In Re Lester

124 B.R. 63, 1990 WL 264585
CourtUnited States Bankruptcy Court, S.D. Ohio
DecidedNovember 28, 1990
DocketBankruptcy 2-89-01506
StatusPublished
Cited by5 cases

This text of 124 B.R. 63 (In Re Lester) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Bankruptcy Court, S.D. Ohio primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In Re Lester, 124 B.R. 63, 1990 WL 264585 (Ohio 1990).

Opinion

OPINION AND ORDER ON TRUSTEE’S OBJECTION TO CLAIM OP EXEMPTION

BARBARA J. SELLERS, Bankruptcy Judge.

This matter is before the Court on the objection of Robert Storey, the duly-appointed trustee of this Chapter 7 bankruptcy estate (“Trustee”), to a claim of exemption asserted by Nancy J. Lester (“Debt- or”). The matter was heard by the Court on October 4, 1990.

The Court has jurisdiction in this matter under 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b) and the General Order of Reference previously entered in this district. This is a core proceeding which this Bankruptcy Judge may hear and determine under 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2). The following constitute findings of fact and conclusions of law.

I.FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Nancy Lester amended her bankruptcy schedules to include as an asset an award of $6,333 resulting from the settlement of a claim against St. Ann’s Hospital. The settlement related to an injury she sustained while a patient in the emergency room of the hospital. The total amount of the award was $10,000. After deductions for legal and other expenses, $6,333 remains as her share of that award. The Debtor seeks to claim as exempt $5,400 of that award.

The parties do not dispute the appropriateness of the Debtor’s amendment of her schedules to reflect the $6,333 realized from the settlement. However, the Trustee objects to the Debtor’s claim of exemption for $5,400 of that award. The Debtor contends, however, that the exemption is warranted by Ohio Rev.Code §§ 2329.-66(A)(12)(c) or (A)(17).

II.ISSUE PRESENTED

The issue before the Court is whether any of the Debtor’s settlement award may be claimed by her as exempt under the provisions of Ohio Rev.Code §§ 2329.-66(A)(12) or 2329.66(A)(17).

III.DISCUSSION

A. Exemption Pursuant to Ohio Revised Code § 2329.66(A)(12)(c).

Under the authority granted to the states by 11 U.S.C. § 522(b), Ohio has “opted-out” of the specific exemption scheme provided by the Bankruptcy Code. Therefore, an Ohio bankruptcy debtor may claim property as exempt from her bankruptcy estate only if Ohio law permits such exemption from the claims of creditors. See, Ohio Rev.Code § 2329.662.

Ohio Rev.Code § 2329.66(A)(12) provides in pertinent part:

(A) Every person who is domiciled in this state may hold property exempt from execution, garnishment, attachment or sale to satisfy a judgment or order as follows:
* * * * *
(12) The person's right to receive, or moneys received during the preceding twelve calendar months from any of the following:
* * * * * *
*65 (c) A payment, not to exceed five thousand dollars, on account of personal bodily injury, not including pain and suffering or compensation for actual pecuniary loss, of the person or an individual for whom the person is a dependent;

When an objection is raised to a debtor’s claim of exemption, it is the burden of the objecting party to prove that the exemption is not properly claimed. Bankruptcy Rule 4003(c). The rule places upon the objecting party the initial burden of showing the inappropriateness of the asserted exemption. That burden is met by the introduction of evidence which rebuts the prima facie effect of the claim of exemption. Successful rebuttal then shifts the burden to the debtor to demonstrate that the exemption is proper. See, In re Hollar, 79 B.R. 294, 296 (Bankr.S.D.Ohio 1987).

Section 2329.66(A)(12)(c) of Ohio Rev.Code requires allocation to show that the payments actually are for personal bodily injury. The demands of allocation have not been the subject of much case law. However, at least one Ohio Court of Appeals has addressed the issue. With the agreement of the parties, the Court in Mike v. Rendano recognized that “the statute does not exempt payments for pain and suffering or compensation for actual pecuniary loss, including medical payments.” (Aug. 5, 1985) Mahoning App. No. 84 C.A. 72, 1985 WL 7019 (unreported). This reasoning also is in accord with the federal decisions interpreting this statute. As stated by one court:

These courts have generally determined that this language allows a debtor a maximum exemption of five thousand dollars ($5,000) from the proceeds of a personal injury settlement separate from payment for pain and suffering or lost wages.

In re Young, 93 B.R. 590, 594 (Bankr.S.D.Ohio 1988). See also, In re Brooks, 12 B.R. 22, 25 (Bankr.S.D.Ohio 1981).

Because the exemption does not include amounts properly attributable either to pain and suffering or to actual pecuniary loss, those amounts must be separated from the total award. Further, pursuant to Ohio Rev.Code § 2329.66(A)(12)(d), payments which compensate for the loss of future earnings are treated as a separate exemption. See In re Carson, 82 B.R. 847, 855-856 (Bankr.S.D.Ohio 1987).

Upon consideration of the requirements and limitations of the statute and the allocated burden of proof, the Court concludes that the Debtor’s claimed exemption of $5,000 must fail. The Trustee, as the objecting party, met his initial burden of demonstrating that the Debtor’s claimed exemption is inappropriate by showing that the Debtor had failed to allocate the award to show that any payments were for personal bodily injury. It is not enough for the Debtor merely to claim the entire amount as exempt. Once that exemption is challenged, some showing must be made that the award is for personal bodily injury and not for pain and suffering or actual pecuniary loss. Placing this burden of production on the Debtor does not violate the requirement of Bankruptcy Rule 4003(c) because the objecting party still initially must establish that the exemption is not properly claimed. That burden is met, however, by a showing that the Debtor has failed to make the necessary allocation. This interpretation reflects the realistic assumption that only the Debtor possesses the evidence to establish proper allocation. If the payment is on account of personal bodily injury, it is exempt. But there is no presumption that an award is only for personal bodily injury.

The Debtor did not sufficiently allocate any of the components of her award.

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In Re Rhinebolt
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141 B.R. 157 (S.D. Ohio, 1991)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
124 B.R. 63, 1990 WL 264585, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-lester-ohsb-1990.