In Re: Lien Asserted Against Heffran, M.

Opinion

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

IN RE: LIEN ASSERTED AGAINST : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF MATTHEW HEFFRAN : PENNSYLVANIA :

:

:

APPEAL OF: MATTHEW HEFFRAN : No. 2140 EDA 2013

Appeal from the Judgment Entered October 30, 2013, In the Court of Common Pleas of Pike County, Civil Division, at No. 1389-2012.

BEFORE: SHOGAN, FITZGERALD* and PLATT**, JJ. MEMORANDUM BY SHOGAN, J.: FILED SEPTEMBER 03, 2014 Appellant, Matthew Heffran, appeals from the judgment entered on October 30, 2013, in the Pike County Court of Common Pleas. After review, we vacate the judgment entered on the verdict, reverse the order granting a

remand for a new trial.

The trial court set forth the relevant facts and procedural history of this matter as follows:

This case arose out of a motor vehicle accident on July 26, 2007 in which the Appellant, Matthew Heffran, was injured. As a result of his work-related injuries, Appellant received workers compensation benefits from Eastern Alliance Insurance Group (herein

compensation benefits.

was $32,741.96. This amount consisted of $13,288.41 in wage

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*Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court. **Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

loss payments and $19,453.55 in medical payments. In addition, the Compromise and Release Agreement contained a clause where EAIG agreed to waive $17,000 of its subrogation lien on any third party claim that Appellant chose to pursue.

On May 17, 2012, Appellant settled a related third party action against Charles Bolte in the amount of $100,000. As a result, EAIG asserted a workers compensation subrogation lien against Appellant. Suffice it to say, the parties had significant disagreement over the exact amount of the subrogation lien owed by the Appellant to EAIG. Appellant thereafter filed a Petition with this Court on July 9, 2012 requesting that the disputed funds be paid into the Court for adjudication.

By Order dated August 28, 2012, this Court directed

which was the alleged disputed amount. On September 10, 2012, EAIG filed a Petition seeking, inter alia, reimbursement of its subrogation lien in the alleged amount of $60,629.59. On

with a Counter-Claim. On March 13, 2013, this Court entered an

EAIG thereafter filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on April 26, 2013. On May 28, 2013, this Court granted in part and

granted the Motion with regards to the fact that EAIG was

Appellant. The Motion was denied, however, regarding the specific amount of the lien, which remained a genuine issue of material fact.

A Jury Trial was held in this matter on June 18, 2013. At the trial, Appellant and EAIG introduced testimony and evidence of the third party settlement amount of $100,000 as well as

$33,333.34 in procuring that settlement. Further, evidence was presented of indemnity and medical payments totaling $60,629.59 and the previously agreed upon credit of $17,000 towards the subrogation lien.

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After both Appellant and EAIG had rested their cases, but before closing arguments, this Court determined that no genuine issue of material fact remained in dispute between the parties.

aim for relief, we determined that the amount of subrogation lien owed by Appellant to EAIG was $23,319.72

expert witness,[1] James Haggerty, Esquire. This Court also determined that Appellant had failed to meet his burden of clear and convincing evidence for the fraud claims of his Counter-

verdict was therefore granted that same day.

Appellant filed a Motion for Post-Trial Relief on June 27, 2013, alleging that this Court erred by finding that fraud had not been proven by clear and convincing evidence. The Motion also alleged that this Court was in error when it found there to be no issues of material fact for determination by the jury. This Court

Trial Court Opinion, 9/12/13, at 1-3.

On July 16, 2013, Appellant filed an appeal to this Court. Procedurally, the appeal was premature, as judgment had not been entered on the verdict. See Johnston the Florist v. TEDCO Construction Corp., 657 A.2d 511, 514 (Pa. Super. 1995) (an appeal lies from the entry of judgment and not an order denying a post-trial motion). Ultimately, judgment was

1 While the trial court refers to Attorney Haggerty as an expert witness at page three of its opinion, the trial court goes on to state that it never formally qualified Attorney Haggerty as an expert at page six. Indeed, the record confirms that Attorney Haggerty was not formally qualified as an expert. However, this does not alter our ultimate conclusion. Despite the

Haggerty not testified at all, there would still be the record documents and Exhibits 1-10, N.T., 6/18/13, at 141.

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entered on October 30, 2013. This procedural anomaly does not hamper our appellate review, and we shall proceed with our discussion.2 Id.

consideration:

Whether the Court of Common Pleas of Pike County erred in determining that Appellant had not shown fraud by clear and convincing evidence?

Whether the Appellant had additional claims, outside of fraud, which it had proven sufficiently?

Whether the Court of Common Pleas of Pike County erred in determining that no genuine issue of material fact remained on the issues of bad faith, fraud, bad intent, deception, misrepresentation, purpose, malice, outrageousness, wantonness, oppressiveness and reckless indifference?

issues are interrelated and essentially seek the same relief, we shall address them concurrently. As noted above, Appellant claims the trial court erred in determining that Appellant had not shown fraud by clear and convincing evidence and asserts that there was a sufficient basis for the issue of punitive damages to be presented to the jury.

2 This court has held that quashing a premature appeal is an unnecessary expenditure of judicial resources where the decision on appeal is otherwise

judgment. Johnston the Florist, 657 A.2d at 514. This is true because one of the parties would inevitably praecipe for the entry of judgment, and a subsequent appeal would follow. Id.

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Our standard of review when considering motions for a directed verdict

Court will revers only when we conclude that there was an abuse of discretion or an error of law that controlled the outcome of the case. International Diamond Importers, Ltd. v. Singularity Clark, L.P., 40 A.3d 1261, 1267 (Pa. Super. 2012).

Further, the standard of review for an appellate court is the same as that for a trial court.

There are two bases upon which a JNOV can be entered: one, the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law and/or two, the evidence is such that no two reasonable minds could disagree that the outcome should have been rendered in favor of the movant. With the first, the court reviews the record and concludes that, even with all factual inferences decided adversely to the movant, the law nonetheless requires a verdict in his favor. Whereas with the second, the court reviews the evidentiary record and concludes that the evidence was such that a verdict for the movant was beyond peradventure.

International Diamond Importers, Ltd., 40 A.3d at 1267 (quoting Janis v. AMP, Inc., 856 A.2d 140, 143-144 (Pa. Super. 2004))(internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Additionally, it is well settled that while the existence of fraud is a jury question, evidence of fraud must be clear and convincing, and whether the evidence of fraud justifies its submission to the jury is a question of law for the court. Greenwood v. Kadoich, 357 A.2d

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604, 606 (Pa. Super. 1976). In reviewing questions of law, our standard of review is de novo and our scope of review, to the extent necessary to resolve this question of law, is plenary. Swords v. Harleysville Insurance Companies, 883 A.2d 562, 567 (Pa. 2005). Finally, punitive damages are appropriate only in cases of outrageous behavior, where the d egregious conduct shows either an evil motive or reckless indifference to the rights of others. J.J. DeLuca Co., Inc. v. Toll Naval Associates, 56 A.3d 402, 415 (Pa. Super. 2012). Punitive damages are appropriate when the re of such an outrageous nature as to demonstrate intentional, willful, wanton, or reckless conduct. Id. at 415-416.

ms for

Appellant, wherein Appellee demanded from Appellant the full $60,629.59,

agreed-upon waiver of an ad Court Opinion, 9/12/13, at 5. The trial court then cited to the testimony of Attorney James Haggerty, who Appellant called as an expert witness. The trial court supported its conclusion that there was no proof of fraud or

Id

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demand of the full $60,629.59 was merely a mistake. Id. We are constrained to disagree.

The trial court is correct that Attorney Haggerty testified Appellee was owed $23,319.72. Trial Court Opinion, 9/12/13, at 3. However, that was not the amount Appellee demanded and Attorney Haggerty never testified that $23,319.72 was the amount demanded. Additionally, contrary to the he record reveals that Attorney Haggerty never

Rather, Attorney Haggerty testified that the email in which Appellee averred that the total paid out on the claim was $27,000.00, as opposed to the actual total of $60,629.59, was a mistake. N.T., 6/18/13, at 80. Attorney Haggerty explained that if Appellee had only paid out $27,000.00, when that number is reduced by $9,000.00 reflecting the one-

that

would be the mistake. Id. (emphasis added). Attorney Haggerty then com claiming that he owed only $1,000.00. Id.

ed-

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repeated claim that it was owed the full $60,629.59 remains at issue. For this reason, we conclude that reasonable minds could disagree on the outcome of the case and that a verdict for Appellee was not a certainty. International Diamond Importers, Ltd., 40 A.3d at 1267.

counterclaims should not have been dismissed. As noted above, there is no demand for the full amount of $60,629.59 was a mistake; Appellee, sought to recover from Appellant an amount to which it knew it was not entitled. N.T., 6/1/8/13, at 162-163. We conclude that this satisfies the threshold requirement of clear and convincing evidence, and

outrageous, permitting an award of punitive damages, should also have been considered by the jury. Greenwood, 357 A.2d at 606; J.J. DeLuca Co., Inc., 56 A.3d at 415.3 For the reasons set forth above, we conclude that the trial court erred in concluding that there was no genuine issue of material fact and that Appellant failed to support its allegation of fraud by clear and convincing

3 Additionally, and for these same reasons, there is no indication in the record before us that Appellee was entitled to judgment as a matter of law International Diamond Importers, Ltd., 40 A.3d at 1267.

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should also have been decided by the jury. Therefore, we vacate the judgment entered on the verdict and reverse the order granting a directed

remand for further proceedings.

Judgment vacated. Order reversed. Case remanded for a new trial.

Jurisdiction relinquished.

PLATT, J., files a Dissenting Memorandum.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. Prothonotary

Date: 9/3/2014