NOTICE FILED This Order was filed under 2021 IL App (4th) 200566-U Supreme Court Rule 23 and is March 31, 2021 not precedent except in the NO. 4-20-0566 Carla Bender th limited circumstances allowed 4 District Appellate under Rule 23(e)(1). IN THE APPELLATE COURT Court, IL
OF ILLINOIS
FOURTH DISTRICT
In re L.C., a Minor ) Appeal from the ) Circuit Court of (The People of the State of Illinois, ) Macon County Petitioner-Appellee, ) No. 18JA252 v. ) Meghann C., ) Honorable Respondent-Appellant). ) Thomas E. Little, ) Judge Presiding.
JUSTICE CAVANAGH delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Turner and Harris concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: The appellate court affirmed, concluding that the trial court’s finding of unfitness and termination of respondent’s parental rights were not against the manifest weight of the evidence.
¶2 In November 2018, the State filed a petition for wardship of L.C., the infant child
of respondent, Meghann C. In January 2019, the trial court adjudicated the minor neglected and
abused, made her a ward of the court, and placed custody and guardianship with the Illinois
Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS). The State filed a petition to terminate
respondent’s parental rights in January 2020. After separate hearings, in August and October of
2020, the court found respondent to be an unfit parent and that it was in the minor’s best interests
to terminate respondent’s parental rights.
¶3 On appeal, respondent argues the trial court erred in terminating her parental rights.
Specifically, she alleges the court erred in finding she was an unfit parent for failing to (1) maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern, or responsibility as to the minor’s welfare, (2) make
reasonable efforts to correct the conditions that were the basis for the minor’s removal from
respondent’s care, and (3) make reasonable progress toward the return of the minor within nine
months following the adjudication of neglect. She also claims the court’s best-interest
determination was against the manifest weight of the evidence. We affirm.
¶4 I. BACKGROUND
¶5 A. Neglect Proceedings
¶6 On October 14, 2018, DCFS received a hotline call expressing grave concerns
about the minor’s father and respondent’s husband, Tommy C., and his mental health, drinking,
and abusive behavior. According to the caller, she had witnessed the aftermath of an incident when
Tommy C. had nailed respondent to the wall by the skin between her fingers, used a blow torch to
burn the Superman logo into her back, and mutilated her nipples. Although respondent denied a
problem, refused to press charges, and refused to leave Tommy C., the caller feared for the safety
of their newborn child, L.C., born October 13, 2018. However, respondent and Tommy C. agreed
to an intact case, meaning DCFS would monitor a safety plan where respondent and L.C. could
live with respondent’s mother without Tommy C. By November 7, 2018, the parents were not
complying with DCFS’s directives and the infant was taken into protective custody, out of
respondent’s care. L.C. remained in her grandmother’s home, where she continues to reside.
¶7 On November 21, 2018, the State filed a petition for adjudication of neglect and
abuse. The State alleged L.C.’s environment was injurious to her welfare when she resided with
her parents because of Tommy C.’s unresolved substance abuse and mental illness, which caused
him to be delusional and abusive. The State also alleged, with regard to L.C.’s injurious
environment, that respondent was unwilling or unable to separate from Tommy C. On these same
-2- grounds, the State alleged L.C. was an abused minor because her parents created a substantial risk
of physical injury to her. We note Tommy C. is not a party to this appeal.
¶8 After an evidentiary hearing on January 28, 2019, the trial court entered an
adjudicatory order finding L.C. to be neglected and abused within the meaning of the Juvenile
Court Act of 1987 (705 ILCS 405/2-3 (West 2018)). On April 10, 2019, the court entered a
dispositional order finding it would be consistent with the health, welfare, and safety of L.C. to
make her a ward of the court.
¶9 Both parents appealed the trial court’s adjudicatory and dispositional orders. In a
consolidated decision, this court affirmed. See In re L.C., 2019 IL App (4th) 190269-U.
¶ 10 B. Termination of Respondent’s Parental Rights
¶ 11 On January 7, 2020, the State filed a petition to terminate respondent’s parental
rights. The State alleged she was an unfit person pursuant to Illinois’s Adoption Act (750 ILCS
50/1(D) (West 2018)) and identified three grounds supporting its allegation: (1) she failed to
maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern, or responsibility as to L.C.’s welfare (750 ILCS
50/1(D)(b) (West 2018)), (2) she failed to make reasonable efforts to correct the conditions that
were the basis for the removal of L.C. from her care during any nine month period following
adjudication of neglect and abuse (750 ILCS 50/1(D)(m)(i) (West 2018)), and (3) she failed to
make reasonable progress toward the return of L.C. to her care during any nine-month period
following adjudication of neglect and abuse, namely between January 29, 2019, and October 29,
2019, and between April 3, 2019, and January 3, 2020 (750 ILCS 50/1(D)(m)(ii) (West 2018)).
¶ 12 At the fitness hearing on August 13, 2020, the State presented the testimony of
Roger Fitzgerald-Jackson, the assigned caseworker from Lutheran Child and Family Services
(LCFS). He was assigned the case in February 2019, after respondent’s case plan had already been
-3- developed. Respondent’s services included mental health counseling, a substance abuse
assessment, and domestic violence services. She was also required to cooperate with LCFS and
achieve stability.
¶ 13 According to Fitzgerald-Jackson, respondent participated in mental health and
substance abuse assessments early in the case—when it was an intact case. Since that time, and
with additional concerns, respondent was referred for a full psychological examination, which was
not completed. He blames that partly on respondent’s noncompliance and partly on the fact that
they were unable to complete the integrated assessment until January 22, 2020, after the petition
to terminate was filed. He said respondent cited religious considerations for her “extreme
resistance” to drug tests. In approximately April 2020, not during the nine-month period at issue,
respondent completed a self-reporting substance abuse assessment, which did not satisfy her case
plan requirements. Also, respondent participated in a self-reporting domestic violence assessment,
where she claimed no problematic issues and where her history with Tommy C. was not
considered.
¶ 14 Fitzgerald-Jackson testified respondent stopped visiting L.C. in April or May 2019.
She and Tommy C. moved to Ohio in August or September 2019. There, she did not complete any
services. They have since moved, but as of the date of the hearing, they did not reside in Illinois.
In Fitzgerald-Jackson’s opinion, respondent will not comply with her recommended services
because she minimizes the issues and denies the existence of any problems. According to
Fitzgerald-Jackson, respondent has taken no steps forward since the beginning of the case. He
explained:
“[Respondent’s] services are innately linked to her husband’s services due
to the fact that they reside in the same environment, so even if she were to complete
-4- services, if she’s not willing to either leave her relationship or otherwise distance
herself from the person who makes her environment unsafe, then I cannot say that
she would successfully complete services even if she were to do the tests.”
The State rested.
¶ 15 Respondent testified that, while living in Decatur, she was employed as a sleep-lab
technician at Decatur Memorial Hospital for 10 years. She said it was “very difficult” to contact
the caseworker by telephone but they “finally were able to start communicating via e-mail.”
Respondent testified that between January 2019 and January 2020, she requested referrals for
services but she did not receive any. She attempted to participate in services on her own. For
example, she contacted DOVE in Decatur regarding domestic violence services, but they referred
her back to her caseworker. While living in Ohio, she tried to stay in contact with the caseworker
but, according to her, he “never answered his phone or got back with any messages or anything.”
¶ 16 Respondent testified L.C. was “the most important in [her] life, and whatever [she]
need[ed] to get done, [she] need[ed] to get done.” According to respondent, she has tried to
complete everything LCFS has asked her to do. She was just waiting for Fitzgerald-Jackson to tell
her when and where to show up, and she would be there. She said the integrated assessment could
not be completed in January 2019 because of the “frigid weather.” She was trying to find a job and
move back to Illinois to “spend more time and be closer to our daughter.”
¶ 17 On cross-examination, respondent testified she and Tommy C. moved from Illinois
in October 2019. When asked why she could not have completed the integrated assessment
between January and October of 2019, she again blamed it on the January weather, providing no
further explanation. She was aware she was required to participate in a full psychological
assessment, but she said she never got the referral. She said: “But as soon as he says, you know,
-5- show up on this date at this time, [she] will be there.”
¶ 18 After considering the evidence and arguments of counsel, the trial court found no
part of respondent’s case plan was successfully completed. The domestic-violence assessments in
which she participated were self-reporting and of no value. She failed to undergo a full
psychological evaluation as recommended. The court found respondent’s goals of stability and
cooperation were likewise “never successful.” In fact, according to Fitzgerald-Jackson’s
testimony, not “even any single component of a service plan” was ever rated successful. Further,
the court noted Fitzgerald-Jackson’s testimony that it was not foreseeable, even if respondent
began services, that LCFS could safely return L.C. to respondent in the near future. This was so
because “the father has unaddressed mental health issues as far back as 2011, and [respondent]
continues to maintain a relationship with the father.” Respondent “essentially den[ies] that there’s
any problem[.]” The court recalled Fitzgerald-Jackson’s answer when he was asked if there was
any progress or any positives from January 2019 through January 2020. Fitzgerald-Jackson said
no; there was no progress, no positives. The court found his testimony to be credible.
¶ 19 Further, the trial court found respondent’s testimony was not credible. The court
noted respondent failed to provide a reasonable explanation why she could not participate in an
integrated assessment between January 2019 and October 2019.
¶ 20 The trial court found the State had proved by clear and convincing evidence
respondent was an unfit parent as alleged in the three grounds stated in the petition to terminate.
¶ 21 On October 26, 2020, the trial court conducted the best-interest hearing. The State
presented the testimony of Fitzgerald-Jackson. He testified he prepared the best-interest report for
the court. He noted the address for respondent should be changed to Missouri, rather than
Kentucky, as she had again relocated.
-6- ¶ 22 Fitzgerald-Jackson testified L.C. was in a prospective adoptive placement with her
grandmother, where she had resided since being taken into protective placement. He said L.C. was
a “happy, bubbly kid, very smiley.” She attended day care, which had some preschool elements to
it. She lived with four other children in the home, who refer to her as their sibling; they call her
“sissy.” Both foster parents are “very active within their own families,” they attend church, and
“do some community events.” In Fitzgerald-Jackson’s opinion, it would be in L.C.’s best interest
to terminate respondent’s parental rights due to the ongoing and unaddressed mental health and
substance abuse issues of Tommy C. and “the fact that we have an underlying issue of domestic
violence that has gone unaddressed.” The issue with respondent is her ongoing relationship with
Tommy C., which causes the entire home environment to be unsafe.
¶ 23 On cross-examination, Fitzgerald-Jackson testified he reviewed his case aide’s
notes regarding recent visitation between respondent and L.C. He said respondent was affectionate
toward L.C. but L.C. “sometimes [took] a while *** to warm up to” her. He identified the concern
regarding “the child’s willingness to approach the parents.”
¶ 24 The trial court noted it reviewed the best-interest report, which noted that L.C. was
a happy, healthy, and well-developed toddler. She was very integrated into the home with
photographs of her displayed on the walls with other family photographs. She was financially
secure in the home and has a strong bond with all other family members. She considers her foster
parents, who have committed to adoption, to be her “mommy and daddy.” The State rested.
¶ 25 Respondent testified visits with L.C. had been going “really well.” She explained
that since L.C. was taken from her soon after birth, L.C. had not had a chance to bond with
respondent. Respondent testified she was willing to engage in services as she had been “the entire
time.” She said that she and Tommy C. “make wonderful parents.” Respondent asked the court for
-7- additional time, claiming there was no domestic violence and no substance abuse issues. She said
“[e]verything is, you know, great.”
¶ 26 After the arguments of counsel, the trial court indicated it had considered the
evidence and the statutory best-interest factors. The court concluded the State had proved by a
preponderance of the evidence that it was in L.C.’s best interest that respondent’s parental rights
be terminated.
¶ 27 This appeal followed.
¶ 28 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 29 Respondent argues the trial court erroneously terminated her parental rights
because the court’s fitness and best-interest determinations were both against the manifest weight
of the evidence. We disagree and affirm the court’s judgment.
¶ 30 The Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (705 ILCS 405/1 et seq. (West 2018)) and the
Adoption Act (750 ILCS 50/1 et seq. (West 2018)) govern the termination of a parent’s rights to
his or her child. In re D.F., 201 Ill. 2d 476, 494 (2002). Together, the statutes outline two necessary
steps in the process. The State must show the parent is an “unfit person” and that terminating
parental rights serves the best interests of the child. Id. at 494-95 (citing the Adoption Act (750
ILCS 50/1(D) (West 1998); and the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (705 ILCS 405/2-29(2) (West
1998)). Here, respondent challenges both determinations.
¶ 31 When a parent appeals the trial court’s findings that he or she is an “unfit person”
and that terminating parental rights is in the best interests of the child, we do not retry the case but,
instead, limit ourselves to deciding whether the court’s findings are against the manifest weight of
the evidence. In re A.W., 231 Ill. 2d 92, 104 (2008); In re Austin W., 214 Ill. 2d 31, 51-52 (2005).
This is a deferential standard of review. A finding is against the manifest weight of the evidence
-8- only if the evidence “clearly” calls for the opposite finding (In re Daphnie E., 368 Ill. App. 3d
1052, 1072 (2006)), such that “no reasonable person” could arrive at the trial court’s finding based
on the evidence in the record (Prater v. J.C. Penney Life Insurance Co., 155 Ill. App. 3d 696, 701
(1987)).
¶ 32 Therefore, we will begin by considering whether it is clearly evident, from the
evidence in the record, that the State failed to carry its burden of proof. In other words, is it clearly
evident that the State failed to prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that respondent met any
one of the three definitions of an “unfit person” cited in the petition to terminate parental rights?
See In re A.J., 269 Ill. App. 3d 824, 828 (1994).
¶ 33 A. Fitness Finding
¶ 34 In its petition to terminate respondent’s parental rights, the State alleged that she
was an “unfit person” within the meaning of section 1(D)(b) of the Adoption Act (750 ILCS
50/1(D)(b) (West 2018)) in that she, inter alia, had failed to maintain a reasonable degree of
interest, concern, or responsibility as to the minor’s welfare. In deciding whether a parent’s interest
in, concern for, and responsibility toward the child’s welfare have been reasonable in degree, the
trial court should consider the parent’s efforts to visit the child and to otherwise maintain contact
with the child, as well as the parent’s inquiries into the child’s welfare. Daphnie E., 368 Ill. App.
3d at 1064. The court should consider such efforts in the circumstances in which they were made,
taking into account any obstacles to visiting the child. Id. If circumstances make personal visitation
impractical, the court should consider the extent to which the parent showed reasonable interest,
concern, and responsibility by other means, such as letters, telephone calls, and gifts to the child,
“taking into account the frequency and nature of those contacts.” Id.
¶ 35 The evidence presented showed respondent stopped visiting with L.C. in April
-9- 2019 and voluntarily moved to Ohio in the fall of 2019. Her in-person visits did not resume until
August 2020, well after the petition to terminate her parental rights was filed. After living in Ohio,
she moved to Kentucky and later, to Missouri. She failed to engage in any of her service-plan
directives and continued to maintain her relationship with Tommy C., who had serious, unresolved
mental health, substance abuse, and domestic violence issues. Rather than demonstrating any
interest in L.C.’s welfare, the evidence suggested respondent chose to disregard her parental
responsibilities by (1) not visiting with L.C., (2) not working toward reunification, (3) not
maintaining any contact with L.C. by sending cards or letters to her, (4) moving away from L.C.,
and (5) seemingly choosing a relationship with Tommy C. over one with her daughter. In fact,
respondent’s actions, or inactions as the case may be, showed she had no interest, concern, or
responsibility toward L.C.’s welfare or toward the hope of having her child returned to her care.
¶ 36 By finding that respondent had failed to show a reasonable degree of interest,
concern, or responsibility as to L.C.’s welfare, the trial court did not make a finding that was
against the manifest weight of the evidence. See A.W., 231 Ill. 2d at 104.
¶ 37 Because meeting only one of the statutory definitions in section 1(D) of the
Adoption Act (750 ILCS 50/1(D) (West 2018)) is enough to make the parent an “unfit person,”
we need not discuss the remaining unfitness allegations against respondent. See In re F.P., 2014
IL App (4th) 140360, ¶ 83.
¶ 38 B. Best Interest Determination
¶ 39 Once a trial court finds a parent to be an “unfit person,” it must then consider the
child’s best interest. “[A]t a best-interests hearing, the parent’s interest in maintaining the
parent-child relationship must yield to the child’s interest in a stable, loving home life.” In re D.T.,
212 Ill. 2d 347, 364 (2004); see also In re Julian K., 2012 IL App (1st) 112841, ¶ 80 (stating that
- 10 - once the trial court finds the parent unfit, “all considerations, including the parent’s rights, yield
to the best interests of the child”). When considering whether termination of parental rights serves
a child’s best interests, the trial court must consider several factors within “the context of the
child’s age and developmental needs.” 705 ILCS 405/1-3(4.05) (West 2018). These factors
include:
“(1) the child’s physical safety and welfare; (2) the development of
the child’s identity; (3) the child’s familial, cultural[,] and religious
background and ties; (4) the child’s sense of attachments, including
love, security, familiarity, continuity of affection, and the least
disruptive placement alternative; (5) the child’s wishes and
long-term goals; (6) the child’s community ties; (7) the child’s need
for permanence, including the need for stability and continuity of
relationships with parent figures and siblings; (8) the uniqueness of
every family and child; (9) the risks related to substitute care; and
(10) the preferences of the person available to care for the child.”
Daphnie E., 368 Ill. App. 3d at 1072. See also 705 ILCS
405/1-3(4.05)(a) to (j) (West 2018).
¶ 40 A reviewing court gives great deference to the trial court’s decision because the
trial court is in a much better position to see the witnesses and judge their credibility. In re K.B.,
314 Ill. App. 3d 739, 748 (2000). A court’s finding that termination of parental rights is in a child’s
best interests will not be reversed on appeal unless it is against the manifest weight of the evidence.
In re Dal. D., 2017 IL App (4th) 160893, ¶ 53. A best-interest determination is against the manifest
weight of the evidence only if the facts clearly demonstrate the court should have reached the
- 11 - opposite result. Daphnie E., 368 Ill. App. 3d at 1072.
¶ 41 Respondent contends the trial court ignored evidence that she had “put L.C. at the
forefront of [her] decision-making and thought about her continuously.” Respondent blames LCFS
for interfering with her ability to bond with L.C. “by taking the child from [her] out of the hospital.”
Despite respondent’s position, the evidence presented at the best-interest hearing demonstrated
that L.C. was thriving in her relative foster home. She was receiving the care she needed, she was
happy, she had a strong bond with her foster parents and siblings, and she was in a safe, secure,
and stable environment. Additionally, the foster home, the only home in which she has resided,
was a potential adoptive placement, lending itself to achieving the permanency, safety, and
stability she deserved.
¶ 42 When analyzing the statutory best-interest factors, the trial court relied on (1) L.C.’s
sense of attachments, including love, security, familiarity, and continuity of affection, and
(2) L.C.’s need for permanence, including her need for stability and continuity of relationships
with parent figures, with siblings, and other relatives. See Daphnie E., 368 Ill. App. 3d at 1072;
see also 705 ILCS 405/1-3(4.05)(d), (g) (West 2018). Because the evidence does not lead us clearly
to the opposite conclusion, we find the court’s best-interests determination was not against the
manifest weight of the evidence. See In re B.B., 386 Ill. App. 3d 686, 697-98 (2008).
¶ 43 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 44 For the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
¶ 45 Affirmed.
- 12 -