[Cite as In re I.F., 2026-Ohio-844.]
COURT OF APPEALS LICKING COUNTY, OHIO FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
Case No. 2025 CA 00082 and Case No. 2025 CA 00083 IN RE I.F. Opinion And Judgment Entry IN RE N.F. Appeal from the Licking County Common Pleas Court, Juvenile Division, Case Nos. F2024- 0131 and F2024-0293
Judgment: Affirmed
Date of Judgment Entry: March 11, 2026
BEFORE: Craig R. Baldwin; Robert G. Montgomery; David M. Gormley, Judges
APPEARANCES: JERMAINE L. COLQUITT, for Appellant, Mother; JENNY WELLS, Licking County Prosecuting Attorney by KENNETH W. OSWALT, for Licking County Job and Family Services; CAROLYNN E. FITTRO, GAL; and EDWARD ITAYIM, for Father.
Montgomery, J.
{¶1} Biological mother, Briauna Robinson/Freeman, appeals from the judgment
of the Licking County Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division, granting permanent
custody of her two children, I.F. and N.F., to Licking County Job and Family Services.
For the reasons below, we AFFIRM. STATEMENT OF CASE
{¶2} This matter involves dependency proceedings for two minor children, I.F.
and N.F., who share biological mother, B.F. (“Mother”). On May 8, 2025, the Licking
County Job and Family Services (the “Agency”) filed the respective motions for
permanent custody (“PC”). On August 6, 2025, the PC hearing took place. Mother
appeared with counsel and opposed the Agency’s motion.
{¶3} ln support of the Motion, the Agency presented testimony from four (4)
witnesses - Briauna Freeman, Mother, as if on cross; Jeffrey Freeman Sr., Paternal
Grandfather; Jennifer Delancey, Foster Caregiver; and Matthew Tracy, Ongoing Agency
Caseworker. The State also presented Exhibit A, the Updated Family Case Plan filed on
July 9, 2025, admitted without objection. On behalf of Mother, Attorney Collins presented
Mother’s testimony and had the opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses and evidence
presented by the Agency. Father’s attorney did not present any witnesses or evidence
but likewise had the opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses and evidence. Finally,
the Guardian Ad Litem (“GAL”), Carolynn Fittro, Esq., presented testimony and her written
report with recommendations were admitted into evidence.
{¶4} On October 10, 2025, the Court granted the Agency’s motion for PC. The
trial court determined that clear and convincing evidence existed (1) that the children
could not or should not be placed with either parent within a reasonable period of time
under R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a) and R.C. 2151.414(E), and (2) that PC was in I.F. and
N.F.’s best interest. As a result, mother’s parental rights were terminated. Mother has
timely appealed. STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS
{¶5} The record demonstrates the following facts. The two minor children at
issue in this appeal are I.F., born on April 28, 2023, and N.F., born on July 28, 2024. The
biological father (“Father”) is currently incarcerated. Mother has a third child, P.F., who
was born on March 4, 2022, who is not involved in this appeal but was previously involved
with the Agency. On December 22, 2022, P.F. was removed from Mother and Father’s
home, due to domestic violence, mental health concerns, housing issues and income
stability concerns. The paternal grandfather was awarded temporary custody of P.F. and
to date, P.F. remains under his care and control.
{¶6} Shortly after P.F.’s removal, on April 28, 2023, I.F. was born, and because
Mother and Father were continuing services with the Agency and making progress on the
case plan in place, I.F. initially remained in the parents' care. Mother and Father were
engaged in weekly parenting education with a parenting coach, and the Agency was
providing financial assistance to them with the goal of housing and income stability.
However, in January of 2024, Mother contacted Caseworker Matthew Tracy
(“Caseworker Tracy”) reporting another incident of domestic violence between her and
Father. Mother fled to a neighbor's home and called the police. Mother and Father both
had marks on them from the incident, and a police report was filed. Father was later
charged with domestic violence, a third-degree felony.
{¶7} The Agency removed I.F. from the home due to concerns of domestic
violence and mental health issues. On January 29, 2024, an ex parte order of removal
was requested and granted for I.F. On May 28, 2024, I.F. was adjudicated a dependent child.1 An uncontested dispositional hearing immediately followed, and I.F. was placed
in the temporary custody of the Agency. Mother and Father appeared for both the
adjudicatory and dispositional hearings. Following I.F.’s removal, the criminal charges
against Father were dismissed due to Mother’s refusal to testify before the grand jury. A
second grand jury was supposed to take place, but Mother and Father instead got married
and Mother would not testify against Father.
{¶8} During 2024, Mother and Father each had escalating mental health
incidents, including Father’s hospitalizations for suicidal ideations, and threats of harm to
self and/or to others. Incidents of domestic violence also continued to occur, including an
incident when Caseworker Tracy was present and had to physically separate the parents
to de-escalate the situation. In June of 2024, both parents were charged with and pled
guilty to the offense of prohibitions concerning companion animals, and both were
sentenced to two (2) weeks’ incarceration. One month later, on July 28, 2024, N.F. was
born. N.F. was removed from Mother and Father shortly after her birth. In September
2024, Mother filed and received a civil protection order on the advice of her then
counselor. However, within a few days of the order being issued, Caseworker Tracy saw
Mother and Father together at the library, and Mother told Caseworker Tracy that her
therapist pushed her into getting that order.
{¶9} On October 4, 2024, N.F. was adjudicated dependent and placed in the
Agency's temporary custody. N.F. was placed in the same foster home as I.F., and both
have remained in that foster home since their respective removals. The testimony
demonstrates that the foster parents are making sure that all the children’s needs are
1 The original dependency complaint was promptly filed on January 30, 2024; however, due to timing issues, the dependency complaint was re-filed, and the hearing was held on May 28, 2024. being met. N.F. has adjusted seamlessly and is developmentally on target, meeting all
milestones. She is very bonded to everyone in the home. I.F. has a few special needs
that the foster family noticed and promptly addressed, and they continue to support I.F.
in whatever he needs. I.F. was quick to bond with the foster family’s single son, and is
bonded to the foster parents, but was slower to bond with the in-laws living in the home.
The foster family is very open to adopting both children.
{¶10} The GAL filed her written report and recommendations on August 5, 2025,
in which she recommended that it would be in the best interests of the children for the
Court to grant the Motion for PC. The GAL also testified and reiterated her
recommendation and belief that a grant of permanent custody would be in the best
interests of I.F. and N.F., despite Mother’s recent improvements. The GAL based her
recommendations on Mother’s continual issues with housing, income, finances, and
mental health, the cycle of engagement and disengagement from Agency services;
Father’s incarceration (meaning he would not be able to help Mother); concerns of
continued domestic violence; and her belief that, even if given more time, Mother and
Father would not be able to safely provide for the needs of the children.
{¶11} As stated, Father was incarcerated and serving a twenty-seven-month
prison sentence at the time of the permanent custody trial. As a result, Father was
removed from the case plan. No further incidents of domestic violence involving Mother
occurred following Father's incarceration.
{¶12} Mother testified on her own behalf at the PC hearing. According to her, she
remained engaged in services throughout the case, maintained employment, participated
in parenting education, and attended visitation with the children. Mother's visits were appropriate, and her parenting improved during the pendency of the case. Indeed, at the
outset of the PC hearing, Mother requested that the Court consider an extension to allow
additional time for reunification based on her ongoing progress and an identified housing
opportunity anticipated for September of 2025. Tr., at pp. 8-11. The Agency
acknowledged that, if an extension were granted, it would consider expanding Mother's
visitation to unsupervised visits. Tr., at pp. 150-151.
{¶13} Importantly, upon assignment of P.F.'s case in 2022, the Agency
caseworker at the time established a case plan outlining the Agency’s concerns as well
as the objectives for Mother and Father to attempt reunification. Said case plan was filed
with the Court on September 20, 2022. Caseworker Tracy took over in 2023, and after
I.F.’s birth in April 2023, filed an updated case plan with the Court, and after N.F.’s birth,
filed another updated plan. Each case plan remained consistent with its objectives set
forth in late 2022. The case plan was updated yet again to remove Father after his
conviction on five (5) counts of swatting, felonies of the fourth degree, and subsequent
(current) sentence of twenty-seven (27) months in prison.
{¶14} The objectives identified in the case plans for Mother and Father to address
the concerns that led to the removal of I.F. and N.F included completing a mental health
assessment; maintaining stable income; obtaining and maintaining safe and appropriate
housing; each parent addressing their domestically violent behaviors; completing an
Agency approved parenting skills course; and addressing pending criminal charges.
Caseworker Tracy confirmed that Mother and Father received the case plan and
understood the contents and its objectives. ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
{¶15} “I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE CHILDREN COULD NOT BE PLACED WITH MOTHER WITHIN A REASONABLE TIME PURSUANT TO R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(A), BECAUSE THE FINDINGS UNDER R.C. 2151.414(E)(1), (E)(4), AND (E)(16) AS TO MOTHER ARE NOT SUPPORTED BY CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE AND ARE AGAINST THE MANIFEST WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE.”
{¶16} “II. THE TRIAL COURT’S BEST-INTEREST DETERMINATION UNDER R.C. 2151.414(D)(1) IS AGAINST THE MANIFEST WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE.”
STANDARD OF REVIEW
{¶17} Under R.C. 2151.414(B)(1), a juvenile court may grant permanent custody
of a child to the agency that moved for permanent custody if the court determines, “by
clear and convincing evidence, that it is in the best interest of the child” to do so and that
any of five factors enumerated in R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a) through (e) applies. In re A.W.,
2024-Ohio-5791, ¶ 15.
{¶18} “A reviewing court will not reverse a trial court's judgment in a permanent
custody case unless it is against the manifest weight of the evidence." In re V.C., 2024-
Ohio-5153, ¶ 23 (4th Dist.), citing In re C.S., 2019-Ohio-5109, ¶ 21 (4th Dist.). Thus, if
the children services agency presented evidence upon which the trier of fact reasonably
could have formed a firm belief that permanent custody is warranted, then the court's
decision is not against the manifest weight of the evidence. In re R.M., 2013-Ohio-3588,
¶ 55 (4th Dist.); In re K.H., 2008-Ohio-4825, ¶ 43; R.C. 2151.414(B)(1). “Clear and
convincing evidence" is "that measure or degree of proof which is more than a mere
'preponderance of the evidence,' but not to the extent of such certainty as is required
'beyond a reasonable doubt' in criminal cases and which will produce in the mind of the trier of facts a firm belief or conviction as to the facts sought to be established.” Cross v.
Ledford, 161 Ohio St. 469 (1954), paragraph three of the syllabus.
{¶19} The credibility of witnesses and the weight to be given the evidence are
primarily issues for the trier of fact. In re A.H., 2024-Ohio-4694, ¶¶ 30-31 (5th Dist.). “The
underlying rationale of giving deference to the findings of the trial court rests with the
knowledge that the trial judge is best able to view the witnesses and observe their
demeanor, gestures and voice inflections, and use these observations in weighing the
credibility of the proffered testimony.” Seasons Coal Co. v. Cleveland, 10 Ohio St.3d 77
(1984). Credibility determinations are best suited for the trial court and are “crucial in a
child custody case, where there may be much evident in the parties’ demeanor and
attitude that does not translate to the record well.” Davis v. Flickinger, 1997-Ohio-260;
see also, In re Christian, 2004-Ohio-3146 (4th Dist.); In re C.W., 2004-Ohio-2040 (2d
Dist.).
{¶20} In conducting this deferential review, the court remains mindful that “the
right to raise a child is an ‘essential’ and ‘basic’ civil right.’ ” In re T.C., 2020-Ohio-882,
¶ 35; In re Murray, 52 Ohio St.3d 155, 157 (1990), quoting Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S.
645 (1972). A parent has a fundamental liberty interest in the care, custody, and
management of his or her child and an essential and basic civil right to raise his or her
children. Murray, at 156. That right, however, is not absolute. “The natural rights of a
parent * * * are always subject to the ultimate welfare of the child, which is the polestar or
controlling principle to be observed.” In re R.M., Jr., 2018-Ohio-395, ¶ 23 (5th Dist.)
quoting, In re Cunningham, 59 Ohio St.2d 100, 106 (1979). When a court determines
whether to permanently terminate parental rights, the court must grant the affected parent "every procedural and substantive protection the law allows." In re Smith, 77 Ohio App.3d
1, 16 (6th Dist.1991).
APPLICABLE LAW
{¶21} R.C. 2151.414(B)(1) authorizes the juvenile court to grant permanent
custody of the child to the public or private agency if the court determines, by clear and
convincing evidence, that it is in the best interest of the child to grant permanent custody
to the agency; and that one of the following applies:
(a) The child is not abandoned or orphaned, has not been in the
temporary custody of one or more public children services agencies or
private child placing agencies for twelve or more months of a consecutive
twenty-two-month period, * * * and the child cannot be placed with either of
the child's parents within a reasonable time or should not be placed with the
child's parents;
(b) The child is abandoned;
(c) The child is orphaned and there are no relatives of the child who are
able to take permanent custody; or
(d) The child has been in the temporary custody of one or more public
children services agencies or private child placing agencies for twelve or
more months of a consecutive twenty-two-month period; * * *
(e) The child or another child in the custody of the parent or parents from
whose custody the child has been removed has been adjudicated an
abused, neglected, or dependent child on three separate occasions by any
court in this state or another state. {¶22} Thus, R.C. 2151.414(B)(1) establishes a two-pronged analysis that the trial
court must apply when ruling on a motion for permanent custody. In re T.J., 2024-Ohio-
110, ¶ 14 (5th Dist.); In re A.M., 2020-Ohio-5102, ¶ 18. First, the court must find by clear
and convincing evidence “that one or more of the conditions in R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a)
through (e) applies.” Id. And second, the court must find by clear and convincing evidence
that the grant of permanent custody is in the best interest of the child. Id.
{¶23} Relevant here, under (B)(1)(a), PC may be granted if the child cannot or
should not be returned to the parent within a reasonable time. In re K.J., 2025-Ohio-4562
(9th Dist.). In making that determination, the court must consider the sixteen factors listed
in R.C. 2151.414(E), as well as any other relevant evidence. See R.C. 2151.414(E). Id.,
¶ 19. Importantly, R.C. 2151.414(E) expressly states that if the court makes even one
finding under R.C. 2151.414(E)(1)-(15), the court shall determine the children cannot or
should not be placed with the parent. As such, a trial court shall base its decision that a
child cannot be placed with a parent within a reasonable time or should not be placed
with a parent upon the existence of any one of the R.C. 2151.414(E) factors. Id.; see In
re William S., 1996-Ohio-182; In re S.B., 2025-Ohio-2685, ¶ 17 (8th Dist.).
{¶24} Once the court makes the appropriate finding under R.C. 2151.414(B)(1), it
must determine whether PC is in the best interest of the child. In determining the best
interest of the child, R.C. 2151.414(D) mandates the trial court consider all relevant
factors, including, but not limited to the following: (1) the interaction and interrelationship
of the child with the child's parents, siblings, relatives, foster parents and out-of-home
providers, and any other person who may significantly affect the child; (2) the wishes of
the child as expressed directly by the child or through the child's guardian ad litem, with due regard for the maturity of the child; (3) the custodial history of the child; (4) the child's
need for a legally secure placement and whether that type of placement can be achieved
without a grant of permanent custody; and (5) whether any of the factors in divisions (E)(7)
to (11) of this section apply in relation to the parents and child.
{¶25} The court must consider each factor enumerated in R.C. 2151.414(D), as
well as any other relevant factors, and no one factor is given greater weight than the
others. In re Schafer, 2006-Ohio-5513. A juvenile court does not need to specifically list
or discuss each of the best-interest factors to meet the mandate that it “consider” the
factors in R.C. 2151.414(D). A.M., at ¶ 42. However, it must appear from the record that
the trial court did in fact consider the factors listed as well as any other relevant factor.
Id. (holding that although not required, it is preferable for a juvenile court to provide some
discussion or analysis of the best-interest factors to aid in appellate review and to increase
confidence in its decision).
{¶26} Importantly, the focus of the “best interest” determination is upon the child,
not the parent. Indeed, R.C. 2151.414(C) expressly prohibits the court from considering
the effect a grant of permanent custody would have upon the parents. In re A.W., 2025-
Ohio-853 (5th Dist.); In re Awkal, 85 Ohio App.3d 309 (8th Dist. 1994). As well, a child's
best interests are served by the child being placed in a permanent situation that fosters
growth, stability, and security. T.C., at ¶ 54.
ANALYSIS
R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a) and R.C. 2151.414(E)(1)
{¶27} In the first assignment of error, Appellant claims the trial court’s findings to
support that the children cannot be placed with Mother within a reasonable time are against the manifest weight of the evidence. We disagree. As stated above, the trial court
found that the R.C. 2151.414(E)(1), (E)(4), and (E)(16) applied in this case as to Mother.2
{¶28} In conjunction with R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a), that a child cannot or should not
be placed with a parent within a reasonable time, R.C. 2151.414(E)(1) requires the trial
court to determine whether, despite reasonable case planning and diligent efforts by the
agency, the parent failed to substantially remedy the conditions that caused the children's
removal. That section reads, in part:
(E)(1) Following the placement of the child outside the child's home and
notwithstanding reasonable case planning and diligent efforts by the agency
to assist the parents to remedy the problems that initially caused the child
to be placed outside the home, the parent has failed continuously and
repeatedly to substantially remedy the conditions causing the child to be
placed outside the child's home.
***
{¶29} Appellant makes several arguments to support her claim that (E)(1) does
not apply in this case including: (1) the trial court improperly considered Mother’s past
conduct relating to the closed case involving P.F., (2) the condition causing removal,
domestic violence with Father, has been remedied because Father is incarcerated; (3)
Mother’s housing issues were ‘ancillary’ and are in the process of resolution; (4) Mother
was employed and her income was increasing; and (5) Mother’s mental health was
improving. We conclude that each of Mother’s arguments are without merit.
2 The court also referenced R.C. 2151.414(E)(10) and (E)(12), which apply solely to Father. {¶30} First, Appellant claims the trial court improperly considered historical
conduct regarding Mother’s oldest child, P.F., whose case is closed. In re Q.C., 2021-
Ohio-3993, ¶ 20 (9th Dist.) (holding that the trial court erred in relying on evidence from
prior, closed juvenile cases to support a finding that a parent failed to remedy the
conditions causing removal in the current case, citing R.C. 2151.414(E)(1)), citing In re
B.C., 2015-Ohio-2720, ¶ 44 (4th Dist.) (trial court is prohibited from considering facts
about case plan compliance in a prior, closed case); In re Mark H., 1999 Ohio App. LEXIS
1923 (6th Dist.).
{¶31} However, the record reveals that P.F.’s removal was in August 2022, and a
case plan was created for Mother and Father to attempt reunification and to provide
continued support services to both parents. I.F. was born shortly thereafter, in April 2023.
Mother’s case plan was amended after I.F.’s birth, and again after N.F.’s birth, but the
original case plan concerns and objectives were part and parcel of the subsequent
amended ones regarding I.F. and N.F. In other words, the concerns stated in the
respective case plans were ongoing from 2022 through the PC hearing in this matter.
The trial court did not improperly consider Mother’s “historical conduct,” it simply stated
the facts of the matter and provided context for I.F.’s removal as well as ongoing case
plan requirements and objectives. This is not a case where Mother was free of the
Agency’s involvement for a significant amount of time, as Mother suggests. To the
contrary, the Agency was involved with Mother from 2022 forward, without significant
interruption. Thus, the trial court did not improperly consider her historical conduct.
{¶32} Second, Mother claims that the children were removed solely due to
concerns related to domestic violence in the home. And, since the children’s father was incarcerated by the time of the permanent custody hearing, the problem has been
remedied. However, the record clearly demonstrates that I.F. and N.F. were adjudicated
dependent for multiple reasons, only one of which was domestic violence concerns. The
respective decisions finding I.F. and N.F. dependent cite domestic violence, mental health
issues for both parents, lack of housing, and financial instability. The case plan outlined
several items for Mother - she was expected to engage in services to address her
domestically violent behavior, engage in services to address her mental health concerns,
acquire safe and stable housing, and maintain stable income/employment.
{¶33} Even assuming domestic violence was the Agency’s “sole” concern, Mother
seemingly cannot separate herself or her children from Father despite his violent behavior
and significant mental health concerns. The evidence demonstrates Mother’s pattern to
resume contact with Father after each domestic violence incident. For example, despite
initially agreeing to get a CPO against Father, within days of obtaining the order, she saw
Father and then accused her therapist of pushing her into getting the CPO. Tr., at pp.
108-109. Prior to the CPO, Mother refused to testify against Father in front of the grand
jury for a separate incident of domestic violence. Mother refused to testify on two
separate occasions and instead decided to marry Father. Id., at p. 99. At the time of the
hearing, Mother was even living with her father-in-law. The Agency is not confident that
this issue has been resolved, or that such incidents will not continue to occur upon
Father’s release.
{¶34} Additionally, the record demonstrates the Agency had similar domestic
violence concerns regarding Mother herself noting that Mother also screams, yells,
pushes and hits. Mother’s case plan required her to engage in services to address her domestically violent behavior. Indeed, Caseworker Tracy testified it was hard to say
whether Mother or Father was the “aggressor.” Tr., at pp. 112-13. Tracy stated, “I don’t
know if there’s a primary aggressor. And the - - the reason I say that is because the story
changes many times of who was the aggressor and who wasn’t * * * They both admit to
hitting on each other.” Id. Thus, there is competent, credible evidence demonstrating the
domestic violence concerns were not alleviated to the Agency’s satisfaction and in
accordance with the case plan objectives.
{¶35} Third, Mother claims that housing issues were simply ancillary to the
domestic violence issues and were not a critical part of her case plan. To the contrary,
the adjudicatory orders finding dependency and the case plans addressed the need for
Mother to acquire and maintain stable housing for her and her children. The record
demonstrates Mother has a pattern of unstable housing. In December of 2024, Mother
and Father were evicted from their apartment. Subsequently, they were reported to be
living in a motel in Buckeye Lake. After Father’s most recent arrest, Mother began living
with the paternal grandfather. That living arrangement was supposed to be temporary,
for only two weeks, but turned into much longer, even up to the PC hearing. The
arrangement was less than ideal. Aside from Mother stating the home did not have
adequate space for the children, she also claimed she was concerned that paternal
grandfather was "grooming" the other children in his home. Tr., at p. 135.
{¶36} In March, five months before the hearing, Mother reported to Caseworker
Tracy that she was getting an apartment at Washington Square, but then a week later
told the Caseworker Tracy she was “just going to stay” with her father-in-law. Caseworker
Tracy noted that Mother has often said she has a place but then the option would not work out. More specifically, Mother claimed to have a housing option available to her in
September (i.e. a month after the hearing), and Caseworker Tracy stated: “I don't know if
that's real, not real. I don't have anything obviously from a landlord that says this is going
to happen. It's not the first time that [Mother] has said that she's gotten a place.” Overall,
the testimony demonstrates that Mother did not have stable housing for herself or the
children.
{¶37} Fourth, Mother claims her income was increasing and she was employed.
However, as with other matters, Mother’s income and employment history was up and
down and she did not maintain employment that provided sufficient income for herself, let
alone her children.3 Caseworker Tracy further testified that Mother cannot manage her
finances, despite the Agency’s efforts to assist her and prepare a budget, and Mother
depends on others for many of her needs. Caseworker Tracy stated that Mother has
never been independent. The testimony indicates both parents were repeatedly unwilling
or unable to provide the Agency with consistent verification of their rent payments,
receipts, or a budget. As such, Mother did not sufficiently remedy her financial instability.
{¶38} Fifth and finally, Mother maintains her mental health was improving. Mother
suggests that the trial court's reliance upon “unresolved mental health concerns” was
inappropriate because there was no expert testimony regarding a specific condition
preventing reunification. First, there was no objection to the testimony regarding Mother's
mental health issues. Second, a caseworker may give lay opinion testimony about a
parent's mental health issues in a permanent custody case. In re S.D.S., 2024-Ohio-255,
¶ 38 (8th Dist.); see also, In re J.B., 2024-Ohio-680, ¶ 27 (2nd Dist.) ("While Mother
3 Mother did not have a driver’s license, so transportation was a secondary issue. argues that there was no expert testimony demonstrating that she was incapable of
properly caring for her children because of her mental health conditions, no expert
testimony was required”).
{¶39} Mother herself acknowledged needing counseling services and needing
medication, but she was inconsistent in getting treatment. Mother admitted she had not
been going to mental health counseling “as much as probably anybody wanted.” Tr., at
pp. 32-33. Caseworker Tracy testified: “So we were asking for counseling services,
because [Mother] has shared that she definitely has some depression and -- and some
self-esteem issues.” Tr., at p. 103; 137. The GAL similarly testified: “I know Mom's made
efforts to be honest and open with me about her past, and she * * * has suffered a lot of
trauma on her own. That's why I think the mental health piece is so important, because if
she can't deal with her own trauma I'm not sure how she's going to be able to manage
kids, work, get them to day-care, all the things.” Tr., at p. 188.
{¶40} While Mother did attend counseling two times prior to the PC hearing, she
did not consistently take advantage of the resources and recommendations provided to
her by the Agency. The initial mental health services provider, Integrated Services,
dropped services to the parents in October 2024 (presumably after Mother accused the
therapist of forcing her to get the CPO against Father). Upon learning that Mother wanted
to pursue another therapist, the Agency provided Mother with the names of multiple other
providers and even took her to one facility. But Mother did not continue to pursue the
options until just before the PC hearing. According to Caseworker Tracy, Mother lacked
the necessary initiative to get into a new program. While Mother was undoubtedly under
a lot of stress and had unresolved issues from childhood, the Agency tried to assist Mother. In fact, the transcript makes clear that the Agency cared about Mother and her
progress.
{¶41} In the final analysis, the Agency’s case plan identified areas of concern
related to Mother’s need to address her mental health issues, to secure stable
employment and housing, to address continued concerns for domestic violence,
demonstrate financial stability, and gain parenting skills to care for the children. The
Agency’s efforts included making reasonable case plans and diligent efforts to assist the
parents for several years. Caseworker Tracy repeatedly explained these objectives to
Mother and provided recommendations to assist her. The Agency conducted home visits,
attempted to locate kinship placements, and facilitated visitation between Mother and her
children. Despite these efforts, and although Mother tried at times, she failed to attain
important and specific case plan objectives. The trial court stated:
Unfortunately, [Mother and Father] remain largely unchanged from the state
and circumstances they were in when the children were removed from their
care. Despite being provided resources by the Agency, [Mother and Father]
have been unable to demonstrate that they can provide for their own needs,
let alone the children’s needs.
Trial Court’s Decision, p. 14.
{¶42} As an appellate court, we must neither weigh the evidence nor judge the
credibility of the witnesses, our role is solely to determine whether there is relevant,
competent and credible evidence upon which the fact finder could base its judgment. In
re M.K., 2023-Ohio-3786, ¶ 26 (5th Dist.). After a thorough review of the record, we find
that clear and convincing evidence exists to support the trial court’s decision. While Mother made some minimal efforts to engage in the case plan after significant delays,
she failed to substantially remedy the conditions that caused I.F. and N.F. to be removed
in the first instance. It is evident that the trial court fully considered the factual issues and
engaged in a rigorous analysis as required by Ohio law.
{¶43} Accordingly, the record clearly supports the trial court’s finding pursuant to
R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a) and corresponding R.C. 2151.414(E)(1). We need not address
the court’s findings pursuant to R.C. 2151.414(E)(4) or (E)(16), as applied to Mother. As
set forth above, if the court makes even one finding under R.C. 2151.414(E)(1)-(15), the
court shall determine the children cannot or should not be placed with the parent within a
reasonable time.
{¶44} However, we briefly address the additional factors to ensure completeness.
As set forth, the trial court found that under R.C. 2151.414(E)(4), the children cannot be
placed with Mother or Father because they have demonstrated a lack of commitment
towards the children by failing to regularly support, visit, or communicate with the children
when able to do so, or by other actions showing an unwillingness to provide an adequate
permanent home for the children. Competent, credible evidence exists to support the trial
court’s findings.
{¶45} Mother demonstrated a lack of commitment in her failure to meaningfully
engage with Agency services despite significant efforts by the Agency set forth throughout
this Opinion. Mother did not properly rectify her own mental health issues and
corresponding domestic violence tendencies, she did not follow through on finding stable
housing, and she did not demonstrate financial independence or stability for herself or
her children. In fact, with Father incarcerated, Mother was less stable financially. Although Mother did participate in visitation with the children approximately 75% of the
time, and was appropriate during those visits, this fact alone does not overcome her
unwillingness regarding the additional more complex factors leading to the children’s
removal. Quite frankly, the visits were set up by the Agency, were supervised, and were
the easiest part of the case plan. Mother simply did not demonstrate she could properly
care for the basic or special needs of the children, now or in the foreseeable future. Thus,
the children cannot be placed with Mother or should not be placed with her within a
reasonable time. R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a) and R.C. 2151.414(E)(4).
{¶46} Finally, the trial court relied upon the factor outlined in R.C. 2151.414(E)(16)
which allows it to consider “[a]ny other factor the court considers relevant.” Importantly,
this factor does not have any requirement that a parent "failed continuously and
repeatedly to substantially remedy the conditions causing the child to be placed outside
the child's home" like (E)(1), nor the "lack of commitment" or "unwillingness" elements
found in (E)(4). The Court stated it was “extremely significant” that Mother was unable to
be independent or provide for her own needs, without relying on assistance from others
during the pendency of these matters, and that she has been unable to demonstrate
progress on addressing violent behaviors in her and Father’s relationship, as well as an
inability to separate herself from Father. As set forth throughout this Opinion, significant
evidence exists to support the trial court’s findings. Accordingly, Mother’s first
assignment of error is overruled in its entirety.
Best Interest under R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)
{¶47} Once the court makes the appropriate finding under R.C. 2151.414(B)(1), it
must next determine whether PC is in the best interest of the child(ren) based on the express statutory factors as well as any other relevant factor. As stated, the trial court
determined that clear and convincing evidence exists that it is in the best interests of the
children to grant PC to the Agency. Mother’s second assignment of error argues the trial
court erred in so finding. We disagree with Mother.
{¶48} Mother claims that although the trial court explicitly states it considered all
the factors set forth in (B)(1), the record “reflects that the court placed dispositive weight
on the children's foster placement and the passage of time while failing to meaningfully
weigh Mother's relationship with the children, her ongoing progress toward reunification,
and whether the children's need for a legally secure placement could be achieved without
terminating her parental rights.” Appellant’s Brief, p. 14.
{¶49} The juvenile court has considerable discretion in weighing the requisite best
interest factors and there is not one factor that is given more weight than the others. M.K.,
at ¶ 33. Here, the testimony and record demonstrate that the children are bonded to their
foster parents, are receiving more than adequate care, and are thriving in the home. The
foster mother, Caseworker Tracy, and the GAL all agreed on this point. The foster parents
are willing to adopt the children to provide them with permanent stability, while also
acknowledging continued open communication with Mother, as appropriate. The children
are too young to have verbally expressed their wishes. Regarding custodial history, it is
clear the children have been in the Agency’s custody, and physical placement with the
same foster parents, for most of their very young lives. Indeed, I.F. was removed when
he was about nine months old and N.F. was removed shortly after her birth. By the time
of the hearing, I.F. and N.F. had spent a year-and-a-half and a year, respectively, in the
custody of the foster parents. {¶50} Finally, the trial court must examine the need for a legally secure and
permanent home and whether such permanency can be accomplished without a grant of
PC. To this end, Mother improperly suggests that this factor requires the trial court to
grant her request for an extension of temporary custody. Mother appears to maintain that
her status as Mother is paramount. Pursuant to R.C. 2151.415(D), the juvenile court may
extend the temporary custody order of a child for a period of up to six months. In re R.B.,
2023-Ohio-2706, ¶ 46 (5th Dist.). This Court has held that the Agency must request the
extension, such that there is no legal basis for Mother as parent to file for an extension of
temporary custody. In re A.R., 2023-Ohio-1359, ¶ 57 (5th Dist.) Here, importantly, the
Agency did not request one.
{¶51} The trial court properly determined the children need a legally secure and
permanent home and such permanency cannot be accomplished with Mother. The court
stated: “[N.F. and I.F.’s] need for a legally secure permanent placement is immense as
there are no viable relatives or kinship caregivers identified for placement. [Mother and
Father] have been unable to establish that they can provide the children with a safe and
stable environment.” Trial Court’s Decision, p. 20. The evidence in the record and
described throughout this opinion clearly supports the trial court’s findings. “[O]nce the
trial court determines that one of the conditions under R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a) through (d)
exists, the trial court must determine a permanent placement that is in the best interest of
the children, regardless of the identity of the parties competing for custody.” In re B. W,
2015-Ohio-2360, ¶ 31 (10th Dist.). That is exactly the arduous task undertaken by the
trial court. In the final analysis, Mother’s efforts to reunite with her children fell short
despite the Agency’s diligent efforts. Clear and convincing evidence exists to support the trial court’s determination that it is in the children’s best interest to grant the Agency’s
motion for PC. Mother’s second assignment of error is overruled.
CONCLUSION
{¶52} Mother’s first and second assignments of error are overruled, and the
judgment of the Licking County Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division, is AFFIRMED.
{¶53} Costs to Appellant.
By: Montgomery, J.
Baldwin, P.J. and
Gormley, J. concur.