal Defender’s Office, Phoenix By Lindsay Ficklin and D. Tyler Hodgin Counsel for Appellant

Maricopa County Attorney’s Office, Phoenix By Sean M. Moore Counsel for Appellee

Decision of the Court

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Presiding Judge Veronika Fabian delivered the decision of the Court, in which Judge Kent E. Cattani and Judge Michael S. Catlett joined.

F A B I A N, Judge:

¶1 R.L. appeals from the superior court’s order for mental health treatment. She argues that one of the witnesses (a social worker) who testified at her hearing did not qualify under A.R.S. § 36-539 as someone who was “acquainted with” the patient at the time of an alleged mental disorder. But the statute also expressly permits testimony from someone who has “observed” the patient, and there is no question that the social worker satisfied that requirement. Accordingly, we affirm the superior court’s order.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶2 In December 2025, R.L. was in a medical facility, but refusing mental health evaluation and treatment. A psychiatric mental health nurse practitioner at the medical facility petitioned the superior court for a court- ordered evaluation of R.L. under A.R.S. § 36-523. The petition alleged that R.L. was a danger to self, a danger to others, and persistently or acutely disabled. The petition stated R.L. was unwilling and unable to undergo voluntary evaluation. At the same time, a case manager at the medical facility filed an application for involuntary evaluation of R.L. under A.R.S. § 36-520. The court granted the petition and ordered the detention and involuntary evaluation of R.L., who was then transferred to a hospital for evaluation.

¶3 Later that month, one of R.L.’s evaluating physicians filed a petition for court-ordered treatment under A.R.S. § 36-533. The physician concluded that R.L. was persistently or acutely disabled, and opined that the superior court should, after giving notice and holding a hearing, order treatment. The physician also reported that R.L.’s pre-petition drug screening returned positive for methamphetamine and amphetamines. The physician attached an affidavit to the petition, in which he gave R.L. a “probable” diagnosis of “Bipolar 1 Disorder, Manic, Severe with Psychosis.” The physician reported R.L. as voicing delusional content during his interview with her, noting R.L.’s belief she might be pregnant or

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might have had a baby who was being concealed from her and that she had been poisoned while previously serving a term in prison. A second physician attached an affidavit diagnosing R.L. with schizoaffective disorder and concluding court-ordered treatment was necessary. Like the first evaluating physician, the second physician reported that R.L. had said “she thought maybe in October she had the Cartel’s baby,” and had gone on tangents and was “flighty in her ideas.”

¶4 In January 2026, the superior court held a hearing on the petition for court-ordered treatment. At the hearing, the parties stipulated to the admissibility of the affidavits of both physicians. Two additional witnesses testified at the hearing: a licensed social worker and a registered nurse.

¶5 Before the hearing, R.L. filed a motion to preclude the social worker’s testimony, claiming, among other things, that the social worker was not eligible to testify under A.R.S. § 36-539(B) because she was functionally part of the evaluation process. The court denied the motion and the social worker testified.

¶6 The social worker explained that she worked as a crisis interventionist at the hospital where R.L. was being evaluated when she met with R.L. twice on the same day. The social worker clarified that the meetings with R.L. were strictly for the purpose of pre-petition assessment of R.L.’s mental health. The social worker noted that she relied on her skills as a licensed social worker to identify any signs and symptoms of a mental disorder while assessing R.L.

¶7 The social worker then testified as to her personal observations of R.L. In their first meeting, R.L. inquired whether she was pregnant. When the social worker told her she was not, R.L. said she did not believe her and she was going to continue taking prenatal vitamins. R.L. then told the social worker she no longer wished to speak with her, so the social worker left.

¶8 During their second meeting, R.L. quickly became irritable when the social worker did not immediately begin writing down what R.L. was saying. R.L. asked when she would be leaving, and the social worker responded that R.L. would not be leaving because there were concerns about her mental health. R.L. started getting angry and yelling and then got up from her bed and began approaching the social worker. At that point, the social worker ended the interview, even though she had not been able to ask R.L. about her mental health or medication history.

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¶9 The registered nurse’s testimony followed. After considering the doctors’ affidavits and the testimony, the court found by clear and convincing evidence that R.L. was suffering from a mental disorder and that she was persistently or acutely disabled as a result. The court further found that R.L. was either unwilling or unable to voluntarily accept mental health treatment and therefore ordered R.L. undergo an inpatient and outpatient treatment program not to exceed 365 days, with inpatient treatment not to exceed 180 days.

¶10 R.L. timely appealed from the court’s order for treatment. We have jurisdiction under Article VI, Section 9 of the Arizona Constitution and A.R.S. §§ 12-120.21(A)(1), 12-2101(A)(10)(a), and 36-546.01.

DISCUSSION

¶11 R.L. contends that under A.R.S. § 36-539(B), the social worker was not “acquainted” with R.L. and therefore not a qualified witness. Therefore, she concludes, the court order for treatment violated her due process rights. R.L. does not make a due process argument independent of the requirements of the statute. Witness eligibility under A.R.S. § 36-539(B) is a question of law we review de novo. See In re MH2023-004502, 261 Ariz. 342, 346 ¶ 12 (2026).

¶12 On a petition for court-ordered treatment, the evidence shall include, along with testimony of evaluating health professionals:

the testimony of two or more witnesses, regardless of the witnesses’ professional licensure, if any, who observed or were acquainted with the patient at the time of the alleged mental disorder before the submission of the current application for evaluation pursuant to § 36-520 or, if after the submission of the current application, who were not formal participants in the evaluation process. The testimony of the witnesses shall be limited to observed facts and may not include expert opinion or conclusions.

A.R.S. § 36-539(B).

¶13 R.L. maintains that to be “acquainted” with a patient “requires more than merely being uninvolved in a commitment evaluation,” and “requires some knowledge and familiarity with a patient different from what the evaluator witnesses can provide.” R.L. asserts the social worker “lacked the level of acquaintance necessary to serve as acquaintance witnesses given her limited contact and testimony” about R.L.

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and that the social worker’s testimony “failed to offer the informal, day-today observation” required by the statute.

¶14 But the plain language of the statute does not require this. In fact, the term “acquaintance witness” is now a misnomer given the recent amendments to the statute in 2025. See 2025 Ariz. Sess. Laws, ch. 20, § 1 (1st Reg. Sess.) (S.B. 1354). The statute now permits, in the disjunctive, witnesses “who observed or were acquainted with the patient at the time of the alleged mental disorder.” Id. (emphasis added). Thus, under the current version of the statute, which was in effect at the time of the underlying proceedings, it is sufficient for the witness to have “observed” the patient.

¶15 Here, the social worker “observed” R.L. and her testimony was “limited to observed facts” that did not “include expert opinion or conclusions.” A.R.S. § 36-539(B). Thus, the social worker qualified under the statute to testify about her pre-petition observations of R.L.

¶16 R.L. relies heavily on definitions of “acquainted” derived from caselaw interpreting that requirement, such as In re Coconino Cnty. No. MH 1425, 181 Ariz. 290 (1995). Given the statutory amendments that added the “observed” language, that caselaw is of limited, if any, guidance.

¶17 Notably, the statute does not require that this observation occur for any specific length of time. “The key . . . is that acquaintance witnesses must have personal and relevant information as to whether the patient is suffering from a mental disorder.” In re MH2012-002480, 232 Ariz. 421, 423 ¶ 11 (App. 2013). Although increased interaction with a respondent in multiple contexts provides a basis for giving a witness’s testimony more weight, the statute does not require a specific level of interaction. See MH 2008-002596, 223 Ariz. 32, 37 ¶ 19 (time spent gathering information goes to weight of testimony rather than admissibility).

¶18 R.L. argues that the language of the statute shows that “acquaintance witness testimony differs in nature from the expert testimony to be provided by the evaluator witnesses,” and because “acquaintance witnesses are meant to offer lay testimony based on observations of the patient uncolored by any expertise,” such witnesses must “offer testimony distinct from the physicians and relevant to a patient’s mental health status at the time of the alleged mental disorder.” But R.L. does not point to specifics as to why the social worker’s testimony was not distinct from the evaluator’s testimony. Instead, she argues that to have distinct testimony, the witness must have observed her in “informal, day-to-day settings.” That is, the witness must offer testimony indicative of

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her everyday behavior. Again, the statute does not say that. And the caselaw interpreting “acquainted” to require such a perspective is irrelevant to the meaning of “observed.”

¶19 Finally, a review of the social worker’s testimony shows that it was distinct from that of the evaluators. The evaluators provided medical diagnoses and expert opinions based on their interviews with R.L. The social worker testified only to personal observations and reported R.L.’s questions, statements, and reactions outside of R.L.’s evaluation. These interactions, however brief, occurred outside the evaluation process and offered a sufficiently distinct perspective.

CONCLUSION

¶20 The social worker was eligible to testify under § 36-539(B). We affirm.

MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court FILED: JR