In re Lyles

714 A.2d 120, 1998 D.C. App. LEXIS 124, 1998 WL 385430
CourtDistrict of Columbia Court of Appeals
DecidedJuly 9, 1998
DocketNo. 97-BG-328
StatusPublished
Cited by3 cases

This text of 714 A.2d 120 (In re Lyles) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District of Columbia Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In re Lyles, 714 A.2d 120, 1998 D.C. App. LEXIS 124, 1998 WL 385430 (D.C. 1998).

Opinion

PER CURIAM:

Before us in this reciprocal discipline proceeding is a report of the Board on Professional Responsibility recommending that respondent, who has been disbarred by the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, be disbarred from the practice of law in this jurisdiction. Respondent has filed no brief in opposition to the Board’s recommendation. For the reasons stated in the Board’s report which we adopt and append hereto, we accept the recommendation of the Board.

Accordingly, it is

ORDERED that respondent Pamela L. Lyles be disbarred from the practice of law in the District of Columbia, effective immediately. The time after which respondent may seek reinstatement shall run from the filing of an affidavit conforming to the requirements of D.C.Bar Rule XI, § 14(g).

APPENDIX

REPORT, RECOMMENDATION AND ORDER OF THE BOARD ON PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY

Respondent currently is suspended from the practice of law in the District of Columbia for six months, with a requirement that she demonstrate fitness before reinstatement. In re Lyles, 680 A.2d 408 (D.C.1996). In that original jurisdiction proceeding, the Court adopted the Board’s recommended conclusion that Respondent violated the District of Columbia Rules of Professional Conduct in connection with four separate client matters in which she represented debtors in bankruptcy proceedings. That suspension is still in effect.1

Respondent now is before the Board on a reciprocal discipline matter arising from the disbarment of Respondent by the United States District Court for Maryland, for misconduct arising from four individual bankruptcy matters before that court in which Respondent represented individual debtors. Upon receiving notice of the Maryland federal court’s action, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals, on March 28, 1997, again suspended Respondent from the practice of law in the District of Columbia and ordered the Board to recommend, after hearing from Bar Counsel and Respondent, “whether identical, greater or lesser discipline should be imposed as reciprocal discipline or whether the Board, instead, elects to proceed de novo pursuant to Rule XI, § 11.”

Bar Counsel recommends the imposition of identical reciprocal discipline. Respondent filed with the Board an opposition to the imposition of reciprocal discipline. Respondent thereafter, on December 22, 1997, filed in the Court of Appeals a document styled “Motion for Immediate Reinstatement and [122]*122Objection to Imposition of Reciprocal Discipline.” The Court referred that filing to the Board, which has received a statement in response from Bar Counsel. That motion will be addressed herein. Upon review of all of these submissions, the Board recommends disbarment as reciprocal discipline.

ANALYSIS

Reciprocal discipline will be imposed unless the respondent demonstrates by clear and convincing evidence that one of the following exceptions to D.C.App. Rule XI, § 11(c) applies:

(1) The procedure elsewhere was so lacking in notice or opportunity to be heard as to constitute a deprivation of due process; or

(2) There was such infirmity of proof establishing the misconduct as to give rise to the clear conviction that the Court could not, consistently with its duty, accept as final the conclusion on that subject; or

(3) The imposition of the same discipline by the Court would result in grave injustice; or

(4) The misconduct established warrants • substantially different discipline in the District of Columbia; or

(5) The misconduct elsewhere does not constitute misconduct in the District of Columbia.

The Rule “creates a rebuttable presumption that the discipline will be the same in the District of Columbia as it was in the original disciplining jurisdiction.” In re Zilberberg, 612 A.2d 832, 834 (D.C.1992). We examine each potential exception in turn.

(1) Respondent received full notice and an opportunity to be heard in connection with the Maryland federal- court proceeding. On January 10, 1995, the Disciplinary and Admissions Committee of that court entered an order appointing a member of the bar to investigate pending complaints against Respondent. Respondent was notified of the investigation, and was provided with the report of the investigator, which was filed in May 1995. That report addressed Respondent’s conduct in approximately 20 cases in the United States Bankruptcy Court for Maryland. Four client matters were selected for trial before two judges of the Maryland federal court, which occurred over the course of three trial days. Respondent participated in the proceedings and represented herself. She presented the testimony of witnesses and documentary evidence. The two-judge panel recommended disbarment in a thorough opinion, and the full court concurred in the disbarment order.

(2) The Maryland federal court heard substantial proof of the alleged misconduct. Because of the severity of the misconduct alleged, the need to assure that the client matters involved in this reciprocal proceeding do not overlap with those that already were considered by the Court in the discipline reported at 6§0 A.2d 408, and Respondent’s allegations that the discipline involved related to an order of criminal contempt that she claims later was lifted, the Board has taken the unusual precaution of requesting from the disciplining court the record of its disciplinary proceeding. Through Bar Counsel, the Maryland federal court provided the record with the stipulation that it be kept confidential and used by the Board only in connection with these proceedings.

The record before the Maryland federal court discloses that the pattern in the four client matters was similar to that in the original District of Columbia proceeding, although the clients are different. Respondent had very little contact with the clients after an initial meeting, deferring to her “paralegal,” a Mr. Edmond, to handle calls from clients. Respondent failed to respond to motions and to file timely the petitions and schedules necessary to protect her clients’ interests in their bankruptcy proceedings. Due to her failures to appear for court proceedings and creditors’ meetings, and to respond to motions by creditors seeking the lifting of the automatic stay for certain debts, her clients suffered dismissal of their bankruptcy petitions or prejudice to their financial interests. In three of the four matters, she had the clients sign a blank bankruptcy petition, for her to fill in and submit without further review by the clients. Respondent [123]*123failed to provide the clients with copies of filings or notices from the court. She also failed to refund fees when called upon by clients or courts to do so.

The Maryland federal court relied upon testimony of clients in three of the four matters and of successor counsel in two. It also received in evidence extensive records of docket information and filings in the underlying bankruptcy matters. There was no infirmity of proof in the Maryland proceeding.

(3) and (4) No grave injustice would result from the imposition of reciprocal discipline here, and disbarment is within the range of discipline that could be imposed in this jurisdiction for the misconduct proved.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

In Re Greenspan
910 A.2d 324 (District of Columbia Court of Appeals, 2006)
In re Winick
866 A.2d 51 (District of Columbia Court of Appeals, 2005)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
714 A.2d 120, 1998 D.C. App. LEXIS 124, 1998 WL 385430, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-lyles-dc-1998.