in Re: Max B. Hanson

Court of Appeals of Texas·Decided April 9, 2015·No. 12-14-00015-CV·Published

Opinion

ACCEPTED

12-14-00015-CV

TWELFTH COURT OF APPEALS

TYLER, TEXAS

4/9/2015 5:09:48 PM

CATHY LUSK

CLERK

No. 12-14-00015-CV

FILED IN

12th COURT OF APPEALS

In the TYLER, TEXAS 4/9/2015 5:09:48 PM

Twelfth Court of Appeals CATHY S. LUSK Clerk

Tyler, Texas

In re Max B. Hanson, Relator

Relator’s Motion for Rehearing

Max Hanson brought this proceeding because the trial court, over two years ago, refused to sign a decree implementing the parties’ Mediated Settlement Agreement. This Court found an abuse of discretion and granted Max relief. But yesterday the Court issued an opinion dismissing the case. It did so because the trial court, on Monday, signed a divorce decree. Respectfully, the document the trial court signed, see Attachment 1, is incomplete, improper, and not possibly enforceable as a final decree, for a cascade of reasons.

• It delegates judicial duties to third parties.

• It demands the impossible, prospectively ordering the parties to do things in the past.

• It refuses to acknowledge the parties’ actual conduct and fails to find whether that conduct meets the standard of the MSA.

• It does not award property.

• It is fatally vague and non-specific in material respects.

• It omits referenced exhibits.

• And, while parroting MSA terms, it several times omits to order the specific actions necessary to effectuate them.

This proceeding should be reinstated, oral argument should be granted (see “The Court’s analysis would benefit from oral argument,” infra) and the trial court should be directed to sign a new decree that actually confronts the facts and implements the MSA. Otherwise, this proceeding will have accomplished little.

The current decree shies away from necessary determinations.

A decree entered on a settlement agreement should make all rulings necessary to fully implement that settlement. In a case like this one, involving a two-year delay between the settlement and judgment, the decree inevitably will also need to adjudge whether the parties’ intervening conduct has complied with the agreement and will need to adjust for any failures or changed circumstances. This is the role of a court. The trial court’s decree does not undertake it. Instead, the decree mindlessly waives a judicial hand and mechanically tells the parties to go “carry out your settlement, but don’t bother the court with the details.” This

Relator’s Motion for Rehearing Page 2 is an obviously wrong approach which, in this case, fosters rulings that make no sense.

For example, on page 10, the decree purports to order something that is impossible: it calls on Max, prospectively, to pay sums of money at specific times in the past. Specifically, it orders Max to make a series of six monetary payments at various dates in 2012 and 2013. Decree, p. 10-11. When the parties signed their MSA, the agreed series of payments was then entirely proper, because the payments were then all in the future. But to now order Max to make payments in the past is nonsense, the equivalent of a forbidden ex post facto order. This error renders the decree invalid.

Equally important, the trial court’s decree does not tell Max or anyone else whether the payments he has in fact made are or are not sufficient to vest the property rights he was supposed to receive under the MSA. Decree, p. 11 (“If MAX HANSON does not pay the entire $62,500 then the escrow agent does not deliver the transfer documents to Max and Marie maintains her ownership in the Alberta property.”) Max has paid the $62,500, in U.S. dollars. But Marie nonetheless has alleged that the payment obligation wasn’t met, apparently on the basis that some sort of bank transfer fee may have been imposed in the fund transfer. Max’s valuable real-property rights---a key to component of the entire property settlement---should not be held hostage to this

Relator’s Motion for Rehearing Page 3 quibble, with zero guidance on the matter. But that is exactly what the current decree does.

Rather than thoughtlessly state that Max is now “ordered” to “make”

certain payments back in 2012 and 2013 or give a third party the power to determine whether those payments were fully made, a proper decree would (1) acknowledge the MSA’s terms as respects the obligation to pay money in the past, (2) make findings of fact as to whether Max’s past conduct met his payment obligation under the MSA, and (3) declare the legal consequences of that conduct. But such a decree would not prospectively order a thing to be done before the decree is signed because that could make performance impossible. Here, a proper decree would state that Max has fulfilled his MSA payment obligations and thus would order the necessary execution and exchange of specific documents transferring property. The proposed decree that Max gave the trial court does this. As does the amended decree Max now proposes. See Attachment 2.

The decree is impermissibly vague and improperly delegates judicial duties.

Also, on page 10, the current decree simply repeats statements from the MSA, with some editorial commentary about “all security documents” and about signing “all documents to transfer title.” Specifically, the decree gives Max 10 days to sign “all security documents . . . to provide for the wife’s protection in

Relator’s Motion for Rehearing Page 4 the event [he] defaults on” mortgages upon the Canadian properties awarded him in the decree. Decree, p. 10. Then, the decree orders that the unspecified documents, whatever they might be, should be sent to the mediator, Bobby Freeman, to hold. This is inadequate, because it leaves the parties to speculate on what is required and foments dispute. Under the decree, Max has no clue as to exactly what form of documents he should sign, what form of documents Mr. Freeman will think he should have signed, or what framework Freeman may use in going about grading Max’s actions. Everyone instead must fly blind, with Max left to suffer the consequence---the potential permanent loss of property rights the MSA had earmarked for him. It should not be this way.

Judgments, to be enforceable, “must be sufficiently definite and certain to define and protect the rights of all litigants . . . to the end that ministerial officers can carry the judgment into execution without ascertainment of facts not therein stated.” Kimsey v. Kimsey, 965 S.W.2d 690, 694 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1998, pet. denied). Divorce decrees are no different. To be effective, they likewise must spell out the details of compliance in “clear, specific, and unambiguous terms” so that the parties “will readily know exactly what duties or obligations are imposed.” Ex parte Linder, 783 S.W.2d 754, 757 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1990, no pet.); citing Ex parte Slavin, 412 S.W.2d 43 (Tex. 1967). A proper decree in this case thus would specify the material terms of the documents required to be signed or order the signing of identified documents (as Max’s proposed decree

Relator’s Motion for Rehearing Page 5 would do). Max repeatedly has requested just such a decree. But the trial court has demonstrated overwhelmingly that it is unprepared to order such relief. Unless and until this Court directs it to do so, the controversy will continue.

The decree editorializes impermissibly and makes incorrect rulings.

On page 11, the decree states that the trial court has an “understanding”

about the parties’ agreement as to unpaid income taxes. Such statements are improper in a decree. This one, which “understands” the parties agreed to file U.S. tax returns, is also materially incorrect. While the lawyers indicated that their clients would file separate tax returns for 2013 through 2015, the matter of where the parties would file those returns was not agreed in the MSA or otherwise. Max should be afforded his federal right to file his tax returns in either Canada or the U.S.

The decree excluded referenced exhibits.

The trial court’s decree refers to two exhibits that are not attached. A proper decree would include them.

The decree erroneously punishes Max for Marie’s failures.

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Related

Kimsey v. Kimsey
965 S.W.2d 690 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 1998)
Ex Parte Slavin
412 S.W.2d 43 (Texas Supreme Court, 1967)
Ex Parte Linder
783 S.W.2d 754 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 1990)