In Re Lucas

62 B.R. 949, 1986 Bankr. LEXIS 3170, 14 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 729
CourtUnited States Bankruptcy Court, S.D. California
DecidedJuly 16, 1986
Docket19-00436
StatusPublished
Cited by7 cases

This text of 62 B.R. 949 (In Re Lucas) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Bankruptcy Court, S.D. California primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In Re Lucas, 62 B.R. 949, 1986 Bankr. LEXIS 3170, 14 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 729 (Cal. 1986).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM DECISION

LOUISE DeCARL MALUGEN, Bankruptcy Judge.

Steven and Samantha Lucas (“Debtors”) seek to avoid liens of ITT Financial Services, formerly known as Aetna Finance Company (“Aetna”). 11 U.S.C. § 522(f)(2)(A) permits a debtor to avoid non-possessory, non-purchase money security interests in, among other things, the debtor’s “household furnishings” and “household goods.” Aetna opposes the Debtors’ lien avoidance action on the ground that, under state law, the subject items of collateral do not qualify as “household furnishings” or “household goods.”

FACTS

Debtors filed a joint Chapter 7 petition and elected to utilize the exemption provisions of § 703.140(b) of the California Code of Civil Procedure (“CCP”). 1 Each joint debtor has claimed a $500 jewelry exemption [CCP § 703.140(b)(4)]. The Debtors have not claimed a homestead exemption 2 [CCP § 703.140(b)(1) ]. Instead, they have elected to apply this exemption to the provisions of CCP § 703.140(b)(5), California’s “catch-all” exemption. Under this provision, a debtor may exempt his interest in any property to the extent of $400, plus any unused portion of his homestead exemption (in this case, $7,500). The Debtors have exempted more than $7,900 worth of property under the catch-all provision. 3 Based on this fact and the Debtors’ attempt to claim two jewelry exemptions, the Court surmises that the Debtors are relying on 11 U.S.C. § 522(m) to support an argument that each joint debtor is entitled to the exemptions provided under CCP § 703.140(b).

*951 ISSUES

I. Does 11 U.S.C. § 522(m) authorize California joint debtors to each claim California exemptions?

II. Under California law, which items of Aetna collateral are “household furnishings” or “household goods”?

III. May a debtor avoid a lien encumbering his interest in a “household furnishing” or “household good” when the debtor exempts that interest under the State’s catch-all exemption rather than under its household furnishings/goods exemption?

DISCUSSION

I. Applicability of 11 U.S.C. § 522(m) to California Exemptions.

11 U.S.C. § 522(m) provides, “[s]ub-ject to the limitations of [§ 522(b)], this section shall apply separately with respect to each debtor in a joint case.” Pertinent legislative history provides, “[s]ubsection (m) provides the rule for a joint case; each debtor is entitled to the federal exemptions provided under this section or to the state exemptions, whichever the debtor chooses.” H.R.Rep. No. 95-595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 363 (1977), U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 1978, pp. 5787, 6319.

The circuits differ as to whether § 522(m) requires those states which have opted out of the scheme of federal exemptions to apply their exemption schemes separately to each debtor in a joint case. See, e.g., In re Granger, 754 F.2d 1490, 1492 (9th Cir.1985); First National Bank of Mobile v. Norris, 701 F.2d 902, (11th Cir.1983); Cheeseman v. Nachman, 656 F.2d 60 (4th Cir.1981). The Ninth Circuit has adopted the rule that those states which have “opted out” are not bound by § 522(m). Gran-ger, supra, at 1492.

Accordingly, each joint debtor may not independently claim the exemptions provided by California law, but rather, must “share” the exemptions.

II. Which Items Are “Household Furnishings” or “Household Goods”?

Bankruptcy debtors may not avoid liens encumbering an item of property unless that item is, inter alia, a “household furnishing” or “household good.” See 11 U.S.C. § 522(f)(2)(A).

The California Code of Civil Procedure does not define the term “household furnishings” nor “household goods.” Under the prior California exemption statute, California courts held that household items were exempt “household furnishings” or “household goods” if they were “necessary”. Independence Bank v. Heller, 275 Cal.App.2d 84, 79 Cal.Rptr. 868 (1969); Newport National Bank v. Adair, 2 Cal.App.3d 1043, 83 Cal.Rptr. 1 (1969); Estate of Millington, 63 Cal.App. 498, 218 P. 1022 (1923); Los Angeles Finance Co. v. Flores, 110 Cal.App.2d Supp. 850, 243 P.2d 139 (1952). “Necessary” furniture does not have to be indispensable to the bare existence of the debtor and his family. Haswell v. Parsons, 15 Cal. 266 (1860). In discussing whether a particular household furnishing or good is “necessary”, the leading California case holds that a furnishing or good is “necessary” if it is appropriate to, “the station in life of the owner and the manner of comfortable living to which he has become accustomed.” See Independence Bank, supra, 275 Cal.App.2d at 87, 79 Cal.Rptr. 868; See also, Newport National Bank, supra, 2 Cal.App.3d at 1046, 83 Cal.Rptr. 1, 41 A.L.R.3d at 607 (1972).

California’s current exemption statute provides that debtors may exempt household items if they are “ordinarily and reasonably necessary” to the debtors and their dependents at their principal place of residence. CCP § 704.020(a)(1). With respect to whether property is “ordinarily and reasonably necessary”, California courts must consider the extent to which the item is ordinarily found in a household, and whether the item has extraordinary value as compared to the value of the same item found in other households. CCP § 704.020(b)(1) and (2).

1. Stereo and VCR.

California has already held that a stereo is a “necessary household furnish *952 ing.” In re Marriage of Sanabia, 95 Cal.App.3d 483, 157 Cal.Rptr. 56 (1979); See also, Matter of Beard, 5 B.R. 429 (S.D.Iowa 1980) (stereo is a “household good”); In re Ruppe, 3 B.R. 60 (Bankr.D.Colo.1980).

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Bluebook (online)
62 B.R. 949, 1986 Bankr. LEXIS 3170, 14 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 729, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-lucas-casb-1986.