In re: Mbe Digital, Inc.

• Court: United States Bankruptcy Appellate Panel for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: November 9, 2016
• Docket: CC-16-1121-FMcTa
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

FILED NOV 09 2016 1 NOT FOR PUBLICATION SUSAN M. SPRAUL, CLERK U.S. BKCY. APP. PANEL 2 OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT

3 UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY APPELLATE PANEL 4 OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT 5 In re: ) BAP No. CC-16-1121-FMcTa ) 6 MBE DIGITAL, INC., ) Bk. No. 2:12-bk-34701-BR ) 7 Debtor. ) _____________________________ ) 8 ) ADESORN HEMARATANATORN, ) 9 ) Appellant, ) 10 ) v. ) MEMORANDUM* 11 ) DAVID J. PASTERNAK, ) 12 ) Appellee. ) 13 ______________________________) 14 Argued and Submitted on October 21, 2016 at Pasadena, California 15 Filed – November 9, 2016 16 Appeal from the United States Bankruptcy Court 17 for the Central District of California 18 Honorable Barry Russell, Bankruptcy Judge, Presiding 19 Appearances: Clark Rivera argued on behalf of Appellant Adesorn Hemaratanatorn; Alan Wayne Forsley of Fredman 20 Lieberman Pearl LLP argued on behalf of Appellee David J. Pasternak. 21 22 Before: FARIS, McKITTRICK,** and TAYLOR, Bankruptcy Judges. 23 24 * This disposition is not appropriate for publication. 25 Although it may be cited for whatever persuasive value it may have, see Fed. R. App. P. 32.1, it has no precedential value, see 26 9th Cir. BAP Rule 8024-1.

27 ** The Honorable Peter C. McKittrick, United States Bankruptcy Judge for the District of Oregon, sitting by 28 designation. 1 INTRODUCTION 2 Appellant Adesorn Hemaratanatorn appeals from the bankruptcy 3 court’s denial of his motion to vacate the California superior 4 court’s award of fees and costs to appellee David J. Pasternak, 5 the court-appointed receiver for debtor MBE Digital, Inc. He 6 argues, among other things, that the award violated the automatic 7 stay of § 3621 and intruded upon the bankruptcy court’s exclusive 8 jurisdiction under §§ 503 and 543. We disagree; there was no 9 stay violation because the fees and costs were levied against 10 Mr. Hemaratanatorn and others, not against the debtor or its 11 estate, and the bankruptcy petition did not divest the superior 12 court of jurisdiction over the fee award. Accordingly, we 13 AFFIRM. 14 FACTUAL BACKGROUND 15 MBE is a digital printing corporation that was formed by 16 Mr. Hemaratanatorn, Michael Hellyar, and Brian Rayner. This case 17 arises from the infighting among these three shareholders and 18 others. 19 In 2009, Mr. Hellyar’s wife, Annette Hellyar, filed for 20 divorce. In the dissolution proceedings, Mrs. Hellyar contended 21 that Mr. Hellyar’s interest in MBE was a community asset. 22 Mr. Hellyar disputed this claim and sought declaratory relief to 23 establish his rights and to determine the rights of Mrs. Hellyar, 24 Mr. Hemaratanatorn, Mr. Rayner, and Mr. Rayner’s girlfriend, 25 26 1 Unless specified otherwise, all chapter and section 27 references are to the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1532 and all “Rule” references are to the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy 28 Procedure, Rules 1001-9037.

2 1 Cindy Lujan. 2 Mr. Hemaratanatorn then alleged that Mrs. Hellyar, 3 Mr. Rayner, and Ms. Lujan conspired to wrest control of MBE away 4 from him and Mr. Hellyar and loot the business. Mr. Hellyar and 5 Mr. Hemaratanatorn brought a shareholder’s derivative action to 6 establish their ownership interests in MBE. They also filed an 7 ex parte application for the appointment of a receiver. Although 8 the superior court was hesitant to appoint a receiver and 9 suggested less drastic alternatives, in August 2010, it appointed 10 Mr. Pasternak as receiver for MBE. The superior court ordered 11 that MBE was responsible for payment of Mr. Pasternak’s fees and 12 costs. 13 Initially, Mr. Pasternak was only charged with reviewing 14 MBE’s records. Then, in December 2010, Mr. Hemaratanatorn filed 15 an ex parte application requesting that Mr. Pasternak be given 16 full powers over MBE. He alleged that Mrs. Hellyar, Mr. Rayner, 17 and Ms. Lujan had converted MBE’s business to a new company, 18 BMR Digital. 19 The superior court granted Mr. Pasternak full and exclusive 20 power, duty, and authority to administer and manage all of MBE’s 21 business affairs. Mr. Pasternak was authorized to take 22 possession of MBE’s records, assets, and property. 23 In early 2011, Mr. Pasternak requested that the superior 24 court include BMR in the receivership, alleging that BMR had 25 siphoned off significant funds from MBE and failed to turn over 26 MBE’s records. The superior court granted the request. 27 Mr. Pasternak reported that MBE owed significant debts, 28 that he had not been able to reduce MBE’s financial obligations,

3 1 and that he was defending a number of lawsuits against MBE. By 2 then, Mr. Pasternak had incurred over $250,000 in unpaid fees and 3 costs. 4 In August 2011, Mr. Rayner and Ms. Lujan filed a motion 5 seeking to terminate the receivership (or, in the alternative, to 6 direct Mr. Pasternak to file for bankruptcy on behalf of MBE), 7 arguing that MBE was losing money and incurring debts it could 8 never satisfy. Mr. Pasternak and Mr. Hellyar opposed the 9 motion.2 10 In November 2011, Mr. Rayner and Ms. Lujan again filed a 11 motion to terminate the receivership. This time, Mr. Pasternak 12 supported termination because he had not received compensation or 13 reimbursement of costs and the matter was a significant strain on 14 his office. But Mr. Hellyar and Mr. Hemaratanatorn opposed the 15 second motion and asserted that MBE was a profitable and viable 16 company. The superior court denied the motion to terminate the 17 receivership because it wanted Mr. Pasternak to continue serving 18 as receiver during the upcoming trial. 19 By December 2011, Mr. Pasternak’s fees and costs totaled 20 $417,073.85, and he owed other professionals over $90,000. He 21 informed the superior court that none of his fees had been paid 22 due to lack of funds in the estate and that he could not 23 “continue to serve in this matter any longer unless the parties 24 provide for the payment of the receivership’s substantial unpaid 25 costs of administration.” In late December 2011, he informed the 26 2 27 The state court record does not include a formal ruling on the August 2011 request. Presumably, the superior court denied 28 the motion.

4 1 superior court that he “will ask the court to hold all of the 2 individual parties jointly and severally responsible for the 3 unpaid receivership costs of administration.” 4 After a bifurcated trial on the equitable claims in February 5 2012, the superior court ordered that, upon payment of $250,000 6 to Mr. Pasternak, the receivership would terminate and control of 7 MBE would revert to Mr. Hellyar and Mr. Hemaratanatorn. 8 In May 2012, Mr. Pasternak informed the superior court that 9 he had not received the $250,000 payment; and so the receivership 10 continued. 11 On July 18, 2012, MBE, through Mr. Hellyar, filed a 12 voluntary chapter 11 petition without Mr. Pasternak’s knowledge 13 or consent.3 Mr. Pasternak immediately turned over custody, 14 possession, and control of MBE’s business to MBE. 15 In September 2012, Mr. Pasternak filed in the superior court 16 a final report and account and a motion for fees and costs (“Fee 17 Motion”). He stated that his total unpaid fees and costs 18 exceeded $535,000 and that other professionals’ fees exceeded 19 $90,000. Mr. Pasternak requested that the superior court hold 20 all individual parties jointly and severally liable for the 21 receivership fees and costs, “because all of them are or claimed 22 to be owners of the receivership business, and this receivership 23 thereby operated that business for their benefit during this 24 receivership. This request is not a surprise because I have 25 repeatedly stated my intention to make this request in my 26 3 27 On February 21, 2013, upon motion by the United States Trustee, the bankruptcy court converted MBE’s chapter 11 case to 28 one under chapter 7.

5 1 previously filed and served interim reports.” 2 Mr. Hellyar and Mr. Hemaratanatorn opposed the final report. 3 In particular, Mr. Hemaratanatorn proclaimed his innocence and 4 asserted that Mr. Pasternak’s conduct may have hurt MBE as much 5 as (or more than) the actions of Mr. Rayner, Ms. Lujan, and 6 Mrs. Hellyar. 7 In November 2012, the superior court approved 8 Mr. Pasternak’s final report and account. It issued an order 9 (“Fee Order”) determining that Mr. Hemaratanatorn, Mr. Rayner, 10 Ms. Lujan, Mr. Hellyar, and Mrs. Hellyar were jointly and 11 severally liable for receivership fees and costs totaling 12 $626,244.11. The superior court also ruled that the individual 13 parties “jointly and severally shall defend and indemnify the 14 Receiver against any claims, demands, debts, etc. which may arise 15 from the receivership.” The Fee Order discharged Mr. Pasternak 16 and exonerated his bond. 17 In May 2014, the California Court of Appeals upheld the Fee 18 Order. The appellate court held (among other things) that 19 Mr. Pasternak’s fees were reasonable; there was no 20 misadministration; and Mr. Hemaratanatorn and Mr. Hellyar were 21 jointly and severally liable for the receivership’s fees and 22 costs. 23 On February 9, 2016, about four years after MBE filed for 24 bankruptcy and nearly two years after the California Court of 25 Appeals affirmed the Fee Order, Mr. Hemaratanatorn filed a motion 26 in the bankruptcy court to vacate the superior court’s Fee Order 27 (“Motion to Vacate”). He argued (among other things) that, at 28 the time MBE filed for bankruptcy in July 2012, “the automatic

6 1 stay was in place and the state court was divested of 2 jurisdiction to rule upon the Receiver’s administration of the 3 estate, discharge, and fees.” 4 After a hearing, the bankruptcy court denied the Motion to 5 Vacate. It held that the Fee Order did not violate the automatic 6 stay and, as a result, the Fee Order was binding on the 7 bankruptcy court. 8 Mr. Hemaratanatorn timely appealed. 9 JURISDICTION 10 The bankruptcy court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 11 §§ 1334 and 157(b)(1) and (2)(A). We have jurisdiction under 12 28 U.S.C. § 158. 13 ISSUES 14 (1) Whether the Fee Order violated the automatic stay. 15 (2) Whether §§ 503 and 543 divested the superior court of 16 jurisdiction to decide the Fee Motion. 17 (3) Whether the Fee Order had preclusive effect. 18 STANDARDS OF REVIEW 19 We review the bankruptcy court’s conclusions of law de novo 20 and its findings of fact for clear error. Hansen v. Moore 21 (In re Hansen), 368 B.R. 868, 874 (9th Cir. BAP 2007). “De novo 22 review requires that we consider a matter anew, as if no decision 23 had been made previously.” Francis v. Wallace (In re Francis), 24 505 B.R. 914, 917 (9th Cir. BAP 2014) (citation omitted). A 25 bankruptcy court clearly errs if its findings were illogical, 26 implausible, or “without support in inferences that may be drawn 27 from the facts in the record.” United States v. Hinkson, 28 585 F.3d 1247, 1262–63 & n.21 (9th Cir. 2009) (en banc).

7 1 We review de novo the bankruptcy court’s determination as to 2 whether the automatic stay provisions of section 362 have been 3 violated. Palm v. Klapperman (In re Cady), 266 B.R. 172, 178 4 (9th Cir. BAP 2001), aff’d, 315 F.3d 1121 (9th Cir. 2003) 5 (citation omitted); Advanced Ribbons & Office Prods., Inc. v. 6 U.S. Interstate Distrib., Inc. (In re Advanced Ribbons & Office 7 Prods., Inc.), 125 B.R. 259, 262 (9th Cir. BAP 1991) (the scope 8 of the automatic stay is “a legal issue which we review de 9 novo”). 10 Similarly, we review de novo questions of jurisdiction. See 11 McCowan v. Fraley (In re McCowan), 296 B.R. 1, 2 (9th Cir. BAP 12 2003) (“Whether a court has subject matter jurisdiction is a 13 question of law that we review de novo.”); Odd-Bjorn Huse v. 14 Huse-Sporsem, A.S. (In re Birting Fisheries, Inc.), 300 B.R. 489, 15 497 (9th Cir. BAP 2003) (“Subject matter jurisdiction is a 16 question of law.”). 17 “[T]he availability of issue preclusion is reviewed de 18 novo.” Lopez v. Emergency Serv. Restoration, Inc. (In re Lopez), 19 367 B.R. 99, 103 (9th Cir. BAP 2007) (citation omitted). 20 DISCUSSION 21 A. The Fee Order did not violate the automatic stay. 22 Mr. Hemaratanatorn contends that the Fee Order violated the 23 automatic stay, because the filing of MBE’s bankruptcy petition 24 operated to stay all superior court proceedings, even the 25 superior court’s consideration of the Fee Motion. We disagree. 26 Mr. Hemaratanatorn argues that the automatic stay precluded 27 a broad range of acts, including the superior court’s decision on 28 the Fee Motion. He says that § 362(a)(3), which prohibits “any

8 1 act to obtain possession of property of the estate or of property 2 from the estate or to exercise control over property of the 3 estate” precluded the superior court from entering the Fee Order. 4 Mr. Hemaratanatorn misapprehends the nature of the automatic 5 stay, or the scope of the Fee Order, or both. The Fee Order was 6 not directed toward MBE or its estate, but rather toward the 7 individual shareholders and others. In other words, the Fee 8 Order did not concern “the property of the estate.” 9 It is well settled that the automatic stay is applicable 10 only to the debtor and the estate and does not protect 11 nondebtors. 12 [S]ection 362(a) does not stay actions against guarantors, sureties, corporate affiliates, or other 13 non-debtor parties liable on the debts of the debtor. . . . Similarly, the automatic stay does not 14 protect the property of parties such as officers of the debtor, even if the property in question is stock in 15 the debtor corporation, and even if that stock has been pledged as security for the debtor’s liability. 16 17 Boucher v. Shaw, 572 F.3d 1087, 1092-93 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal 18 citations and quotation marks omitted); see Solidus Networks, 19 Inc. v. Excel Innovations, Inc. (In re Excel Innovations, Inc.), 20 502 F.3d 1086, 1095 (9th Cir. 2007) (“we have consistently held 21 that the automatic stay does not apply to suits against 22 non-debtors”); In re Advanced Ribbons & Office Prod., Inc., 23 125 B.R. at 263 (“The automatic stay of section 362(a) protects 24 only the debtor, property of the debtor or property of the 25 estate. It does not protect non-debtor parties or their 26 property.”). 27 Put simply, Mr. Hemaratanatorn’s position rests on a false 28 premise: that the automatic stay applies to any action relating

9 1 in any way to the debtor. However, the automatic stay is not so 2 broad and is limited to the situations enumerated in § 362(a). 3 In this case, the Fee Order did not concern “the property of the 4 estate” and did not affect MBE’s bankruptcy estate. There was no 5 violation of the automatic stay.4 6 Mr. Hemaratanatorn argues that the Fee Order impacted the 7 property of MBE’s bankruptcy estate because it “operates to 8 deprive the Debtor of any choses in action arising from Receiver 9 misconduct, and such choses in action are, legally and 10 undeniably, property of the bankruptcy estate.” He also contends 11 that the superior court, “by imposing a huge derivative liability 12 on MBE’s shareholders, at the same time created an enormous 13 indemnity liability on the part of MBE towards those 14 shareholders, and this sort of action readily predicts to 15 complicate the Debtor’s prospects for emerging from bankruptcy.” 16 But, as Mr. Pasternak’s counsel agreed at oral argument, the 17 Fee Order is not binding on the bankruptcy trustee and does not 18 affect the estate’s rights. Whatever surcharge rights exist 19 4 20 We have recognized that the bankruptcy court may extend the automatic stay to nondebtors under the “unusual 21 circumstances” doctrine, where the interests of the debtor and the nondebtor are inextricably interwoven. In re Ripon Self 22 Storage, LLC, BAP No. EC-10-1325-HKiD, 2011 WL 3300087, at *6 23 (9th Cir. BAP Apr. 1, 2011). However, this “extension” is really “an injunction issued by the bankruptcy court after a hearing 24 where it is established that unusual circumstances are needed to protect the administration of the bankruptcy estate. Thus, any 25 extension of the automatic stay to nondebtors does not occur 26 automatically but requires the filing of an adversary proceeding requesting the bankruptcy court to act under § 105(a).” Id. 27 (citations omitted). The bankruptcy court did not extend the protections of the automatic stay to any of the nondebtors, and 28 Mr. Hemaratanatorn did not appeal on this basis.

10 1 under § 543(c)(3) are still available to the estate. See 2 § 543(c)(3) (after notice and a hearing, the court shall 3 “surcharge such custodian . . . for any improper or excessive 4 disbursement . . . .”). The Fee Order imposed significant 5 liability upon the individual shareholders, but it did not impose 6 any liability upon, or take any rights away from, MBE.5 See 7 Boucher, 572 F.3d at 1092-93. 8 Therefore, the Fee Order did not violate the automatic 9 stay.6 10 B. Neither § 503 nor § 543 deprived the superior court of jurisdiction to consider and enter the Fee Order. 11 12 Mr. Hemaratanatorn argues that, when MBE filed its 13 bankruptcy petition, the superior court immediately lost 14 jurisdiction to consider and approve the Fee Motion. He is 15 16 5 If the Fee Order barred any claims by the bankruptcy 17 trustee or the estate against Mr. Pasternak or his surety, the Fee Order would be void, but only to that extent. 18 Mr. Pasternak’s counsel so agreed at oral argument. 19 6 Mr. Hemaratanatorn argues that the bankruptcy filing 20 immediately suspended the shareholder’s derivative action (because the shareholders then allegedly lacked standing to act 21 on behalf of MBE), thus divesting Mr. Pasternak of his ability to take any action in the superior court litigation. Mr. Pasternak 22 correctly states that Mr. Hemaratanatorn did not present this 23 issue to the bankruptcy court. We will not consider arguments raised for the first time on appeal. See Ezra v. Seror 24 (In re Ezra), 537 B.R. 924, 932 (9th Cir. BAP 2015). 25 Mr. Hemaratanatorn contends that his argument concerns 26 subject matter jurisdiction, which can be raised at any time. As we explain herein, the bankruptcy case did not affect the 27 superior court’s subject matter jurisdiction over Mr. Pasternak’s compensation taxed against nondebtors and could not preclude its 28 consideration of the Fee Motion.

11 1 mistaken. 2 Mr. Hemaratanatorn’s argument rests on a false premise: that 3 §§ 503(b)(3)(E) and 543(c)(2) are jurisdictional statutes that 4 divest other courts of jurisdiction. He argues, without 5 authority, that “[s]ection 543 . . . grants the bankruptcy court 6 exclusive jurisdiction to determine the reasonableness of the 7 receiver’s unpaid fees and costs and to order their 8 payment . . . .” 9 Mr. Hemaratanatorn uses the term “jurisdiction” all too 10 loosely. The bankruptcy court’s jurisdiction is governed by 11 28 U.S.C. §§ 157 and 1334. Nothing in §§ 503 or 543 or 12 Rule 60027 purports to confer exclusive jurisdiction on the 13 bankruptcy court or otherwise limit the jurisdiction of a state 14 court. 15 Our holding is consistent with the Supreme Court’s 16 jurisprudence that courts should not read a jurisdictional 17 limitation into a statute where none exists: 18 when Congress does not rank a statutory limitation on coverage as jurisdictional, courts should treat the 19 restriction as nonjurisdictional in character. Applying that readily administrable bright line to this 20 case, we hold that the threshold number of employees for application of Title VII is an element of a 21 plaintiff’s claim for relief, not a jurisdictional issue. 22 23 Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 516 (2006) (emphasis added) 24 (construing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e). 25 Sections 503 and 543 permit a bankruptcy court to decide fee 26 27 7 Rule 6002 is a procedural rule that could not affect the 28 jurisdiction of any court.

12 1 applications by custodians but do not grant it jurisdiction, let 2 alone exclusive jurisdiction. Following the Supreme Court’s 3 bright-line test in Arbaugh, we note that §§ 503 and 543 do “not 4 speak in jurisdictional terms or refer in any way to the 5 jurisdiction of the [bankruptcy] courts.” Id. at 515. 6 Moreover, Mr. Hemaratanatorn overlooks the fact that § 503 7 concerns “administrative expenses.” Although not explicitly 8 defined, administrative expenses are important to the extent 9 necessary to determine which claims against the bankruptcy estate 10 have priority under § 507. See § 507(a)(2). In the present 11 case, the fee award was not levied against MBE’s bankruptcy 12 estate and therefore does not concern “administrative expenses” 13 as understood by the Bankruptcy Code. 14 Mr. Hemaratanatorn cites Moore v. Scott, 55 F.2d 863 (9th 15 Cir. 1932), for the proposition that the bankruptcy court has 16 exclusive jurisdiction to consider a receiver’s fees, even when 17 the receiver was appointed prebankruptcy. Moore’s status as 18 binding authority is questionable; it was decided five decades 19 before Congress restructured the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy 20 courts in 1984. Further, Moore did not consider the issue at bar 21 here: whether a nonbankruptcy court may enter a fee award against 22 nondebtors. Rather, it held that, once “a bankruptcy has 23 supervened, no other court has the power or authority partially 24 to administer or to deplete the estate, by disposing of or 25 impressing a lien upon it or upon any part thereof - valid prior 26 liens, of course, excepted - not even in favor of its own 27 receivers.” 55 F.2d at 865 (emphases added). Similarly, other 28 authorities cited by Mr. Hemaratanatorn are premised on actions

13 1 against a bankruptcy estate. See, e.g., Gross v. Irving Tr. Co., 2 289 U.S. 342, 344 (1933) (holding that the state court cannot 3 determine a receiver’s compensation, because, “[u]pon 4 adjudication of bankruptcy, title to all the property of the 5 bankrupt, wherever situated, vests in the trustee as of the date 6 of filing the petition in bankruptcy”); In re China Village, LLC, 7 Case No. 10-60373-ASW, 2012 WL 32684, at *5 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 8 Jan. 4, 2012) (“decisions affecting the [bankruptcy estate’s] 9 property fall under the domain of this Court”). 10 In any event, Mr. Hemaratanatorn lacks standing to enforce 11 § 543 on behalf of MBE. The trustee is the representative of the 12 bankruptcy estate and has exclusive standing to enforce the 13 estate’s rights. See § 323(a) (“The trustee in a case under this 14 title is the representative of the estate.”); Ahcom, Ltd. v. 15 Smeding, 623 F.3d 1248, 1250 (9th Cir. 2010) (“When the trustee 16 does have standing to assert a debtor’s claim, that standing is 17 exclusive and divests all creditors of the power to bring the 18 claim.”); Smith v. Arthur Andersen LLP, 421 F.3d 989, 1002 (9th 19 Cir. 2005) (“[u]nder the Bankruptcy Code the trustee stands in 20 the shoes of the bankrupt corporation and has standing to bring 21 any suit that the bankrupt corporation could have instituted had 22 it not petitioned for bankruptcy”). 23 Accordingly, the superior court had jurisdiction to enter 24 the Fee Order.8 25 8 26 Mr. Hemaratanatorn also argues that Mr. Pasternak violated § 543(b) and Rule 6002 by failing to provide the bankruptcy court 27 with a full accounting. We make no determination as to this issue, as it is not relevant to this appeal (and 28 (continued...)

14 1 C. The bankruptcy court had no authority to review the superior court’s Fee Order. 2 3 Having determined that the Fee Order did not violate the 4 automatic stay or trespass on the bankruptcy court’s exclusive 5 jurisdiction, we turn to Mr. Hemaratanatorn’s argument that he 6 should be able to argue his position to the bankruptcy court 7 because the Fee Order was unjust.9 8 The bankruptcy court determined that, because the superior 9 court had the authority to enter the Fee Order, the Rooker- 10 Feldman doctrine10 and preclusion principles prevented it from 11 reexamining the substance of the Fee Order. We agree. 12 Mr. Hemaratanatorn’s argument is based on a false premise: 13 that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine is inapplicable because 14 Mr. Pasternak “and the state court flagrantly violated the 15 exclusive subject matter jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court and 16 the result was an order which violates the Supremacy Clause and 17 should be vacated.” 18 However, as discussed above, the Fee Order did not intrude 19 upon the bankruptcy court’s jurisdiction, nor did it violate the 20 21 8 (...continued) 22 Mr. Hemaratanatorn lacks standing to raise this issue). 9 23 The situation would be different if MBE’s chapter 7 trustee were asserting claims under § 543 or otherwise. As we 24 state above, we do not think that the superior court’s Fee Order is binding on the trustee or deprives the trustee of any rights 25 against Mr. Pasternak or his surety. 26 10 The Rooker-Feldman doctrine arose from the United States 27 Supreme Court decisions in District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983), and Rooker v. Fidelity Trust 28 Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1983).

15 1 automatic stay. 2 The bankruptcy court had no authority to review the Fee 3 Order. The Full Faith and Credit Act, which implemented the 4 Constitution’s Full Faith and Credit Clause, requires that we 5 accord the decisions of state courts “the same full faith and 6 credit . . . as they have by law or usage in the courts of such 7 State . . . from which they are taken.” 28 U.S.C. § 1738; see 8 Migra v. Warren City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 465 U.S. 75, 80-81 9 (1984). Neither the bankruptcy court nor this Panel can review 10 the decisions of the superior court. “[T]he Rooker-Feldman 11 doctrine provides that the United States Supreme Court is the 12 only federal court that may review an issue previously determined 13 or ‘inextricably intertwined’ with the previous action in state 14 court between the same parties.” In re Birting Fisheries, Inc., 15 300 B.R. at 498; see Noel v. Hall, 341 F.3d 1148, 1158 (9th Cir. 16 2003) (“A federal district court dealing with a suit that is, in 17 part, a forbidden de facto appeal from a judicial decision of a 18 state court must refuse to hear the forbidden appeal. As part of 19 that refusal, it must also refuse to decide any issue raised in 20 the suit that is ‘inextricably intertwined’ with an issue 21 resolved by the state court in its judicial decision.”). 22 Accordingly, the bankruptcy court did not have the authority 23 to allow Mr. Hemaratanatorn to relitigate what the California 24 state courts have already decided. It properly declined to 25 vacate the Fee Order. 26 CONCLUSION 27 For the reasons set forth above, the California superior 28 court had authority to decide the Fee Motion, and its decision

16 1 did not violate the automatic stay or any jurisdictional statute. 2 Therefore, we AFFIRM. 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28