FILED JUN 18 2026 NOT FOR PUBLICATION SUSAN M. SPRAUL, CLERK U.S. BKCY. APP. PANEL OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY APPELLATE PANEL OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT
In re: BAP No. CC-25-1151-SGL MARION CHATMON, Debtor. Bk. No. 2:25-bk-16046-WB
MARION CHATMON, Appellant, v. MEMORANDUM* PACIFIC LOANWORKS, INC., Appellee.
Appeal from the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Central District of California Julia Wagner Brand, Chief Bankruptcy Judge, Presiding
Before: SPRAKER, GAN, and LAFFERTY, Bankruptcy Judges.
INTRODUCTION
Chapter 131 debtor Marion Chatmon appeals from an order granting
Pacific Loanworks, Inc. relief from stay. The order in relevant part annulled
the stay retroactively to validate Pacific Loanworks’ postpetition
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication. Although it may be cited for whatever persuasive value it may have, see Fed. R. App. P. 32.1, it has no precedential value, see 9th Cir. BAP Rule 8024-1. 1 Unless specified otherwise, all chapter and section references are to the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. §§ 101–1532, and all “Rule” references are to the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure. foreclosure of real property in which Marion claimed a fractional
ownership interest.2 The bankruptcy court applied the correct legal
standard for granting retroactive stay annulment. And none of its factual
findings were clearly erroneous. Furthermore, Marion’s belated attempt on
appeal to challenge Pacific Loanworks’ standing lacks merit. Accordingly,
we AFFIRM.
FACTS 3
A. Marion’s daughter borrows money from the lenders.
In September 2019, Marion’s daughter Ashlei borrowed $355,000. She
secured her obligation to repay this loan by granting the lenders a security
interest in a parcel of mixed-use real property located on Crenshaw
Boulevard in Los Angeles, California (“Property”). To document this loan
transaction, Ashlei executed a note and a deed of trust. The note
collectively identified several different individuals and a family trust as the
“Lender” but directed Ashlei to make all loan payments to Pacific
Loanworks.4 In addition, the deed of trust identified Pacific Loanworks as
2 We refer to Marion by her first name for ease of reference and to differentiate her from her daughter Ashlei Antionette Chatmon-James, to whom we refer as Ashlei. No disrespect is intended to either party. 3 We exercise our discretion, when appropriate, to take judicial notice of
documents electronically filed in the underlying bankruptcy case. See Atwood v. Chase Manhattan Mortg. Co. (In re Atwood), 293 B.R. 227, 233 n.9 (9th Cir. BAP 2003). 4 Some of the original lenders later assigned their respective rights under the note
and deed of trust to others. Regardless, Pacific Loanworks has claimed to represent the interests of the lenders—whoever they might be—as their servicing agent at all relevant times. 2 trustee under the deed of trust, with a power to sell the Property in the
event of a default.5
The note contemplated that Ashlei would make monthly interest-
only payments until the loan matured in November 2022, at which point
the entire remaining loan balance would come due. The parties agreed in
2022 to extend the maturity date of the loan to November 2024.
B. Events leading up to Pacific Loanworks’ foreclosure and Marion’s bankruptcy filings.
According to Pacific Loanworks, unbeknownst to it and without the
lenders’ consent, Ashlei conveyed a 50% interest in the property to Marion
in December 2022 or January 2023.
Ashlei failed to repay the outstanding loan balance when the
extended loan matured in November 2024. Consequently, Pacific
Loanworks initiated foreclosure proceedings against the Property. On the
eve of the scheduled foreclosure sale in April 2025, Marion filed a chapter
13 bankruptcy and immediately notified the foreclosure trustee to prevent
the trustee’s sale from moving forward (“First Bankruptcy”). However, the
bankruptcy court entered an order on July 11, 2025, granting the chapter 13
trustee’s motion to dismiss the First Bankruptcy for failure to make any
plan payments and failure to appear at her continued § 341(a) meeting of
5 Pacific Loanworks subsequently executed and recorded a Substitution of Trustee naming Total Lender Solutions, Inc. as successor trustee under the deed of trust. Total Lender Solutions later served as the foreclosing trustee at the trustee’s sale. 3 creditors.
Marion filed her second chapter 13 petition on July 17, 2025 (“Second
Bankruptcy”). The foreclosure trustee completed the trustee’s sale of the
Property roughly forty-five minutes after the commencement of the Second
Bankruptcy, allegedly without any knowledge of the Second Bankruptcy.
C. Pacific Loanworks moves for relief from stay.
Less than a week later, Pacific Loanworks moved for relief from stay.
The motion sought not only to permit Pacific Loanworks to proceed with
its rights under state law to perfect the prior foreclosure sale and obtain
possession of the Property but also to annul the stay retroactively to
validate the foreclosure sale even though the sale occurred postpetition.
Pacific Loanworks identified itself as the lenders’ duly-authorized
servicing agent. In two accompanying declarations, the movant’s president
Matthew Gross reiterated that Pacific Loanworks was the servicing agent
for the lenders, who qualified as both “holders” of the note and
“beneficiaries” under the deed of trust.
The stated basis for relief from stay was Marion’s alleged
misconduct. Among other things, Gross stated in his supporting
declarations that Ashlei and Marion had a history of sharing fractionalized
interests in real property and filing serial, skeletal bankruptcies to impede
foreclosure. He further asserted that Marion and Ashlei were engaging in a
scheme to delay, hinder, or defraud their creditors. Gross also stated that
both Pacific Loanworks and the lenders were unaware of the Second
4 Bankruptcy until after completion of the foreclosure sale to lenders by
partial credit bid.6
Marion initially filed a request for additional time to respond to the
relief from stay motion. She represented that she recently had undergone a
surgical procedure and hence needed more time to respond. The day
before the first scheduled relief from stay hearing, August 11, 2025, Marion
filed two responses to the motion—one by counsel and the other pro se.
The response filed by counsel focused on the value of the Property and
whether it was necessary for an effective reorganization. This response
claimed that Marion had $700,000 in equity in the Property and the
Property was necessary for an effective reorganization. Marion’s one-page
pro se response alleged that Pacific Loanworks and its agents had notice of
her Second Bankruptcy prior to the trustee’s sale but nonetheless
proceeded with the sale in willful violation of the automatic stay. Neither
response was accompanied by any supporting evidence.
The first hearing on the relief from stay motion was held on August
12, 2025. Notwithstanding his client’s allegations to the contrary, Marion’s
counsel conceded at the hearing that the lenders (and Pacific Loanworks)
6 Pacific Loanworks also claimed that Marion tried to hide her First Bankruptcy by changing her Social Security number as stated in the petition commencing her Second Bankruptcy. However, the petition at page 3 specifically disclosed the First Bankruptcy. On the other hand, neither of these petitions listed Marion’s bankruptcy filed in August 2019, even though the petition asks debtors to identify all bankruptcies they have filed in the last eight years. 5 did not have notice of the Second Bankruptcy at the time the foreclosure
occurred. He further confirmed that he was not alleging that the
foreclosure sale occurred in bad faith. Marion’s counsel instead pressed his
argument regarding equity and reorganization, even though Pacific
Loanworks had not sought stay relief based on § 362(d)(2).
Ultimately, the bankruptcy court stated that it would grant relief
from stay permitting Pacific Loanworks to pursue its rights under state
law.7 The court continued the hearing to August 21, 2025, to permit Marion
additional time to respond to Pacific Loanworks’ stated grounds for
retroactive annulment.
D. The parties’ supplemental briefing and the bankruptcy court’s stay annulment ruling.
Marion, through counsel, filed a supplemental opposition to the stay
motion. Despite counsel’s concession at the August 12, 2025 hearing, the
supplement pressed her claim that the foreclosure trustee and lenders had
notice of the Second Bankruptcy at the time the foreclosure sale occurred.
Marion also insisted that she had not defaulted on the loan—that she had
tendered payment, but Pacific Loanworks refused to accept it. She further
maintained that the foreclosure sale was a sham, because no “real money”
exchanged hands and because the sale price extinguished Marion’s
7 According to the court, relief from stay going forward was appropriate because Marion was not the borrower under the note, so she was not entitled to reorganize this debt under the Code. The court also denied prospective relief under § 362(d)(4). These rulings have not been challenged by Marion on appeal. 6 $700,000 in equity in the property. But Marion submitted no evidence to
support any of these allegations.
Pacific Loanworks responded to Marion’s supplemental opposition.
It pointed to Marion’s counsel’s multiple statements at the August 12, 2025
hearing indicating that he was not asserting that the lenders conducted the
foreclosure sale in bad faith or had advance notice of the Second
Bankruptcy. The movant also set forth the factors typically considered for
annulment of the stay and explained why under those factors it was
entitled to annulment.
Pacific Loanworks then pointed out that Marion had submitted no
evidence to support any of her allegations. In contrast to Marion’s
supplemental papers, Pacific Loanworks’ supplemental papers included
two supporting declarations. Gross submitted an additional declaration in
which he explained that Pacific Loanworks had rejected and returned a
tendered (monthly) payment from Marion because the loan had fully
matured. Meanwhile, Pacific Loanworks’ counsel Gerrick Warrington
submitted a declaration, which included the transcript from the August 12,
2025 hearing.
The bankruptcy court held the second and final relief from stay
hearing on August 21, 2025. Both Marion and her counsel spoke at the
hearing. Marion claimed to have records showing that she notified the
creditor by phone and email of the Second Bankruptcy. But she never
explained why she did not present this evidence to the court as part of her
7 supplemental opposition. Her counsel, meanwhile, focused once again on
Marion’s alleged equity in the property and argued that it would be unfair
to grant annulment, which would deprive Marion of her equity in the
Property and simultaneously afford the lender a windfall. Marion’s counsel
further claimed that the lenders would not suffer any prejudice if the sale
was deemed void and they were forced to re-notice the sale. Pacific
Loanworks largely recapitulated the same points it had advanced in its
supplemental brief.
The bankruptcy court then rendered its oral ruling. After reciting the
stay annulment factors set forth in Fjeldsted v. Lien (In re Fjeldsted), 293 B.R.
12, 25 (9th Cir. BAP 2003), the court weighed the relevant factors and
concluded that annulment of the stay was appropriate. On August 22, 2025,
the court entered its relief from stay order. Marion timely appealed.
JURISDICTION
The bankruptcy court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1334 and
157. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 158.
ISSUES
1. Was Pacific Loanworks entitled to seek relief from stay on behalf of
the lenders?
2. Did the bankruptcy court err by not conducting an evidentiary
hearing?
3. Did the bankruptcy court abuse its discretion by annulling the stay?
8 STANDARDS OF REVIEW
Questions regarding a party’s standing and status as a real party in
interest typically present questions of law, which we review de novo. See
Allen v. US Bank, Nat’l Ass’n (In re Allen), 472 B.R. 559, 564 (9th Cir. BAP
2012). “De novo review is independent, with no deference given to the trial
court’s conclusion.” Id. (citing Barclay v. Mackenzie (In re AFI Holding, Inc.),
525 F.3d 700, 702 (9th Cir. 2008)).
We review the bankruptcy court’s annulment of the stay for an abuse
of discretion. In re Fjeldsted, 293 B.R. at 18. The decision whether to hold an
evidentiary hearing also is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Tyner v.
Nicholson (In re Nicholson), 435 B.R. 622, 629 (9th Cir. BAP 2010), partially
abrogated on other grounds by, Law v. Siegel, 571 U.S. 415, 423-27 (2014). The
bankruptcy court abused its discretion if it applied an incorrect legal
standard or its factual findings were illogical, implausible, or without
support in the record. TrafficSchool.com, Inc. v. Edriver, Inc., 653 F.3d 820, 832
(9th Cir. 2011).
DISCUSSION
In her opening appeal brief, Marion only challenges the portion of the
relief from stay order annulling the stay. She primarily argues that the
bankruptcy court should have held an evidentiary hearing. She
additionally contends that the court did not weigh the relevant equitable
factors before annulling the automatic stay. For the first time she also
asserts that Pacific Loanworks failed to present sufficient or admissible
9 evidence that it had standing—or was a real party in interest (“RPII”)—
entitled to seek relief from stay on behalf of the lenders. We start with the
standing/RPII issue and then address the other issues in turn.
A. Pacific Loanworks was entitled to seek relief from stay.
Citing Veal v. American Home Mortgage Servicing, Inc. (In re Veal), 450
B.R. 897 (9th Cir. BAP 2011), Marion asserts that Pacific Loanworks lacked
standing to seek relief from stay and was not the RPII entitled to enforce
the note and deed of trust. Relying on Veal, Marion insists that Pacific
Loanworks failed to establish that it is the servicing agent for the lenders
under the note and deed of trust. She complains that Pacific Loanworks
“styled itself as a servicing agent” for the lenders but failed to submit the
servicing agreement or other evidence to show it was authorized to act for
the lenders.
Veal does not support Marion’s position. In Veal, this Panel was
careful to distinguish between Article III standing, prudential standing,
and RPII doctrine. Id. at 906-07. Under Veal, there can be no legitimate
question that Pacific Loanworks had Article III standing. In the parlance of
Veal, injury in fact was established because the automatic stay prohibited
Pacific Loanworks from pursuing its alleged remedies against Marion,
causation existed because Pacific Loanworks could not exercise those
alleged remedies absent relief from stay, and redressability existed because
relief from stay—specifically annulment of the stay—would retroactively
validate the foreclosure sale. See id. at 906.
10 As for prudential standing and RPII, unlike in Veal, Marion never has
challenged the lenders’ status as the holders of the note and the
beneficiaries under the deed of trust. Moreover, notwithstanding her
multiple statements on appeal to the contrary, Marion never disputed
during the relief from stay proceedings that Pacific Loanworks was the
duly authorized servicing agent for the lenders. In fact, her filings all
implicitly assumed that Pacific Loanworks was authorized to act on behalf
of the lenders. Indeed, she and her counsel repeatedly referred to movant
as if it were, itself, the lender and the foreclosing party.
In any event, during the course of the relief from stay proceedings,
Pacific Loanworks’ president submitted multiple declarations in which he
stated that his company was the servicing agent authorized to act for the
lenders, who were holders of the note and beneficiaries under the deed of
trust. Marion never objected to this evidence or filed anything during the
relief from stay proceedings indicating that she disputed Pacific
Loanworks’ asserted role as servicer for the lenders. Her statements and
argument on appeal to the contrary are simply incorrect.
Gross’s declarations and the accompanying loan documents were the
only evidence before the bankruptcy court on the issue of Pacific
Loanworks’ status as servicer for the holders of the note and beneficiaries
under the deed of trust. The loan documents identified Pacific Loanworks
as the party to whom payments should be made under the note and as
trustee under the deed of trust. These roles are consistent with and tend to
11 corroborate Pacific Loanworks’ asserted status as servicer for the lenders.
In the absence of any dispute or evidence to the contrary, the court
accepted Pacific Loanworks’ prima facie evidence that it was the servicer
for the lenders. Under these circumstances, the bankruptcy court did not
commit reversible error by treating Pacific Loanworks as the servicer for
the lenders and as a party entitled to seek relief from stay on their behalf.
See generally In re Veal, 450 B.R. at 920 (holding that when a debtor challenges
an alleged servicer’s standing, “that servicer must show it has an agency
relationship with a ‘person entitled to enforce’ the note”).
Nor was the bankruptcy court obliged to hold an evidentiary hearing
regarding Pacific Loanworks’ standing. Though Marion claims that she
requested an evidentiary hearing, we have found nothing in the relief from
stay record supporting this claim. Furthermore, even if she had requested
such a hearing, she was not entitled to it. Relief from stay motions are
contested matters governed by Rule 9014 and subject to the procedures
made applicable by that Rule. See First Yorkshire Holdings, Inc. v. Pacifica L
22, LLC (In re First Yorkshire Holdings, Inc.), 470 B.R. 864, 871 (9th Cir. BAP
2012). Contested matters may be disposed of without an evidentiary
hearing when there are no disputed material factual issues presented by
the parties for the court to decide. See, e.g., Caviata Attached Homes, LLC v.
U.S. Bank, Nat’l Ass’n (In re Caviata Attached Homes, LLC), 481 B.R. 34, 44
(9th Cir. BAP 2012); Khachikyan v. Hahn (In re Khachikyan), 335 B.R. 121, 126
(9th Cir. BAP 2005). When, as here, the adverse party fails to raise a
12 genuine dispute regarding a material factual issue, the bankruptcy court
need not hold an evidentiary hearing. See In re Caviata Attached Homes, LLC,
481 B.R. at 45-46; In re Khachikyan, 335 B.R. at 128; see also FAB 5 LLC v. Dye
(In re FAB 5 LLC), 2025 WL 2556098 (9th Cir. BAP Sept. 5, 2025) (“The court
only is required to hold an evidentiary hearing when the parties’ initial
papers demonstrate the existence of a genuine and material disputed
factual issue.”).
Marion needed to do something more than complain for the first time
on appeal that the bankruptcy court should have held an evidentiary
hearing on the standing issue. Given the unchallenged evidence in the
relief from stay record regarding Pacific Loanworks’ status as servicing
agent for the holders of the note and the beneficiaries under the deed of
trust, the bankruptcy court did not commit reversible error by treating
Pacific Loanworks as the party entitled to seek relief from stay with respect
to the foreclosure sale of the Property.
B. The bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion when it annulled the stay.
Marion’s only substantive argument concerns the bankruptcy court's
decision to annul the stay. Her argument is twofold. First, she claims that
the court did not make sufficient findings or conduct an adequate analysis
of the relevant circumstances. According to her, the court granted
annulment “without adequate equitable balancing and on an inadequate
record.” Second, Marion again assails the bankruptcy court’s failure to hold
13 an evidentiary hearing—even though she never requested one and never
presented any evidence demonstrating the existence of a genuine and
material disputed factual issue. We disagree with Marion on both counts.
At the August 21, 2025 relief from stay hearing, the bankruptcy court
offered a detailed analysis of the annulment issue and rendered specific
factual findings. The court cited In re Fjeldsted, 293 B.R. at 25, and recounted
the factors articulated in that decision as relevant to whether stay
annulment should be granted. These factors included:
1. Number of filings;
2. Whether, in a repeat filing case, the circumstances indicate an intention to delay and hinder creditors;
3. A weighing of the extent of prejudice to creditors or third parties if the stay relief is not made retroactive, including whether harm exists to a bona fide purchaser;
4. The debtor's overall good faith;
5. Whether creditors knew of the stay but nonetheless took action, thus compounding the problem;
6. Whether the debtor has complied, and is otherwise complying, with the Bankruptcy Code and Rules;
7. The relative ease of restoring parties to the status quo ante;
8. The costs of annulment to debtors and creditors;
9. How quickly creditors moved for annulment, or how quickly debtors moved to set aside the sale or violative conduct;
10. Whether, after learning of the bankruptcy, creditors
14 proceeded to take steps in continued violation of the stay, or whether they moved expeditiously to gain relief;
11. Whether annulment of the stay will cause irreparable injury to the debtor;
12. Whether stay relief will promote judicial economy or other efficiencies.
Id. (citation modified).
The bankruptcy court also acknowledged Fjeldsted’s admonition that
these factors should not be treated as if they were an algebraic formula or a
rigid scorecard; rather, they were meant to be flexible reference points in a
loose analytical framework. See id. at 25. As the bankruptcy court
explained:
So those are the things I have to consider. And in considering-- and not one of them is more important than another, I have to consider them in totality and I am–some may be relevant, some may not be relevant, but I use those factors in order to make my decision.
As to the first and second factors, the bankruptcy court reasoned that
Marion’s history of multiple bankruptcy filings, and her commencement of
the bankruptcies just before foreclosure, “tends to indicate an intention to
delay or hinder creditors.” Thus the court indicated that these factors
favored annulment. As to the third factor—weighing the prejudice to the
lenders and third parties absent stay annulment—the court indicated that
the only attendant prejudice was unnecessary delay in completing a
foreclosure sale that simply was going to be repeated if the stay was not
15 annulled. As the court explained, its August 12, 2025 decision to grant
relief from stay to permit Pacific Loanworks to proceed with its state law
remedies, along with the statutory termination of the stay after 30 days
under § 362(c)(3)(A), meant that even if it did not annul the stay, Pacific
Loanworks was free to immediately reinitiate a foreclosure sale. So, this
factor also favored annulment.
As to the fourth factor—Marion’s good faith—the court declined to
find that she had been acting in bad faith on the record presented. The
court indicated that the issue of Marion’s good faith or bad faith in seeking
relief under the Code was an open question. Thus, the court did not weigh
Marion’s good faith or bad faith either in favor of or against stay
annulment.
As to the fifth factor regarding the lenders’ knowledge of the stay, the
bankruptcy court specifically found that they “did not know of the stay
before completing the [trustee’s] sale.” Marion claims on appeal that she
placed multiple phone calls to the foreclosure trustee Total Lender
Solutions immediately after her July 17 petition filing. But she presented no
evidence of these facts to the bankruptcy court as part of the relief from
stay proceedings.8 The only evidence of notice was presented by Pacific
Loanworks. One of Gross’s declarations stated that the movant and the
8 Her appeal papers include a declaration in which she details her alleged phone calls to Total Lender Solutions. Aplt. Opn. Br. at pp. 38-39 of 43. But Marion apparently created, executed, and submitted the declaration only as part of her appeal papers. 16 lenders did not learn of the July 17, 2025 bankruptcy filing until after the
foreclosure sale occurred. Thus, the evidence in the record at the time of the
court’s decision supported its finding that the lenders did not know about
the stay when the foreclosure occurred. Again, this factor favored
As for the sixth factor regarding Marion’s compliance with the Code
and the applicable rules, the court found that her compliance was “a little
problematic.” The court indicated that Marion had struggled to perform
some of her duties as a debtor in both of her recent bankruptcies despite
being represented by counsel. Accordingly, this was another factor in favor
of annulment.
As to the seventh factor regarding the ease of restoring the status quo
ante, the court found that restoring the status quo would have been easy.
This finding was supported by the undisputed fact that the foreclosing
lenders were the successful purchasers at the foreclosure sale. This factor
did not militate in favor of annulment.
The eighth factor concerned the relative cost to the debtor and the
lenders associated with the decision of whether to annul the stay. The court
indicated that this factor favored annulment. The court apparently
weighed the delay the lenders were going to incur against the fact that the
debtor would be immediately confronted with a new foreclosure sale even
if stay annulment was denied. Thus, the court’s comments indicate that it
17 concluded that the balance of costs tipped in favor of the lenders. 9
As to the ninth factor, how quickly the lenders sought annulment, the
court observed that the lenders moved for annulment very quickly—within
days of the foreclosure sale. Thus, this factor also favored annulment.
Similarly, the tenth factor favored annulment. The court found that the
lenders did not take any further steps in violation of the stay once they
learned of Marion’s July 17, 2025 bankruptcy filing.
As for the eleventh factor—the prospect of irreparable harm to
Marion—the court found that she would not suffer irreparable harm if the
stay was annulled, because the lenders could simply reinitiate the
foreclosure sale. Again, this factor favored annulment.
Finally, as to the twelfth factor, the court found that annulment of the
stay would promote judicial economy because it would retroactively
validate the foreclosure sale that already had occurred.
In sum, the bankruptcy court found that virtually all the Fjeldsted
factors favored annulment. Moreover, the evidence in the record supported
the court’s analysis and findings. Marion has failed to sufficiently explain
9 Marion’s counsel argued before the bankruptcy court that the cost to her of annulling the stay was substantial. He maintained that annulling the stay would effectively prevent her from being able to resell the Property and capture what she claimed was $700,000 in equity. The court’s comments suggest that the court gave little or no credence to this argument. As the court indicated, relief from stay already was in effect, a new foreclosure sale would follow shortly even if the stay was not annulled, and there was no evidence of any sale in prospect by Marion. In short, Marion’s ability to capture any equity in the Property was speculative at best and nonexistent at worst. 18 why any of these findings—or the court’s ultimate decision to annul the
stay based on those findings—were illogical, implausible or without
support in the record. Nor are we aware of any such grounds.10
This only leaves for consideration Marion’s insistence that the court
should have held an evidentiary hearing on the stay annulment factors.
However, as we already have explained, an evidentiary hearing was not
required here because Marion’s opposition failed to demonstrate the
existence of any genuine and material disputed factual issue.
Consequently, Marion has failed to establish that the bankruptcy
court’s annulment of the stay should be reversed or vacated.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, we AFFIRM.
10 Beginning on page 111 of the document she filed with this Panel on March 16, 2026, Marion requested that we accept as her opening appeal brief the brief beginning on page 115 of her March 16, 2026 filing. However, on March 6, 2026, this Panel issued an order denying her request to file a late opening brief because she already had filed an opening brief on January 6, 2026. Accordingly, we have treated pages 115 through 132 of her March 16, 2026 filing as her reply brief in this appeal, and we have reviewed and considered its contents as part of our analysis in this appeal. 19