In re Marriage of Lebovich

2025 IL App (1st) 230576-U

• Court: Appellate Court of Illinois
• Decided: September 30, 2025
• Docket: 1-23-0576
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

2025 IL App (1st) 230576-U SIXTH DIVISION

September 30, 2025

Nos. 1-23-0576, 1-24-0630, 1-24-1307, and 1-25-1003 (cons.)

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1). ______________________________________________________________________________

IN THE APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS FIRST DISTRICT ______________________________________________________________________________ In re THE MARRIAGE OF ALISSA LEBOVICH, ) Appeal from the Circuit Court ) of Cook County. Petitioner-Appellee, ) ) ) and ) No. 2018 D 10915 ) LENNY LEBOVICH, ) Honorable ) Abbey Fishman Romanek, Respondent-Appellant. ) Judge, presiding.

PRESIDING JUSTICE C.A. WALKER delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Pucinski and Hyman concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

¶1 Held: In this dissolution of marriage proceeding, we (1) reject respondent’s claim of judicial bias; (2) affirm the circuit court’s allocation of summer parenting time, decision on extracurricular sports activities, requirement that respondent provide full access to the children’s electronic devices to petitioner, dissipation finding regarding a severance package, and attorney’s fees award; and (3) remand for further proceedings consistent with this order. Nos. 1-23-0576, 1-24-0630, 1-24-1307, and 1-25-1003 (cons.)

¶2 This case arises from the dissolution of marriage proceedings between the respondent-

appellant Lenny Lebovich and petitioner-appellee Alissa Lebovich. Lenny and Alissa have two

children, M.L. and N.L. The claims primarily arise from two orders the circuit court entered

following trial, a parental allocation order (Allocation Judgment) and the dissolution of marriage

judgment (Dissolution Judgment). Lenny challenged both orders in a series of appeals, each

consolidated here, in which he raises both large and small-scale challenges to the court’s actions.

¶3 Lenny’s overarching claim is that the court’s orders should be vacated in their entirety, and

the matter remanded for new proceedings in front of a new judge, because the circuit court judge

was biased against him. Failing that, he challenges narrower aspects of the court’s orders.

Regarding the Allocation Judgment, he challenges the court’s summer parenting time and

extracurricular activity findings, along with the requirement that he provide his Apple password

to Alissa and any other information she needs to have co-control of the children’s electronic

devices. Regarding the Dissolution Judgment, he challenges the court’s finding that he dissipated

marital funds by not accepting a severance payment from his former employer and the award of

$200,000 in attorney’s fees to Alissa. Finally, Lenny challenges orders entered after the

Dissolution Judgment which (1) required a full turnover of proceeds arising from the sale of shares

the court deemed marital property, and (2) suspended his parenting time until he purged himself

of contempt for his continued failure to provide all information to Alissa regarding access to the

children’s electronic devices. For the reasons below, we reject Lenny’s bias claim; affirm the

Allocation and Dissolution Judgments; and remand for further proceedings.

¶4 BACKGROUND

2 Nos. 1-23-0576, 1-24-0630, 1-24-1307, and 1-25-1003 (cons.)

¶5 Alissa filed her petition for dissolution of marriage on December 13, 2018. During the

pendency of the dissolution proceedings, the circuit court appointed a Guardian Ad Litem (GAL)

for M.L. and N.L., Howard Rosenberg, on May 9, 2019.

¶6 On July 15, 2021, the circuit court entered an order which, in relevant part, required Lenny

to immediately “provide all passwords, access codes, and/or login information required for Alissa

to access the children’s electronic devices and have the ability to download media and applications

on the devices *** the children’s use of technology must be 100 percent transparent.” The court

ordered that if Lenny did not comply by close of business on July 19, 2021, he would thereafter

incur a fine of $100 a day until he complied. Based on the record, Lenny has still not complied up

to the date of the filing of this order. Lenny’s noncompliance has resulted in multiple court orders

against him, including the entry of sanctions in the amount of $75,700 on August 29, 2023, and

the suspension of his parenting time pursuant to an indirect civil contempt finding on May 6, 2025.

¶7 Following a hearing on December 1, 2021, the circuit court ordered Lenny to pay $125,000

in interim attorney’s fees. During the hearing, the court explained it was awarding the fees “for the

purpose of equalizing the fees [paid] to date.” The court acknowledged Alissa had already “paid

about $430[,000]” through funding provided in part by her mother, Carolyn Schwarz.

¶8 On May 28, 2021, the circuit court entered an order establishing that summer parenting time

for 2021 would use a “5-2-2-5” split to make the parenting time roughly equivalent. M.L. and N.L.

primarily resided with Alissa outside of the summer months.

¶9 Before trial, both parties filed a petition for contribution to attorney’s fees. Alissa moved

under 750 ILCS 5/503 (West 2020) and 750 ILCS 5/508 (West 2020).

¶ 10 Trial occurred across multiple dates between March 1, 2022, and June 30, 2022. At trial,

Lenny testified he had been unemployed since his termination from PRE Brands (PRE) in 2019, a

3 Nos. 1-23-0576, 1-24-0630, 1-24-1307, and 1-25-1003 (cons.)

company he helped start and for whom he served as Chief Executive Officer (CEO). He was living

off of his “retirement,” though he made no withdrawals in 2022. Lenny declined a severance offer

from PRE of $62,500 because it “[p]rovided blanket releases of any claims against the company.”

He had not filed a claim against PRE and had no plan to do so. Regarding the electronic device

access issue, Lenny testified he “provided all the information that I am able to provide.” He

admitted he did not provide Alissa with his personal access code or login information because his

“personal password” is “connected to everything, all my e-mail, and everything I do using my

technology,” and that M.L. and N.L.’s device accounts were “underneath” that personal password.

¶ 11 Alissa testified she was concerned with N.L.’s participation on a travel basketball team with

children two years older than him. She believed Lenny overscheduled the children with

extracurricular activities, and was concerned with “travel sports” in particular because they are

“very time-consuming.” Lenny also signed up M.L. for baseball without notifying Alissa. She still

had not been provided full access for the children’s electronic devices despite the circuit court’s

July 15, 2021 order. Respecting summer parenting time, she did not want to continue the equal

split because “the children were overscheduled, exhausted.”

¶ 12 Schwarz testified at trial regarding her financial support of Alissa, including the funds she

supplied Alissa to assist with attorney’s fees. Alissa gave Schwarz promissory notes regarding the

attorney’s fees Schwarz helped Alissa pay, and Schwarz “definitely” had an expectation of

repayment from Alissa.

¶ 13 Dr. Sol Rappaport testified that Lenny hired him to perform an evaluation under 750 ILCS

5/604.10(c) (West 2018), which states in relevant part that the “court shall order an evaluation to

assist the court in determining the child’s best interests.” During his interviews with Rappaport,

Lenny admitted that he called Alissa “useless,” “worthless,” and “the C-word.” While Lenny was

4 Nos. 1-23-0576, 1-24-0630, 1-24-1307, and 1-25-1003 (cons.)

employed, “by far a majority of decisions were made by Alissa.” Lenny had violated various court

orders during the pendency of the dissolution proceedings. Rappaport believed that M.L. and

N.L.’s participation on multiple travel sports teams could “create difficulties,” and that M.L.

struggled with emotional issues during his baseball games. N.L. reported to Rappoport that his

favorite thing about his time with Lenny was the activities, but his favorite thing about his time

with Alissa was that he could relax because he was often tired after time with his father. Alissa

reported that she has to limit her activities with N.L. and M.L. because they are tired when they

return from Lenny’s parenting time, and Rappoport agreed with her about this point.

¶ 14 On summer parenting time, Rappaport testified that the same parenting schedule should be

used during the summer months as during the school year because it provided consistency, and

Alissa had “been the main caregiver throughout their lives.” When questioned about Rosenberg’s

opinion on summer parenting time, Rappoport stated he did not know whether Rosenberg

recommended equal summer parenting time but admitted such an arrangement would not be

“necessarily problematic.”

¶ 15 Rosenberg testified about recommendations he made in his capacity as GAL, which

involved multiple interviews and interactions with Lenny, Alissa, M.L., and N.L. On the electronic

device access issue, Rosenberg testified “to this day Lenny has not followed that Court order

because *** he think it [in]fringes upon some privacy.” Regarding the children’s participation in

team sports, Rosenberg recommended “there should be only one team or group sport at a time”

because two “is just too much.” As to the summer parenting time schedule, he recommended a

“2/5/5/2” split of the days, generally amounting to 50/50 parenting time, arguing it was a “good

opportunity” for the children to spend time with each parent. He acknowledged the “incivility”

and “war” between Lenny and Alissa had to stop for such an arrangement to work.

5 Nos. 1-23-0576, 1-24-0630, 1-24-1307, and 1-25-1003 (cons.)

¶ 16 Lenny called Oksana Yoshimura, Jill McOmber, Christian Riley, Dennis Sheehan, Anne

Frank, and Geoffrey Shank as witnesses, each of whom testified as to their positive observations

of Lenny as a father.

¶ 17 Following the trial, the circuit court entered the two operative orders primarily at issue in

this consolidated appeal: the December 2, 2022 Allocation Judgment, and the February 7, 2023

Dissolution Judgment. The court stated in the Allocation Judgment, “When a Judgment of

Dissolution of Marriage is entered, this Allocation Judgment, in whole, shall be incorporated by

reference into the Judgment of Dissolution of Marriage.”

¶ 18 In the Allocation Judgment, the circuit court, in relevant part, made findings respecting

“Extracurricular Activities and Summer Camp,” which included that: “Alissa and Lenny shall

consult with one another and attempt to jointly agree upon the selection and scheduling of

extracurricular activities for the children and summer camp ***, subject to the terms set forth

below,” and continued, “[t]he children may be enrolled in one (1) team/group sport or activity per

season, taking into consideration each child’s preference. The parties shall alternate seasons for

choice of the one (1) team/group sport or activity for both M.L. and N.L.”

¶ 19 The circuit court allocated parenting time as follows: “The parties shall adhere to the

following regular parenting time schedule for M.L. and N.L.: Lenny shall have one weeknight

overnight with the children to occur every Wednesday.*** Lenny shall additionally have

alternative weekend overnight parenting time with the children beginning on Friday [afternoon

through Monday morning]. *** Lenny shall also have regular parenting time with the children on

two (2) Thursday evenings per month preceding Alissa’s weekend with the children ***. All other

regular parenting time not specifically allocated to Lenny shall be allocated to Alissa.”

¶ 20 On the electronic device access issue, the circuit court found:

6 Nos. 1-23-0576, 1-24-0630, 1-24-1307, and 1-25-1003 (cons.)

“The children each currently have their own Apple ID and password under Lennys Apple

account. Both Lenny and Alissa currently have the children’s Apple ID and password

information and are entitled to the same in the event that information changes. *** Because

the children’s Apple IDs and password are associated with Lenny’s Apple account, Lenny

is the only parent with the ability to fully control access to the children’s Apple accounts.

In recognition thereof, Lenny has an affirmative duty to provide Alissa with all passwords

and information which in any way affect the children’s use of their Apple ID, any device,

or application (i.e. Facebook messenger). In the event that any such password is connected

to any of Lenny’s sensitive personal information, Lenny shall change said password to a

unique password not tied to any of his other personal platforms.”

¶ 21 The Dissolution Judgment contained additional findings relevant to this appeal. Before

listing its findings, the circuit court recounted the testimony from various witnesses, including

Lenny, and concluded “Lenny lacked credibility.” The court further found that Schwarz testified

credibly. In analyzing maintenance, the court noted that Alissa had an imputed income of $40,000,

while Lenny’s was $180,000.

¶ 22 Regarding dissipation, the circuit court found that Lenny dissipated the marital assets by

$189,216.49 (not the full requested amount from Alissa’s of $927,454.22). Included in that finding

was $62,500 from Lenny’s “waiver of severance payment” from PRE. The court rejected Lenny’s

explanation that accepting the severance offer would “compromise [his] rights in the future with

respect to his interest in the business” and require “him to agree not to file a claim against PRE”

because it found Lenny “had no intention of filing any claims against PRE and has not filed any

claims against PRE.”

7 Nos. 1-23-0576, 1-24-0630, 1-24-1307, and 1-25-1003 (cons.)

¶ 23 The circuit court also ruled that Lenny’s shares and interest in PRE were marital property,

to be split evenly.

¶ 24 In the attorney’s fees section of the Dissolution Judgment, the circuit court awarded Alissa

$200,000 in fees, which included the still outstanding $125,000 in interim fees. The court

explained its finding by recounting Lenny’s history of elongating the proceedings, including listing

multiple instances of Lenny violating court orders, which necessitated responsive filings from

Alissa, including Lenny’s failure to provide the passwords to the children’s devices. The court

also noted that on the date of Dissolution Judgment, “[t]here remains an outstanding Order of

Commitment and Attachment of Contempt Order until Lenny purges himself of contempt by

posting $125,000 cash bond or until release by the process of law. Lenny has refused to turn

himself into the Court, has refused to comply with the Court Order requiring him to pay $125,000

to [Alissa’s attorneys].” The court concluded that this conduct showed Lenny “needlessly and

substantially increased the cost of litigation through his total disregard of court orders.” The court

acknowledged Alissa paid her attorneys $425,688 and still owed $186,479.67. It concluded, “for

all these reasons, Lenny shall contribute $200,000 towards Alissa’s attorneys’ fees and costs

(inclusive of the $125,000 previously ordered).”

¶ 25 Amongst the other findings in the Dissolution Judgment, the circuit court denied Alissa’s

request for permanent maintenance; awarded Lenny certain real property free of any claim from

Alissa; and split multiple costs related to M.L. and N.L. 60% for Lenny and 40% for Alissa.

¶ 26 Finally, the circuit court included the following language in the Dissolution Judgment, “The

Court expressly finds that there is no just reason for delaying enforcement or appeal of this

Judgment.”

8 Nos. 1-23-0576, 1-24-0630, 1-24-1307, and 1-25-1003 (cons.)

¶ 27 Following entry of the Allocation Judgment and Dissolution Judgment, the circuit court

entered two additional orders which Lenny attempts to challenge on this appeal. First, on March

1, 2023, Alissa filed an “Emergency Petition for the Entry of a Mandatory Injunction and for

Turnover Order” because she had allegedly discovered Lenny potentially had access to proceeds

from a sale of the PRE shares. 1 The petition had three “counts,” including count II for a turnover

order. Alissa sought the full proceeds of any sale because, per the Dissolution Judgment, “Alissa

is awarded 50% of the membership interest in PRE Brands,” and other additional funds from the

court’s dissipation and attorney’s fees findings. In that same Judgment, Lenny is ordered to

reimburse Alissa $94,608.26 of marital funds he dissipated.” Lenny is also ordered to reimburse

Alissa for 60% of the children’s expenses.” Lenny failed to appear at a hearing that same day, and

the court granted count II for the turnover order and executed documents effectuating the turnover

in Lenny’s stead.

¶ 28 Second, Alissa filed a petition for a rule to show cause in January 2025, complaining that

Lenny still had not provided her full access to the children’s electronic devices. The circuit court

found Lenny in indirect civil contempt on May 6, 2025, and entered an order suspending his

parenting time that same day, indicating that Lenny should file a motion with the court if he purged

himself of the contempt.

¶ 29 Before turning to Lenny’s claims, we must note that examination of the record reveals a

contentious litigation between the parties and their attorneys, which featured repeated instances of

Lenny and his counsel having heated exchanges with the circuit court judge. Noteworthy amongst

these exchanges are the following passages:

1 This court will not discuss any specific amounts or parties involved in the transaction, as this information was filed under seal with this court. 9 Nos. 1-23-0576, 1-24-0630, 1-24-1307, and 1-25-1003 (cons.)

¶ 30 On March 10, 2022, during a discussion of Lenny’s concern that he could be arrested

pursuant to the circuit court’s body attachment order for his failure to pay the $125,000 in interim

attorney’s fees, the circuit court judge stated that Lenny’s conduct “pisses her off” and said to

Lenny, “I really don’t care if you get picked up. I hope you do frankly because you blew my orders

and you’ve blown dozens of my orders because you don’t respect me or the court or anyone else

as far as I can tell.”

¶ 31 On March 23, 2022, during a discussion of the circuit court’s requirement that neither Lenny

nor Alissa disparage each other in public, the circuit court judge said to Alissa, “I bet you he

doesn’t know who he told because he told so many people…Don’t you dare, Mr. Lebovich, sit

there and tell the kids it’s their fault, and the other kids are all messed up. Not that you’re listening

to me because I know you’re not, but it’s going in an order again…Your time is up. I’m done with

this nonsense. I’m done hearing about how you’re going to be destitute because if you were so

destitute, you’d be working and you’re not, and you haven’t.”

¶ 32 On August 15, 2023, in a discussion of Lenny’s alleged failure to abide by the Dissolution

Judgment’s extracurricular activity limitation, the circuit court judge stated, “Do you even care

about your kids, Mr. Lebovich?” and “You do what you want when you want. God bless. Go do

it, but you’re not doing it to your kids. I’m just done. I’m just done.”

¶ 33 JURISDICTION

¶ 34 This is a consolidated case involving four separate appeals. Lenny filed a motion to

reconsider the Allocation Judgment on January 13, 2023. The circuit court denied it on February

23, 2024. Lenny then filed his notice of appeal on March 21, 2024, in case No 1-24-0630.

10 Nos. 1-23-0576, 1-24-0630, 1-24-1307, and 1-25-1003 (cons.)

¶ 35 Lenny filed a motion to reconsider the Dissolution Judgment on March 1, 2023. The circuit

court struck the motion that same day. Lenny filed a motion to reinstate on March 10, 2023, and

also filed a notice of appeal in 1-23-0576 on March 29, 2023.

¶ 36 The court later reinstated the motion to reconsider the Dissolution Judgment on August 21,

2023, which it denied on June 7, 2024. Lenny then filed his notice of appeal in case No. 1-24-1307

on June 21, 2024.

¶ 37 Finally, following the May 6, 2025 order, Lenny filed his notice of appeal in case No. 1-25-

1003 on May 27, 2025.

¶ 38 Based on the above, Lenny filed his notices of appeal within 30 days of the dismissal or

denial of his motions to reconsider in the first three appeals from the Adjudication Judgment and

Dissolution Judgment, i.e. case Nos. 1-23-0576, 1-24-0630, and 1-24-1307. The Dissolution

Judgment was a final order that rendered both itself and the Allocation Judgment (incorporated

into the Dissolution Judgment by the circuit court) final and appealable, and contained a finding

of finality per Illinois Supreme Court Rule 304(a) (eff. Mar. 8, 2016). Accordingly, this court has

jurisdiction over these cases pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rules 301 (Feb. 1, 1994), 303 (eff.

July 1, 2017), and 304(a) (eff. Mar. 8, 2016). In so finding, we acknowledge that Lenny’s notice

of appeal in 1-24-1307 also challenged the court’s March 1, 2023 order, which, among other

things, required a turnover of funds, in addition to striking the motion to reconsider. We specify

that this court’s finding of jurisdiction in case 1-24-1307 applies only insofar as Lenny appeals

from the denial of reconsideration of the Dissolution Judgment, and not necessarily as to any other

claim arising from the March 1, 2023 order, as we will explain below.

¶ 39 We note that the notice of appeal creating case No. 1-23-0576 was premature. That notice

was filed within 30 days of the court’s striking Lenny’s motion to reconsider the Dissolution

11 Nos. 1-23-0576, 1-24-0630, 1-24-1307, and 1-25-1003 (cons.)

Judgment, but the court later reinstated that motion, then denied it on the merits, prompting a

proper, timely notice of appeal in 1-24-1037. See Workman v. St. Therese Medical Center, 266 Ill.

App. 3d 286, 292 (1994).

¶ 40 Finally, Alissa contests this court’s jurisdiction over case No. 1-25-1003, contending the

order was not final and appealable. As explained below, we need not decide whether we have

jurisdiction over this order, as it is obviated due to the resolution of a claim arising from the

Dissolution Judgment.

¶ 41 ANALYSIS

¶ 42 On these consolidated appeals, Lenny raises multiple claims, beginning with the

overarching claim that all appealed-from orders should be vacated due to judicial bias. Beyond

bias, Lenny claims the circuit court erred in the Allocation Judgment respecting (1) the summer

parenting time schedule, (2) the limitation of extracurricular activities for M.L. and N.L. to one

activity per season, and (3) the electronic device access issue. He further claims the court erred in

the Dissolution Judgment in its finding on (1) dissipation for refusing the $62,500 severance offer

from PRE, and (2) the award to Alissa of $200,000 in attorney’s fees. Finally, Lenny claims the

court erred by requiring turnover of the full amount of proceeds from the PRE shares sale on March

1, 2023, and by suspending his parenting time in the May 6, 2025 order.

¶ 43 I. Judicial Bias

¶ 44 We must begin with judicial bias. A circuit court judge is presumed to be neutral, and a

litigant bears a heavy burden to demonstrate that a judge was biased against him such that a court

order may be invalidated on that basis. Eychaner v. Gross, 202 Ill. 2d 228, 280 (2002). “Allegedly

erroneous findings and rulings by the trial court are insufficient reasons to believe that the court

has a personal bias for or against a litigant.” Id. Bias will only be found if the litigant can

12 Nos. 1-23-0576, 1-24-0630, 1-24-1307, and 1-25-1003 (cons.)

demonstrate a “deep-seated favoritism or antagonism that would make fair judgment impossible.”

Liteky v. U.S., 510 U.S. 540, 555 (1994). Such a finding is only appropriate in the “most extreme

circumstances.” People v. Conway, 2023 IL 127670, ¶ 22. A judge’s expressions of frustration

directed towards a litigant do not necessarily demonstrate bias. See Antonacci v. Seyfarth Shaw,

LLP, 2015 IL App (1st) 142372, ¶ 39. In the context of a substitution of judge request, the Illinois

Supreme Court has explained, “Where bias or prejudice is invoked as the basis for seeking

substitution, it must normally stem from an extrajudicial source.” In re Estate of Wilson, 238 Ill.

2d 519, 554 (2010).

¶ 45 At the outset, we note that Alissa contends Lenny forfeited this argument by not bringing a

motion for substitution of judge. While there is precedent for finding the failure to move for

substitution of judge forfeits a claim of judicial bias (see County of Peoria v. Couture, 2022 IL

App (3d) 210091, ¶ 49) we note that, as Lenny points out, the most problematic exchanges

occurred during and after the trial, making the potential for Lenny to seek substitution unrealistic.

Moreover, waiver and forfeiture are limitations on the parties, not this court, and in this instance

we find it appropriate to address the substance of Lenny’s judicial bias argument. See Medponics

Illinois, LLC v. Department of Agriculture, 2021 IL 125443, ¶ 52.

¶ 46 Lenny argues the circuit court exhibited a pervasive bias against him beginning on July 15,

2021, and extending until the present. He cites a handful of specific incidents and passages, most

notably those listed above, which reveal the circuit court judge routinely expressed frustration at

Lenny’s failure to follow her orders.

¶ 47 We find that the circuit court judge was not biased against Lenny such that she was

incapable of rendering fair and impartial rulings. Based on the record, including the instances

Lenny cites in his briefs, and recounted herein, there is no question that the judge’s frustration

13 Nos. 1-23-0576, 1-24-0630, 1-24-1307, and 1-25-1003 (cons.)

levels with Lenny increased as time went on, and that the judge made statements that went well

beyond judicial decorum. But while the passages are unfortunate, it is well-established that

expressions of frustration are not conclusive evidence of bias, and there is nothing to suggest that

the judge’s comments to Lenny were born out of any antagonism arising from an extrajudicial

source beyond its frustration with Lenny’s conduct. See Danhauer v. Danhauer, 2013 IL App (1st)

123537, ¶ 27; see also Wilson, 238 Ill. 2d at 554. Taking the most egregious passages, quoted

above, into consideration, each arises from Lenny’s undisputed refusal to follow the court’s orders.

With this context in mind, the judge’s comments were borne of frustration and not fundamental

antagonism.

¶ 48 Lenny’s claim also fails because, despite the circuit court judge’s harsh rhetoric, it entered

orders in favor of both sides throughout the pendency of the litigation, including after July 15,

2021. This demonstrates the court remained able to give Lenny a fair hearing, despite his literally

contemptuous behavior. Liteky v. U.S., 510 U.S. at 555 (bias requires showing that a fair judgment

is impossible). In the Dissolution Judgment, for example, the court denied Alissa permanent

maintenance, awarded Lenny disputed property, and ordered Alissa to pay 40% of many childcare

costs; these are hardly the rulings of a court that simply gave Alissa whatever she wanted. More

recently, in the May 6, 2025 order, despite Lenny’s years-long refusal to abide by the court’s

electronic device access orders, the court still permitted Lenny to purge himself of contempt

without escalating the potential consequences against him, as would have been within its power.

Thus, while the court’s language was inappropriate, and rhetorical editorializing should be avoided

going forward, the record is also clear that the court did not allow this frustration to so influence

its decision-making that it was incapable of giving Lenny a fair hearing such that its orders should

be reversed or a new judge assigned on remand. Id.

14 Nos. 1-23-0576, 1-24-0630, 1-24-1307, and 1-25-1003 (cons.)

¶ 49 Finally, Lenny’s claim fails because it is insufficiently supported by legal authority. In fact,

Lenny fails to identify a single dissolution of marriage case where a judge’s rulings were

overturned based on judicial bias. This is with good reason; such examples are exceedingly rare,

if in fact any exist, based on this court’s research. It was Lenny’s burden to support his argument

with case law (see Ill. S. Ct. R. 341(h)(7) (eff. Oct. 1, 2020)), and he failed to do so. Instead, he

cites to the well-known cases from the Illinois and United States Supreme Court, which established

the general propositions of judicial bias law. In each of these cases, the court emphasized the huge

burden the claimant faced, and what an exceedingly rare fact pattern it would take to satisfy that

burden, and then denied the claim of bias before it. See Liteky v. U.S., 510 U.S. at 554-56; Conway,

2023 IL 127670, ¶¶ 22-27; Eychaner, 202 Ill. 2d at 279-81. We follow this guidance and reach the

same result; the circuit court judge’s language strongly expressed her frustration, but did not show

deep-seated antagonism, and did not prevent her from making fair and impartial rulings.

¶ 50 II. The Allocation Judgment

¶ 51 Lenny next challenges the circuit court’s findings in the Allocation Judgment on (1) summer

parenting time, (2) extracurricular activities, and (3) the electronic device access issue.

¶ 52 The first two issues arise from the circuit court’s determination of parental responsibilities.

In making determinations on both parental decision-making and parenting time, the Illinois

Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act requires the circuit court to base its decision on the best

interests of the child. 750 ILCS 5/602.5 (West 2020); 750 ILCS 5/602.7 (West 2020); In re

Marriage of Hipes and Lozano, 2023 IL App (1st) 230953, ¶¶ 36-38. “Because the trial court is in

the best position to assess the credibility of witnesses and determine the child’s best interests, its

decision regarding the allocation of parenting time must be accorded great deference.” In re

Marriage of Palarz, 2022 IL App (1st) 210618, ¶ 28. A reviewing court will not reverse a decision

15 Nos. 1-23-0576, 1-24-0630, 1-24-1307, and 1-25-1003 (cons.)

“regarding the allocation of parental responsibilities unless the court abused its considerable

discretion, or its decision is against the manifest weight of the evidence.” Id.

¶ 53 The evidence at trial demonstrated support for both Lenny and Alissa’s sides of these issues.

Rappoport favored continuing the school year parenting time arrangement in the summer, while

Rosenberg believed a 50/50 summer split could benefit the children, provided Lenny and Alissa

made efforts to cooperate. Similarly, Rappoport identified that the children enjoyed playing sports,

while Rosenberg suggested a limitation. Each parent testified in support of their position, with

Alissa expressing concern with overscheduling and fatigue due to Lenny overscheduling the

children. Lenny also offered the testimony of friends and neighbors in favor of his ability as a

parent to support this argument for increased parenting time.

¶ 54 On this record, we find the circuit court’s parenting responsibility conclusions were

reasonable, even if the record also would have supported a different finding. It is these specific

circumstances why deferential standards of review exist in these cases—the circuit court judge is

much more familiar with this case than this court, and was present during the trial to view the

witnesses first hand and synthesize that trial testimony with its knowledge of the case to arrive at

a conclusion as to what was in M.L. and N.L.’s best interests. Id.

¶ 55 Specifically respecting extracurricular activities, the circuit court acknowledged that some

activity and participation was a positive but balanced this by incorporating a recommended

limitation on it by requiring one sport at a time, with the parents choosing on a rotational basis.

This was a reasonable conclusion with support in the record, including from both Rosenberg and

Rappaport, meaning the decision had a basis in the record and was not arbitrary or unreasonable

such that we can find it was against the manifest weight of the evidence or constituted an abuse of

discretion, even if the opposite conclusion also had record support. See In re Marriage of Bates,

16 Nos. 1-23-0576, 1-24-0630, 1-24-1307, and 1-25-1003 (cons.)

212 Ill. 2d 489, 516 (2004) (“Where the evidence permits multiple reasonable inferences, the

reviewing court will accept those inferences that support the court’s order.”)

¶ 56 Similarly, respecting the summer parenting time decision, the circuit court was again

confronted with a scenario where the parties conflicted and there was support in the record for

both sides, and it made a reasonable conclusion to continue the school-year parenting time

structure. While the 50/50 summer structure may also have been reasonable and was

(conditionally) supported by Rosenberg, this does not mean the court’s conclusion otherwise was

unreasonable. The court concluded that the best interest of the children would be served by

continuity, and may well have concluded that the caveat Rosenberg provided was unlikely to be

met because Alissa and Lenny showed no likelihood of better cooperation. Again, given our

standard of review, we cannot reverse this finding on appeal. Id. (“A custody determination, in

particular, is afforded ‘great deference’ because ‘the trial court is in a superior position to judge

the credibility of the witnesses and determine the best interests of the child.’ ” (quoting In re

Marriage of Gustavson, 247 Ill. App. 3d 797, 801 (1993))).

¶ 57 Lenny’s final claim arising from the Allocation Judgment is the circuit court’s requirement

that he provide full access to Alissa for the children’s electronic devices. Lenny has refused to

abide by some version of this requirement for over four years, apparently up to and including right

now, as he was currently under a contempt order for this refusal at the time this court was last

updated. He justifies this conduct by arguing that to provide this access, he would have to provide

his Apple password, which would give Alissa too much access into his personal affairs.

¶ 58 We first acknowledge that the parties dispute the nature of the circuit court’s orders on this

issue, with Lenny contending it amounts to a “mandatory injunction,” while Alissa contends it is

more akin to a discovery order. We find the circuit court’s findings on this issue in the Allocation

17 Nos. 1-23-0576, 1-24-0630, 1-24-1307, and 1-25-1003 (cons.)

Judgment were just that—an allocation of parental responsibility—and not a separate “mandatory

injunction” requiring that Alissa to make some additional showing. The court’s finding is that both

parents are to share the responsibility to monitor the children’s electronic device; this is a

reasonable allocation of responsibility and, and most accurately considered a necessary function a

parent must carry out given the centrality of electronic devices in modern society. 750 ILCS

5/602.5(b)(1), (2), (4) (West 2020).

¶ 59 We further note that, even if it were a mandatory injunction, our standard of review would

still be abuse of discretion, meaning the circuit court’s decision would be owed similar (if not

exactly the same) level of deference as an allocation of parental responsibility decision. Compare

In re Marriage of Winter, 2013 IL App (1st) 112836, ¶ 20 (“The decision to grant or deny an

injunction rests within the sound discretion of the trial court and on review the decision will not

be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion.”) with Palarz, 2022 IL App (1st) 210618, ¶ 28 (A lower

court’s decision regarding the allocation of parental responsibilities will not be overturned “unless

the court abused its considerable discretion, or its decision is against the manifest weight of the

evidence.”).

¶ 60 Lenny presents no argument as to why the circuit court’s order that he provide Alissa full

access was not in the children’s best interest and instead argues only that he provided sufficient

access in his judgment, and the court and Alissa should simply be satisfied with the access he

deemed appropriate. This is an untenable position counter to the fundamental function of the law;

the court, not the parties, decides what its orders requires, and a party cannot disobey a court order

simply because it does not agree with it. See In re Marriage of Andrew, 2023 IL App (1st) 221039,

¶¶ 56-60.

18 Nos. 1-23-0576, 1-24-0630, 1-24-1307, and 1-25-1003 (cons.)

¶ 61 Even if Lenny’s argument was worth addressing substantively, it is immediately revealed

as facially invalid because it is based on a false premise. It is fallacy that in order for each parent

to have equal access and control of the children’s devices, Lenny would have to provide Alissa his

Apple password. The reality, of course, is that Lenny and Alissa can simply divorce the children’s

electronic devices from Lenny’s preexisting Apple account and create a new account structure,

with Lenny and Alissa both maintaining control at the highest level from the outset of the account’s

creation, under which the children’s devices will be managed. This structure will effectuate the

circuit court’s intent, as expressed in the Allocation Judgment, to ensure the best interest of the

children will be furthered while not compromising the integrity of Lenny’s personal information.

¶ 62 Thus, we affirm the circuit court’s finding in the Allocation Judgment that Lenny must

supply full access, but vacate any related orders (pre- or post-dating the Allocation Judgment) that

specifically required Lenny to provide his Apple password or any other particular type of access,

and remand for the court to enter a new order, per the court’s findings in the Allocation and

Dissolution Judgments, which requires Lenny and Alissa to immediately collaborate on creating a

new account under which they both share equal access to the parental control of the children’s

devices (and Facebook Messenger, and any other device or application). This court is not naïve,

however, and we explicitly note that the circuit court should not hesitate to use its powers of

indirect civil contempt should Lenny fail to abide by the new order.

¶ 63 This finding obviates Lenny’s appeal in case No. 1-25-1003, as that order contains a

requirement that is contrary to the remedy fashioned in this order, and as such is vacated. In so

ordering, we make no finding as to whether this court would have had jurisdiction to consider the

May 6, 2025 order on its own merits. See Hamilton v. Williams, 237 Ill. App. 3d 765, 780 (1992).

Without reaching the merits of that appeal, however, we do note that on remand, should the circuit

19 Nos. 1-23-0576, 1-24-0630, 1-24-1307, and 1-25-1003 (cons.)

court determine it is appropriate to suspend parenting time, Illinois law requires that it find “by a

preponderance of the evidence that a parent engaged in any conduct that seriously endangered”

the child. 750 ILCS 5/603.10(a) (West 2024).

¶ 64 Finally, we must address the circuit court’s order of August 29, 2023, requiring Lenny to

pay Alissa $75,700 as a fine for noncompliance with its initial July 15, 2021 order that Lenny

provide full access to the children’s electronic devices. Based on our finding that remand for a new

order is necessary to effectuate the court’s intent in the Allocation Judgment, we must vacate the

penalty. We further note that the court’s order that Alissa was to collect this sum was improper. A

court’s financial remedy for a party refusing to follow its orders, should it choose that method of

enforcement, is a fine levied in relation to an indirect civil contempt finding, and such a fine is

payable to the court, not a party. See Door Properties, LLC v. Nahlawi, 2023 IL App (1st) 230012,

¶¶ 39-42. “A civil contempt order with an improper purge provision can often be described by

another name—a purported civil contempt order that, because of its improper purge provision, has

unintentionally morphed into an order of criminal contempt.” Id. ¶ 38 (citing Penfield Co. of

California v. Security & Exchange Comm'n, 330 U.S. 585, 592-93 (1947)). It appears that is what

happened here--the July 15, 2021 order became an order of indirect criminal contempt. Though

civil contempt is coercive and meant to gain compliance, criminal contempt orders are punitive

and designed to vindicate the court’s authority. Criminal contempt is to punish the contemnors for

their previous conduct that cannot be undone. Id at ¶ 40. “Compelling payment of a fixed fine,

rather than compliance with the discovery orders, would also stray from coercing future behavior

and fall more comfortably into the realm of punishing” for past acts that cannot be undone. Id.

¶ 41.

¶ 65 III. The Dissolution Judgment

20 Nos. 1-23-0576, 1-24-0630, 1-24-1307, and 1-25-1003 (cons.)

¶ 66 Lenny’s next claims arise from the Dissolution Judgment, namely: (1) the circuit court’s

finding that his decision not to accept the $62,500 PRE severance offer constituted dissipation,

and (2) the court’s award of $200,000 in attorney’s fees to Alissa, including $125,000 in interim

attorney’s fees previously ordered. Lenny also challenges (3) a turnover order, entered against him

on March 1, 2023, corresponding to the full proceeds of the sale of the PRE shares the court found

were marital property in the Dissolution Judgment.

¶ 67 We begin with dissipation. The circuit court found that Lenny dissipated marital assets by

refusing to sign a severance agreement that would have paid him $62,500. Lenny maintains this

was error because he was under no obligation to sign the severance agreement, as it required him

to waive his right to sue PRE in the future.

¶ 68 In dividing marital property, a circuit court may consider the “dissipation by each party of

the marital property.” 750 ILCS 5/503(d)(2) (West 2020). Dissipation is “the use of marital

property for the sole benefit of one of the spouses for a purpose unrelated to the marriage at a time

that the marriage is undergoing an irreconcilable breakdown.” In re Marriage of Evanoff and

Tomasek, 2016 IL App (1st) 150017, ¶ 37. When a spouse is accused of dissipation, “The

complaining spouse must make a prima facie case for dissipation before the burden shifts to the

spouse charged with dissipation to demonstrate, with clear and convincing evidence, how the funds

were spent.” In re Marriage of Budorick, 2020 IL App (1st) 190994, ¶ 88. The court will find

dissipation if the spouse cannot demonstrate the funds were spent for a “legitimate family

expense.” Id. We review a circuit court’s dissipation finding under the manifest weight of the

evidence standard. Id. In conducting this review, the circuit court’s factual findings and credibility

determinations are entitled to deference, and this court will not substitute its judgment for that of

the factfinder on these issues. See In re D.F., 201 Ill. 2d 476, 498-99 (2002).

21 Nos. 1-23-0576, 1-24-0630, 1-24-1307, and 1-25-1003 (cons.)

¶ 69 We find the circuit court’s conclusion that Lenny dissipated the marital property in the

amount of $62,500 was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. First, Lenny does not

contest that Alissa made a prima facie case that Lenny failed to collect an available $62,500 which,

if collected, would have been considered marital property, or that the issue arose during a time of

irretrievable breakdown. Instead, he only claims that the court erred in finding his refusal to sign

the severance agreement constituted dissipation because a future lawsuit might increase the marital

assets. The issue, then, turned on the court’s determination of whether Lenny established by clear

and convincing evidence that his intent in refusing to accept the severance offer was an attempt to

increase the marital property by maintaining the right to pursue a more valuable legal claim, or if

he simply acted to decrease the value of the marital property by $62,500 without a credible

explanation. Budorick, 2020 IL App (1st) 190994, ¶ 88. The court resolved this issue by finding

Lenny did not credibly testify as to an explanation, and instead took a unilateral act to decrease

marital property. On this finding, we must defer to the lower court, who was in a better position to

judge Lenny’s credibility as a witness. D.F., 201 Ill. 2d at 498-99. This fact, combined with the

undisputed fact that Lenny never pursued a claim against PRE, means the court based its decision

on its own credibility determinations and a reasonable interpretation of the evidence in the record,

meaning we cannot find the decision was against the manifest weight of the evidence, and must

affirm. Id.

¶ 70 Lenny claims his conduct amounted to refusing funds, not spending funds already in the

marital estate. This is a distinction without a difference in this context. There is no dispute that due

to a unilateral decision by Lenny, the marital property contained 62,500 fewer dollars. Whether

that reduction was due to conduct rising to dissipation was a decision within the discretion of the

22 Nos. 1-23-0576, 1-24-0630, 1-24-1307, and 1-25-1003 (cons.)

circuit court, and it made its decision based on grounds supported by the record and its finding that

Lenny lacked credibility, a finding, again, to which we must defer.

¶ 71 The next claim arising from the Dissolution Judgment is the circuit court’s award of

$200,000 in attorney’s fees. The circuit court ordered contribution pursuant to Alissa’s petition

under 750 ILCS 5/503 (West 2020) and 750 ILCS 5/508 (West 2020). Per the latter, “At the

conclusion of any pre-judgment dissolution proceeding ***, contribution to attorney’s fees and

costs may be awarded from the opposing party in accordance with subjection (j) of Section 503.”

750 ILCS 5/508(a) (West 2020). Subsection (j) reads, in relevant part, “Any award of contribution

to one party from the other party shall be based on the criteria for division of marital property.”

750 ILCS 5/503(j)(2) (West 2020). That criteria includes the parties’ economic circumstances and

ability to earn income in the future. 750 ILCS 5/503(d)(5), (11) (West 2020). To justify a

contribution award, the spouse seeking the contribution must establish his or her inability to pay

the attorney’s fees, and the other spouse's ability to pay. Shen v. Shen, 2015 IL App (1st) 130733,

¶ 99. A court can consider a party’s conduct during the litigation in making a contribution award.

In re Marriage of Patel and Sines-Patel, 2013 IL App (1st) 112571, ¶ 117. A reviewing court

defers to the circuit court’s credibility findings during a dissolution of marriage trial. See In re

Marriage of Stuhr, 2016 IL App (1st) 152370, ¶ 69. We review an attorney’s fees contribution

award for abuse of discretion. Sines-Patel, 2013 IL App (1st) 112571, ¶ 67.

¶ 72 Lenny’s primary challenge to the attorney’s fee award is that the circuit court incorporated

the previous interim fee award of $125,000 into the $200,000, and the interim award was improper

because Alissa did not need monetary assistance to adequately participate in the litigation. In

dissolution of marriage proceedings, a circuit court can award interim attorney’s fees from one

party to another when there is a disparity in funds between the parties, a process commonly

23 Nos. 1-23-0576, 1-24-0630, 1-24-1307, and 1-25-1003 (cons.)

described as “leveling the playing field.” See In re Marriage of Patel, 2013 IL App (1st) 122882,

¶¶ 33-34. The court may base its finding on a number of statutory factors (750 ILCS 5/501(c-1)(1)

(West Supp. 2021)), but the core consideration for the court is to determine whether an award is

necessary “to enable the petitioning party to participate adequately in the litigation,” which

requires a finding that “the party from whom attorney’s fees and costs are sought has the financial

ability to pay reasonable amounts and that the party seeking attorney’s fees and costs lacks

sufficient access to assets or income to pay reasonable amounts.” 750 ILCS 5/501(c-1)(3) (West

Supp. 2021).

¶ 73 We find the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in awarding Alissa $200,000 in

attorney’s fees. There is no dispute that Alissa had paid over $400,000 in fees and still owed over

$180,000, and that the parties had a wide imputed income disparity, valid considerations for the

court in making its award. See 750 ILCS 5/503(d)(5), (11) (West 2020). Schwarz, Alissa’s mother,

loaned Alissa much of the funding she used to pay the attorney’s fees, loans she “definitely”

expected to be paid back. The court found Schwarz’s testimony credible, a finding to which we

must defer. Stuhr, 2016 IL App (1st) 152370, ¶ 69. Alissa’s need to repay these loans was also a

valid consideration in awarding attorney’s fees. The law maintains that contribution is appropriate

on a showing that forcing the spouse seeking contribution to pay the fees would undermine their

financial stability, which the requirement for Alissa to repay the loans to her mother without

contribution from Lenny very well may have done. Shen, 2015 IL App (1st) 130733, ¶ 99.

¶ 74 Additionally, the court extensively detailed Lenny’s conduct throughout the litigation in

making its award, another factor the court can consider in contribution. See Sines-Patel, 2013 IL

App (1st) 112571, ¶ 117. It follows that the court’s order of $200,000 in contribution is supported

24 Nos. 1-23-0576, 1-24-0630, 1-24-1307, and 1-25-1003 (cons.)

by the record and based on appropriate factors under the law, and thus not subject to reversal for

abuse of discretion. Id. ¶ 67.

¶ 75 Lenny’s argument that interim attorney fees were inappropriate because Alissa had access

to Schwarz’s funding during the pendency of the litigation does not impact our conclusion. Even

accepting Lenny’s proposition that the record showed there was no disparity in access to funding

that affected Alissa’s ability to adequately participate in the litigation, we may affirm on any basis

supported by the record, and the record provides more than enough support for the conclusion that

$200,000 is a reasonable attorney’s fee award, irrespective of the lower court’s specific

justification for $125,000 of that award. See Andrew, 2023 IL App (1st) 221039, ¶ 36.

¶ 76 Next, Lenny takes issue with the circuit court’s acceptance of Schwarz’s testimony that she

expected to be repaid, arguing that because of the familial relationship and Alissa’s income level,

it is unrealistic that Alissa will repay the loans. This argument fails, however, as again, it is

axiomatic that as a reviewing court, we must defer to the lower court’s credibility findings. Stuhr,

2016 IL App (1st) 152370, ¶ 69. 2 The circuit court was much better positioned than this court to

assess Schwarz’s credibility on her expectation of repayment. Moreover, the fact that Alissa did

not have immediate access to funds, thus necessitating the loans, does not foreclose a finding that

Schwarz credibly expected repayment. Schwarz was well aware that dissolution proceedings were

ongoing, at the conclusion of which the court could award funds to Alissa with which she could

reimburse Schwarz.

22 Lenny briefly references the legal maxim that a transfer from a parent to a child will typically be considered a gift, but provides no argument as to why Schwarz’s payments to Alissa’s attorneys would fit this characterization, and as such we will not substantively consider the argument. See Ill. S. Ct. R. 341(h)(7) (eff. Oct. 1, 2020). 25 Nos. 1-23-0576, 1-24-0630, 1-24-1307, and 1-25-1003 (cons.)

¶ 77 Finally, Lenny argues the circuit court’s attorney’s fees award was improper because, under

750 ILCS 5/508(b) (West 2020), fees assessed against a party for failure to comply with a court’s

order should be assessed specific to each proceeding, and not generally as part of a contribution

award. See In re Marriage of Gattone, 317 Ill. App. 3d 346, 359-60 (2000). This argument fails

because while the court certainly highlighted Lenny’s conduct in its fee award, which included his

violation of court orders, the $200,000 was not simply an attempt to compensate Alissa for specific

instances of Lenny’s disobeying court orders; instead, as the court explained, it was because Lenny

generally engaged in conduct that needlessly elongated the litigation, an appropriate consideration

for a contribution award. See Sines-Patel, 2013 IL App (1st) 112571, ¶ 117.

¶ 78 Lenny’s final claim is a challenge to the turnover aspect of the circuit court’s March 1, 2023

order. Specifically, the court granted count II of Alissa’s emergency petition, which requested the

turnover of the full proceeds amount in repayment for funds owed per the Dissolution Judgment.

Lenny claims (1) the turnover order constituted error because the court did not have the authority

to sign the forms releasing the funds, as it constituted the court improperly waiving Lenny’s

contractual rights against PRE, and (2) the court should not have awarded Alissa his 50% of the

share proceeds.

¶ 79 Though not raised by the parties, we must consider our own jurisdiction Village of Kirkland

v. Kirkland Properties Holding Company, LLC I, 2023 IL 128612, ¶ 37. We find we do not have

jurisdiction to review Lenny’s claim arising from the turnover aspect of the court’s March 1, 2023

order. Per In re Marriage of Crecos, 2021 IL 126192, ¶¶ 44-45, a post-dissolution order that is

final as to only a subset of the remaining pending issues requires the lower court to make an

“express written finding that there is no just reason delaying either enforcement or appeal or both,”

per Illinois Supreme Court Rule 304(a) (eff. Mar. 8, 2016). There is no doubt from the record that

26 Nos. 1-23-0576, 1-24-0630, 1-24-1307, and 1-25-1003 (cons.)

(1) the March 1, 2023 order was a post-dissolution order that contained no Rule 304(a) language,

and (2) there were many unresolved issues remaining after entry of the order. Accordingly, we

lack jurisdiction to consider the propriety of the court’s turnover order and cannot reach Lenny’s

claim. Crecos, 2021 IL 126192, ¶ 45.

¶ 80 CONCLUSION

¶ 81 For the reasons stated above, the Allocation Judgment and Dissolution Judgment are

affirmed, and the matter is remanded for additional proceedings consistent with this order. On

remand, the court will enter a new order executing the Allocation Judgment’s electronic device

access requirement per this order’s instructions.

¶ 82 Affirmed and remanded with instructions.