[Cite as In re L.F., 2025-Ohio-1643.]
STATE OF OHIO ) IN THE COURT OF APPEALS )ss: NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COUNTY OF SUMMIT )
IN RE: L.F. C.A. Nos. 31253 L.F. 31269 J.F. 31270 31271
APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT ENTERED IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS COUNTY OF SUMMIT, OHIO CASE No. DN 22 12 1079 DN 22 12 1080 DN 22 12 1082
DECISION AND JOURNAL ENTRY
Dated: May 7, 2025
FLAGG LANZINGER, Presiding Judge.
{¶1} Appellants, R.G.-F. (“Mother”) and J.F. (“Father”) appeal from a judgment of the
Summit County Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division, that terminated their parental rights
and placed three of their minor children in the permanent custody of Summit County Children
Services Board (“CSB”). This Court affirms.
I.
{¶2} Mother is the biological mother of Li.F., born October 23, 2015; La.F., born May
29, 2017; and J.F., born April 12, 2011. Father and Mother are no longer married but, because
they were married at the time of each child’s birth, Father is presumed to be the father of these
children. Mother and Father have other children who were also removed from their custody during 2
the trial court proceedings, but they are not parties to this appeal. Mother also had a 22-year-old
son who died by suicide several months before this case began.
{¶3} These children were also removed from their parents’ custody during prior
dependency and neglect cases in 2018, but few details about those cases are included in the record.
The juvenile court removed the children, adjudicated them neglected and dependent, and
eventually returned them to Mother after she complied with the reunification requirements of the
case plan. The record includes no details about Father’s role, if any, during the prior cases.
{¶4} On December 9, 2022, CSB filed complaints to allege that Li.F., La.F., and J.F.
(and Mother’s three other minor children) were dependent because Mother was grieving the recent
death of her adult son and was overwhelmed with caring for the six children in her home. The
home was filthy and unsafe; two of the children had significant behavioral problems; one of the
children had severe developmental delays and untreated physical problems; and Mother was
struggling emotionally and financially to meet the family’s basic needs. Although CSB had
offered to develop a voluntary case plan, which would have allowed the children to remain in
Mother’s custody, Mother insisted that CSB remove the children from the home because she
needed time alone to work through her grief, get her home in order, and allow the children to get
the services that they needed because she was unable to control them.
{¶5} When this case began, Father was incarcerated after violating the conditions of his
community control on a Ross County conviction of felony drug possession. Father remained
incarcerated throughout most of this case. He wrote his children a few letters from prison, but did
not visit them or work with CSB on reunification after he was released. Consequently, this Court
will focus primarily on the facts pertaining to Mother. 3
{¶6} Mother and Father later waived their rights to adjudicatory and dispositional
hearings. The trial court adjudicated the children dependent, placed them in the temporary custody
of CSB, and adopted the case plan as an order of the court. The case plan required Mother to
engage in consistent mental health counseling to learn how to manage her grief and stressors in
her life; successfully complete a parenting program focused on dealing with children with
developmental disabilities; demonstrate that she can use appropriate parenting techniques and set
boundaries for all of her children; obtain and maintain clean, safe, and stable housing; and
demonstrate that she can meet the financial and other basic needs of herself and her children.
{¶7} Shortly after the case plan was adopted, Mother was diagnosed with major
depression, anxiety, and post-traumatic stress disorder. She began to engage in counseling to learn
to appropriately cope with the loss of her adult son and other stressors in her life. She moved in
with her boyfriend and his mother but admitted throughout this case that she could not have her
children live there. Mother lacked housing for her children throughout this case.
{¶8} Mother did not begin parenting classes until this case had been pending for almost
one year. Although the caseworker had referred Mother to two agencies that offered the parenting
classes required by the case plan, which deal with the unique needs of children with developmental
delays, Mother went to a third agency that did not offer such specialized parenting instruction.
Moreover, Mother did not visit the children regularly, and she did not reach out to the children’s
counselors or to Li.F.’s school about the development and implementation of his individualized
education plan. Consequently, Mother continued to lack a basic understanding of her children’s
developmental and emotional needs.
{¶9} After the children were placed in foster care, they began regular counseling to help
regulate their emotions and behavioral outbursts. After the children spent several months in 4
counseling and adjusted to their foster homes, their counselors opined that each child was
benefiting from counseling and the structure and stability of their respective foster homes. J.F.
told his counselor that he was angry that he was back in foster care and that he worried about
whether Mother would do what she needed to do to for the family to be reunified.
{¶10} CSB initially moved for permanent custody on October 31, 2023, and Mother and
Father alternatively requested a six-month extension of temporary custody. Although Father
remained incarcerated at the time, he attended the hearing and testified that he was due to be
released from prison in less than three months and that, after his release, he intended to work
toward reunification with his children. The trial court heard evidence that Mother had made
progress in counseling and had maintained steady employment, but that she continued to have
financial problems, had not obtained housing, nor had she taken parenting classes as required by
the case plan. Mother testified that, if the trial court granted an extension of temporary custody,
she would be able to comply with the remaining requirements of the case plan.
{¶11} Following the hearing on the alternative motions, the trial court denied the agency’s
first permanent custody motion and extended temporary custody because Mother had begun to
make progress on the reunification requirements of the case plan and the court concluded that there
was a reasonable probability that the children could be returned to Mother or otherwise
permanently placed within the extension period. See R.C. 2151.415(D)(1).
{¶12} During the next several months, however, Mother did not attempt to engage in
parenting classes to address children with developmental delays or otherwise take steps to
understand the unique needs of her children. Mother continued in counseling but had not worked
through the trauma of losing her son and continued to blame others or her busy schedule for her
failure to comply with the case plan. The caseworker sent Mother numerous listings for available 5
rental homes and offered to help Mother financially with the first and last month’s rent, but Mother
did not secure a home for her children.
{¶13} On May 13, 2024, CSB again moved for permanent custody of these children.
Mother alternatively requested legal custody of the children or another extension of temporary
custody. Father filed no alternative dispositional motion and did not appear for the final hearing,
although he was represented by counsel. After a hearing held during late September 2024, the trial
court terminated parental rights and placed Li.F., La.F., and J.F. in the permanent custody of CSB.
{¶14} Mother and Father appeal and raise a total of three assignments of error. Because
Father alleges procedural errors, this Court will address his arguments before Mother’s challenge
to the weight of the evidence supporting the trial court’s judgment.
II.
FATHER’S ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR I
THE COURT ERRED TO THE DETRIMENT OF [FATHER] WHEN IT ADMITTED A STALE TRANSCRIPT OF LEGAL PROCEEDINGS INTO EVIDENCE THUS RELIEVING [CSB] OF ITS BURDEN OF PRODUCTION AND BURDEN OF PROOF AND DEPRIVING FATHER OF HIS DUE PROCESS RIGHTS.
{¶15} Father’s first assignment of error is that the trial court committed reversible error
by admitting into evidence the transcript of the prior permanent custody hearing. Several weeks
before the final hearing, CSB filed a written motion for the trial court to admit the transcript from
the prior permanent custody hearing to enable the agency to streamline its presentation of evidence.
None of the parties filed anything to oppose that motion. The day before the hearing, the trial
court filed a written order to allow the admission of the transcript into evidence.
{¶16} At the final hearing, the transcript was admitted into evidence as an exhibit, without
objection by any of the parties. Although Father did not attend the permanent custody hearing, he 6
was represented by counsel throughout the proceedings. Consequently, Father has forfeited all but
plain error on appeal. See, e.g., In re T.B., 2014-Ohio-4040, ¶ 12 (9th Dist.).
{¶17} Father has not developed a plain error argument, nor has he cited any authority to
support his position that the trial court erred in admitting the transcript from the prior hearing.
Father suggests only that the evidence was not relevant because it involved circumstances from
seven months earlier. He fails to argue or demonstrate, however, how evidence about the
circumstances of the parents and children at an earlier point in the same case was not relevant to
the trial court’s ultimate determination about the best interests of the children. Because Father has
failed to demonstrate any error, much less plain error, his first assignment of error is overruled.
FATHER’S ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR II
THE COURT ERRED TO THE DETRIMENT OF [FATHER] WHEN IT FOUND THAT [CSB] PROVIDED REASONABLE EFFORTS AT REUNIFICATION WHICH WAS JUSTIFIED BY NEITHER THE SUFFICIENCY-OF-THE- EVIDENCE NOR MANIFEST-WEIGHT-OF-THE-EVIDENCE.
{¶18} Through his second assignment of error, Father asserts that the trial court erred by
finding that CSB had made reasonable efforts to reunify him with his children. Any error in that
finding would be harmless, however, unless it was essential to the permanent custody judgment.
Father has failed to demonstrate that the trial court was required to make a finding of reasonable
reunification efforts at the permanent custody stage of the proceedings. In re L.A., 2023-Ohio-
1877, ¶ 8 (9th Dist).
{¶19} R.C. 2151.419(A) specifically required CSB to establish, and the trial court to find,
that the agency made reasonable efforts toward reunification or to prevent the continued removal
of Father’s children from the home:
at any hearing held pursuant to section 2151.28 [shelter care], division (E) of section 2151.31 [ex parte emergency temporary custody], or section 2151.314 [shelter care placement], 2151.33 [pre-adjudication temporary placement], or 7
2151.353 [disposition following adjudication] of the Revised Code at which the court removes a child from the child’s home or continues the removal of a child from the child’s home[.]
R.C. 2151.419(A). CSB was not required to demonstrate that it made reasonable reunification
efforts at the permanent custody hearing unless it had not done so at one of the prior hearings set
forth in R.C. 2151.419(A)(1). In re C.F., 2007-Ohio-1104, ¶ 43. Father does not argue that the
trial court failed to make the requisite findings at those prior hearings or that the findings were not
proper, nor did he challenge any of those findings in the trial court.
{¶20} Father’s primary argument is that CSB failed to work with him on reunification
after he was released from incarceration in May 2024, four months before the final hearing. Father
was represented by counsel throughout these proceedings but never raised any challenge to the
reunification efforts exerted by CSB. If he believed that the services offered by CSB under the
existing case plans were not sufficient, his trial counsel could have filed proposed case plan
amendments but did not. See R.C. 2151.412(F)(2) (“Any party may propose a change to a
substantive part of the case plan[.]”). Father also failed to raise any issue about the agency’s
reunification efforts at the permanent custody hearing.
{¶21} From the beginning of this case, the case plan required Father to maintain contact
with the caseworker and to contact the agency upon his release from incarceration to make his
intentions known about whether he wanted to assume a parental role in his children’s lives. Father
was released from incarceration approximately four months before the permanent custody hearing,
but he failed to contact CSB, the children, the guardian ad litem, or the trial court after his release.
Mother testified that she had been in contact with Father since his release. The caseworker further
testified that she did not know where Father was, but that she had repeatedly called him and left
messages at the phone number Mother had given her, but Father never returned her calls. 8
{¶22} The record demonstrates that Father’s failure to work toward reunification with
Li.F., La.F., and J.F. was the result of his own inaction, not any shortcomings by CSB. In re L.A.,
2023-Ohio-1877, at ¶ 12 (9th Dist). Father’s second assignment of error is overruled.
MOTHER’S ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN AWARDING PERMANENT CUSTODY TO [CSB] [AS THE JUDGMENT] WAS AGAINST THE MANIFEST WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE.
{¶23} Mother’s sole assignment of error is that the trial court’s permanent custody
decision was against the manifest weight of the evidence. Before a juvenile court may terminate
parental rights and award permanent custody of a child to a proper moving agency, it must find
clear and convincing evidence of both prongs of the permanent custody test: (1) that the child is
abandoned; orphaned; has been in the temporary custody of the agency for at least 12 months of a
consecutive 22-month period; the child or another child of the same parent has been adjudicated
abused, neglected, or dependent three times; or that the child cannot be placed with either parent,
based on an analysis under R.C. 2151.414(E); and (2) that the grant of permanent custody to the
agency is in the best interest of the child, based on an analysis under R.C. 2151.414(D)(1). R.C.
2151.414(B)(1) and 2151.414(B)(2); see also In re William S., 75 Ohio St.3d 95, 98-99 (1996).
{¶24} In considering whether the juvenile court’s judgment is against the manifest weight
of the evidence, this Court “weighs the evidence and all reasonable inferences, considers the
credibility of witnesses and determines whether in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the [finder
of fact] clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the [judgment]
must be reversed and a new [hearing] ordered.” (Internal quotations and citations omitted.)
Eastley v. Volkman, 2012-Ohio-2179, ¶ 20. When weighing the evidence, this Court “must always
be mindful of the presumption in favor of the finder of fact.” Id. at ¶ 21. 9
{¶25} The trial court found that the first prong of the permanent custody test was satisfied
because Li.F, La.F., and J.F. had been in the temporary custody of CSB for at least 12 months of
a consecutive 22-month period. Mother does not dispute that finding, which is supported by the
record. At the time CSB filed its most recent motion for permanent custody, these children had
been in CSB’s temporary custody for more than 14 months of the prior 22-month period.
{¶26} Next, the trial court was required to find that permanent custody was in the best
interest of the children. When reviewing the trial court’s best interest determination, this Court
focuses primarily on the specific factors set forth in R.C. 2151.414(D). In re M.S., 2023-Ohio-
1558, ¶ 25 (9th Dist.). The trial court was required to consider the statutory best interest factors,
which include: the interaction and interrelationships of the children, their wishes, their custodial
history, their need for permanence and whether that can be achieved without a grant of permanent
custody, and whether any of the factors outlined in R.C. 2151.414(E)(7)-(11) apply. R.C.
2151.414(D)(1)(a)-(e); see In re R.G., 2009-Ohio-6284, ¶ 11 (9th Dist.). None of the factors set
forth in R.C. 2151.414(E)(7) through (11) are relevant in this case.
{¶27} By the time of the hearing, this case had been pending for nearly two years.
Mother’s ability to interact with the children for the majority of that time had been limited to
weekly, supervised visits, but Mother did not take advantage of most of those opportunities to see
her children. Although Mother states in her brief that her visits with the children “were all
unsupervised[,]” and went well, Mother was not permitted to have unsupervised visits with her
children until this case had been pending for more than 18 months and after CSB filed its most
recent motion for permanent custody of the children. Prior to that time, Mother’s in-person visits
were required to be supervised at the agency’s visitation center or as arranged by the foster parents. 10
Mother was also permitted to have telephone calls or Zoom visits that were also required to be
supervised.
{¶28} For the first year of this case, however, Mother refused to attend supervised visits
at the agency’s interaction center because she did not believe supervision was necessary. Mother
arranged a few in-person visits with the children at their respective foster homes, so her in-person
visits for the first year of the case were limited to those few visits. Mother had Zoom visits with
the children, but those visits did not keep the younger children actively engaged and Mother did
not always appear for the scheduled Zoom visits.
{¶29} There was also evidence before the trial court that Mother had been inconsistent
throughout this case about whether she wanted to be reunified with her children. According to the
caseworker, she had repeatedly asked Mother, “Do you want your children back? . . . [and ] [s]he’s
always said . . . I’m not sure. I don’t think so. Sometimes I want to. Sometimes I don’t.” The
caseworker expressed ongoing uncertainty about Mother’s wishes because Mother never once
expressed to her that she was willing to fight for her children.
{¶30} When cross-examined about this aspect of the caseworker’s testimony, Mother
stated that she did want her children back, but emphasized that she knew that they were in good
homes and that Li.F. in particular had “come a long way[]” so “[t]hat’s why I never fully answered
[about wanting the children back].” Mother recognized that the children were making progress in
counseling and other therapeutic services and admitted that she had not been involved in any of
those services but had heard about them from the foster parents.
{¶31} Although the children had expressed their desire to return to Mother’s custody, the
guardian ad litem opined that permanent custody was in their best interest because Mother was
unable to provide them with a safe and stable home. The guardian ad litem had more experience 11
with Mother and these children than the caseworker, as she also served as the guardian ad litem
when Mother’s children were removed from her custody in 2018. Although she did not give details
about the prior removal of the children, the guardian ad litem had observed a significant decline in
Mother’s motivation to work toward reunification with her children. She explained that, in the
2018 case, Mother was highly motivated to get her children back and worked diligently on the
reunification goals of the case plan to ensure that the children were returned to her custody.
{¶32} In this case, however, the guardian ad litem had seen minimal evidence that Mother
was committed to reunification. Mother refused opportunities to visit her children or engage with
any of their service providers, and she failed to accept help from CSB or others that might have
enabled her to provide a suitable home for her children. Mother had not accepted personal
responsibility for the upheavals of her family in 2018 or 2022 and had made little progress toward
reunification in this case. Instead, Mother continued to blame her busy work schedule and other
reasons for the circumstances of her family.
{¶33} These children had been removed from Mother’s custody in two separate cases,
had been in temporary placements for a total of more than two years, and needed a permanent
stable home. CSB had been unable to find any suitable relatives who were willing and able to
provide a permanent home for any of these children and neither parent was able to do so. In stable
and structured homes, the children had made great progress in improving their emotional,
behavioral, and developmental wellbeing. They needed permanency to allow their progress to
continue.
{¶34} Given the evidence admitted at the hearing, Mother has failed to demonstrate that
the trial court lost its way by concluding that permanent custody was in the best interest of Li.F,
La.F., and J.F. See Eastley at ¶ 20. Mother’s assignment of error is overruled. 12
III.
{¶35} The parents’ assignments of error are overruled. The judgment of the Summit
County Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division, is affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.
There were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
We order that a special mandate issue out of this Court, directing the Court of Common
Pleas, County of Summit, State of Ohio, to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy
of this journal entry shall constitute the mandate, pursuant to App.R. 27.
Immediately upon the filing hereof, this document shall constitute the journal entry of
judgment, and it shall be file stamped by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals at which time the period
for review shall begin to run. App.R. 22(C). The Clerk of the Court of Appeals is instructed to
mail a notice of entry of this judgment to the parties and to make a notation of the mailing in the
docket, pursuant to App.R. 30.
Costs taxed to Appellants.
JILL FLAGG LANZINGER FOR THE COURT
STEVENSON, J. CARR, J. CONCUR. 13
APPEARANCES:
ALAN M. MEDVICK, Attorney at Law, for Appellant.
ALEXANDRA HULL, Attorney at Law, for Appellant.
ELLIOT KOLKOVICH, Prosecuting Attorney, and HEAVEN R. DIMARTINO, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for Appellee.