In re Marriage of Hu

2026 IL App (3d) 250130-U

• Court: Appellate Court of Illinois
• Decided: January 30, 2026
• Docket: 3-25-0130
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).

2026 IL App (3d) 250130-U

Order filed January 30, 2026 ____________________________________________________________________________

IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

THIRD DISTRICT

In re MARRIAGE OF ) Appeal from the Circuit Court ) of the 18th Judicial Circuit, MAX HU, ) Du Page County, Illinois, ) Petitioner-Appellant, ) ) Appeal No. 3-25-0130 and ) Circuit No. 23-DC-243 ) XIAOWEI YING, ) Honorable ) Robert E. Douglas, Respondent-Appellee. ) Judge, Presiding. ____________________________________________________________________________

JUSTICE PETERSON delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Brennan and Bertani concurred in the judgment. ____________________________________________________________________________

ORDER

¶1 Held: Appellant forfeited the issue regarding the disproportionate distribution of the child’s expenses. The court did not abuse its discretion in the distribution of marital assets. The court’s determination that a retirement account was marital property was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. We are unable to properly review the remaining issues due to the court’s failure to make adequate findings.

¶2 Petitioner, Max Hu, appeals the Du Page County circuit court’s judgment of dissolution.

He argues that the court erred by: (1) ordering the parties to pay a disproportionate share of the child’s expenses; (2) awarding respondent, Xiaowei Ying, 60% of the marital assets without

making any findings regarding the disproportionate division; (3) ordering Hu to pay Ying

$10,800 rather than reimbursing the marital estate and apportioning those funds equally; (4)

classifying a retirement account as marital property and dividing it without making statutorily

required findings; and (5) ordering Hu to deposit $55,957 into an account before

disproportionately dividing the account without making any statutorily required findings. We

affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand for further proceedings.

¶3 I. BACKGROUND

¶4 The parties were married in February 2018. One child, B.H., was born into the marriage

in 2022. Hu petitioned for dissolution of marriage in March 2023, and Ying filed a counter-

petition for dissolution of marriage the next month. During the course of the proceedings, the

court entered an order setting temporary child support, providing for the child’s out-of-pocket

expenses to be divided, 60% paid by Hu and 40% paid by Ying. The order also provided that,

until a parental allocation judgment was entered, Ying was responsible for day care costs.

Pursuant to the parties’ agreement, a parental allocation judgment regarding parental

responsibilities and a parenting plan were entered on January 27, 2025. That same day, the

matter proceeded to trial on the remaining issues.

¶5 Hu testified that he was 36 years old. He worked as a portfolio manager with an annual

salary of $135,050. Hu also received bonuses. Additionally, Hu received a salary from a real

estate holding/property management company he started prior to the marriage. Hu’s gross

monthly income, according to his 2023 financial affidavit, was $17,704.08. Hu testified that he

opened a Merrill Edge IRA account ending 9G21 in 2019. He opened the account with $27,000

from his employment with Bank of China. About $18,000 of the funds were earned prior to the

2 marriage. Hu conceded that the difference between the approximately $27,000 account balance

and the $18,000 earned prior to the marriage was marital funds. Hu deposited $6,000 of marital

funds into the account based on Ying’s advice, but a few months later he removed the $6,000

from the account due to potential tax consequences. Hu testified regarding his nonmarital assets,

including real property, business interests, and investment accounts.

¶6 Ying testified that she was 33 years old. In 2025, Ying’s base salary was $85,280. She

received a bonus of $1,500 the previous year. Ying did not testify as to any nonmarital assets.

¶7 Both parties testified regarding various financial information, including their bank

accounts, retirement accounts, expenditures, and deposits and withdrawals in various accounts.

Additionally, numerous financial documents were admitted into evidence. Hu’s financial

affidavit, which was admitted into evidence, showed that he earned $17,704.08 per month, which

equals $212,448.96 per year.

¶8 Following the trial, the parties were to submit written closing arguments. The record does

not contain written closing arguments from either party. The court did not make oral findings but

entered a written judgment of dissolution. The court found that Hu earned $212,448 annually and

Ying earned $87,487 annually. The court ordered Hu to pay $1,499.13 per month in child

support. The court also ordered that childcare expenses, educational expenses, and expenses for

activities were to be paid on a 60/40 basis in Ying’s favor. The court ordered that the flexible

spending account and health savings account be utilized to offset the parties’ respective

obligations on a 60/40 basis in Ying’s favor. Hu was also ordered to pay $1443 per month in

maintenance for a period of 14.5 months. The court split the “marital benefits accrued” through

marital retirement and/or investment accounts 60/40 in favor of Ying, except for the Merrill

Edge IRA account ending 9G21, which the court split 50/50 between the parties. The court

3 ordered that Hu was to receive 40% of the equity in real estate held in Ying’s name, which was

determined to be marital property. The court split the Chase marital accounts, one in each party’s

name, 60/40 in favor of Ying. However, it also ordered Hu to reimburse the account in his name

$55,957 prior to the division. Hu was also ordered to reimburse Ying $10,800 in marital funds he

deposited into his Bank of America account ending 4188. The court’s order did not analyze any

statutory factors in making its property distribution. The court’s order did not provide a reason

for the reimbursements it ordered Hu to make. Hu appeals.

¶9 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 10 Hu first argues that the trial court failed to follow section 505(a)(3.7)(B) of the Illinois

Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act (Act) (750 ILCS 505(a)(3.7)(B) (West 2024)) when it

ordered a disproportionate division of the child’s expenses. Hu argues that considering the

maintenance ($1443) and child support ($1499.13) that he pays and Ying receives, their net

incomes per month are essentially equal and thus, the division of expenses should be equal. He

argues that Ying’s monthly net income is $9,462.88 with support and maintenance, and his is

$9,042 after paying support and maintenance.

¶ 11 Here, Hu fails to cite where in the record he obtained the figures he provides for each

party’s net income. The failure is a violation of Illinois Supreme Court Rule 341(h)(7) (eff.

Oct. 1, 2020) (providing that argument must “contain the contentions of the appellant and the

reasons therefor, with citation of the authorities and the pages of the record relied on”).

Additionally, Hu fails to explain how the court’s ruling does not comport with section

505(a)(3.7)(B). See e.g., Obert v. Saville, 253 Ill. App. 3d 677, 682 (1993) (“A reviewing court is

entitled to have issues clearly defined with pertinent authority cited and cohesive arguments

presented [citation], and it is not a repository into which an appellant may foist the burden of

4 argument and research.”). Moreover, Hu fails to cite any other authority in support of his

argument. See id.; Ill. Sup. Ct. R. 341(h)(7) (eff. Oct. 1, 2020). Due to Hu’s failures in this

regard, we consider this issue forfeited, decline to consider this issue on the merits, and affirm

the court’s division of expenses. See e.g., In re Marriage of Lugo, 2025 IL App 231478, ¶ 82

(deeming an issue forfeited where the party cited “nothing in the record to support her

contention” and “presented nothing in support of her argument”).

¶ 12 Hu next argues that the court erred by awarding Ying 60% of the marital assets and by

failing to make any findings with regard to the disproportionate division of the estate. This court

will not reverse a trial court’s division of marital assets absent an abuse of discretion. In re

Marriage of Roberts, 2015 IL App (3d) 140263, ¶ 13. “An abuse of discretion occurs when no

reasonable person would take the view adopted by the trial court.” Id. The court “shall divide the

marital property *** in just proportions considering all relevant factors ***.” 750 ILCS 5/503(d)

(West 2024). Section 503(d) of the Act enumerates various factors for the court to consider. Id.

The distribution of assets must be equitable, not necessarily equal. Roberts, 2015 IL App (3d)

140263, ¶ 12. A trial court should make specific findings regarding the relevant factors,

“[h]owever, where the record adequately provides a basis for a reviewing court to determine the

propriety of the decision and the decision is supported by the evidence, the trial court will not be

reversed solely because the record does not contain specific findings.” In re Marriage of Wolf,

180 Ill. App. 3d 998, 1006 (1989).

¶ 13 Here, we cannot say that the court abused its discretion in dividing the majority of the

marital assets 60% in Ying’s favor. The evidence at trial and the findings by the court showed

that Hu earned a substantially higher income than Ying. Additionally, testimony at trial

5 established that Hu had various nonmarital assets, 1 unlike Ying. Based on these facts, it was not

an abuse of discretion for the court to provide Ying with more of the marital assets than Hu. See

Roberts, 2015 IL App (3d) 140263, ¶ 13 (“An abuse of discretion occurs when no reasonable

person would take the view adopted by the trial court.”). Thus, we affirm the court’s

determination to split the majority of the marital assets 60% in Ying’s favor.

¶ 14 Hu further argues that the court erred by determining that his Merrill Edge retirement

account ending 9G21 was marital and therefore erred in dividing that account. Specifically, he

argues that he did not put Ying’s name on the account or take any actions that could lead the

court to determine the account was transmuted into marital property. Hu argues that although he

put $6,000 in marital funds into the account, he quickly removed those funds. He argues that he

testified that he had the account prior to the marriage and that he opened it when he changed

jobs.

¶ 15 Property acquired after marriage, but before dissolution, is presumed to be marital

property. 750 ILCS 5/503(b)(1) (West 2024). Contrary to his argument in his brief, the record

indicates that Hu unequivocally testified that he opened the account in 2019, which was after the

marriage. Therefore, the account is presumed to be marital property, and Hu failed to rebut this

presumption. On appeal, he fails to make any argument that the account falls into one of the

exceptions to the rule that property acquired after marriage is marital. In his reply he argues that

the account was opened with $27,000 in nonmarital funds, which would seem to be an attempt to

argue that the account was “property acquired in exchange for property acquired before the

marriage,” or simply, property acquired before marriage. See 750 ILCS 5/503(a)(2), (6) (West

1 These assets appear to have a fair market value well over a million dollars according to Hu’s financial affidavit that was admitted into evidence at trial. 6 2024). However, Hu testified at trial that a portion of the funds used to open the account were

marital funds. Therefore, we cannot say that the court’s classification of the account as marital

was against the manifest weight of the evidence. 2 See In re Marriage of Heroy, 385 Ill. App. 3d

640, 669 (2008) (providing that a court’s classification of property as marital or nonmarital will

not be reversed unless it is against the manifest weight of the evidence).

¶ 16 Hu also argues that the court erred when it ordered the sum of $10,800 to be paid directly

to Ying, rather than reimbursing the marital estate and then apportioning those funds between the

parties. Hu does not dispute that $10,800 in marital funds deposited into his nonmarital account

ending 4188 should be reimbursed to the marital estate but argues the funds should be divided

between the parties rather than paid in full to Ying. Ying argues that the court did not find that

$10,800 was the total of the funds that Hu diverted to the account ending 4188. She further

argues that Hu testified that he did not know where numerous deposits, totaling over $148,000,

into his nonmarital account ending 4188 originated, such that it is likely Hu diverted much more

than $10,800. Ying further argues that Hu failed to demonstrate error in the court’s decision, and

he only summarily states the decision was against the manifest weight of the evidence.

¶ 17 Section 503(c)(2)(A) of the Act provides that “[w]hen one estate of property makes a

contribution to another estate of property, the contributing estate shall be reimbursed from the

estate receiving the contribution ***.” 750 ILCS 503(c)(2)(A) (West 2024). Here, the parties

2 We further note that, although not argued by either party, section 503(a)(6) of the Act specifically states that property acquired before the marriage is nonmarital, “except as it relates to retirement plans that may have both marital and non-marital characteristics” and section 503(b)(2) of the Act provides that individual retirement accounts acquired by or participated in after the marriage are presumed to be marital. 750 ILCS 5/503(a)(6), (b)(2) (West 2024). Hu failed to rebut this presumption. Further, while we acknowledge that section 503(c)(2)(A) of the Act, (id. § 503(c)(2)(A)), provides for reimbursement when one estate contributes to another, and that is arguably what happened with this account, Hu did not make any such argument on appeal and instead simply argued that the account was his nonmarital property. Thus, we do not address whether there should have been some reimbursement to Hu from this account. 7 seem to agree that the marital estate contributed funds to Hu’s account ending 4188, as marital

funds had been deposited into that account. Thus, the marital estate should be reimbursed.

However, it is unclear how much money from the marital estate was deposited into the

nonmarital account, as the court made no findings in this regard. If the court found that there was

more than $10,800 of marital funds deposited into Hu’s account, then it may be proper for the

court to have ordered Hu to pay $10,800 directly to Ying. However, if that was the total amount

of marital funds that the court found were deposited into Hu’s account, then it would appear that

the amount should have been reimbursed to the marital estate, which the court largely divided,

60% in favor of Ying. Without any findings by the trial court in regard to how it determined this

amount or why it ordered the amount paid directly to Ying, we cannot determine the propriety of

ordering Hu to pay the amount directly to Ying. Therefore, we vacate that portion of the

judgment ordering Hu to pay Ying $10,800 in marital funds he deposited into his account ending

4188, and we remand for further proceedings. If the court again orders such payment, it must set

forth specific findings supporting its decision.

¶ 18 Lastly, Hu argues that the court erred by ordering him to deposit $55,957 into his Chase

account before the account was divided. He further argues that the court made no findings in

regard to this order, and that the court’s decision was against the manifest weight of the

evidence. Specifically, he argues that the court provided no reason or rationale for the

reimbursement, and that there was no evidence regarding this amount of money being

improperly spent on a nonmarital purpose. Ying argues that Hu testified regarding various

withdrawals from the Chase account, totaling almost $100,000 from December 2023 to

November 2024. She argues that the withdrawals were for payments to credit cards Hu did not

identify a year’s worth of mortgage payments on his nonmarital residence, payment of real estate

8 taxes for that residence, payments for repairs to that residence, payments for nonmarital business

interests, and payment of court-ordered child support.

¶ 19 As stated above, section 503(c)(2)(A) of the Act provides that “[w]hen one estate of

property makes a contribution to another estate of property, the contributing estate shall be

reimbursed from the estate receiving the contribution ***.” 750 ILCS 503(c)(2)(A) (West 2024).

If Hu was contributing marital funds to his nonmarital property, then the marital estate should be

reimbursed. However, the court made no specific findings prior to ordering the reimbursement.

Although the court is not always required to make findings, we conclude that this court is unable

to review the propriety of the court’s order in this regard without findings by the court providing

a basis for its decision. Cf. In re Marriage of Wolf, 180 Ill. App. 3d 998, 1006 (1989) (providing

that “where the record adequately provides a basis for a reviewing court to determine the

propriety of the decision and the decision is supported by the evidence, the trial court will not be

reversed solely because the record does not contain specific findings”). Thus, we vacate that

portion of the judgment requiring Hu to reimburse $55,957 to his Chase account ending 0292

prior to its division and remand the matter for further proceedings. If the court again orders such

reimbursement, it must set forth specific findings supporting that order.

¶ 20 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 21 The judgment of the circuit court of Du Page County is affirmed in part, vacated in part,

and the matter remanded for further proceedings.

¶ 22 Affirmed in part and vacated in part.

¶ 23 Cause remanded.