In re L.C.

2019 IL App (2d) 190527-U

Opinion

2019 IL App (2d) 190527-U No. 2-19-0527 Order filed November 18, 2019

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and may not be cited as precedent by any party except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1). ______________________________________________________________________________

IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

SECOND DISTRICT ______________________________________________________________________________

In re L.C., ) Appeal from the Circuit Court ) of De Kalb County. a minor. ) ) ) No. 15-JA-41 ) (The People of the State of Illinois, ) Honorable Petitioner-Appellee v. Tanya M., ) Ronald G. Matekaitis Respondent-Appellant) ) Judge, Presiding. ______________________________________________________________________________

JUSTICE HUTCHINSON delivered the judgment of the court. Justices McLaren and Zenoff concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

¶1 Held: The trial court did not err in finding respondent unfit and terminating her parental rights.

¶2 The minor, L.C., was born in April 2015 to respondent, Tanya M., and Matthew C. In June

2015, police were summoned to Matthew and Tanya’s residence where they learned that, after a

night of heavy drinking, Matthew choked Tanya and threatened her with a stun gun while L.C.

was present. Matthew was arrested and charged with aggravated domestic battery, unlawful

possession of a firearm, and unlawful use of a weapon. This was Matthew’s third arrest for

domestic battery against Tanya. Matthew was eventually convicted of domestic battery and 2019 IL App (2d) 190527-U

attempt possession of a firearm by a felon and sentenced to a 2-year term of imprisonment. As part

of Matthew’s criminal case, the court entered an order of protection prohibiting Matthew from

contact with L.C or Tanya.

¶3 In November 2015, police were again summoned to Tanya’s residence for a well-being

check. There, they found Tanya was passed out and intoxicated. There was dog feces “all over the

floor” and L.C. was found “covered” in feces. The State filed an initial neglect petition and the

Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) implemented a safety plan requiring that

L.C. was to reside with Tanya’s parents.

¶4 In March 2016, Tanya was arrested for stabbing her new paramour. She was intoxicated at

the time, and L.C. was present in the home, all contrary to the safety plan. (The record indicates

that Tanya stabbed her paramour because he attempted to either take away or pour out her beer.)

Protective custody was taken of L.C. and an amended neglect petition was filed. Both Matthew

and Tanya stipulated to an injurious-environment allegation in the amended neglect petition. L.C.

was then adjudicated neglected and made a ward of the court.

¶5 As part of her pending criminal cases, and due to her history of substance abuse, Tanya

had been admitted to DeKalb County’s drug court program. In addition, based upon an integrated

assessment, DCFS created service plans for Tanya. Tanya’s service plans called for her to obtain

a substance abuse evaluation (and follow all recommendations), obtain a mental health assessment

(and follow all recommendations), complete a parenting class, remain drug and alcohol free, obtain

employment, obtain suitable housing for L.C. Although the only matter before us concerns these

abuse and neglect proceedings, we note that the terms of Tanya’s drug court treatment plan closely

tracked the terms of her DCFS service plans.

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¶6 As part of her drug court participation, Tanya was released from jail to complete a 90-day

inpatient treatment program during the summer of 2016. Meanwhile, Matthew was paroled in June

2016; however, the order of protection was still in place. Shortly after Matthew’s parole, DCFS

caseworker Tracey Goodman discovered that Matthew and Tanya had been seeing each other,

romantically, in violation of Matthew’s no-contact order. In September 2016, Matthew was

arrested near the halfway house for violating the order of protection, which also violated his parole.

Matthew was again incarcerated and sentenced to prison.

¶7 In September 2016, Tanya was discharged from inpatient care to a halfway house for

continuing treatment. Tanya’s stay at the halfway house was short lived, however. While at the

halfway house, Tanya tested positive for both alcohol and amphetamines. The final straw came

when Tanya was found to have violated the house rules by having a male visitor in the home. After

the incidents at the halfway house, Tanya was briefly jailed before the drug court returned Tanya

to a second 90-day inpatient program. In October 2016, Tanya’s home monitoring device twice

alerted that she had consumed alcohol. Then, in December 2016, Tanya was discharged from the

inpatient program 67 days in for violating the program’s confidentiality and safety rules (she

posted a picture of the facility and its residents on Facebook). Staff in the program noted that Tanya

was often hostile and denied she needed treatment. Tanya indicated that she posted the picture

with full awareness that it was against the rules and in the hope that her conduct would get her

discharged.

¶8 Tanya did complete a parenting class during her initial inpatient stay; however, we note

that throughout her incarceration, inpatient treatments, and brief residency at the halfway house,

Tanya refused most offers for supervised visitation with L.C. or simply did not show up.

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¶9 At a permanency review in January 2017, the trial court found that Tanya had not made

reasonable efforts or progress towards L.C.’s return. During the subsequent months, Tanya

completed inpatient treatment but ultimately made little progress. Tanya failed to participate in

(court-ordered) psychiatric treatment and refused to take prescribed psychotropic medication.

Ultimately, Tanya was discharged unsuccessfully from drug court. After a permanency hearing in

November 2017, the court found that Tanya had not made reasonable efforts or progress towards

L.C.’s return. The court changed L.C.’s permanency goal to substitute care pending the termination

of parental rights.

¶ 10 In February 2018, the State filed its petition to terminate Matthew’s and Tanya’s parental

rights. With respect to Tanya, the State’s petition alleged that she was unfit in that she: (1) failed

to maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern, or responsibility for L.C.’s welfare (750 ILCS

50/1(D)(b) (West 2016)); (2) failed to make reasonable efforts toward L.C.’s return within 9

months after the adjudication of neglect (750 ILCS 50/1(D)(m)(i) (West 2016)); (3) failed to make

reasonable progress towards L.C.’s return within 9 months after the adjudication of neglect (750

ILCS 50/1(D)(m)(ii) (West 2016)); (4) failed to make reasonable progress towards L.C.’s return

during any subsequent 9-month period (750 ILCS 50/1(D)(m)(iii) (West 2016)); and, (5) due to

repeated incarceration, was incapable of parenting L.C. (750 ILCS 50/1(D)(s) (West 2016)).

¶ 11 A hearing on the State’s petition commenced in September 2018. Tracey Goodman, a

DCFS caseworker, testified regarding Tanya’s service plans, which spanned the history of this

case. Goodman explained that Tanya had significant psychiatric issues that, especially when

coupled with substance abuse, left her particularly susceptible to intimate-partner violence.

Goodman further explained that Tanya had often refused offered counseling and treatment services

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as well as supervised visitation with L.C. Moreover, despite the nearly three-year history of this

case, at no time was Tanya employed or in possession of suitable housing for L.C.

¶ 12 During closing arguments, Tanya’s counsel repeatedly emphasized that Tanya’s “relapses”

were not her “fault” but were rather part of her condition. The trial court issued a 10-page, single-

spaced, memorandum decision finding both Tanya and Matthew unfit as alleged in the State’s

petition. With respect to Tanya, the court found that she had repeatedly engaged in “narcissistic”

behavior and that Tanya simply had not made the efforts necessary to correct her life or to have

L.C. returned to her care. In particular, the court noted that Tanya was not discharged from any

program for “relapsing”; rather, Tanya was discharged from each program (and from drug court

altogether) for intentional conduct in violation of the rules.

¶ 13 At a best-interests hearing, a DCFS case manager testified that neither Matthew nor Tanya

had suitable housing for L.C. In addition, neither Matthew nor Tanya had ever progressed to

unsupervised visitation with L.C.

¶ 14 L.C.’s foster mother testified that L.C. had resided with her, her foster father, and five

foster siblings for the preceding three years. L.C. refers to her foster parents as “Mom” and “Dad”

and her foster siblings as her “brothers and sisters.” When L.C. came to her foster parents, she was

10 months’ old. At that time, L.C.’s sensory and motor skills were delayed. Since that time, L.C.’s

foster parents engaged her in weekly developmental therapy and L.C. was enrolled in preschool

where she was “doing a great job.” L.C.’s foster mother testified that L.C. was learning how to

ride a bike, and enjoys playing outside with her foster siblings. The family eats meals together and

attends church together. In addition, L.C.’s foster parents would pray with her, read to her, and

sing to her each night before bedtime.

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¶ 15 After the hearing, the trial court found that it was in L.C.’s best interests to terminate both

Matthew’s and Tanya’s parental rights. Tanya appeals.

¶ 16 We focus on the evidence concerning the first nine-month period, as we may affirm a

finding of unfitness based on a parent’s failure to make reasonable progress in any single nine-

month period. In re J.L., 236 Ill.2d 329, 340 (2010); see also In re Donald A.G., 221 Ill. 2d 234,

244 (2006); In re C.W., 199 Ill. 2d 198, 210 (2002) (any one ground, properly proven, is sufficient

to enter a finding of parental unfitness). Reasonable progress is measured by an objective

assessment of a parent’s progress in a given nine-month period toward reunification with the child,

which includes compliance with service plans and court directives. In re C.N., 196 Ill. 2d 181, 216-

17 (2001). A parent will be found to have made reasonable progress if and only if his or her actions

during that period indicate that the court will be able to order that the child be returned home in

the near future. In re Phoenix F., 2016 IL App (2d) 150431, ¶ 7. Conversely, the failure to make

reasonable progress includes the parent’s failure to substantially fulfill his or her obligations under

the service plan. Id. In order to reverse a finding of parental unfitness, the reviewing court must

conclude that the trial court's finding was against the manifest weight of the evidence, meaning

that the opposite conclusion was clearly apparent. In re C.N., 196 Ill. 2d at 208.

¶ 17 In the trial court, service plans were introduced that covered the initial nine-month period

after adjudication—i.e., April 29, 2016 through January 29, 2017. Those service plans called for

Tanya to establish and maintain a suitable residence for L.C.’s care; for Tanya to establish and

maintain visitation with L.C.; for Tanya to comply with all court orders; and for Tanya to obtain

assessments and begin services for parenting classes, domestic violence counseling, psychiatric

treatment, and substance abuse treatment. During this time, Tanya completed a parenting class and

a single 90-day course of inpatient treatment. However, she was also unsuccessfully discharged

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from the halfway house, a second 90-day inpatient program, and eventually drug court due to her

unwillingness or inability to abide by each program. Throughout this nine-month period, the record

reflects that Tanya failed to take her own welfare and treatment seriously. Furthermore, the record

shows that Tanya had minimal interest in establishing and maintaining a relationship with L.C.

through supervised visitation. Although we recognize that Tanya was repeatedly incarcerated for

several brief intervals during this nine-month period, her incarceration in no way excuses her

failure to comply with the terms of her service plans. See In re J.L., 236 Ill. 2d 329, 341-43 (2010)

(it is well-settled that a respondent’s incarceration during the relevant nine-month period for

demonstrating reasonable progress will not excuse lack of progress and will not toll the relevant

time period). We agree with the trial court that, during this nine-month period, Tanya made no real

progress towards unsupervised visitation, employment, or establishing a suitable home for L.C.’s

care.

¶ 18 Here, Tanya failed to complete her obligations under the service plan during the relevant

nine-month period. The evidence showed that L.C. absolutely could not be returned to Tanya’s

care in the “near future,” especially during this time period. Accordingly, the trial court’s finding

that respondent was unfit pursuant to section 1(D)(m)(ii) of the Adoption Act because she failed

to make reasonable progress during the nine-month period of April 2016 to January 2017, was not

against the manifest weight of the evidence. Because only one ground for a finding of unfitness is

necessary to uphold a circuit court’s finding of parental unfitness, we need not review contentions

regarding the other bases of the trial court’s findings of unfitness. See In re Gwynne P., 215 Ill. 2d

340, 349 (2005) (parental rights may be terminated where there is a single alleged ground for

unfitness supported by the evidence).

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¶ 19 In an argument slightly less than two pages long, Tanya next contends that it was not in

L.C.’s best interests to terminate her parental rights. Once a trial court has found a parent unfit,

considerations regarding parental rights yield to the best interest of the child. In re N.B., 2019 IL

App (2d) 180797, ¶ 42. The court must consider a number of statutory factors in the context of the

child’s age and developmental needs, including physical safety and welfare, familial and

community ties, and the least disruptive placement. 705 ILCS 405/1-3(4.05)(a-j) (West 2018). The

trial court’s decision on best interest is also reviewed under the manifest-weight standard. In re

N.B., 2019 IL App (2d) 180797, ¶ 43.

¶ 20 We find Tanya’s challenge to the trial court’s best interest finding is meritless. Here, the

evidence showed that L.C. has been under DCFS supervision “[p]retty much all her life.” The

evidence also showed that L.C. was quite close with a loving and warm foster family, including

her foster parents and foster siblings. She was physically safe in her foster home and progressing

well in preschool. In addition, L.C.’s foster family was committed to her adoption. Although,

during the later stages of this case, Tanya made some progress—she began to work with a

parenting coach and eventually obtained a residence (with a new paramour)—it was minimal. In

contrast, as the trial court noted, L.C. has been in care nearly all of her life, and had resided with

her foster parents for the preceding three years. Even unsupervised visitation with Tanya and L.C.

had not taken place for years. Like the trial court, while we do not discount Tanya’s progress

towards completing some of his service-plan goals towards the end of this case, but the fact

remains that her progress and efforts throughout this case were slight at best. After carefully

reviewing the record in this case, we agree with the trial court that L.C. could not be returned to

Tanya within the foreseeable future and that it was in the minor’s best interests to terminate

Tanya’s parental rights.

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¶ 21 Before concluding, we note that pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 311(a), our disposition in

this matter was due by Monday, November 11, 2019. Our review in this case was delayed by an

extension of time to file the appellant’s brief as well as the circuit clerk’s idiosyncratic practice of

combining the court file and transcripts (which were out of order) into a single cumbersome

electronic file. Under the circumstances, we find that good cause has been shown.

¶ 22 For the reasons stated, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of De Kalb County.

¶ 23 Affirmed.

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