FILED JUN 18 2025 NOT FOR PUBLICATION SUSAN M. SPRAUL, CLERK U.S. BKCY. APP. PANEL OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY APPELLATE PANEL OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT
In re: BAP No. CC-25-1037-LSF LESLIE KLEIN, Debtor. Bk. No. 2:23-bk-10990-SK THE SECOND AMENDED KLEIN LIVING TRUST; LESLIE KLEIN; THE MARITAL DEDUCTION TRUST OF ERIKA KLEIN; THE SURVIVOR’S TRUST OF LESLIE KLEIN; BARBARA KLEIN, Appellants, v. MEMORANDUM∗ BRADLEY D. SHARP, Chapter 11 Trustee, Appellee.
Appeal from the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Central District of California Sandra R. Klein, Bankruptcy Judge, Presiding
Before: LAFFERTY, SPRAKER, and FARIS, Bankruptcy Judges.
∗ This disposition is not appropriate for publication. Although it may be cited for
whatever persuasive value it may have, see Fed. R. App. P. 32.1, it has no precedential value, see 9th Cir. BAP Rule 8024-1. 1 INTRODUCTION
Leslie Klein (“Debtor”), his wife Barbara Klein, and certain trusts1
created by Debtor and his former wife (collectively, “Appellants”) appeal
the bankruptcy court’s order requiring Debtor (and any other occupants) to
turn over property of the estate to the chapter 11 2 trustee.
After Debtor asserted that title to his home was held by various
trusts, the chapter 11 trustee sued Appellants to quiet title to the property
in the name of the bankruptcy estate. On the chapter 11 trustee’s motion for
summary judgment, the bankruptcy court held that Debtor’s home was
property of the bankruptcy estate,3 and we recently affirmed that
determination. Klein v. Sharp (In re Klein), BAP No. CC-25-1002-LCF, 2025
WL 1591289 (9th Cir. BAP June 5, 2025) (the “First Appeal”).
Subsequently, in response to the trustee’s request, the bankruptcy
court ordered Debtor to vacate the property to facilitate the trustee’s
marketing and sale of the same. Arguing the same points we resolved in
connection with the First Appeal, Appellants now appeal the order
requiring Debtor to vacate the property.4
1 The trusts affiliated with this appeal are the Second Amended Klein Living Trust and two of its subtrusts, namely, the Marital Deduction Trust of Erika Klein and the Survivor’s Trust of Leslie Klein. 2 Unless specified otherwise, all chapter and section references are to the
Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. §§ 101–1532. 3 Although Appellants filed a motion for a stay of the bankruptcy court’s order
granting the chapter 11 trustee’s motion for summary judgment, the bankruptcy court denied their request. 4 At oral argument, both parties acknowledged that Debtor and his wife had
2 We AFFIRM.
FACTS 5
We previously laid out the background facts of this case in a
Memorandum disposing of the First Appeal (the “Memorandum”). In re
Klein, 2025 WL 1591289, at *1-4. We repeat certain relevant facts herein but
otherwise incorporate the statement of facts from the Memorandum.
Debtor filed a voluntary chapter 11 petition and scheduled an interest
in real property located on June Street in Beverly Hills, California (the
“June Property”). Debtor valued the June Property at $4.9 million and, with
the exception of a $15,000 tax lien, indicated there were no encumbrances
against the June Property. Debtor also scheduled approximately $32
million in liabilities.
Notwithstanding Debtor’s inclusion of the June Property as an asset
in his schedules, Appellants eventually asserted various interests in the
June Property. In response, chapter 11 trustee Bradley D. Sharp (the
“Trustee”) filed a complaint against Appellants to quiet title to the June
vacated the subject property in compliance with the bankruptcy court’s order requiring turnover and a subsequent order enforcing the turnover order. Although these developments may raise concerns regarding mootness, neither party has argued that this appeal is moot, and we cannot rule out the possibility that this Panel would be able to provide some form of effective relief to Appellants. 5 We have taken judicial notice of the bankruptcy court docket and various
documents filed through the electronic docketing system. See O'Rourke v. Seaboard Sur. Co. (In re E.R. Fegert, Inc.), 887 F.2d 955, 957-58 (9th Cir. 1989); Atwood v. Chase Manhattan Mortg. Co. (In re Atwood), 293 B.R. 227, 233 n.9 (9th Cir. BAP 2003). 3 Property. As relevant to this appeal, the Trustee sought a determination
that the June Property was property of the estate.
The bankruptcy court granted the Trustee’s motion for summary
judgment, ruling, in relevant part, that the June Property was property of
Debtor’s bankruptcy estate. As noted above, we affirmed that ruling. Id. at
*8.
During the pendency of the First Appeal, the Trustee filed a motion
for entry of an order compelling Debtor to vacate the June Property (the
“Turnover Motion”). Appellants opposed the Turnover Motion, reiterating
the arguments they made in connection with the First Appeal.
The bankruptcy court entered an order granting the Turnover Motion
and requiring Debtor, as well as any other occupants of the June Property,
to vacate the June Property within 30 days of entry of the order (the
“Turnover Order”). Appellants timely appealed.
JURISDICTION
The bankruptcy court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1334 and
157(b)(2)(A) and (E). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 158.
ISSUE
Did the bankruptcy court err in granting the Turnover Motion?
STANDARD OF REVIEW
“Whether property is included in a bankruptcy estate and procedures
for recovering estate property are questions of law that we review de
novo.” Newman v. Schwartzer (In re Newman), 487 B.R. 193, 197 (9th Cir. BAP
4 2013) (citing White v. Brown (In re White), 389 B.R. 693, 698 (9th Cir. BAP
2008)). “De novo review requires that we consider a matter anew, as if no
decision had been made previously.” Francis v. Wallace (In re Francis), 505
B.R. 914, 917 (9th Cir. BAP 2014) (citations omitted).
DISCUSSION
On appeal, Appellants repeat their arguments from the First Appeal,
raising the same issues we resolved in that appeal. As we discuss in section
A, the law of the case doctrine precludes all of Appellants’ arguments.
The sole issue in this appeal is whether the bankruptcy court erred in
ordering turnover of the June Property. Appellants fail to provide any
argument with respect to this issue. As a result, we may affirm the
Turnover Order on the basis that Appellants have waived any arguments
related to turnover. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir.
2009) (arguments that are “not specifically and distinctly raised and argued
in appellant’s opening brief” are waived). Nevertheless, as we discuss in
section B, the record does not reflect any error with respect to the Turnover
Order.
A. Appellants’ arguments are foreclosed by the law of the case doctrine. “Under the law of the case doctrine, a court will generally refuse to
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FILED JUN 18 2025 NOT FOR PUBLICATION SUSAN M. SPRAUL, CLERK U.S. BKCY. APP. PANEL OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY APPELLATE PANEL OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT
In re: BAP No. CC-25-1037-LSF LESLIE KLEIN, Debtor. Bk. No. 2:23-bk-10990-SK THE SECOND AMENDED KLEIN LIVING TRUST; LESLIE KLEIN; THE MARITAL DEDUCTION TRUST OF ERIKA KLEIN; THE SURVIVOR’S TRUST OF LESLIE KLEIN; BARBARA KLEIN, Appellants, v. MEMORANDUM∗ BRADLEY D. SHARP, Chapter 11 Trustee, Appellee.
Appeal from the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Central District of California Sandra R. Klein, Bankruptcy Judge, Presiding
Before: LAFFERTY, SPRAKER, and FARIS, Bankruptcy Judges.
∗ This disposition is not appropriate for publication. Although it may be cited for
whatever persuasive value it may have, see Fed. R. App. P. 32.1, it has no precedential value, see 9th Cir. BAP Rule 8024-1. 1 INTRODUCTION
Leslie Klein (“Debtor”), his wife Barbara Klein, and certain trusts1
created by Debtor and his former wife (collectively, “Appellants”) appeal
the bankruptcy court’s order requiring Debtor (and any other occupants) to
turn over property of the estate to the chapter 11 2 trustee.
After Debtor asserted that title to his home was held by various
trusts, the chapter 11 trustee sued Appellants to quiet title to the property
in the name of the bankruptcy estate. On the chapter 11 trustee’s motion for
summary judgment, the bankruptcy court held that Debtor’s home was
property of the bankruptcy estate,3 and we recently affirmed that
determination. Klein v. Sharp (In re Klein), BAP No. CC-25-1002-LCF, 2025
WL 1591289 (9th Cir. BAP June 5, 2025) (the “First Appeal”).
Subsequently, in response to the trustee’s request, the bankruptcy
court ordered Debtor to vacate the property to facilitate the trustee’s
marketing and sale of the same. Arguing the same points we resolved in
connection with the First Appeal, Appellants now appeal the order
requiring Debtor to vacate the property.4
1 The trusts affiliated with this appeal are the Second Amended Klein Living Trust and two of its subtrusts, namely, the Marital Deduction Trust of Erika Klein and the Survivor’s Trust of Leslie Klein. 2 Unless specified otherwise, all chapter and section references are to the
Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. §§ 101–1532. 3 Although Appellants filed a motion for a stay of the bankruptcy court’s order
granting the chapter 11 trustee’s motion for summary judgment, the bankruptcy court denied their request. 4 At oral argument, both parties acknowledged that Debtor and his wife had
2 We AFFIRM.
FACTS 5
We previously laid out the background facts of this case in a
Memorandum disposing of the First Appeal (the “Memorandum”). In re
Klein, 2025 WL 1591289, at *1-4. We repeat certain relevant facts herein but
otherwise incorporate the statement of facts from the Memorandum.
Debtor filed a voluntary chapter 11 petition and scheduled an interest
in real property located on June Street in Beverly Hills, California (the
“June Property”). Debtor valued the June Property at $4.9 million and, with
the exception of a $15,000 tax lien, indicated there were no encumbrances
against the June Property. Debtor also scheduled approximately $32
million in liabilities.
Notwithstanding Debtor’s inclusion of the June Property as an asset
in his schedules, Appellants eventually asserted various interests in the
June Property. In response, chapter 11 trustee Bradley D. Sharp (the
“Trustee”) filed a complaint against Appellants to quiet title to the June
vacated the subject property in compliance with the bankruptcy court’s order requiring turnover and a subsequent order enforcing the turnover order. Although these developments may raise concerns regarding mootness, neither party has argued that this appeal is moot, and we cannot rule out the possibility that this Panel would be able to provide some form of effective relief to Appellants. 5 We have taken judicial notice of the bankruptcy court docket and various
documents filed through the electronic docketing system. See O'Rourke v. Seaboard Sur. Co. (In re E.R. Fegert, Inc.), 887 F.2d 955, 957-58 (9th Cir. 1989); Atwood v. Chase Manhattan Mortg. Co. (In re Atwood), 293 B.R. 227, 233 n.9 (9th Cir. BAP 2003). 3 Property. As relevant to this appeal, the Trustee sought a determination
that the June Property was property of the estate.
The bankruptcy court granted the Trustee’s motion for summary
judgment, ruling, in relevant part, that the June Property was property of
Debtor’s bankruptcy estate. As noted above, we affirmed that ruling. Id. at
*8.
During the pendency of the First Appeal, the Trustee filed a motion
for entry of an order compelling Debtor to vacate the June Property (the
“Turnover Motion”). Appellants opposed the Turnover Motion, reiterating
the arguments they made in connection with the First Appeal.
The bankruptcy court entered an order granting the Turnover Motion
and requiring Debtor, as well as any other occupants of the June Property,
to vacate the June Property within 30 days of entry of the order (the
“Turnover Order”). Appellants timely appealed.
JURISDICTION
The bankruptcy court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1334 and
157(b)(2)(A) and (E). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 158.
ISSUE
Did the bankruptcy court err in granting the Turnover Motion?
STANDARD OF REVIEW
“Whether property is included in a bankruptcy estate and procedures
for recovering estate property are questions of law that we review de
novo.” Newman v. Schwartzer (In re Newman), 487 B.R. 193, 197 (9th Cir. BAP
4 2013) (citing White v. Brown (In re White), 389 B.R. 693, 698 (9th Cir. BAP
2008)). “De novo review requires that we consider a matter anew, as if no
decision had been made previously.” Francis v. Wallace (In re Francis), 505
B.R. 914, 917 (9th Cir. BAP 2014) (citations omitted).
DISCUSSION
On appeal, Appellants repeat their arguments from the First Appeal,
raising the same issues we resolved in that appeal. As we discuss in section
A, the law of the case doctrine precludes all of Appellants’ arguments.
The sole issue in this appeal is whether the bankruptcy court erred in
ordering turnover of the June Property. Appellants fail to provide any
argument with respect to this issue. As a result, we may affirm the
Turnover Order on the basis that Appellants have waived any arguments
related to turnover. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir.
2009) (arguments that are “not specifically and distinctly raised and argued
in appellant’s opening brief” are waived). Nevertheless, as we discuss in
section B, the record does not reflect any error with respect to the Turnover
Order.
A. Appellants’ arguments are foreclosed by the law of the case doctrine. “Under the law of the case doctrine, a court will generally refuse to
reconsider an issue that has already been decided by the same court or a
5 higher court in the same case.” Gonzalez v. Arizona, 677 F.3d 383, 389 n.4
(9th Cir. 2012) (citation omitted).
“Under the law of the case doctrine, a court is barred from
reconsidering an issue that already has been decided in the same court or
in a higher court in the same case.” FDIC v. Kipperman (In re Com. Money
Ctr., Inc.), 392 B.R. 814, 832 (9th Cir. BAP 2008) (citing Milgard Tempering,
Inc. v. Selas Corp. of Am., 902 F.2d 703, 715 (9th Cir. 1990)). “For the law of
the case doctrine to apply, the issue must have been decided, either
expressly or by necessary implication.” Id.
However, even if the law of the case doctrine applies, a court may decide, in its discretion, to revisit the issue if: “(1) the first decision was clearly erroneous and would result in manifest injustice; (2) an intervening change in the law has occurred; or (3) the evidence on remand [is] substantially different.” Id. at 832-33 (quoting Milgard Tempering, Inc., 902 F.2d at 715).
Here, the Memorandum already resolved every issue raised by
Appellants in their appellate briefs. In addition, Appellants have not
argued that an exception to the law of the case doctrine applies. The record
before the Panel also does not reflect the existence of an exception:
Appellants have not referenced a clear error in either the bankruptcy
court’s or this Panel’s decisions; there has been no intervening change in
law; and Appellants have not presented any new evidence that would
change the outcome of either the First Appeal or this appeal.
6 Consequently, the law of the case doctrine precludes relitigation of
the issues that were decided via the Memorandum.
B. The bankruptcy court did not err in entering the Turnover Order. Turning to the sole issue presented in the current appeal, given that
this Panel already has affirmed the bankruptcy court’s conclusion that the
June Property is property of the estate, Appellants have not articulated
why an order requiring Debtor to vacate property of the estate was error.
Pursuant to § 542(a), entities in possession “of property that the
trustee may use, sell, or lease” under the Code “shall deliver to the trustee,
and account for, such property or the value of such property, unless such
property is of inconsequential value or benefit to the estate.” (Emphasis
added). There is no dispute that the Trustee has the power to use, sell, or
lease property of the estate, such as the June Property. § 363(b).
In addition, Appellants do not contend that the June Property is of
“inconsequential value or benefit to the estate.” Nor could Appellants
seriously contend as much; as is evident from the facts above, Debtor
valued the June Property at $4.9 million and indicated that only a $15,000
tax lien encumbers the June Property. Given the substantial liabilities of the
estate, the record reflects that a sale of the June Property is of significant
value and benefit to the estate.
Moreover, a debtor has a duty to “cooperate with the trustee as
necessary to enable the trustee to perform the trustee’s duties under this
title.” § 521(a)(3). If the debtor fails to cooperate, the court may order
7 turnover of estate property to the trustee. See In re Bolden, 327 B.R. 657, 668
(Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2005) (“[Debtor] has been uncooperative. The trustee
needs a turnover order to market and sell the property.”).
In light of the above, Debtor had a duty to cooperate with the Trustee
and turn over the June Property to the bankruptcy estate. The bankruptcy
court did not err in ordering Debtor to do so.
CONCLUSION
The bankruptcy court did not err in entering the Turnover Order. We
therefore AFFIRM.