In re Memorial Medical Center, Inc.

337 B.R. 388, 2005 WL 3710624
CourtUnited States Bankruptcy Court, D. New Mexico
DecidedNovember 9, 2005
DocketNo. 7-05-14043 ML
StatusPublished

This text of 337 B.R. 388 (In re Memorial Medical Center, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Bankruptcy Court, D. New Mexico primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In re Memorial Medical Center, Inc., 337 B.R. 388, 2005 WL 3710624 (N.M. 2005).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM

MARK B. McFEELEY, Bankruptcy Judge.

THIS MATTER is before the Court on the Alleged Debtor Memorial Medical Center, Inc.’s Answer and Motion to Dismiss Involuntary Petition (“Motion to Dismiss”). Cardinal Health 301, Inc., Cardinal Health 303, Inc. and Toshiba American Medical Systems, Inc. (together, the “Petitioning Creditors”), filed a brief in opposition to the Motion to Dismiss, and Memorial Medical Center, Inc. (“MMCI”) filed a reply. The Court held a final hearing on the Motion to Dismiss and took the matter under advisement. MMCI is represented by Sutin, Thayer & Browne, A Professional Corporation (Gail Gottlieb), and the Petitioning Creditors are represented by Daniel J. Behles and by Shulman, Rogers, Gandal, Pordy & Ecker, P.A. (Ross D. Cooper). MMCI asserts that the involuntary petition should be dismissed because it is an eleemosynary institution not subject to an involuntary petition for bankruptcy under 11 U.S.C.- § 303. Petitioning Creditors contend that because MMCI is winding up its affairs, it is no longer operating as a non-profit organization, and consequently is not immune from involuntary bankruptcy. Having reviewed the briefs submitted by counsel, and having considered the relevant case law and applicable code sections, and being otherwise sufficiently informed, the Court finds that MMCI is not eligible under 11 U.S.C. § 303(a) to have an involuntary bankruptcy filed against it. Consequently, the Court will grant its Motion to Dismiss.

The facts incident to this involuntary proceeding are largely not in dispute. MMCI was organized as a non-profit corporation under the New Mexico Non-Profit Corporation Act to operate the Memorial Medical Center in Las Cruces, New Mexico. See Articles of Incorporation, Exhibit A to Motion to Dismiss. According to its articles of incorporation, MMCI was organized exclusively for charitable purposes on a not-for-profit basis. Id. MMCI operated the Memorial Medical Center on certain real property owned by the County of Dona Ana and the City of Law Cruces. Prior to the filing of the involuntary petition, MMCI undertook to cease its operations, and began the process of winding up its affairs and liquidating its assets. In June 2004, as part of this process, MMCI transferred assets to the City of Las Cruces, New Mexico and the County of Dona Ana County, New Mexico. This transaction is the subject of state court litigation between MMCI and the Petitioning Creditors.1 Also related to that proceeding is a request by MMCI for the [390]*390appointment of a state court receiver.2 Before that request was adjudicated in state court, Petitioning Creditors filed their involuntary petition on May 19, 2005. Section 303 of the Bankruptcy Code sets the parameters for involuntary petitions. It provides, in relevant part:

An involuntary case may be commenced only under chapter 7 or 11 of this title, and only against a person, except a farmer, family farmer, or a corporation that is not a moneyed, business, or commercial corporation, that may be a debt- or under the chapter under which such case is commenced.

11 U.S.C. § 303(a).

Courts interpreting this section consistently conclude that non-profit organizations are not subject to involuntary proceedings. See, e.g., In re Grace Christian Ministries, Inc., 287 B.R. 352, 355 (Bankr.W.D.Pa.2002) (“A corporation ... may not be an involuntary chapter 7 or 11 debtor if it is a not-for-profit corporation.”); In re United Kitchen Associates, Inc., 33 B.R. 214, 216 (Bankr.W.D.La.1983) (“eleemosynary institutions ... are, thus exempt from involuntary bankruptcy”) (citations omitted). The legislative history of this section supports this conclusion as well. See H.R.Rep. No. 95-595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 321 (1977); S.Rep. No. 95-989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 33 (1978), U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 1978, pp. 5963, 6277, 5787, 5819 (“schools, churches, charitable organizations and foundations” are protected from involuntary petitions).

Despite the consensus in the legislative history and the case law that eleemosynary institutions are not subject to involuntary petitions, neither “eleemosynary institution” nor “non-profit organization” appear within the language of 11 U.S.C. § 303. Instead, § 303(a) excepts from involuntary petitions any corporation that is “not a moneyed business.” 11 U.S.C. § 303(a). Thus, the focus of the Court’s inquiry must be on whether the alleged debtor is a “moneyed business” subjecting such entity to an involuntary proceeding. MMCI asserts that because it was organized as a non-profit organization, it is not a moneyed business and is, therefore, not subject to an involuntary proceeding. Petitioning Creditors counter that because MMCI is no longer operating, it can no longer be considered a non-profit organization immune from an involuntary proceeding. Both MMCI and Petitioning Creditors agree that MMCI was in the process of winding down its affairs and was not operating at the time of the filing of the involuntary petition. Thus the critical question is whether by winding down its affairs, MMCI ceased to retain its status as a non-profit organization and became a “moneyed business” within the meaning of 11 U.S.C. § 303(a).

There is ample case law for the proposition that winding up a business’s affairs does not necessarily render a corporation ineligible for an involuntary petition. See, e.g., In re Segno Communications, Inc., 264 B.R. 501 (Bankr.N.D.Ill.2001) (concluding that because applicable state law provides for the continued existence of a corporation for five years following its dissolution so that the corporation can wind up its affairs, a dissolved corporation can be forced to wind up its affairs in bankruptcy through an involuntary proceeding filed within the five year period); In re Quad City Minority Broadcasters, Inc., 252 B.R. 773 (Bankr.S.D.Iowa 2000) (corporation administratively dissolved under applicable Iowa law was nevertheless eligible for bankruptcy and consequently [391]*391subject to involuntary proceeding); In re McCullough and Co., 199 B.R. 179 (Bankr. W.D.Mo.1996) (corporation in process of liquidating after filing voluntary dissolution proceedings under applicable Missouri law was subject to involuntary chapter 7 proceeding); In re Anderson, 94 B.R. 153, 157 (Bankr.W.D.Mo.1988) (noting that “Courts have uniformly held ... that a voluntary or involuntary Chapter 7 petition may only be filed against a dissolved corporation that is still in existence.”) (citations omitted). But in this case, the entity winding up its affairs was organized and operated as a non-profit. The alleged debtor bears the burden of showing that it is an eleemosynary institution. Cf In re Caucus Distributors, Inc., 83 B.R. 921, 930 (Bankr.E.D.Va.1988) (noting that “the alleged debtors must plead and prove the issue of whether they are eleemosynary organizations”). In evaluating whether an alleged debtor is a non-profit entity that is not a moneyed business within the meaning of 11 U.S.C.

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Bluebook (online)
337 B.R. 388, 2005 WL 3710624, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-memorial-medical-center-inc-nmb-2005.