Filed 11/18/25 In re L.J. CA4/2 Opinion following transfer from Supreme Court NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
In re L.J., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law.
SAN BERNARDINO COUNTY CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES, E080296
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super.Ct.No. J287021)
v. OPINION
S.M.,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County. Steven A. Mapes,
Judge. Conditionally reversed.
Vincent Uberti and Elena S. Min, by appointment of the Court of Appeal, for
Tom Bunton, County Counsel, David Guardado and Laura Feingold, Deputy
County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
1 INTRODUCTION
S.M. (Mother) appeals from the juvenile court’s order terminating her parental
rights to her daughter, L.J. She argues that San Bernardino County Children and Family
Services (CFS) failed to discharge its duty of initial inquiry under the Indian Child
Welfare Act of 1978 (25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.) (ICWA) and California’s implementing
provisions. Specifically, she argues that CFS failed to interview readily available
extended family members regarding L.J.’s possible Indian ancestry1 as required by
former Welfare and Institutions Code, section 224.2, subdivision (b).2
In our original opinion, we concluded that former section 224.2, subdivision (b),
did not apply because L.J. was taken into protective custody pursuant to a warrant. Our
Supreme Court granted review, remanded the cause to us for reconsideration in light of
its decision in In re Ja.O. (2025) 18 Cal.5th 271 (Ja.O.), and we invited the parties to
submit supplemental briefing on the issue. In supplemental briefing, CFS concedes that
it failed to discharge its duty of initial inquiry. We agree and therefore conditionally
reverse the order terminating parental rights and remand with directions.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In October 2020, several days after L.J. was born, CFS filed a dependency petition
for the child, alleging that she was at risk of substantial harm under section 300,
1 Because ICWA uses the term “ ‘Indian,’ ” we use it as well “to reflect the statutory language.” (In re Dezi C. (2024) 16 Cal.5th 1112, 1125, fn. 1 (Dezi C.).) No disrespect is intended.
2 Unlabeled statutory citations refer to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
2 subdivision (b), as a result of Mother’s anger management and mental health issues and
her history of engaging in domestic violence in the presence of L.J.’s older siblings. (In
re L.J. (Sept. 13, 2023, E080296) [nonpub. opn.] (L.J. I){p. 1}.){CT 8} At the detention
hearing, Mother denied having any Indian ancestry. (L.J. I, E080296.){p. 2} At the
jurisdiction and disposition hearing the following month, the juvenile court sustained the
petition’s allegations, took dependency jurisdiction over L.J., removed the child from
Mother, and found that ICWA did not apply. (Ibid.)
During the reunification period, Mother lived with her mother (the maternal
grandmother) and Mother attended at least one visit with father’s mother (the paternal
grandmother). (L.J. I, supra, E080296{pp. 4, 10}.){CT 234} At the continued 12-month
review hearing in March 2022, L.J.’s father denied having any Indian ancestry.
(Id.){p. 3.} The same day, father submitted a Family Find and ICWA Inquiry form
(CFS-030) with identifying and contact information for his sister (the paternal aunt).{CT
250} At the 18-month review hearing the following month, the juvenile court terminated
Mother’s reunification services and set a permanency planning hearing for L.J. under
section 366.26.(Id.){p. 4}
The permanency planning hearing took place in December 2022. (L.J. I, supra,
E080296.){p. 5} The juvenile court terminated Mother’s parental rights, found that L.J.
was likely to be adopted, and selected adoption as her permanent plan. (Ibid.)
Mother appealed the order terminating her parental rights. As relevant here, she
argued that CFS failed to discharge its duty of initial inquiry by failing to interview
readily available extended family members—specifically, the maternal grandmother,
3 paternal grandmother, and paternal aunt—about L.J.’s possible Indian ancestry. (In re
L.J. I, E080296.) In an unpublished opinion, we concluded that the duty to interview
extended family members set out in former section 224.2, subdivision (b), never arose,
because that duty applies only when a child was taken into temporary custody under
section 306. (In re L.J. I, E080296.){p. 9.} At the time, there was a split of authority in
our court on the interpretation of former section 224.2, and we followed the line of cases
holding that the duty to interview extended family members does not apply in a case like
this where the child was taken into protective custody pursuant to a warrant under section
340. (Ibid.)
The California Supreme Court granted review of the issue in Ja.O. Before the
Court issued its opinion, the Legislature passed Assembly Bill No. 81 (2023–2024 Reg.
Sess.) (Assembly Bill 81), and the Governor signed the bill as an urgency measure on
September 27, 2024, effective immediately. (Stats. 2024, ch. 656.) “Assembly Bill 81
amended former section 224.2 to add language specifying that the extended-family
inquiry duty applies whenever a child is placed into a county welfare department’s
temporary custody, regardless of how the child is removed from the home.” (Ja.O.,
supra, 18 Cal.5th at p. 277; see Welf. & Inst. Code, § 224.2, subd. (b)(1)-(2).)
In Ja.O., the Court decided “whether the extended-family inquiry duty applies in
pre-Assembly Bill 81 cases”—like this case—“where the child was placed into a county
welfare department’s temporary custody after being removed from the home pursuant to
a warrant.” (Ja.O., supra, 18 Cal.5th at p. 278, italics added.) The Court held that former
section 224.2 must be interpreted “broadly to require the county welfare department to
4 conduct an extended-family inquiry in all cases in which a child is placed into its
temporary custody, regardless of how the child is removed from the home.” (Id. at
pp. 290-291.) Following its decision in Ja.O., the Court remanded this case to us for
reconsideration.
DISCUSSION
Mother argues that CFS did not complete its duty of initial inquiry under former
section 224.2 because it failed to interview the maternal grandmother, the paternal
grandmother, and the paternal aunt, each of whom were available to CFS during the
dependency proceedings. On remand, CFS concedes the error, and we agree with the
parties.
ICWA established “minimum standards for state courts to follow before removing
Indian children from their families and placing them in foster care or adoptive homes.”
(In re Dezi C., supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 1129.) California’s ICWA implementing statutes
impose “ ‘ an affirmative and continuing duty’ ” on agencies and juvenile courts in every
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Filed 11/18/25 In re L.J. CA4/2 Opinion following transfer from Supreme Court NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
In re L.J., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law.
SAN BERNARDINO COUNTY CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES, E080296
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super.Ct.No. J287021)
v. OPINION
S.M.,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County. Steven A. Mapes,
Judge. Conditionally reversed.
Vincent Uberti and Elena S. Min, by appointment of the Court of Appeal, for
Tom Bunton, County Counsel, David Guardado and Laura Feingold, Deputy
County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
1 INTRODUCTION
S.M. (Mother) appeals from the juvenile court’s order terminating her parental
rights to her daughter, L.J. She argues that San Bernardino County Children and Family
Services (CFS) failed to discharge its duty of initial inquiry under the Indian Child
Welfare Act of 1978 (25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.) (ICWA) and California’s implementing
provisions. Specifically, she argues that CFS failed to interview readily available
extended family members regarding L.J.’s possible Indian ancestry1 as required by
former Welfare and Institutions Code, section 224.2, subdivision (b).2
In our original opinion, we concluded that former section 224.2, subdivision (b),
did not apply because L.J. was taken into protective custody pursuant to a warrant. Our
Supreme Court granted review, remanded the cause to us for reconsideration in light of
its decision in In re Ja.O. (2025) 18 Cal.5th 271 (Ja.O.), and we invited the parties to
submit supplemental briefing on the issue. In supplemental briefing, CFS concedes that
it failed to discharge its duty of initial inquiry. We agree and therefore conditionally
reverse the order terminating parental rights and remand with directions.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In October 2020, several days after L.J. was born, CFS filed a dependency petition
for the child, alleging that she was at risk of substantial harm under section 300,
1 Because ICWA uses the term “ ‘Indian,’ ” we use it as well “to reflect the statutory language.” (In re Dezi C. (2024) 16 Cal.5th 1112, 1125, fn. 1 (Dezi C.).) No disrespect is intended.
2 Unlabeled statutory citations refer to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
2 subdivision (b), as a result of Mother’s anger management and mental health issues and
her history of engaging in domestic violence in the presence of L.J.’s older siblings. (In
re L.J. (Sept. 13, 2023, E080296) [nonpub. opn.] (L.J. I){p. 1}.){CT 8} At the detention
hearing, Mother denied having any Indian ancestry. (L.J. I, E080296.){p. 2} At the
jurisdiction and disposition hearing the following month, the juvenile court sustained the
petition’s allegations, took dependency jurisdiction over L.J., removed the child from
Mother, and found that ICWA did not apply. (Ibid.)
During the reunification period, Mother lived with her mother (the maternal
grandmother) and Mother attended at least one visit with father’s mother (the paternal
grandmother). (L.J. I, supra, E080296{pp. 4, 10}.){CT 234} At the continued 12-month
review hearing in March 2022, L.J.’s father denied having any Indian ancestry.
(Id.){p. 3.} The same day, father submitted a Family Find and ICWA Inquiry form
(CFS-030) with identifying and contact information for his sister (the paternal aunt).{CT
250} At the 18-month review hearing the following month, the juvenile court terminated
Mother’s reunification services and set a permanency planning hearing for L.J. under
section 366.26.(Id.){p. 4}
The permanency planning hearing took place in December 2022. (L.J. I, supra,
E080296.){p. 5} The juvenile court terminated Mother’s parental rights, found that L.J.
was likely to be adopted, and selected adoption as her permanent plan. (Ibid.)
Mother appealed the order terminating her parental rights. As relevant here, she
argued that CFS failed to discharge its duty of initial inquiry by failing to interview
readily available extended family members—specifically, the maternal grandmother,
3 paternal grandmother, and paternal aunt—about L.J.’s possible Indian ancestry. (In re
L.J. I, E080296.) In an unpublished opinion, we concluded that the duty to interview
extended family members set out in former section 224.2, subdivision (b), never arose,
because that duty applies only when a child was taken into temporary custody under
section 306. (In re L.J. I, E080296.){p. 9.} At the time, there was a split of authority in
our court on the interpretation of former section 224.2, and we followed the line of cases
holding that the duty to interview extended family members does not apply in a case like
this where the child was taken into protective custody pursuant to a warrant under section
340. (Ibid.)
The California Supreme Court granted review of the issue in Ja.O. Before the
Court issued its opinion, the Legislature passed Assembly Bill No. 81 (2023–2024 Reg.
Sess.) (Assembly Bill 81), and the Governor signed the bill as an urgency measure on
September 27, 2024, effective immediately. (Stats. 2024, ch. 656.) “Assembly Bill 81
amended former section 224.2 to add language specifying that the extended-family
inquiry duty applies whenever a child is placed into a county welfare department’s
temporary custody, regardless of how the child is removed from the home.” (Ja.O.,
supra, 18 Cal.5th at p. 277; see Welf. & Inst. Code, § 224.2, subd. (b)(1)-(2).)
In Ja.O., the Court decided “whether the extended-family inquiry duty applies in
pre-Assembly Bill 81 cases”—like this case—“where the child was placed into a county
welfare department’s temporary custody after being removed from the home pursuant to
a warrant.” (Ja.O., supra, 18 Cal.5th at p. 278, italics added.) The Court held that former
section 224.2 must be interpreted “broadly to require the county welfare department to
4 conduct an extended-family inquiry in all cases in which a child is placed into its
temporary custody, regardless of how the child is removed from the home.” (Id. at
pp. 290-291.) Following its decision in Ja.O., the Court remanded this case to us for
reconsideration.
DISCUSSION
Mother argues that CFS did not complete its duty of initial inquiry under former
section 224.2 because it failed to interview the maternal grandmother, the paternal
grandmother, and the paternal aunt, each of whom were available to CFS during the
dependency proceedings. On remand, CFS concedes the error, and we agree with the
parties.
ICWA established “minimum standards for state courts to follow before removing
Indian children from their families and placing them in foster care or adoptive homes.”
(In re Dezi C., supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 1129.) California’s ICWA implementing statutes
impose “ ‘ an affirmative and continuing duty’ ” on agencies and juvenile courts in every
child welfare case to inquire whether the child is or may be an Indian child. (Ja.O.,
supra, 18 Cal.5th at pp. 277-278; former § 224.2, subd. (a).)
At the time the protective custody warrant for L.J. was executed, former section
224.2, subdivision (b), provided that the county welfare department must ask “extended
family members . . . whether the child is, or may be, an Indian child.” (Former § 224.2,
subd. (b).) The term “ ‘extended family member’ ” includes the child’s grandparents and
aunts and uncles. (25 U.S.C. § 1903(2); accord, Welf. & Inst. Code, § 224.1, subd.
(c)(1).) In Ja.O., the Court held that the duty to interview extended family members set
5 out in former section 224.2, subdivision (b), applies “regardless of whether the child was
removed from the home with or without a warrant.” (Ja.O., supra, 18 Cal.5th at p. 285.)
We therefore conditionally reverse the order terminating Mother’s parental rights and
remand for CFS to complete its initial inquiry.
DISPOSITION
The order terminating Mother’s parental rights to L.J. is conditionally reversed.
On remand, the juvenile court shall order CFS to comply with the inquiry requirements of
section 224.2, consistent with this opinion. If the court subsequently determines that CFS
has complied and that ICWA does not apply, then the court shall reinstate the order
terminating parental rights. If the court determines that ICWA applies, then it shall
proceed in conformity with ICWA and California’s implementing provisions. (See In re
Dezi C., supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 1141.)
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
FIELDS J. We concur:
CODRINGTON Acting P. J.
RAPHAEL J.