In re M. Children

2025 Ohio 4744

• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals
• Decided: October 15, 2025
• Docket: C-250379
• Status: Published

Opinion

[Cite as In re M. Children, 2025-Ohio-4744.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO

IN RE: M. CHILDREN : APPEAL NO. C-250379 TRIAL NO. F/20/1196 Z :

: JUDGMENT ENTRY

This cause was heard upon the appeal, the record, and the briefs. For the reasons set forth in the Opinion filed this date, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. Further, the court holds that there were reasonable grounds for this appeal, allows no penalty, and orders that costs be taxed under App.R. 24. The court further orders that (1) a copy of this Judgment with a copy of the Opinion attached constitutes the mandate, and (2) the mandate be sent to the trial court for execution under App.R. 27.

To the clerk: Enter upon the journal of the court on 10/15/2025 per order of the court.

By:_______________________ Administrative Judge [Cite as In re M. Children, 2025-Ohio-4744.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO

IN RE: M. CHILDREN : APPEAL NO. C-250379 TRIAL NO. F/20/1196 Z :

: OPINION

Appeal From: Hamilton County Juvenile Court

Judgment Appealed From Is: Affirmed

Date of Judgment Entry on Appeal: October 15, 2025

James J. Whitfield, for Appellant Mother,

Connie Pillich, Hamilton County Prosecuting Attorney, and Patsy Bradbury, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for Appellee Hamilton County Department of Job and Family Services,

Raymond T. Faller, Hamilton County Public Defender, and Kimberly A. Helfrich, Assistant Public Defender, for Appellee Guardian Ad Litem. OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

BOCK, Judge.

{¶1} Appellant Mother appeals the juvenile court’s grant of permanent

custody of her three children, Ma.M., Mi.M., and J.M. (“M. Children”), to the

Hamilton County Department of Job and Family Services (“HCJFS”). Mother raises

two assignments of error.

{¶2} We overrule Mother’s first assignment of error and hold that the

juvenile court was not required to determine whether HCJFS made reasonable efforts

to reunify the family when deciding HCJFS’s R.C. 2151.413 permanent-custody motion

because the trial court had made a reasonable-efforts finding earlier in the

proceedings.

{¶3} We overrule Mother’s second assignment of error and hold that the

juvenile court’s judgment granting HCJFS permanent custody of the children based

on Mother’s inability to provide the children with a legally-secure permanent

placement was not contrary to the weight of the evidence. That evidence revealed that

Mother tested positive for methamphetamine months before the hearing, did not

distance herself from the M. Children’s father (“Father”), and minimized domestic-

violence issues in their relationship.

{¶4} We affirm the juvenile court’s judgment.

I. Factual and Procedural History

{¶5} Mother and her ex-husband, J.A. (“Ex-Husband”) have five children

together—P.A., A.A., Sa.A., C.A., and Se.A. (collectively, the “A. Children”). Mother and

Ex-Husband coparent under a shared-parenting plan, wherein Mother is the A.

Children’s residential parent. After her divorce from Ex-Husband, Mother married

Father and welcomed twins, Ma.M. and Mi.M., in January 2019. Then in 2021, Mother

and Father welcomed J.M.

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A. HCJFS’s custody motions

{¶6} In December 2020, HCJFS filed a complaint and motion for temporary

custody or protective supervision of Ma.M. and Mi.M. HCJFS alleged that Ma.M. and

Mi.M. were dependent based on Mother’s hospital admission for a mental-health

emergency while Father was on parole and living in a Talbert-House facility.

{¶7} After a hearing, the magistrate denied HCJFS’s request for temporary

custody but granted HCJFS protective supervision over Ma.M. and Mi.M. The trial

court instructed Mother to (1) follow treatment recommendations, (2) submit to a

diagnostic assessment and follow any recommendations, (3) comply with the

recommended medication regime, (4) prohibit Father from having unsupervised

contact with the children, (5) not be the person to supervise Father with the children,

(6) not allow Father to live in the home with the children, (7) sign all release-of-

information forms requested by HCJFS, and (8) use protective daycare as required.

{¶8} The magistrate appointed a guardian ad litem (“GAL”) for Ma.M. and

Mi.M. HCJFS’s case plan named Father’s drug use and Mother’s untreated mental-

health issues as areas of concern. In February 2021, the magistrate adjudicated Ma.M.

and Mi.M. dependent and extended the protective-supervision order.

{¶9} In June 2021, HCJFS filed a second complaint and motion for

temporary custody of Ma.M. and Mi.M. based on allegations of neglect and

dependency. It alleged that Father’s parole officers found Mother in the house during

Father’s parenting time, which violated the terms of his parole, and that Father, who

had been carrying Mi.M. when officers entered the house, tossed his son to an officer—

causing the child to hit the corner of the kitchen counter—and fled the scene. The

magistrate granted HCJFS interim custody of Ma.M. and Mi.M. In August 2021, the

court adjudicated Ma.M. and Mi.M. dependent for a second time.

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{¶10} J.M. was born to Mother and Father in August 2021. Days later, HCJFS

sought temporary custody of J.M. In September 2021, the magistrate adjudicated J.M.

dependent based on Father’s actions during his parole violation. The magistrate

supplemented his order with a finding that HCJFS made reasonable efforts to prevent

J.M.’s removal through substitute care, visitation, mental-health treatment, protective

daycare, and case management. Mother objected to J.M.’s dependency adjudication

on manifest-weight grounds, but the juvenile court overruled her objection.

{¶11} The magistrate extended HCJFS’s temporary custody of the M.

Children, noting that HCJFS expected Mother to “satisfactorily engage in case plan

services and demonstrate the necessary behavior change[] before she is reunified with

her children.” He found that Mother was engaged in “behavioral counseling,”

consistently visited the M. Children, and had attended some of their therapeutic

appointments. But HCJFS believed that Mother’s “counseling was not addressing the

pattern of behavior between her and [F]ather” and Mother was not consistently

attending the M. Children’s appointments. The magistrate found that HCJFS had

made reasonable efforts to end the continued removal of the M. Children through

“substitute care, visitation, counseling, therapeutic services, and caseplan

management.”

{¶12} Then in November 2022, HCJFS moved for permanent custody of the

M. Children under R.C. 2151.413(A) and “a finding that HCJFS made reasonable

efforts to eliminate the continued need for the children’s removal from their home and

that the children’s best interests dictates [sic] continued out of home placement.”

HCJFS alleged in the motion that Mother continued to struggle with mental-health

issues, failed “to attend the children’s medical and therapy appointments,” reduced

5 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

her visitation schedule, and did not “learn appropriate interventions and strategies to

use when interacting with her children.”

{¶13} Ex-Husband moved for custody of the M. Children to allow the M.

Children to “live with[] and grow up with their siblings and near other family.” The

next month, HCJFS filed a complaint and a motion for temporary custody of the A.

Children, alleging that some of the A. Children were living with Mother. Relevant here,

the magistrate entered protective supervision orders over some of the A. Children and

required Mother to undergo random drug screens. Ex-Husband withdrew his petition

for custody of the M. Children.

B. Permanent-custody hearing

{¶14} The magistrate held permanent-custody hearings in May, July, and

August 2024. HCJFS’s case for terminating Mother’s parental rights rested on

Mother’s case-plan progress, mental-health issues and treatment, substance-abuse

issues and treatment, visits with the M. Children, and relationship with Father.

{¶15} At the time of the hearings, Mother and Father had been married for six

years. In January 2024, Mother had moved into a house owned by her father, where

some of the A. Children lived. Mother had a full-time, remote job. Father was in prison

during the hearings and most of the time that this case was pending below.

{¶16} The twins were around five years old at the time of the permanent-

custody hearings, were set to start kindergarten in August 2024, and had lived with

their foster parents for more than two years. Their foster mother testified that the

twins were two years old when they were placed with her and were “basically . . . like

infants who just laid on their back and cried, had some food insecurities . . . had really

low muscle tone, weren’t talking.” Both twins were diagnosed with global development

delay, and Ma.M. was diagnosed with autism spectrum disorder. The twins have

6 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

received physical, occupational, speech, and feeding therapy while in foster care. At

the time of the hearings, Ma.M. had four appointments and Mi.M. had three

appointments each week.

{¶17} J.M. was placed into foster care days after he was born in August 2021

and was almost three years old when the hearings began. J.M.’s foster mother testified

that J.M.’s shoulder was injured during birth and he was “slow to use his limbs.” J.M.

was diagnosed with hypotonia, global development delay, sensory processing

disorder, and autism spectrum disorder. J.M. has weekly occupational, feeding, and

sensory-therapy appointments, and will need “ABA therapy.”

1. Mother’s progress with case-plan services

{¶18} Mother completed two diagnostic assessments of functioning (“DAFs”)

in 2020 and 2023. Her first DAF assessor recommended that HCJFS offer Mother

“parental programs that would include information on how to help kids with

developmental disabilities.” Mother testified that HCJFS did not offer that service. In

2023, her DAF assessor recommended that HCJFS provide Mother with outpatient

substance-abuse treatment, random drug screens, individual counseling, and

pharmacological management. And her assessor suggested that HCJFS offer Mother

parenting support and education for parents of children with developmental delays

and Nar-Anon as beneficial services.

{¶19} Mother testified that HCJFS ignored those suggestions. As part of

Mother’s case plan, HCJFS coordinated her mental-health treatment and visitation

with the children through Family Nurturing Center (“FNC”). Later, HCJFS provided

drug screens. Eventually, a Caseworker1 referred Mother for a parenting evaluation.

1 Numerous HCJFS employees worked on the family’s case, supervised caseworkers, and testified

at the hearings. We refer to HCJFS employees overseeing the family’s case as “Caseworker(s).”

7 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

{¶20} Mother routinely met with her Caseworkers. She recalled repeatedly

asking them “what they wanted to see” from her to allow her to regain custody of her

children. According to Mother, HCJFS and the Caseworkers did not set concrete goals,

so Mother attended a host of parenting and trauma classes at Beech Acres. Mother

testified that she implements the lessons she learned from those classes and what she

has learned from her children’s therapy appointments.

i. Visitation and the children’s appointments

{¶21} Initially, Mother resisted suggestions about the M. Children’s needs and

doubted the need for their appointments to address their special needs. At first, she

arrived at the end of her children’s appointments. In 2022, HCJFS told Mother they

wanted her to attend more consistently. Eventually, Mother was engaged with the

children’s therapy appointments and HCJFS was satisfied with her attendance.

Sometimes, Mother’s work schedule conflicted with the children’s appointments.

Mother testified that, if the juvenile court returned the children to her custody, she

would schedule the children’s appointment to a facility closer to her home. And with

the help of her support network, she expected no issues with her children’s

appointments.

{¶22} Mother’s visits with the children first occurred at Family Nurturing

Center (“FNC”), with supervision. In 2022, visits transitioned to Mother’s home.

Caseworkers were initially concerned about cleanliness in Mother’s house, but she was

receptive to feedback. A Caseworker described Mother as attentive and receptive to

her children.

{¶23} An FNC employee supervised Mother’s visits with the M. Children from

November 2022 to March 2024. She testified that Mother was receptive to feedback

and had no concerns with Mother’s parenting. The FNC employee also testified that

8 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

the children’s transition from Mother to their foster parents after visits were “long and

drawn out” because the foster parents lingered in Mother’s home “looking around the

house” and “trying to find things wrong that were not necessarily a problem, which

would lead to “complaints about the house” and “other things that were going on.”

ii. Mother’s mental health

{¶24} Mother had anxiety and received mental-health treatment before this

case began. Mother testified that, during the COVID-19 pandemic, she began having

panic attacks because she was “isolated and living alone with the twins.” She called

police, arranged childcare, and went to the hospital for psychiatric treatment, which

led to the “twins [being] removed into foster care on that day.” Sa.A., Mother’s teenage

son, testified that Mother was “very distressed” in 2021 and not “in a great state of

mind” after HCJFS removed Ma.M. and Mi.M.

{¶25} As part of her case plan, Mother began therapy in 2020. Caseworkers

testified that Mother consistently attended her mental-health treatment. Mother and

her Caseworkers testified that Father’s substance abuse and his behaviors were a

trigger for Mother. Mother worked on her own substance-abuse issues and her

boundaries with Father in therapy. According to Sa.A., Mother is currently “more

composed,” “more empathetic,” and is selfless.

{¶26} In August 2022, Mother admitted herself to Becket Springs, an

inpatient mental-health-treatment facility in Cincinnati, Ohio. After her inpatient

stay, she engaged in outpatient treatment. The Beckett Springs admission packet

reveals that Mother reported having suicidal thoughts. But she was deemed “stable”

when she was discharged ten days later. At the hearing, Mother adamantly denied

being suicidal or reporting thoughts of suicide to Beckett Springs.

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{¶27} Caseworkers testified that Mother did not apply what she learned in

therapy. HCJFS wanted to see that Mother could “parent as well as addressing . . . the

mental health, being able to self-protect, protect herself, protect her children, being

able to identify . . . triggers and . . . appropriate responses to those.” Another

Caseworker testified that Mother’s therapist reported that Mother was making

progress. While Mother followed HCJFS’s therapy requirements, a Caseworker

testified that the mental-health component of Mother’s case plan was incomplete

because the agency had not seen changes in Mother’s behavior or in her involvement

with Father.

iii. Mother’s substance-use issues

{¶28} Mother testified that she had used marijuana, and occasionally cocaine,

in the past. In 2019, she tried methamphetamine. According to Mother, she used

methamphetamine semi-regularly by the spring of 2022. By summer, she was using

methamphetamine every day to “deal with the trauma” caused by HCJFS’s removing

her children and the death of a family member. Her daily methamphetamine use

continued for three months, until her “life became unmanageable” and she sought

treatment at Beckett Springs.

{¶29} Mother checked herself into Beckett Springs and participated in

inpatient substance-abuse treatment. During her ten-day stay, Mother realized that

she was a “drug addict” and “at risk of drug use anytime [she’s] around someone who’s

using.” After her stay, Mother began outpatient treatment, which was three-hour-long

sessions, three days each week. But she discontinued that intensive outpatient-

treatment program when its demands threatened her employment. At the time of trial,

Mother participated in “Sober Recovery,” a support group with weekly meetings.

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{¶30} Mother testified that after she left Beckett Springs, she continued using

methamphetamine. In February 2023, Mother tested positive for drugs and admitted

to her drug use. She testified that she had maintained sobriety since February 2023.

After that failed drug test, Mother routinely tested negative for drugs. A Caseworker

believed Mother was “doing really well,” “demonstrating sobriety,” and prioritizing her

children, so HCJFS recommended expanding Mother’s visitation rights.

{¶31} But Mother’s hair follicles tested positive for methamphetamine twice

in October 2023 and once in January 2024. Along with Mother, Caseworkers and case-

plan providers were confused by the positive test results. Mother’s therapist,

Caseworkers, and FNC visitation facilitator did not see evidence in Mother’s behavior

that she was using drugs at the time.

{¶32} At the hearings, Mother testified that she had driven a truck that Father

had used to smoke methamphetamine sometime around September 2023. She

theorized that her hair was exposed to methamphetamine residue in the interior of the

truck, which caused her follicles to test positive for methamphetamine. But during a

meeting before a visit between Mother and the children, Mother told the FNC

visitation facilitator that the hair-follicle test result “was correct, and that she did mess

up, and she knows that [] she did, and she was gonna move forward.”

{¶33} A Talbert House employee treated Mother during her intensive

outpatient program and then as Mother’s individual therapist. Mother completed and

graduated from an outpatient drug-treatment program. The therapist worked with

Mother on her relationship with Father and her sobriety. In the therapist’s view,

Mother had “drastically improved her relationship . . . with sober support.” Mother’s

progress in her drug-treatment program was “very significant,” and she was “in

sustained remission.”

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iv. Mother’s relationship with Father

{¶34} As of May 2024, Father had been incarcerated for one year because, in

his words, “I’m a drug addict and I made bad decisions.” Father’s criminal history

includes a child-endangerment conviction related to throwing Mi.M. at his parole

officer, “bail jumping,” probation violations, and felony drug possession. While Father

was scheduled for release in July 2025, additional charges were pending against him.

Father testified that Mother encouraged him to better himself in prison, so he enrolled

himself in “numerous programs” for substance abuse and domestic violence and left

the Aryan Brotherhood. Because of his good behavior, the prison moved Father to

minimum-security housing.

{¶35} Mother described her relationship with Father as “toxic,” but denied any

domestic violence in their relationship. Father, like Mother, denied any domestic

violence in their relationship. Mother defined domestic violence as dominance and

control that “can include physical violence.” But she testified that she and Father had

“gotten physically assertive with one another,” had “thrown things,” and had “broken

things” when arguing. And Father had “probably” slapped Mother.

{¶36} Mother’s Beckett Springs admission paperwork states that Mother was

“covered in bruises with two black eyes, swollen face, [and had] wounds on her arms

and face” in August 2022. She told employees that her injuries “were from her

husband, who dropped her off at the facility.” But Mother testified that Father did not

cause her injuries, and instead attributed the injuries to being clumsy, an iron

deficiency, and having gone camping before her admission to Beckett Springs.

{¶37} A Caseworker testified that Father manipulated and controlled Mother.

She recalled that Mother had called the police because of Father’s drug-induced

aggression. Once, Father stole Mother’s phone and prevented her from taking a drug

12 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

test. In the fall of 2022, Father reported to a Caseworker that Mother “might be using”

drugs. Father testified that he reported Mother because he was “on the run” and

Mother had “shunned” him.

{¶38} Caseworkers testified that Mother had described Father as a trigger for

her mental-health and substance issues. Indeed, Mother initially testified that Father

convinced her to take methamphetamine. Later in her testimony, she said it was her

decision. Mother clarified that Father “himself, is not a trigger” for Mother’s drug use

or mental-health issues; instead, her trigger “is his drug use.”

{¶39} Mother testified that through therapy, she has learned to set boundaries

with Father and believes that in the fall of 2023 she had set the boundaries that HCJFS

wanted to see. She had stopped talking to him and demanded that he improve himself

before she would even consider visiting or talking to him. Mother testified that her

boundaries with Father involved “when he is not doing well.” In those instances,

Mother would not “engage with [him]” and “cut[s] off communication.” Mother

testified that Father “attempted to control” her in the past, but “[h]e doesn’t have any

access to” her finances, job, or family as leverage for control.

{¶40} After Father completed substance-abuse and parenting classes in

prison, Mother began visiting and speaking with Father regularly. Mother explained

that she reengaged with Father because her “sons are his sons, and what he does with

his life at any point in his life is going to affect them.” So, she wanted to offer Father

“support and positive reinforcement for the [positive] things that he’s doing.”

Moreover, she deposits roughly “$100, $150 a month” into Father’s commissary.

{¶41} Father initially testified that he wanted to continue his relationship with

Mother. He recalled that she had raised the prospect of a divorce at one point. But

Father persuaded her to not file for divorce and insisted he would refuse to sign any

13 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

divorce paperwork. Mother disagreed that Father had talked her out of filing for

divorce. She testified that she intends to file for divorce and has “no plans” to “continue

a relationship with [Father] at all” after his release. Later Father testified that after he

is released from prison, he would not rely on Mother for housing because he and

Mother are “not together, and it would hurt [his] sons.”

{¶42} Caseworkers saw evidence that Mother, at one point, did set boundaries

with Father. But according to one Caseworker, Mother was not “able to keep the

children safe” when Father was around, and the domestic-violence incidents occurred

when Father was out of prison. Caseworkers cited the “thousands” of calls between

Mother and Father when he was in prison as proof that Mother had not set firm

boundaries in her relationship with Father.

{¶43} A new therapist began providing Mother family and individual therapy

in February 2024. HCJFS’s referral guided the scope of Mother’s therapy. The

therapist testified, “there didn’t appear to be a right-there-in-the-moment concern for

domestic violence” and HCJFS did not refer Mother to domestic-violence counseling.

The therapy focused on Mother’s boundaries with Father, and the therapist believed

that Mother felt safe communicating and visiting with Father while he was in prison

because the calls “are recorded and . . . it’s a controlled environment when she sees

him.” Mother discussed “her expectation for when [Father]” would be released from

prison and “she didn’t have a plan to have any relations with [Father].” Mother’s

previous therapist also testified that Mother had dramatically improved her

boundaries with Father and limited her contact with him.

{¶44} Mother’s friends and her addiction-recovery sponsor testified that

Mother went months without speaking with Father and had set firm boundaries with

him. Mother’s sponsor testified that Mother had considered seeking a protection order

14 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

against Father, and that divorce is still an option for Mother. Mother’s sponsor

believed that Mother had protective measures in place to protect her children.

C. The juvenile court’s decision

{¶45} The magistrate granted HCJFS’s motion for permanent custody because

the M. Children had been in HCJFS’s temporary custody for more than 12 months of

a consecutive 22-month period under R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(d) and permanent custody

was in the children’s best interest under R.C. 2151.414(D)(1). Mother objected, arguing

that the magistrate’s decision was not supported by sufficient evidence and was

contrary to the weight of the evidence, the findings were contrary to law, and HCJFS

did not make reasonable efforts to provide Mother with the opportunity to reunify with

her children. The juvenile court overruled Mother’s objections, adopted and

supplemented the magistrate’s findings, terminated Mother’s parental rights, and

awarded permanent custody of the M. Children to HCJFS.

II. Analysis

{¶46} Mother raises two assignments of error. First, she argues that the

juvenile court erred when it found that HCJFS had made reasonable efforts to assist

Mother in remedying the issues that caused her children’s removal. Second, she

asserts that the juvenile court’s best-interest findings were contrary to the manifest

weight of the evidence.

A. The juvenile court was not required to make a reasonable-efforts finding when considering HCJFS’s permanent-custody motion

{¶47} Mother disputes the evidence supporting the juvenile court’s finding of

reasonable efforts, citing R.C. 2151.419. She argues that the record demonstrates that

HCJFS’s services were neither reasonable nor diligent. She cites the fact that HCJFS

knew the A. Children were living with Mother. And while the A. Children were safe,

15 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

secured, and nurtured, HCJFS “failed to take steps to reintegrate the children at issue

back into Mother’s home.”

{¶48} Generally, “the state must make reasonable efforts to reunify the family

before terminating parental rights.” In re C.F., 2007-Ohio-1104, ¶ 4. Multiple Ohio

statutes require a child-services agency to make reasonable efforts to reunify the

family when the agency seeks or maintains custody of a child. To satisfy this duty, the

agency “‘“must act diligently and provide services appropriate to the family’s need to

prevent the child’s removal or as a predicate to reunification.”’” In re D.D., 2023-Ohio-

4147, ¶ 20 (10th Dist.), quoting In re H.M.K., 2013-Ohio-4317, ¶ 95 (3d Dist.), quoting

In re D.A., 2012-Ohio-1104, ¶ 30 (6th Dist.).

{¶49} Mother’s reasonable-efforts argument focuses on R.C. 2151.419(A)(1).

That statute instructs the juvenile court to decide whether an agency “has made

reasonable efforts to prevent the removal of the child from the child’s home, to

eliminate the continued removal of the child from the child’s home, or to make it

possible for the child to return safely home.” R.C. 2151.419(A)(1).

{¶50} The reasonable-efforts determination must be made after a “hearing

held pursuant to [R.C.] 2151.28, . . . 2151.31[(E)], or . . . 2151.314, 2151.33, or 2151.353

. . . at which the court removes a child from the child’s home or continues the removal

of a child from the child’s home.” Id. Accordingly, R.C. 2151.419(A)(1) requires a

juvenile court to make a reasonable-efforts determination after “adjudicatory,

emergency, detention, and temporary-disposition hearings, and dispositional

hearings for abused, neglected, or dependent children, all of which occur prior to a

decision transferring permanent custody to the state.” In re C.F. at ¶ 41.

{¶51} So, while the State must make reasonable efforts to reunify the family

during child-custody proceedings at some point before the court terminates parental

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rights, the child-services agency must prove that it made such reasonable efforts at a

permanent-custody hearing only if it had “not [already] established that reasonable

efforts have been made prior to the hearing on a motion for permanent custody.” In re

C.F., 2007-Ohio-1104, at ¶ 43. In cases where an agency has demonstrated earlier in

the proceedings that it made reasonable efforts, the reasonable-efforts statute, “R.C.

2151.419(A)(1)[,] does not apply in a hearing on a motion for permanent custody filed

pursuant to R.C. 2151.413.” Id. at ¶ 43; see also In re S Children, 2024-Ohio-538, ¶ 42

(1st Dist.) (“R.C. 2151.419(A) requires a reasonable-efforts finding in a dispositional

hearing after an adjudication of abuse, neglect, or dependency.”).

{¶52} HCJFS sought permanent custody of the M. Children under R.C.

2151.413(A). Before the permanent-custody hearing, three entries—the disposition

order and two continuance entries—contained findings that HCJFS had made

“reasonable efforts to eliminate the continued removal from the home and make it

possible for the child[ren] to return home by provision of the following services:

substitute care, visitation, counseling, therapeutic services, and case management.”

Mother did not object to those findings. And by failing to object to the magistrate’s

reasonable-efforts findings, Mother forfeited all but plain error on appeal under Juv.R.

40(D)(3)(b)(iv). See In re L.D., 2024-Ohio-4888, ¶ 18 (1st Dist.); see also In re De.R.,

2024-Ohio-1183, ¶ 18 (1st Dist.). We will not find plain error unless the trial court

committed an error that “‘seriously affects the basic fairness, integrity, or public

reputation of the judicial process[.]’” In re J.W., 2019-Ohio-2730, ¶ 7 (1st Dist.),

quoting In re Etter, 134 Ohio App.3d 484, 492 (1st Dist. 1998).

{¶53} The juvenile court did what the statute requires—it determined during

the proceedings that HCJFS made reasonable efforts to reunite the family. And

because HCJFS demonstrated its reasonable efforts earlier in the proceedings, R.C.

17 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

2151.419(A)(1) was inapplicable at the “hearing on a motion for permanent custody

filed pursuant to R.C. 2151.413.” In re C.F. at ¶ 43.

{¶54} Mother did not object to the magistrate’s reasonable-efforts findings

and does not suggest that those findings amount to a plain error. As such, we need not

consider whether the juvenile court plainly erred. See Burd v. Artis, 2025-Ohio-625, ¶

11 (1st Dist.). Moreover, the transcripts of those earlier proceedings that resulted in

the reasonable-efforts findings are not in the record on appeal, which would prevent

us from reviewing those findings. See In re B.H., 2021-Ohio-4152, ¶ 23 (9th Dist.).

{¶55} We overrule Mother’s first assignment of error because the juvenile

court did not have to make a reasonable-efforts finding when considering HCJFS’s

R.C. 2151.413 permanent-custody motion because HCJFS was found to have made

reasonable efforts at earlier stages in the proceedings.

B. The evidence supports the juvenile court’s best-interest findings

{¶56} In her second assignment of error, Mother argues that the trial court’s

determination that awarding permanent custody of the M. Children to HCJFS is in

their best interests is contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence.

{¶57} Mother, like all parents, has a “fundamental liberty interest . . . in the

care, custody, and management of [her] child[ren].” Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S.

745, 752 (1982). Indeed, a “parent’s ‘desire for and right to “the companionship, care,

custody, and management of his or her children”’ is an interest far more precious than

any property right.” Id. at 756, quoting Lassiter v. Dept. of Social Servs., 452 U.S. 18,

27 (1981), quoting Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972). Terminating those

parental rights is considered “the family-law equivalent of the death penalty in a

criminal case.” In re M Children, 2019-Ohio-484, ¶ 13 (1st Dist.). Consequently,

permanently terminating parental rights is proper only as a measure of last resort and

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when necessary to protect the welfare of the children. See In re T.L., 2019-Ohio-4919,

¶ 17 (7th Dist.). In other words, terminating parental rights is “only justified when it is

in the ‘best interests’ of the child.” In re Cunningham, 59 Ohio St.2d 100, 105 (1979).

{¶58} Under R.C. 2151.414(B)(1), the juvenile court may grant a child-services

agency permanent custody of a child if it finds “‘by clear and convincing evidence, that

it is in the best interest of the child’ to do so and that one of five factors enumerated in

R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a) through (e) applies.” In re Z.C., 2023-Ohio-4703, ¶ 7. Clear and

convincing evidence “produce[s] in the mind of the trier of facts a firm belief or

conviction as to the facts sought to be established.” Cross v. Ledford, 161 Ohio St. 469,

(1954), paragraph three of the syllabus. Clear and convincing evidence is a higher

burden of persuasion than the preponderance-of-evidence standard in most civil

cases, but a lesser burden than the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard in criminal

cases. Id.

{¶59} A manifest-weight challenge requires us to review the record, weigh the

evidence and reasonable inferences, appraise witness credibility, and determine

whether the trial court clearly lost its way, creating “a manifest miscarriage of justice

that the judgment must be reversed and a new trial ordered.’” In re Z.C. at ¶ 14, quoting

Eastley v. Volkman, 2023-Ohio-2179, ¶ 20. Appellate courts must remain “‘mindful of

the presumption in favor of the finder of fact’” when reviewing the weight of the

evidence. Id., quoting Eastley at ¶ 21.

{¶60} When considering an R.C. 2151.413(A) permanent-custody motion, the

juvenile court must consider the following factors, along with any other relevant

factors, when deciding if permanent custody is in the best interests of the child:

(a) The interaction and interrelationship of the child with the child’s

parents, siblings, relatives, foster caregivers and out-of-home providers,

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and any other person who may significantly affect the child;

(b) The wishes of the child, as expressed directly by the child or through

the child’s guardian ad litem, with due regard for the maturity of the

child;

(c) The custodial history of the child . . . ;

(d) The child’s need for a legally secure permanent placement and

whether that type of placement can be achieved without a grant of

permanent custody to the agency;

(e) Whether any of the factors in divisions (E)(7) to (11) of this section

apply in relation to the parents and child.

R.C. 2151.414(D)(1).

{¶61} When analyzing the best interest of a child, “no single factor is

controlling, and the weight to be given to any factor lies within the trial court’s

discretion.” In re L.L., 2020-Ohio-5609, ¶ 8 (1st Dist.).

{¶62} Here, the magistrate’s best-interest analysis focused on the children’s

interactions and interrelationships, their custodial history, and their need for a legally

secure permanent placement. See R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(a), (c), and (d). The juvenile

court adopted and supplemented those findings.

{¶63} Mother does not challenge the juvenile court’s findings that the M.

Children are bonded to Mother, their foster parents, and to “some degree” the A.

Children. Mother also does not challenge the juvenile court’s findings that Ma.M. and

Mi.M. were removed from Mother’s care in June 2021, that J.M. was removed from

Mother’s care in August 2021, or that the three were adjudicated dependent.

{¶64} Rather, Mother’s manifest-weight argument focuses on the juvenile

court’s analysis of the children’s need for a legally secure permanent placement, which

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“‘encompasses a stable environment where a child will live in safety with one or more

dependable adults who will provide for the child’s needs.’” In re Z.F., 2024-Ohio-1698,

¶ 45 (1st Dist.), quoting In re M.B., 2016-Ohio-793, ¶ 56 (4th Dist.). As Mother points

out, the magistrate’s and juvenile court’s discussions of the M. Children’s need for

legally secure permanent placements include multiple findings and an extensive

discussion of the evidence.

{¶65} Ohio courts have held that a parent’s inability to create distance from

an abusive partner supports a finding that the parent cannot provide a legally secure

permanent placement. See In re H.C., 2025-Ohio-3010, ¶ 33 (4th Dist.) (collecting

cases). Moreover, courts have held that when a parent struggling with addiction does

not adequately address their substance-abuse issues, a juvenile court could consider

that parent’s home unsafe or legally unsecure. See In re B.M., 2017-Ohio-3892, ¶ 55

(4th Dist.); see also In re J. Children, 2025-Ohio-1430, ¶ 32 (1st Dist.).

{¶66} The magistrate found that Mother did not demonstrate that she can

remain sober and remove herself from unhealthy relationships. The magistrate was

“not persuaded that the concerns related to Mother’s substance abuse have been

remedied” and remained “concerned that she has not made the behavioral changes

necessary to gain insight into the nature of her addiction nor been able to maintain

sobriety, despite her engagement in treatment services.” Moreover, “Mother enabled

Father” and there “was a consistent pattern of Father abusing substances, becoming

incarcerated, being released from incarceration, Mother continuing to enable his

lifestyle, which then led to the continued cycles of his use and incarceration.” The

magistrate found that Mother minimized the domestic-violence issues, and her

testimony was not credible.

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{¶67} The juvenile court also found that Mother did not show behavioral

changes necessary to remedy the issues surrounding her relationship with Father and

substance use, citing Mother’s phone calls with Father and admission that the hair-

follicle tests were “correct” and she “did mess up.”

{¶68} Mother argues that these findings ignore the evidence of Mother’s

progress and sobriety. She cites a psychological exam that she underwent in August

2023, which acknowledged her progress in sobriety, mental health, and understanding

her children’s needs. But Mother tested positive for methamphetamine after that

evaluation, in October 2023 and January 2024. And then Mother admitted that the

hair-follicle test results were correct.

{¶69} Mother also cites contradictory statements by Caseworkers and the GAL

about their knowledge of the A. Children’s presence in Mother’s home as evidence that

the Caseworkers and GAL lack credibility. But the evidence surrounding Mother’s

relationship with Father and substance-use issues was credible. The magistrate found

that Mother’s testimony lacked credibility, and Mother has not explained why the

juvenile court should have departed from that credibility finding.

{¶70} We note that evidence exists that Mother had taken steps to set

boundaries and distance herself from Father and has made strides in her recovery

from substance abuse, despite the positive tests. See State v. Davis, 2017-Ohio-8479,

¶ 13 (8th Dist.) (recognizing that “relapse is an extremely common, and often

inevitable, aspect of recovery from drug addiction.”). But the evidence showed that

Mother’s insistence that the hair-follicle tests were false positives was dishonest. And

the juvenile court correctly noted that Mother minimized the domestic-violence issues

in her relationship and kept Father in her life. Indeed, Mother was arrested for

domestic violence against Father at one point and Mother sought to use photos of

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bruises and injuries as evidence for a temporary restraining order against Father.

{¶71} On this record, we cannot say that the juvenile court’s decision to grant

HCJFS permanent custody of her children was contrary to the manifest weight of the

evidence. We overrule Mother’s second assignment of error.

III. Conclusion

{¶72} We overrule the two assignments of error and affirm the juvenile court’s

judgment awarding HCJFS permanent custody of the M. Children.

Judgment affirmed.

CROUSE, J., concurs. KINSLEY, P.J., concurs separately.

KINSLEY, P.J., concurring separately.

{¶73} I concur with the majority’s resolution of Mother’s assignments of error.

I write separately, however, to address what I perceive as confusion by the parties as

to the applicable legal standards governing the permanent custody inquiry. The

guardian ad litem argued that the central issue in this case pertains to Mother and

Father’s “behavioral changes.” Similarly, HCJFS argued that the children should be

removed from Mother’s care because she failed to remedy the conditions in her home

that caused the children’s removal. Neither of these contentions accurately reflect the

R.C. 2151.414(D)(1) best-interest factors that apply when a child has been in the

custody of HCFJS for 12 of 22 consecutive months, as the M. Children were. Given that

parental termination is the family law equivalent of the death penalty, and given the

serious impacts that occur when the law remakes families, greater precision is

warranted in applying the parental termination standards to the M. Children. In re M.

Children, 2019-Ohio-484, ¶ 13 (1st Dist.).

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{¶74} The law requires a two-step inquiry before children can be removed

from the custody of their biological parents. First, the child must be eligible for an

award of permanent custody by satisfying one of the criteria in R.C. 2151.414(B)(1). In

re X.M.W., 2020-Ohio-449, ¶ 9 (1st Dist.). These criteria include (1) that the child

cannot or should not be placed with either parent within a reasonable period of time,

(2) that the child is abandoned or orphaned, (3) that the child or another child of the

same parent has been adjudicated abused, neglected, or dependent three times, or (4)

that the child has been in the temporary custody of HCJFS for 12 or more months of a

consecutive 22-month period. R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a)-(e). In determining whether a

child cannot or should not be placed with her parents under R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a),

courts are to consider all relevant evidence. R.C. 2151.414(E). Fifteen enumerated

conditions require the juvenile court to conclude that this criterion has been met,

including when a parent fails to remedy the conditions that caused the child to be

removed from the parent’s home. R.C. 2151.414(E)(1).

{¶75} Once a child has been determined to be eligible for permanent custody

under R.C. 2151.414(B)(1), the juvenile court must assess whether an award of

permanent custody is in the child’s best interest. In re X.M.W. at ¶ 9. This inquiry

requires the juvenile court to take into consideration a number of factors about the

child’s relationships, wishes, custodial history, and “need for a legally secure

placement.” R.C. 2151.414(D)(1). In ascertaining a child’s best interest, the juvenile

court is also directed to consider five of the sixteen conditions that indicate whether a

child cannot or should not be placed with her parents. R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(e)

(incorporating R.C. 2151.414(E)(7) to (11) into a permanent custody best-interest

determination). But the inquiry into whether a parent has remedied the conditions

that caused the child to be removed from the parent’s home is not among the five

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conditions that the statute incorporates at the best-interest stage. Id. Thus, under

Ohio’s parental termination scheme, the relevance of a parent’s failure to remedy the

conditions that caused a child to be removed from the home is cabined to cases in

which a child cannot or should not be placed with that parent. Id.

{¶76} Nonetheless, the parties’ briefs in this case, as well as several of the

magistrate’s custody orders, focused on whether Mother demonstrated sufficient

“behavioral change” to retain custody of her children. But “behavioral change” is not a

legal standard. It appears nowhere in the Revised Code sections governing parental

termination. As a term, it is incredibly vague, in that it does not specify what precisely

a parent is to do or accomplish. What is worse, it is objectively immeasurable, leaving

the decision as to whether a parent has sufficiently reformed to the discretion of

HCJFS.

{¶77} To the extent a parent’s inability to overcome previous struggles is

relevant to the parental termination calculus, it may come into play, if at all, in

determining whether a parent remedied the conditions that necessitated removal

under R.C. 2151.414(E)(1). But that factor only applies to cannot-or-should-not-place

cases under R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a), not 12-in-22 cases under R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(d).

As this case is of the latter variety, the factor simply does not apply.

{¶78} Evidence about a parent’s ability to provide for a child’s needs and

wellbeing is therefore more properly admitted under the “legally secure placement”

factor at the best-interest stage. A legally secure placement is a safe, stable, and

consistent environment where a child’s needs will be met. In re R.R., 2023-Ohio-2575,

¶ 35 (6th Dist.). A juvenile court may need to consider a wider range of information

than merely the conditions which caused removal of the child to determine a parent’s

ability to provide this environment to a child. For example, a child may have been

25 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

removed from the home due to a parent’s substance abuse disorder, but the parent

may also be currently unable to provide a safe and secure environment due to the

presence of a dangerous adult in the residence.

{¶79} This is in fact what occurred here. The condition that led to the removal

of Mother’s children was, sadly, her need for emergency mental health intervention. If

the parties and the juvenile court focus solely on whether she remedied that condition

under R.C. 2151.414(E)(1), she undoubtedly did. The record reveals that Mother no

longer suffered from suicidal ideation at the time of the permanent custody trial and

no longer needed in-patient mental health support.

{¶80} But focusing on this factor, which is not statutorily required for 12-in-

22 cases like this one, has a distorting effect as to whether Mother could provide a

legally secure environment for her children. When focusing on this much broader

criterion under R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(d), the evidence presented at the permanent

custody trial went beyond Mother’s then-current mental health status. It also

indicated that Mother had recently relapsed into substance abuse and could not ensure

the children’s safety from Father, who had been physically abusive to her. Despite the

clear progress Mother made in other areas of her life, I agree with the majority’s

conclusion that this evidence demonstrated Mother’s inability to provide a legally

secure placement for her children. I reach this conclusion solely by reference to R.C.

2151.414(D)(1)(d) and not by weighing any ambiguous reference to Mother’s

“behavioral changes,” whatever that might mean.