In Re MBNA America Bank, N.A.

340 F.3d 1328, 67 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1778, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 16739, 2003 WL 21954218
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
DecidedAugust 15, 2003
Docket02-1558, 74/472, 74/417, 74/908, 74/538
StatusPublished
Cited by10 cases

This text of 340 F.3d 1328 (In Re MBNA America Bank, N.A.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In Re MBNA America Bank, N.A., 340 F.3d 1328, 67 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1778, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 16739, 2003 WL 21954218 (Fed. Cir. 2003).

Opinions

MICHEL, Circuit Judge.

MBNA America Bank, N.A. (“MBNA”) appeals the June 11, 2002, decision of the United States Patent and Trademark Of[1331]*1331fice’s Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (“the Board”) affirming the Examining refusal to register the word marks MONTANA SERIES and PHILADELPHIA CARD because Section 2(e)(1) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1052(e)(1) (2000), precludes registration of marks that are “merely descriptive.” In re MBNA Am. Bank, N.A., 2002 WL 1285938, 2002 TTAB LEXIS 355 (June 11, 2002). Because the Board committed no legal error, and more than substantial evidence supports the Board’s finding that the two service marks in issue are merely descriptive of a feature or characteristic of the services, i.e., according to the amended applications, “credit card services featuring credit cards depicting scenes or subject matter of, or relating to,” the state of Montana or the city of Philadelphia, we affirm.

I.

In 1993, MBNA filed two intent-to-use applications, pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1051(b), to register the marks MONTANA SERIES and PHILADELPHIA CARD for “credit card services.” The recitation of services for the two marks was later amended to read: “credit card services featuring credit cards depicting scenes or subject matter of, or relating to,” the state of Montana, or the city of Philadelphia, respectively. The term “CARD” in PHILADELPHIA CARD has been disclaimed. After rejections on various grounds, and withdrawal and reinstatement of certain rejections, the Examining Attorney finally refused registration of both marks citing Section 2(e)(1) of the Lanham Act.

Pending are at least 75 other applications filed by MBNA to register similar service marks, including at least 45 applications for state names preceding the word “SERIES” and 27 applications for city names immediately preceding the word “CARD.” Two marks, DELAWARE SERIES and KENTUCKY SERIES, were allowed registration by the Examining Attorney and issued in 1992 and 1995, respectively.

MBNA appealed the Examining Attorney’s rejection of registration for MONTANA SERIES and PHILADELPHIA CARD to the Board. The Board made specific findings regarding affinity credit cards, i.e., credit cards depicting images of or named after various social or lifestyle associations such as sports teams, universities, wine connoisseurs, bird lovers, etc. For the ease at bar, the Board found that MBNA’s services as recited in its applications were essentially “regional affinity” credit card services that combine traditional financial services with affinity cards named after geographical regions of the country. The Board found that a significant feature of MBNA’s regional affinity credit card services was to appeal to the user’s regional pride and loyalties with cards depicting scenes of and/or named after the state of Montana or the city of Philadelphia, and that this significant feature was further manifested by how MBNA marketed and promoted its affinity credit card services. Finding that the two marks merely described a significant feature of the underlying credit card services, the Board affirmed the Examining Attorney’s refusal to register the marks.

MBNA appeals the Board’s decision. This court has jurisdiction over the appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(4)(B).

II.

This court reviews the Board’s legal conclusions without deference. In re [1332]*1332Hiromichi Wada, 194 F.3d 1297, 1299 (Fed.Cir.1999). The Board’s determination that a mark is merely descriptive is a factual finding, which this court upholds unless unsupported by substantial evidence. In re Nett Designs, 236 F.3d 1339, 1341 (Fed.Cir.2001). The principal issue on appeal is whether substantial evidence supports the Board’s finding that the marks, as applied for, were merely descriptive. MBNA also challenges the Board’s decision on the grounds that the Board committed legal errors in, allegedly, concluding that a “regional designation” can never be inherently distinctive, finding descriptiveness based on a trade dress, using a purchaser motivation test, and failing to resolve doubts as to descriptiveness in the applicant’s favor.

A.

“In order to be registered, a mark must be capable of distinguishing the applicant’s goods from those of others.” Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 768, 112 S.Ct. 2753, 120 L.Ed.2d 615 (1992) (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1052). A mark is “distinctive and capable of being protected if it either (1) is inherently distinctive or (2) has acquired distinctiveness through secondary meaning.” Id. at 769, 112 S.Ct. 2753 (citation omitted). In the present case, MBNA does not argue that its marks MONTANA SERIES and PHILADELPHIA CARD have acquired distinctiveness through secondary meaning, and has not pursued registration under 15 U.S.C. § 1052(f) for such acquired distinctiveness. Rather, it contends that its marks are inherently distinctive.

Marks are often classified, according to their increasing degree of inherent distinctiveness, as: (1) generic, (2) descriptive, (3) suggestive, and (4) arbitrary or fanciful. Id. at 768, 112 S.Ct. 2753. Suggestive or arbitrary marks are deemed inherently distinctive and are entitled to registration as such; generic or descriptive marks are not. Id. Although the dividing lines are not always clear, the distinctions are critical in a registration determination. In re Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner, & Smith, Inc., 828 F.2d 1567, 1569 (Fed.Cir.1987).

At the core of this appeal is the question whether MONTANA SERIES and PHILADELPHIA CARD are inherently distinctive, i.e., suggestive or arbitrary, or not inherently distinctive, i.e., merely descriptive. The Board affirmed the Examining Attorney’s rejection of registration of the marks pursuant to Section 2(e)(1) of the Lanham Act, which provides that a trademark cannot be registered if it, “when used on or in connection with the goods of the applicant^] is merely descriptive or deceptively misdescriptive of them.” 15 U.S.C. § 1052(e)(1). Section 2(e)(1) also applies to a service mark, pursuant to Section 3 of the Act. Id. § 1053.

A mark is merely descriptive if it immediately conveys information concerning a quality or characteristic of the product or service. Nett Designs, 236 F.3d at 1341. The perception of the relevant purchasing public sets the standard for determining descriptiveness. Id. Thus, a mark is merely descriptive if the ultimate consumers immediately associate it with a quality or characteristic of the product or service.

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340 F.3d 1328, 67 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1778, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 16739, 2003 WL 21954218, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-mbna-america-bank-na-cafc-2003.