FILED APR 8 2025 SUSAN M. SPRAUL, CLERK NOT FOR PUBLICATION U.S. BKCY. APP. PANEL OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY APPELLATE PANEL OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT
In re: BAP No. NC-24-1096-FBC LI’S CAPITAL LLC, Debtor. Bk. No. 18-30918-dm
E. LYNN SCHOENMANN, Appellant, v. MEMORANDUM* UNITED STATES TRUSTEE, Appellee.
Appeal from the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of California Dennis Montali, Bankruptcy Judge, Presiding
Before: FARIS, BRAND, and CORBIT, Bankruptcy Judges.
INTRODUCTION
Appellant E. Lynn Schoenmann appeals from the bankruptcy court’s
order removing her as chapter 71 trustee for personal misconduct unrelated
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication. Although it may be cited for whatever persuasive value it may have, see Fed. R. App. P. 32.1, it has no precedential value, see 9th Cir. BAP Rule 8024-1. Unless specified otherwise, all chapter and section references are to the 1
Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1532. to her duties as trustee. We AFFIRM.
FACTS
A. Probate litigation
Ms. Schoenmann has been a chapter 7 panel trustee since 1997.
A few years prior to her appointment as panel trustee, she married
Donn Schoenmann. At that time, Mr. Schoenmann was financially
successful. He fell ill soon thereafter, and his mental and physical health
and his financial condition gradually deteriorated.
In 2016, Mr. Schoenmann executed new estate planning documents
and deeds that terminated Ms. Schoenmann’s right of survivorship in four
pieces of real estate. But later that same year, Mr. and Ms. Schoenmann
signed a Post Marital Agreement (the “PMA”) that (among other things)
restored Ms. Schoenmann’s right of survivorship in three of the properties.
Mr. Schoenmann died in 2018. His passing meant that, by virtue of
the right of survivorship restored in the PMA, Ms. Schoenmann became the
owner of the real estate.
Ms. Schoenmann instituted probate proceedings in California
superior court and became executor of the probate estate.
Mr. Schoenmann’s children by a prior marriage (the “Heirs”) actively
litigated the probate case.
First, the Heirs sought a preliminary injunction restraining
Ms. Schoenmann from transferring one of the real estate interests. The
superior court granted the preliminary injunction, finding that there was a
2 strong likelihood that the Heirs could show that the transfer of the real
estate was a fraudulent transfer.
Second, the Heirs filed a petition to invalidate the PMA. They argued
that Ms. Schoenmann induced Mr. Schoenmann to sign the PMA by taking
advantage of his physical and mental frailty and that the PMA was
contrary to his true intentions. Ms. Schoenmann argued that the PMA was
the product of extensive negotiations in which Mr. Schoenmann was
represented by counsel and that its terms were consistent with his intent.
The stakes were high: if the Heirs were successful, Ms. Schoenmann’s right
of survivorship in the real estate (and her ownership upon
Mr. Schoenmann’s death) would be invalidated.
The parties agreed to a bifurcated trial, the first phase of which
would decide the validity of the PMA. After a ten-day bench trial, the
superior court issued a detailed and comprehensive tentative decision and
proposed statement of decision (the “Tentative Decision”). 2 The court laid
out a harrowing tale of Ms. Schoenmann’s abuse, intimidation, and
manipulation of Mr. Schoenmann while he was in desperate mental,
emotional, and physical condition. The court indicated its intention to
decide that Mr. Schoenmann was an abused spouse, that the PMA unfairly
benefitted Ms. Schoenmann, that Ms. Schoenmann used undue influence to
induce Mr. Schoenmann to sign the PMA, and that the PMA was invalid.
2 In a bench trial on factual questions, the court must make a tentative decision, which is neither a judgment nor binding. Cal. R. of Ct. 3.1590(a), (b).
3 The superior court allowed the parties to file objections to the
Tentative Decision within fifteen days after its issuance. 3
B. The EIDL Loan
In the meantime, about three weeks before the probate trial was set to
begin, Ms. Schoenmann applied for a COVID-19 Economic Injury Disaster
Loan (the “EIDL Loan”) from the U.S. Small Business Administration. In
her application, Ms. Schoenmann listed all four of the real properties as
potential collateral for the loan and stated that she was the sole owner of
each property. She did not disclose the pending probate proceedings
challenging her ownership of the properties and threatening her with
significant monetary liability. She also did not disclose the attorneys’ fees
that she had incurred but that had not yet been billed.
Ms. Schoenmann obtained approval for an EIDL Loan of $924,700.
Four days before the trial in superior court, she signed a loan agreement in
which she said that she owned the four parcels of real estate, that her title
had never been “disputed or questioned,” and that the properties were free
of claims by third parties. She promised to use the loan proceeds “solely as
working capital to alleviate economic injury caused by disaster occurring
in the month of January 31, 2020 and continuing thereafter.”
Eventually, she used about half of the EIDL Loan proceeds to pay her
attorneys. She allegedly used the remaining funds on personal expenses,
The parties may file objections to a proposed statement of decision and 3
judgment within fifteen days of service. Cal. R. of Ct. 3.1590(g). 4 such as automobile payments, travel expenses, and cash withdrawals.
C. Ms. Schoenmann’s bankruptcy case
In January 2022, before the time to object to the Tentative Decision
expired, Ms. Schoenmann filed a chapter 11 petition. The automatic stay
prevented the superior court from issuing a final decision.
When she filed her chapter 11 petition, Ms. Schoenmann voluntarily
requested suspension from assignment as chapter 7 trustee in future cases
for 120 days. She subsequently agreed to multiple extensions of the
suspension.
The Heirs moved the bankruptcy court to lift the automatic stay so
the superior court could enter a final decision. Ms. Schoenmann objected.
Instead, she agreed that she “would live with the tentative decision as the
result” and maintained that the only issue before the superior court was
the PMA, “which the probate court voided and we accept, for the purposes
of everything going forward, that the probate court has voided it.” At a
later hearing, Ms. Schoenmann argued that she did not agree to accept the
superior court’s findings unrelated to the validity of the PMA and that the
Tentative Decision was not binding on the bankruptcy court.
The Heirs also filed adversary proceedings challenging the
dischargeability of Ms. Schoenmann’s debt to the probate estate and
seeking recovery of assets that allegedly belonged to the probate estate.
Ms. Schoenmann filed adversary proceedings against the Heirs seeking to
quiet her title to the four properties and for a declaration that the Heirs had
5 no claim to her profit-sharing plan.
Ms. Schoenmann and the Heirs settled most of their dispute in March
2023. The chapter 11 case was converted to chapter 7 in September 2023,
and some (but not all) of the adversary proceedings that the Heirs and
Ms. Schoenmann had filed against each other were dismissed.4
The quiet title adversary proceeding was not among the dismissed
cases. The bankruptcy court granted summary judgment in favor of the
Heirs based on the preclusive effect of the Tentative Decision. On appeal,
the district court affirmed, holding (among other things) that
Ms. Schoenmann had not challenged the finality of the Tentative Decision
in the bankruptcy court and could not raise that argument for the first time
on appeal. Schoenmann v. Schoenmann, Case No. 22-cv-09156-AMO, 2024
WL 4227587 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 17, 2024). Ms. Schoenmann’s appeal to the
Ninth Circuit is pending.
D. The removal proceedings
In November 2023, the U.S. Trustee filed a motion to remove
Ms. Schoenmann as trustee (“Motion to Remove”) in this case and all other
cases in which she was serving as trustee. The U.S. Trustee argued that the
misconduct described in the Tentative Decision, her misstatements made in
connection with the EIDL Loan, and her misuse of those funds were
“cause” for removal under § 324(a).
4 Ms. Schoenmann received her chapter 7 discharge on April 18, 2024. The case remains open. 6 Ms. Schoenmann vigorously opposed the Motion to Remove. She
largely argued that the allegations about her actions concerning her
husband and the EIDL loan were false and in any event did not amount to
“cause” for her removal. Additionally, she argued that the Tentative
Decision was not entitled to issue preclusive effect.
Prior to the hearing on the Motion to Remove, Ms. Schoenmann
resigned from the chapter 7 trustee panel. The U.S. Trustee accepted her
resignation and decided that its administrative review of “her eligibility to
receive future case assignments” was moot. However, the U.S. Trustee
asserted that her resignation did not moot the Motion to Remove.
After two hearings, 5 the court entered a detailed decision granting
the Motion to Remove and removed Ms. Schoenmann as trustee in all
pending cases with a few exceptions. (No one challenges the court’s
decision to leave Ms. Schoenmann in office in the excepted cases.) In
summary, the court held that (1) personal misconduct unrelated to a
specific bankruptcy case can be “cause” for removal, (2) the Tentative
Decision has preclusive effect, and Ms. Schoenmann had agreed to be
bound by it, (3) the state court’s preliminary injunction has preclusive
effect, (4) the court’s own partial summary judgments in the adversary
proceedings also had preclusive effect, (5) the facts found in the Tentative
5 After the first hearing on the Motion to Remove, Ms. Schoenmann voluntarily resigned from most of her cases and requested court assistance in implementing the resignations. After the second hearing, she resigned from additional cases, including Li’s Capital. 7 Decision and the preliminary injunction amounted to “cause,”
(6) Ms. Schoenmann’s improper conduct regarding the EIDL Loan
amounted to “cause,” and (7) Ms. Schoenmann’s resignation did not moot
the issue of her removal.
Ms. Schoenmann timely appealed.
JURISDICTION
The bankruptcy court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1334 and
157(b)(2)(A). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 158.
ISSUE
Whether the bankruptcy court erred when it removed
Ms. Schoenmann as chapter 7 trustee for “cause” under § 324.
STANDARDS OF REVIEW
We review a bankruptcy court’s decision to remove a trustee under
§ 324 for an abuse of discretion. Dye v. Brown (In re AFI Holding, Inc.), 530
F.3d 832, 844 (9th Cir. 2008) (adopting in total this Panel’s decision and
holding that “[r]emoval of a trustee under § 324 is left to the sound
discretion of the bankruptcy court”).
“We . . . review de novo the bankruptcy court’s determination that
issue preclusion is available. If we conclude that issue preclusion is
available, we review for abuse of discretion the bankruptcy court’s decision
giving issue preclusive effect to the state court’s decisions.” Black v. Bonnie
Springs Family Ltd. P’ship (In re Black), 487 B.R. 202, 210 (9th Cir. BAP 2013)
(citation omitted).
8 To determine whether the bankruptcy court has abused its discretion,
we conduct a two-step inquiry: (1) we review de novo whether the
bankruptcy court “identified the correct legal rule to apply to the relief
requested” and (2) if it did, we consider whether the bankruptcy court’s
application of the legal standard was illogical, implausible, or without
support in inferences that may be drawn from the facts in the record.
United States v. Hinkson, 585 F.3d 1247, 1262-63 (9th Cir. 2009) (en banc).
“De novo review requires that we consider a matter anew, as if no
decision had been made previously.” Francis v. Wallace (In re Francis), 505
B.R. 914, 917 (9th Cir. BAP 2014).
DISCUSSION
A. Personal misconduct unrelated to a specific trustee assignment can amount to “cause” for removal under § 324(a).
Ms. Schoenmann argues that the bankruptcy court erred when it
decided that conduct unrelated to her work as a trustee could amount to
cause for removal. We disagree.
Section 324(a) provides that “[t]he court, after notice and a hearing,
may remove a trustee . . . for cause.” Ms. Schoenmann’s argument hinges
on the meaning of “cause.”
“Our analysis begins with the statutory language . . . . If that
language is plain, our analysis also ends there.” Mission Hen LLC v. Lee (In
re Lee), 655 B.R. 340, 349 (9th Cir. BAP 2023) (citing Lamie v. U.S. Tr., 540
U.S. 526, 534 (2004) (“It is well established that when the statute’s language
9 is plain, the sole function of the courts—at least where the disposition
required by the text is not absurd—is to enforce it according to its terms.”
(cleaned up)); Smallwood v. Allied Van Lines, Inc., 660 F.3d 1115, 1121 (9th
Cir. 2011) (“Our analysis begins, as it must, with the text of the statute in
question. Under the ‘plain meaning’ rule, where the language of a statute is
plain and admits of no more than one meaning the duty of interpretation
does not arise, and the rules which are to aid doubtful meanings need no
discussion.” (cleaned up))).
“Cause” is an expansive and sweeping word. The Ninth Circuit has
observed that “[c]ause for removal of an appointed panel trustee under
§ 324(a) is not susceptible to sharp definition, but is determined on a case-
by-case, totality-of-circumstances approach, subject to the bankruptcy
court’s broad discretion.” In re AFI Holding, Inc., 530 F.3d at 852; cf. Smith v.
Robbins (In re IFS Fin. Corp.), 803 F.3d 195, 206 (5th Cir. 2015) (considering
“cause” under § 324(a) and noting that “the phrase ‘for cause’ in two other
Bankruptcy Code provisions is ‘not defined in the statute so as to afford
flexibility to the bankruptcy courts’” (citation omitted)). In AFI Holding, the
Ninth Circuit adopted this Panel’s decision, in which we stated that “[i]t is
well established that ‘cause’ may include trustee incompetence, violation of
the trustee’s fiduciary duties, misconduct or failure to perform the trustee’s
duties, or lack of disinterestedness or holding an interest adverse to the
estate. . . . This listing is illustrative, but not exhaustive.” 530 F.3d at 845
(citations omitted).
10 According to Ms. Schoenmann, “cause” must be something related to
the trustee’s work in one or more bankruptcy cases. But Congress used
only the broad word “cause,” with no qualifications or adornment. If
Congress intended Ms. Schoenmann’s meaning, it would have used a
narrower word or phrase. Cf. Avendano-Ramirez v. Ashcroft, 365 F.3d 813,
818 (9th Cir. 2004) (“[W]e must presume that Congress said what it meant
and meant what it said.”); Stehrenberger v. Stehrenberger (In re Stehrenberger),
665 B.R. 402, 415 (9th Cir. 2024) (“We presume that Congress acted
intentionally and intended the plain meaning of the statute.”).
Ms. Schoenmann correctly points out that nearly all of the published
and available unpublished decisions removing trustees rely on misconduct
related to the performance of the trustee’s duties in bankruptcy cases. But
Ms. Schoenmann cites no case, and we have found no case, refusing to
remove a trustee for personal misconduct. Indeed, the authoritative Collier
treatise says that, “[u]nder the Bankruptcy Code, causes for removal have
included situations in which . . . the trustee was guilty of misconduct in
office or personal misconduct.” 3 Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 324.02 (Richard
Levin & Henry J. Sommer eds., 16th ed.). One court removed a chapter 13
trustee who sexually harassed his employees. In re Chapter 13, Pending &
Future Cases, 19 B.R. 713, 717 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. 1982) (initially finding
that the trustee had efficiently and honestly performed his official duties as
a chapter 13 trustee and denying the motion to remove, but on a motion for
reconsideration, holding that the federal and state policy against sexual
11 harassment warranted removal of the trustee). Although the trustee’s
misconduct in that case literally happened in his office, it had nothing to do
with his administration of bankruptcy cases.
Ms. Schoenmann’s narrow definition of “cause” would hamstring the
bankruptcy court. If a trustee engages in misconduct that calls into
question his or her integrity and trustworthiness or that, if repeated in a
bankruptcy case, could harm the interests of the estate and its creditors, the
court should be free to take preemptive action.
We therefore hold that “cause” under § 324(a) is not limited to
misconduct in the performance of a trustee’s duties as such.
B. The bankruptcy court’s findings regarding the EIDL Loan were not clearly erroneous.
The bankruptcy court did not err in holding that Ms. Schoenmann’s
actions concerning the EIDL Loan qualified as personal misconduct
warranting removal under § 324(a).
The bankruptcy court found that Ms. Schoenmann “acted improperly
in seeking, obtaining and then dealing with or retaining the proceeds” of
the EIDL Loan. The court found that she did not disclose the then-pending
probate litigation, even though the application form asked her to disclose
“contingent liabilities,” “legal claims,” and “other liabilities.” The court did
not believe her assertion that she found the instructions confusing. It also
found that the loan agreement for the EIDL Loan permitted her to use the
loan proceeds only for “working capital,” that the legal fees she incurred in
12 the probate litigation and the bankruptcy case had nothing to do with her
trustee practice, and that payment of those fees was not a proper use of the
funds for working capital purposes. Finally, the court noted that it had
permitted her to use the loan proceeds only in a manner “consistent with
the use restrictions contained in the EIDL loan documents.” Therefore, her
misuse of the loan proceeds was also a violation of the court’s order.
Ms. Schoenmann argues strenuously that these findings were wrong.
She claims that she did not knowingly omit the pending probate
proceedings from the loan application (because the application was
“patently ambiguous”) and did not knowingly misuse the loan proceeds
(because the restrictions on use of the loan proceeds were “ambiguous”
and “undefined”). But the bankruptcy court’s findings are supported by
evidence in the record, and Ms. Schoenmann does not argue on appeal that
the court should have held an evidentiary hearing.
Furthermore, Ms. Schoenmann essentially ignores the portion of the
loan agreement stating that the proceeds were for use “solely as working
capital to alleviate economic injury caused by disaster occurring in the
month of January 31, 2020 and continuing thereafter.” She only claims that
that phrase “is not informative” and that she was “left to guess.” There is
no evidence that the COVID-19 pandemic had anything to do with the
attorneys’ fees that Ms. Schoenmann incurred in the probate proceedings
or her personal bankruptcy case. Rather, she claims on appeal that she
determined that the loan proceeds could be used “as ‘working capital’ to
13 pay part of her legal and accounting fees in an amount proportionate to the
damage and threat to the viability of her Chapter 7 business” and as
payroll and to cover other ongoing business expenses. The bankruptcy
court did not err in discounting her explanation. We find no clear error in
the court’s factual findings. 6 Those findings were independently sufficient
to support the conclusion that cause existed to remove Ms. Schoenmann as
a chapter 7 trustee.
C. The bankruptcy court erred in affording prior rulings issue preclusive effect.
The bankruptcy court gave preclusive effect to the superior court’s
Tentative Decision and preliminary injunction and to its own partial
summary judgment. This was error.
State law determines the preclusive effect of a judgment. See Plyam v.
Precision Dev., LLC (In re Plyam), 530 B.R. 456, 462 (9th Cir. BAP 2015) (“A
bankruptcy court may rely on the issue preclusive effect of an existing state
court judgment as the basis for granting summary judgment. . . . In so
doing, the bankruptcy court must apply the forum state’s law of issue
preclusion.”). Under California law, issue preclusion applies only when
(among other requirements) there is a “final judgment on the merits.”
Samara v. Matar, 5 Cal. 5th 322, 338 (2018). In particular, a trial court
6 We also note that Ms. Schoenmann represented in the loan agreement that her title to the real estate collateral had never been “disputed or questioned.” She made this statement in the face of the pending probate court trial, in which the Heirs sought to invalidate the PMA and eliminate her interest in the real property. 14 decision that evades appellate review has no issue preclusive effect. Id. at
335 (“Affording preclusive effect to a trial court determination that evades
appellate review might speed up the resolution of controversies, but it
would do so at the expense of fairness, accuracy, and the integrity of the
judicial system. We decline to endorse that tradeoff.”).
California law expressly provides that a “tentative decision does not
constitute a judgment and is not binding on the court.” Cal. R. of Ct.
3.1590(b). Therefore, the Tentative Decision was not final and did not have
preclusive effect.
The bankruptcy court also noted that Ms. Schoenmann agreed to be
bound by the Tentative Decision. This is not exactly accurate. Although the
representations of counsel at the hearings were somewhat vague and even
slippery, it is fairly clear that she agreed to be bound by the result of the
Tentative Decision – the avoidance of the PMA and the changes in her
property rights that flowed from that – not the superior court’s factual
findings that supported the result.
The bankruptcy court held that the superior court’s preliminary
injunction had issue preclusive effect. But under California law, with
respect to a preliminary injunction, “the finality requirement of collateral
estoppel is unmet. A preliminary injunction is a provisional remedy, and the
trial court possesses the inherent power to modify its preliminary
injunction which is of a continuing or executory nature.” Huntingdon Life
Scis., Inc. v. Stop Huntingdon Animal Cruelty USA, Inc., 129 Cal. App. 4th
15 1228, 1248 (2005) (cleaned up).7
The court also said that it had given preclusive effect to the Tentative
Decision when it granted summary judgment against Ms. Schoenmann in
the quiet title adversary proceeding. For the reasons stated above, this
decision was erroneous; the Tentative Decision was not a final judgment
with preclusive effect. 8
The U.S. Trustee argues that, even if the Tentative Decision and the
preliminary injunction lacked preclusive effect, the court could
nevertheless consider them as part of the totality of the circumstances. If
the bankruptcy court had made its own findings consistent with the state
court’s decisions, we would probably agree. But the court did not make
independent findings and instead relied only on the preclusive effect of the
state court’s decisions.
7 The U.S. Trustee argues that the preliminary injunction ruling was “sufficiently firm” because Ms. Schoenmann had an opportunity to be heard and the superior court issued a reasoned decision. This argument ignores the California law cited above. 8 Additionally, issue preclusion should apply only if it comports with fairness and sound public policy. Khaligh v. Hadaegh (In re Khaligh), 338 B.R. 817, 824-25 (9th Cir. BAP 2006) (“The sixth element is a mandatory ‘additional’ inquiry into whether imposition of issue preclusion in the particular setting would be fair and consistent with sound public policy.”), aff’d, 506 F.3d 956 (9th Cir. 2007). “The court’s consideration of fairness and public policy typically focuses on: preservation of the integrity of the judicial system, promotion of judicial economy, and protection of litigants from harassment by vexatious litigation.” Italiane v. Jeffrey Catanzarite Family Ltd. P’ship (In re Italiane), 632 B.R. 662, 677 (9th Cir. BAP 2021) (cleaned up), aff’d, No. 21-60054, 2022 WL 17412881 (9th Cir. Dec. 5, 2022). Because the court’s decision in the quiet title adversary proceeding about the preclusive effect of the Tentative Decision was so clearly incorrect, it would be unfair to bootstrap it into preclusive effect in the removal proceeding.
16 But these errors were harmless. The court correctly decided that
Ms. Schoenmann’s conduct concerning the EIDL amounted to cause for
removal. That decision is an independently sufficient basis to affirm the
bankruptcy court’s order.
D. Ms. Schoenmann’s resignation from some (but not all) of her cases did not moot the Motion to Remove.
Ms. Schoenmann argues that her resignation rendered the Motion to
Remove moot (so the bankruptcy court should not have considered it) and
that we should vacate the bankruptcy court’s judgment as moot because
she currently is overseeing only a few remaining cases. We disagree.
“A case becomes moot — and therefore no longer a ‘Case’ or
‘Controversy’ for purposes of Article III — when the issues presented are
no longer live or the parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the
outcome.” Citizens for Clean Energy v. U.S. Dep't of the Interior, No. 22-35789,
2024 WL 702312, at *1 (9th Cir. Feb. 21, 2024) (cleaned up) (holding that a
challenge to a federal administrative order becomes moot when the order is
revoked). As the Supreme Court recently explained, “Sometimes, events in
the world overtake those in the courtroom, and a complaining party
manages to secure outside of litigation all the relief he might have won in
it. When that happens, a federal court must dismiss the case as moot.” Fed.
Bureau of Investigation v. Fikre, 601 U.S. 234, 240 (2024).
For two reasons, Ms. Schoenmann’s resignation did not moot the
Motion to Remove.
17 First, removal of a trustee has automatic consequences that extend
beyond the specific case in which removal is sought. Section 324(b)
provides that, “[w]henever the court removes a trustee or examiner under
subsection (a) in a case under this title, such trustee or examiner shall
thereby be removed in all other cases under this title in which such trustee
or examiner is then serving unless the court orders otherwise.” The
trustee’s resignation in fewer than all of the trustee’s cases did not give the
U.S. Trustee “all the relief [it] might have won” in court. See Fikre, 601 U.S.
at 240.
Second, “a defendant cannot automatically moot a case simply by
ending its unlawful conduct once sued.” Already, LLC v. Nike, Inc., 568 U.S.
85, 91 (2013). “To show that a case is truly moot, a defendant must prove no
reasonable expectation remains that it will return to its old ways.” Fikre,
601 U.S. at 241 (cleaned up). Given Ms. Schoenmann’s unflagging assertion
that everything she did was correct, there is a more than “reasonable
expectation” that she could return to her old ways if she were not removed.
CONCLUSION
The bankruptcy court did not err when it removed Ms. Schoenmann
as trustee. We therefore AFFIRM.