2020 IL App (1st) 191283-U Order filed: April 17, 2020
FIRST DISTRICT FIFTH DIVISION
No. 1-19-1283
NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and may not be cited as precedent by any party except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1). ______________________________________________________________________________
IN THE APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT ______________________________________________________________________________
In re the Marriage of: ) Appeal from the ) Circuit Court of HELEN NARDI, f/k/a Helen Jonas, ) Cook County. ) Petitioner-Appellee, ) ) No. 2014 D 5374 and ) ) GABRIEL CORDOVA, ) Honorable ) Jeanne Cleveland Bernstein, Respondent-Appellant. ) Judge Presiding. ______________________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE ROCHFORD delivered the judgment of the court. Presiding Justice Hoffman and Justice Delort concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: Circuit court did not abuse its discretion in failing to impute income to petitioner or in failing to recuse itself from this matter, nor did it exceed its authority in requiring respondent to provide and pay for a court reporter and pay for petitioner’s fees and costs. However, the circuit court abused its discretion in calculating respondent’s child support arrearage, and this matter is therefore remanded for recalculation of that amount.
¶2 Respondent-appellant, Gabriel Cordova, appeals from several postdissolution orders
entered by the circuit court relating to the modification of his child-support obligation to petitioner No. 1-19-1283
appellee, Helen Nardi, f/k/a Helen Jonas. For the following reasons, we affirm in part, reverse in
part, and remand for further proceedings. 1
¶3 I. BACKGROUND 2
¶4 On June 10, 2014, Helen filed a petition for the dissolution of her marriage to Gabriel. The
petition alleged that: the parties were married on July 7, 2007; they had two minor children, one
born on October 2, 2007, and the other born on October 21, 2009 (the children); and the parties
had been living separately since June 2010. Helen requested that she and Gabriel be awarded joint
custody of the children. In his answer to the petition, and in a cross-petition for dissolution of
marriage, Gabriel sought sole custody, care, and control of the children and requested that Helen
pay child support.
¶5 The circuit court entered a judgment for dissolution of marriage (dissolution judgment) on
May 12, 2015. The judgment incorporated the parties' marital settlement agreement (MSA), and
joint parenting agreement (JPA). The MSA stated that Helen and Gabriel would have joint legal
custody of the children and “named” Helen as “the residential parent.” However, paragraph 1(D)
of the JPA provides: “GABRIEL and HELEN agree that HELEN shall be the residential parent
with respect to Education and GABRIEL shall be the residential parent for Medical and related
issues.” The visitation schedule contained in the JPA includes the following provision:
“GABRIEL shall be entitled to regular parenting time with the children on alternate
weekends commencing on Friday after school and ending on Sunday at 5:00 p.m., no later
1 In adherence with the requirements of Illinois Supreme Court Rule 352(a) (eff. July 1, 2018), this appeal has been resolved without oral argument upon the entry of a separate written order stating with specificity why no substantial question is presented. 2 Portions of this order have been taken from a prior decision entered by this court in this matter. See, In re Marriage of Jonas, 2018 IL App (1st) 172871-U.
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than 8:00 p.m. and on Monday overnight to Tuesday wherein he shall take the children to
school and Thursday after school overnight until Friday wherein he shall take the children
to school.”
¶6 The MSA provides that Helen and Gabriel would split the costs of the minors’
extracurricular activities, as well as the costs of school fees and tuition through high school
graduation, with a maximum payment by Gabriel of $5,500 per year as to these expenses. As to
child support, the JPA provides:
“GABRIEL shall pay to HELEN as and for child-support, the sum of $200.00 per
month which represents an amount below statutory guidelines. Said amount has been
arrived at in light of the fact that GABRIEL will parent the children as much time as
HELEN parents the children and in light of the fact that he will be contributing no more
than $5,500.00 towards the children's educational and extracurricular expenses. Said
obligation shall continue until the youngest child is emancipated.”
¶7 On January 21, 2016, Helen filed a petition under section 510 of the Illinois Marriage and
Dissolution Act (Act) (750 ILCS 5/510 (West 2016)), which sought to modify Gabriel’s child
support obligation based on a substantial change in circumstances. Helen alleged that she had been
unemployed since July 2015 and, although she had been seeking new employment, she had
become temporarily disabled after breaking her foot in October 2015. Helen maintained that
Gabriel had earned a gross income of $69,000 in 2013 and that, on “information and belief,” he
also received a military disability pension of $500 per month. She asked that “a guideline child
support [order] be entered based on [Gabriel’s] net income.” The petition included a certification
signed by Helen, pursuant to section 1-109 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/1-109
(West 2016)), but included no further evidentiary proof.
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¶8 The matter was continued repeatedly, ultimately to January 17, 2017, for a pretrial
conference.
¶9 On January 17, 2017, the parties appeared with counsel. At that time, Gabriel had not filed
a responsive pleading to the petition to modify child support. Although there is no transcript of the
proceedings, it appears that the court held only a pretrial conference on that date. Furthermore, on
that date the court entered an order indicating that Helen’s motion to modify child support was
“before the court” and the court was “fully advised.” The order: (1) directed Gabriel to pay Helen
28% of his net pay in child support based on his 2016 earnings; and (2) found that arrearages in
child support would be calculated beginning on January 21, 2016 (the date the petition to modify
was filed by Helen), after accounting for any child support payments Gabriel may have already
made.
¶ 10 On February 16, 2017, Gabriel filed a petition to vacate the January 17, 2017, order. In the
petition, he alleged that the issue of child support was discussed at a “brief” pretrial conference,
but the court did not conduct an evidentiary hearing before entering the order which modified his
child support payment. Gabriel asserted that, during the pretrial conference, “it was alleged that
Helen was the residential parent and that she spent more time with the child.” Gabriel argued that
the court was not made aware that the JPA provided that Helen was a residential parent with respect
to education, that he was the residential parent with respect to medical and related issues, and that
he was to pay $200 per month in child support based on the understanding that he would parent
the children as much as Helen would.
¶ 11 On May 16, 2017, the circuit court entered an order which denied Gabriel’s motion to
vacate the January 17, 2017, order and instructed both parties to exchange financial information.
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¶ 12 On July 19, 2017, Helen filed a petition for rule to show cause and other relief alleging that
Gabriel had not paid the increased child support based upon 28% of his net income, which she
alleged was $1,290 per month, or the child support arrearage she calculated to be $21,020, pursuant
to the order of January 17, 2017. Instead, Gabriel had continued to pay $200 per month in child
support, pursuant to the dissolution judgment. On September 5, 2017, the circuit court gave Gabriel
time to respond to the petition, appointed a child representative, and set a hearing on the petition
for rule on October 11, 2017.
¶ 13 In Gabriel's verified response to the petition for rule to show cause, he admitted that a
“temporary” child support order was entered “without prejudice” on January 17, 2017. He asserted
that the issue of permanent child support was still pending. In an affirmative defense, Gabriel
attacked the January 17, 2017, order as setting forth an improper “straight percentage” child-
support obligation, which was ambiguous as to the exact amount to be paid.
¶ 14 On October 11, 2017, the court heard arguments on the petition for rule to show cause. The
court entered an order on that date setting Gabriel's child support arrearage at $26,677.69, based
upon the January 17, 2017 order, with statutory interest of 9% due on any amounts not paid after
January 17, 2017. The order did not state how the arrearage amount of $26,677.69 had been
calculated, and did not give a specific amount of modified monthly child support payments. The
court discharged the petition for rule to show cause and set the case for October 12, 2017, “for
entry of a child support order [and] determination of arrears.”
¶ 15 On October 19, 2017, the circuit court entered a uniform order for support requiring Gabriel
to pay $1,289.74 per month in child support, as well as $100 per month toward the outstanding
arrears of $26,677.69. The obligation to pay the support would terminate on October 21, 2027.
The case was continued to December 12, 2017, for a report from the child representative.
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¶ 16 In response to Gabriel’s motion requesting a finding under Supreme Court Rule 304(a)
(eff. Mar. 8, 2016) as to the child support orders, on November 16, 2017, the court entered an order
stating that the October 19, 2017, order was a permanent child support order. The order further
stated that all issues between the parties had been resolved, there were no pending motions, and
the child representative was discharged. Gabriel then filed a prior appeal (No. 1-17-2871), and his
notice of appeal stated that he was appealing from the final order of November 16, 2017, “and any
and all orders leading up to and included in said judgment including but not limited to the orders
of: January 17, 2017; May 16, 2017; and October 19, 2017.”
¶ 17 On appeal, Gabriel argued—inter alia—that the circuit court erred by failing to conduct an
evidentiary hearing before modifying his child support obligations under section 510(a)(1) of the
Act. We agreed with Gabriel on that issue, found it dispositive of his prior appeal, and therefore
reversed the circuit court's judgment and remanded this matter to the circuit court for an evidentiary
hearing on the merits of Helen's petition to modify child support. In re Marriage of Jonas, 2018
IL App (1st) 172871-U, ¶ 31.
¶ 18 Upon remand, Helen filed an appearance pro se. Thereafter, during a hearing held on
October 25, 2018, the circuit court sua sponte sought a private attorney from the courtroom to
represent Helen. It is undisputed that, at least with respect to Helen, this representation was to be
provided pro bono. The circuit court also ordered Gabriel to provide a court reporter “at all times,”
and ordered the parties to exchange certain financial information and affidavits.
¶ 19 On November 13, 2018, Gabriel filed a motion seeking clarification regarding the circuit
court’s order. Gabriel specifically sought to clarify: (1) the exact nature of his obligation to provide
a court reporter, and if he was responsible for paying for such a reporter, and (2) whether Helen’s
counsel would serve pro bono with respect to both parties, or whether Helen’s counsel could seek
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to recover fees and costs from Gabriel pursuant to the Act. In an order entered November 27, 2018,
the circuit court clarified that Gabriel was responsible for providing a court reporter “at every court
appearance.” (Emphasis in original.) In a subsequently filed written response to the motion to
clarify, Helen’s counsel acknowledged that she responded to the circuit court’s sua sponte request
to represent Helen pro bono, but also asserted that the Act entitled Helen to seek interim and
prospective attorney’s fees and costs from Gabriel in order to “level the playing field.” Helen’s
counsel also stressed that no order entered by the circuit court precluded Helen from exercising
her right to seek fees and costs under the Act.
¶ 20 Thereafter, on January 3, 2019, Helen’s counsel filed a petition seeking interim and
prospective fees and costs. In his written response to this petition, Gabriel asserted that Helen
should not be awarded attorney fees and costs because she was being provided counsel pro bono,
there was thus no need to “level the playing field,” and Gabriel did not have the financial resources
to pay Helen’s fees and costs.
¶ 21 The parties then each filed a petition for a rule to show cause. The issues raised in those
petitions, and the circuit court’s rulings with respect thereto, are not at issue in this appeal.
¶ 22 The matter proceeded to a hearing on all pending matters, which was held over the course
of two days in March and May of 2019. The circuit court heard testimony from both Helen and
Gabriel, and received several documents into evidence.
¶ 23 On May 31, 2019, the circuit entered a written order resolving: (1) Helen’s petition to
modify child support, (2) the petitions for rule to show cause filed by the parties, (2) Gabriel’s
motion for clarification, (3) Helen’s petition for fees and costs, and (4) Gabriel’s oral motion for
the circuit court judge to recuse herself, made on the second day of the hearing. In that order, as is
relevant to this appeal, the circuit court: (1) concluded that Helen was unable to work, had no
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current income, and no income would therefore be imputed to her, (2) ordered that Gabriel would
be responsible for paying $1,323 per month in in child support, commencing June 1, 2019, as well
as $100 per month toward an arrearage for past due child support calculated to be $29,565.37, an
amount to which statutory interest would accrue, (3) entered a $12,144.12 judgment for fees and
costs against Gabriel and in favor of Helen’s attorney, and (4) denied the oral motion for recusal.
As to the arrearage, the record reflects that the trial court’s calculation included the $26,677.69
arrearage previously calculated (as reflected in the October 19, 2017, order), and added $3,801.58
in statutory interest on that amount. The order also finally determined all the remaining, pending
issues, and stated that the matter was “off call.”
¶ 24 Gabriel filed a timely notice of appeal on June 21, 2019. Helen did not file an appellee’s
brief with this court, and on this court's own motion we ordered the case be taken on Gabriel’s
appellate brief and the record on appeal only.
¶ 25 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 26 Again, Helen has failed to file an appellee’s brief. Nevertheless, an appeal may be decided
without the benefit of an appellee's brief. See First Capitol Mortgage Corp. v. Talandis
Construction Corp., 63 Ill. 2d 128, 133 (1976) (a reviewing court can decide the merits of the
appeal where the record is simple and the claimed errors can be decided without the aid of an
appellee's brief).
¶ 27 Gabriel first argues that the circuit court erred in modifying his child support obligation,
where the court’s conclusion that Helen was unable to work and the court’s resultant failure to
impute any income to her were an abuse of discretion.
¶ 28 Section 510(a)(1) of the Act provides that a court may modify a child support order “upon
a showing of a substantial change in circumstances.” 750 ILCS 5/510(a)(1) (West 2018). A parent
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seeking a modification of child support, based on a substantial change in circumstances, has the
burden of proof to establish that a substantial change in circumstances has occurred since the entry
of the prior support order. In re Marriage of Sorokin, 2017 IL App (2d) 160885, ¶ 28; In re
Marriage of Saracco, 2014 IL App (3d) 130741, ¶ 13. If a party seeking a modification establishes
that there is a substantial change in circumstances, the circuit court may modify the child support
obligation in accordance with the factors listed in section 505(a) of the Marriage Act. 750 ILCS
5/505(a) (West 2018); In re Marriage of Rash and King, 406 Ill. App. 3d 381, 388 (2010).
¶ 29 Motions to modify child support turn on the individual facts and circumstances of each
case. In re Marriage of Garrett, 336 Ill. App. 3d 1018, 1020 (2003). The decision to modify a child
support payment lies within the discretion of the trial court and we will disturb the decision only
where there has been an abuse of discretion. Id. A trial court's decision as to whether to impute
income is also reviewable under the abuse of discretion standard. In re Marriage of Van Hoveln,
2018 IL App (4th) 180112, ¶ 43.
¶ 30 With respect to the circuit court’s conclusion that Helen was unable to work, Gabriel
contends that this finding was not adequately supported by the evidence. The evidence introduced
at the hearing established that Helen had been gainfully employed for many years in the past. She
had also been receiving unemployment benefits until March 2019, and one is only entitled to such
benefits if they are “able to work.” 820 ILCS 405/500(C) (West 2018); Moss v. Department of
Employment Security, 357 Ill. App. 3d 980, 985 (2005). Helen also testified that she was actively
searching for employment at the time of the hearing, albeit unsuccessfully.
¶ 31 Nevertheless, even if the circuit court abused its discretion in concluding that Helen was
unable to work, we find any such error to be harmless. It is undisputed that Helen was not gainfully
employed at the time of the hearing. Thus, the only prejudice Gabriel contends resulted from the
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finding that Helen could not work was the circuit court’s resulting decision not to impute any
income to her for purposes of calculating a modification of his child support obligation.
¶ 32 However, the Act itself provides that only where “a parent is voluntarily unemployed or
underemployed, child support shall be calculated based on a determination of potential income.”
(Emphasis added.) 750 ILCS 5/505(3.2) (West 2018). As such, Illinois courts may impute income
to a parent for purposes of calculating that parent's statutory child support obligation only where
the parent is voluntarily unemployed, is attempting to evade a support obligation, or unreasonably
failed to take advantage of an employment opportunity. In re Marriage of Gosney, 394 Ill. App.
3d 1073, 1077 (2009). “If none of these factors are in evidence, the court may not impute income
to the noncustodial parent.” Id.
¶ 33 Here, while there may have been evidence of Helen’s ability to work, there was absolutely
no evidence that her lack of employment was due to any of the three Gosney factors outlined above.
As such, the circuit court properly declined to impute any income to Helen, and any possible error
in concluding that no income should be imputed to her specifically because of her purported
inability to work was harmless. 3
¶ 34 Gabriel next contends that the circuit court erred in finding that his arrearage for past-due
child support amounted to $29,565.37. He specifically argues the circuit court erred by basing his
current arrearage upon the $26,677.69 amount included in the October 17, 2017, order previously
3 In a related argument, Gabriel also faults the circuit court for not—at a minimum—requiring Helen to complete a job diary documenting her continued efforts to find employment, pursuant to section 505.1(a) of the Act. 750 ILCS 5/550.1(a) (West 2018). (“Whenever it is determined in a proceeding to establish or enforce a child support or maintenance obligation that the person owing a duty of support is unemployed, the court may order the person to seek employment and report periodically to the court with a diary, listing or other memorandum of his or her efforts in accordance with such order.”) That section clearly allows, but does not require, a circuit court to require such a diary. Here, the record reflects Helen’s good-faith efforts to find employment, and we therefore find no abuse of discretion in the circuit court’s failure to impose this requirement upon her.
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reversed by this court.
¶ 35 We review this issue for an abuse of discretion. In re Marriage of Schomburg & Osland,
2016 IL App (3d) 160420, ¶ 19. “A circuit court abuses its discretion when it makes an error of
law.” Cable America, Inc. v. Pace Electronics, Inc., 396 Ill. App. 3d 15, 24 (2009). We agree with
Gabriel that the circuit court erred in making this calculation.
¶ 36 Pursuant to section 510(a) of the Act, “the provisions of any judgment respecting
maintenance or support may be modified only as to installments accruing subsequent to due notice
by the moving party of the filing of the motion for modification. 750 ILCS 5/510(a) (West 2018).
“A plain reading of section 510(a) dictates that a retroactive modification is limited to only those
installments that date back to the filing date of the petition for modification and, thus, insures that
the respondent is put on notice prior to the court ordering him to pay increased support.” In re
Marriage of Pettifer, 304 Ill. App. 3d 326, 328 (1999).
¶ 37 Thus, here it was entirely within the circuit court’s discretion to modify and increase
Gabriel’s monthly child support obligation to $1323—an amount Gabriel has not challenged other
than the specific argument regarding imputation of Helen’s income discussed and rejected above—
and to then make that obligation retroactive to the date upon which Helen originally filed her
petition to modify child support, January 21, 2016.
¶ 38 However, in calculating Gabriel’s child support arrearage, in light of this retroactive
increase in his monthly obligation, the circuit did not add up the 40 total monthly child support
installments due between January 21, 2016, and the entry of the May 31, 2019, order (an amount
we calculate to be $52,920), and then subtract the total amount of child support payments Gabriel
had actually made over the course of that time. Rather, it is clear from the record that the circuit
court arrived at its newly-calculated $29,565.37 arrearage for past due child support by—at least
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in part—including the $26,677.69 arrearage previously calculated (as reflected in the October 19,
2017, order) and adding $3,801.58 in statutory interest on that amount.
¶ 39 As detailed above, because an evidentiary hearing was not held before the entry of the
October 19, 2017, order modifying Gabriel’s child support obligations and entering a judgment
for the previously-calculated arrearage, we reversed that judgment and remanded this matter to the
circuit court for an evidentiary hearing on the merits of Helen's petition to modify child support in
our prior order. In re Marriage of Jonas, 2018 IL App (1st) 172871-U, ¶ 31. It was therefore
improper for the circuit court to base its calculation on the arrearage contained in the previously
reversed order, and include in its new calculation of Gabriel’s arrearage any statutory interest on
the $26,677.69 judgment that we had previously reversed. See 7-Eleven, Inc. v. Dar, 363 Ill. App.
3d 41, 45-46 (2005) (postjudgment interest is not properly awarded with respect to a reversed and
vacated judgment).
¶ 40 We must therefore reverse the $29,565.37 judgment entered against Gabriel for an
arrearage in past-due child support. Unfortunately, the record is insufficient for us to recalculate
the correct amount of Gabriel’s arrearage, as the total amount of Gabriel’s historical child support
payments, as well as any payments he made toward the previously-calculated arrearage, is not
entirely clear. We therefore remand this matter with directions that the amount of the acreage be
determined by first calculating the total amount owed by Gabriel pursuant to the newly-calculated
child support obligation of $1323 per month, backdated to the date Helen originally filed her
petition to modify child support, January 21, 2016 and subtracting from that amount any and all
payments Gabriel has made to Helen for child support since that time, whether they be his prior
monthly child support payments or payments made toward the previously-calculated child support
arrearage. Any statutory interest added to the arrearage resulting from this calculation should only
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be imposed from the date the arrearage is calculated and a judgment as to that amount is entered
upon remand. See In re Marriage of Waltrip, 216 Ill. App. 3d 776, 786 (1991) (“In cases where
the exact amount owed is not calculated until the disposition of the case following remandment,
interest on the judgment runs from the date of the new decree.”).
¶ 41 Gabriel next asserts that the circuit court “exceeded its authority” by ordering him to
provide and pay for a court reporter at every appearance, and in appointing an attorney to represent
Helen and ordering Gabriel to pay for Helen’s attorney. Importantly, Gabriel does not contend that
the circuit abused its discretion in making these decisions, only that the circuit court lacked any
authority to do so. We find that the circuit court did not exceed its authority.
¶ 42 With respect to the requirement that a court reporter be provided for all appearances, we
find that this requirement fits well within the circuit court’s inherent authority to control its own
docket and the course of litigation, including the authority to prevent undue delays in the
disposition of cases. J.S.A. v. M.H., 224 Ill. 2d 182, 196 (2007). From our review of the record, the
circuit court believed that our review of her orders in Gabriel’s prior appeal was hampered by the
lack of a complete record on appeal, and took this action to ensure that a more complete record
would be available for any future appellate proceedings, thus preventing any further delay. The
circuit court did not exceed its authority in entering this order.
¶ 43 We also conclude that the circuit court’s order that Gabriel pay for both a court reporter
and Helen’s attorney fees and costs was also within its authority. As an initial matter, the record
does not actually reflect that Helen’s attorney was appointed by the circuit court. Rather, during
the first hearing held upon remand the circuit court sua sponte sought an attorney to volunteer to
represent Helen, and one of the attorneys present in the courtroom agreed to do so.
¶ 44 That matter aside, section 508(a) of the Act specifically grants the circuit court the authority
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to “order any party to pay a reasonable amount for his own or the other party's costs and attorney's
fees.” 750 ILCS 5/508(a) (West 2018). The requirement that Gabriel pay for a reporter and Helen’s
fees and costs fits squarely within this specific statutory authority.
¶ 45 Again, Gabriel has not argued that the circuit court abused its discretion in entering these
orders, rather that the circuit court lacked any authority to do so. On that limited issue, we must
disagree.
¶ 46 Finally, Gabriel contends that the circuit court abused its discretion in not recusing itself
from this matter considering the purported evidence of bias against Gabriel and his attorney.
¶ 47 Pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 63(C)(1), “[a] judge shall disqualify himself or
herself in a proceeding in which the judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned,”
including instances where “the judge has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party or a party's
lawyer, or personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding.” Ill. S. Ct.
R. 63(C)(1)(a) (eff. Feb 2, 2017). “Whether a judge should recuse himself is a decision in Illinois
that rests exclusively within the determination of the individual judge, pursuant to the canons of
judicial ethics found in the Judicial Code.” (Emphasis in original.) In re Marriage of O'Brien, 2011
IL 109039, ¶ 45. The trial court is in the best position to determine whether it needs to recuse itself.
Hassebrock v. Deep Rock Energy Corp., 2015 IL App (5th) 140105, ¶ 55. “When reviewing a trial
judge's recusal decision, we must determine whether the decision was an abuse of the judge's
discretion.” Barth v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 228 Ill. 2d 163, 175 (2008).
¶ 48 On appeal, Gabriel first cites the circuit court’s orders requiring him to provide a court
reporter and to pay for Helen’s fees and costs as evidence of bias. However, we have already
concluded that these orders were within the court’s authority. Gabriel has not argued that they
represented an abuse of discretion, and we find nothing about these orders to be reflective of
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improper bias.
¶ 49 Gabriel next cites to various exchanges between the circuit court and either Gabriel or his
counsel, which he claims revealed the courts bias and lack of impartiality. However, “ ‘judicial
remarks during the course of a trial that are critical or disapproving of, or even hostile to, counsel,
the parties, and their cases, ordinarily do not support a bias or partiality challenge,’ ” unless “ ‘they
reveal such a high degree of favoritism or antagonism as to make fair judgment impossible.’ ”
Eychaner v. Gross, 202 Ill. 2d 228, 281 (2002) (quoting Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555
(1994)). We have carefully reviewed the record, and conclude that the circuit court's statements
and actions here did nothing to reveal anything resembling such a high degree of favoritism or
antagonism. We therefore find that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in denying the oral
motion to recuse.
¶ 50 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 51 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court in part, reverse in
part, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this order.
¶ 52 Affirmed in part and reversed in part.
¶ 53 Cause remanded.
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