In Re Marriage Of Harlan Dean Jr., Res. And Laura Lee Dean, App.

• Court: Court of Appeals of Washington
• Decided: November 3, 2025
• Docket: 86782-2
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

In the Matter of the Marriage of: No. 86782-2-I

HARLAN DEAN, JR., DIVISION ONE

Respondent, UNPUBLISHED OPINION

LAURA LEE DEAN,

Appellant.

FELDMAN, J. — Laura Lee Dean appeals from the trial court’s dissolution

order and decree characterizing a home on Rutsatz Road in Washington (the

Rutsatz home) as separate property belonging to her husband, Harlan Dean, Jr.,

and awarding her an equitable share of the increased value of the home following

that disputed characterization. Laura also appeals from the trial court’s order

denying her subsequent motion for reconsideration. 1 Because Laura fails to

establish that the trial court mischaracterized the Rutsatz home as Harlan’s

separate property, we affirm.

I

Harlan and Laura were first married in 1999. Prior to their marriage, Harlan

owned two adjoining parcels of land in Trego, Montana (the Trego property). Both

1 Because Laura and Harlan have the same last name, we refer to them by their first names for

clarity. No. 86782-2-I

parties signed a prenuptial agreement which provided that Harlan would maintain

ownership of all property that he brought into the marriage. In 2002, Harlan and

Laura divorced. Harlan was awarded the property he brought into the marriage,

including the Trego property, pursuant to the prenuptial agreement.

On July 19, 2003, Harlan and Laura remarried. In approximately 2005,

Laura and Harlan began living on the Trego property, where they continued to live

for the following seven years. Then, in January 2012, following various investment

losses, Laura and Harlan decided to sell the Trego property for approximately $1.7

million. The proceeds from the sale were deposited in various accounts.

Approximately four months later, in April 2012, Laura and Harlan purchased the

Rutsatz home for $525,000. In August 2022, Laura and Harlan separated for a

second time.

On September 20, 2022, Harlan filed a Petition for Divorce. Prior to the

dissolution trial, Laura’s financial expert, Alan Knutson, prepared a report opining

that there is no indication as to where the proceeds from the sale of the Trego

property were deposited, nor could he “find a readily traceable connection between

the [Trego] sale and the [Rutsatz] purchase.” However, Knutson did note in his

report that “[t]he timing of the [Trego] property sale and the purchase of the

[Rutsatz] property would indicate a relationship continuing the separate property

claim.” Laura testified to the same effect: when asked “where . . . the money for

the [Rutsatz] house c[a]me from,” she replied that it was from “[w]hen we sold

Trego.” Knutson also testified at trial and reiterated the substance of his report.

Following the dissolution trial, on March 14, 2024, the trial court found that

Knutson’s report, supplemented by his testimony, regarding the timing of the sale

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of the Trego property and the purchase of the Rutsatz home indicated a

relationship supporting Harlan’s separate property claim. As such, the trial court

concluded that one could “follow the money” from the Trego property to the Rutsatz

home and, thus, the Rutsatz home was Harlan’s separate property. The trial court

awarded Laura 50 percent of the increase in value of the Rutsatz home, measured

from the date of purchase, amounting to $230,700. Laura subsequently filed a

motion for reconsideration, which the trial court denied. This timely appeal

followed.

II

Laura’s principal argument on appeal is that the trial court incorrectly

characterized the Rutsatz home as Harlan’s separate property. We disagree.

In dissolution proceedings, trial courts have broad discretion to characterize

each asset as separate or community property. In re Marriage of White, 105 Wn.

App. 545, 549-50, 20 P.3d 481 (2001). An asset is characterized as of the date of

its acquisition, and its character does not change thereafter. Id. at 550. “[An] asset

is separate property if acquired before marriage; acquired during marriage by gift

or inheritance; acquired during marriage with the traceable proceeds of separate

property; or . . . acquired during permanent separation.” Id. (emphasis added).

Separate property “will retain that character as long as it can be traced or

identified.” In re Marriage of Schwarz, 192 Wn. App. 180, 190, 368 P.3d 173 (2016)

(citing In re Marriage of Pearson-Maines, 70 Wn. App. 860, 865, 855 P.2d 1210

(1993)). Separate funds should be traced with some degree of particularity. Id. at

189. Conversely, property acquired during marriage is presumptively community

property. Id.

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When property is acquired during marriage, the burden is on the spouse

asserting the property’s separate character to establish that character through

clear and convincing evidence. Id. at 184. The standard of “clear and convincing”

evidence requires “positive evidence, direct or circumstantial, that makes a

proposition highly probable.” Id. at 218 (emphasis added). “The requirement of

clear and [convincing 2] evidence is not met by the mere self-serving declaration of

the spouse claiming the property in question that [the spouse] acquired it from

separate funds and a showing that separate funds were available for that purpose.”

Berol v. Berol, 37 Wn.2d 380, 381-82, 223 P.2d 1055 (1950). At the same time,

the testimony of a “single credible witness” can serve as clear and convincing

evidence of tracing of separate funds, even when refuted by other testimony. In re

Schwarz, 192 Wn. App. at 214.

A trial court’s characterization of property is a mixed question of law and

fact. In re Marriage of Watanabe, 199 Wn.2d 342, 348, 506 P.3d 630 (2022). “‘The

time of acquisition, the method of acquisition, and the intent of the donor, for

example, are questions for the trier of fact.’” In re Marriage of Kile, 186 Wn. App.

864, 876, 347 P.3d 894 (2015) (quoting In re Marriage of Martin, 32 Wn. App. 92,

94, 645 P.2d 1148 (1982)). The ultimate characterization of property as community

or separate, in turn, is a question of law that we review de novo. In re Schwarz,

192 Wn. App. at 192. Where, as here, the trial court has weighed the evidence,

our “role is simply to determine whether substantial evidence supports the findings

2 The Schwarz court refers interchangeably to the quantum of required evidence as “clear and

convincing” and “clear and satisfactory.” 192 Wn. App. at 189. We utilize the former as it appears to be more prevalent and there is no demonstrated difference between the two.

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of fact, and if so, whether the findings in turn support the trial court’s conclusions

of law.” In re Marriage of Rockwell, 141 Wn. App. 235, 242, 170 P.3d 572 (2007).

“‘Substantial evidence exists if the record contains evidence of sufficient quantity

to persuade a fair-minded, rational person of the truth of the declared premise.’”

In re Marriage of Griswold, 112 Wn. App. 333, 339, 48 P.3d 1018 (2002) (quoting

Bering v. SHARE, 106 Wn.2d 212, 721 P.2d 918 (1986)).

In reviewing the trial court’s findings, our review is largely deferential. We

will not “‘substitute [our] judgment for the trial court’s, weigh the evidence, or

adjudge witness credibility.’” In re Marriage of Kaplan, 4 Wn. App. 2d 466, 479,

421 P.3d 1046 (2018) (quoting In re Rockwell, 141 Wn. App. at 242). “‘We need

determine only whether the evidence most favorable to the prevailing party

supports the challenged findings, even if the evidence is in conflict.’” DeVogel v.

Padilla, 22 Wn. App. 2d 39, 48, 509 P.3d 832 (2022) (quoting Thomas v. Ruddell

Lease-Sales, Inc., 43 Wn. App. 208, 212, 716 P.2d 911 (1986)). Additionally, “‘In

determining whether substantial evidence exists to support a court’s finding of fact,

the record is reviewed in the light most favorable to the party in whose favor the

findings were entered.’” In re Kaplan, 4 Wn. App. 2d at 479 (quoting In re Marriage

of Gillespie, 89 Wn. App. 390, 404, 948 P.2d 1338 (1997)). Thus, we view the

record in the light most favorable to Harlan, as he is the party in whose favor the

findings were entered.

Applying these legal principles here, substantial evidence supports the trial

court’s findings, which in turn support its conclusion that the Rutsatz home is

Harlan’s separate property. The Trego property that Laura and Harlan lived in prior

to moving to the Rutsatz home was brought into the second marriage by Harlan.

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As such, the Trego property was separate property, as it was “an asset

. . . acquired before [the] marriage.” In re White, 105 Wn. App. at 550. The Rutsatz

home was purchased during Laura and Harlan’s second marriage. As such, there

is a presumption that the Rutsatz home is community property. However, as

discussed above, that presumption can be rebutted by clear and convincing

evidence which makes the proposition that the Rutsatz home was purchased with

separate funds—and is therefore Harlan’s separate property—highly probable.

In rebutting this presumption, the “single credible witness” (In re Schwarz,

192 Wn. App. at 214) is Laura’s expert, Knutson. In his initial report, Knutson

opined: “The timing of the [Trego] property sale and the purchase of the [Rutsatz]

property would indicate a relationship continuing the separate property claim.”

Knutson repeated this opinion at trial, noting that the purchase of the Rutsatz

property "followed by a little over two and a half months from the sale of the [Trego]

property.” The trial court, in turn, found this testimony to be credible, and we defer

to that determination. In re Kaplan, 4 Wn. App. 2d at 479. This evidence supports

Harlan’s assertion that the Rutsatz home was purchased with separate property.

That is particularly so when we view the evidence in the light most favorable to

Harlan (the party in whose favor the findings were entered) as required. Id. As

such, the trial court findings are supported by substantial evidence and the

findings, in turn, support the trial court’s conclusion that the funds used to purchase

the Rutsatz home had retained their separate character prior to the purchase.

Laura’s many arguments that the Rutsatz home is community property are

unpersuasive. First, Laura contends that there is no extrinsic evidence to support

Harlan’s contention that the Rutsatz home was purchased through separate funds

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and that relying on Harlan’s testimony alone does not qualify as clear and

convincing evidence. However, Laura overlooks the expert report and testimony

of Knutson, which the trial court relied on in concluding that the Rutsatz home was

purchased with separate funds. Knutson’s report and testimony serve as

“evidence, direct or circumstantial, that makes a proposition highly probable.” In

re Schwarz, 192 Wn. App. at 218. The trial court did not rely solely on “self-serving

testimony” from Harlan, as Laura contends, but on the testimony and report “of a

third-party,” Knutson. Id. at 192-93, 215

Second, Laura contends that instead of maintaining their separate

character, the funds from the Trego property were commingled. Again, this

argument fails. When community and separate funds are “commingled,” the

presumption may arise that the funds have been rendered community property. In

re Schwarz, 192 Wn. App. at 190. However, commingling in this sense is not

simply a combining of funds, it must be “hopeless commingling” which arises “only

after the effort at tracing proves impossible.” Id. (emphasis added). Here, tracing

was possible, as evidenced by Knutson’s report that the timing of the sale of the

Trego property and purchase of the Rutsatz home indicates that the separate

funds from the Trego property sale were used to purchase the Rutsatz home.

Indeed, Laura herself testified at trial that the funds from the Trego property sale

were used to purchase the Rutsatz home. This testimony, along with Knutson’s

report (which the trial court found credible), all of which must be viewed favorably

to Harlan, makes it highly probable that the Rutsatz home was purchased with the

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separate funds acquired through the sale of the Trego property. Where, as here,

tracing is possible, funds are not commingled. 3

Third, Laura argues that because Harlan intended for her to live in the

Rutsatz home, her name was on the deed, and no prenuptial agreement was

executed prior to the second marriage, Harlan intended to convert the Rutsatz

home to community property. Again, we are unpersuaded. Instructive here, the

court in Borghi noted that courts have “consistently refused to recognize any

presumption arising from placing legal title in both spouses’ names and instead

adhered to the principle that the name on a deed or title does not determine the

separate or community character of the property, or even provide much evidence.”

In re Estate of Borghi, 167 Wn.2d 480, 488, 219 P.3d 932 (2009). We also fail to

find a connection between a lack of prenuptial agreement and an intent to

transmute the character of property. There is no evidence that Harlan abstained

from executing a second prenuptial agreement because he intended to transmute

the character of all property brought into the marriage. Harlan’s intention to have

Laura live in the Rutsatz home with him, the inclusion of her name on the deed,

and a lack of prenuptial agreement does not constitute sufficient evidence that

Harlan intended to transmute the character of the property from separate to

community property.

In sum, the trial court did not err in characterizing the Rutsatz home as

Harlan’s separate property. Laura’s remaining assignments of error are that the

3 Relatedly, Laura argues that her testimony that the funds from the sale of the Trego property were

used to purchase the Rutsatz home is not an opposing party admission, as she “did not admit that the Trego property was Harlan’s separate property.” This argument is waived, as Laura has not assigned error to this or any other evidentiary ruling. See Rutter v. Rutter’s Estate, 59 Wn.2d 781, 788, 370 P.2d 862 (1962).

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court erred in awarding her an equitable share of the increased value of the Rutsatz

home based on that disputed characterization and abused its discretion 4 in

denying her subsequent motion for reconsideration challenging its prior

determination. Because the trial court did not err in characterizing the Rutsatz

home as separate property, Laura’s remaining arguments likewise fail.

III

Lastly, Harlan argues he is entitled to attorney fees pursuant to RCW

26.09.140, which permits a court to award fees to the prevailing party in a family

law case after considering the financial resources of the parties. In re Marriage of

Hannah, 27 Wn. App. 2d 577, 591, 541 P.3d 372 (2023). In determining whether

a fee award is appropriate pursuant to the statute, we consider both the parties’

relative ability to pay and the arguable merit of the issues raised on appeal. In re

Marriage of Leslie, 90 Wn. App. 796, 807, 954 P.2d 330 (1998). But here, Harlan

“has not filed an affidavit of financial need with the court in accordance with RAP

18.1(c), so we cannot grant fees under RCW 26.09.140.” In re Hannah, 27 Wn.

App. 2d at 591.

Affirmed.

WE CONCUR:

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4 See In re Marriage of Fallow, 31 Wn. App. 2d 24, 41, 547 P.3d 914 (2024) (“We review a superior court's decision to grant or deny a motion for reconsideration for abuse of discretion.”).

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