In Re Lamarre

269 B.R. 266, 47 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d 426, 2001 Bankr. LEXIS 1459, 38 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 177, 2001 WL 1410419
CourtUnited States Bankruptcy Court, D. Massachusetts
DecidedNovember 8, 2001
Docket94-17808
StatusPublished
Cited by4 cases

This text of 269 B.R. 266 (In Re Lamarre) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Bankruptcy Court, D. Massachusetts primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In Re Lamarre, 269 B.R. 266, 47 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d 426, 2001 Bankr. LEXIS 1459, 38 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 177, 2001 WL 1410419 (Mass. 2001).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM DECISION ON SUPPLEMENTAL OBJECTION OF TRUSTEE TO CLAIMS

JOEL B. ROSENTHAL, Bankruptcy Judge.

In 1993 Paul and Catherine Foley (the “Claimants”) filed a breach of contract suit against Ronald Lamarre (the “Debtor”) in state court. The Debtor filed his bankruptcy petition in 1995. 1 Subsequently, the Claimants commenced an adversary proceeding to fix and liquidate their claims *267 as well as to obtain a determination that their claims were nondischargeable. The Court awarded judgment in the Claimants’ favor: Paul Foley was awarded $97,000 and Catherine Foley was awarded the sum of $25,900. Each monetary award carried the same award of interest namely “prejudgment interest from January 1, 1993, the date of the breach or demand, at the rate of 12% per annum, plus post judgment interest from today [June 27, 1996] at the annual rate of 5.62%.” 2 In addition the judgment declared these debts nondis-chargeable.

The parties agree, and they are correct, that postpetition interest, whether it is prejudgment or postjudgment, cannot be included in the claim against the estate. 3 The Claimants, however, assert that they are entitled to prepetition prejudgment interest while the Trustee argues that all prejudgment interest is unmatured and therefore should be disallowed. For the reasons set forth below, the Court holds that prepetition prejudgment interest is not unmatured and is to be included in the claims.

SECTION 502(b)(2)

Section 502(b) of the Bankruptcy Code provides in pertinent part:

... the court, after notice and hearing, shall determine the amount of such claim in lawful currency of the United States as of the date of the filing of the petition, and shall allow such claim in such amount, except to the extent that—
(2) such claim is for unmatured interest.

The Bankruptcy Code, however, does not define the term “unmatured interest” or the words “matured” or “unmatured”. “Laws should be examined as a whole and words given their plain meaning unless this would yield an absurd result.” Couvertier v. Gil Bonar, 173 F.3d 450, 452 (1st Cir.1999). “Mature” means “to become due”; a “matured claim” as “a claim that is due for payment”. BlaCK’s Law DiCtionary 999 and 240 (7th ed.1999). Therefore, matured interest is interest that is due and payable; unmatured interest is the opposite, ie., interest that is not yet due and payable. Defining “unmatured interest” as interest not yet due and payable gives the word its ordinary definition and is in keeping with the legislative intent. 4

Moreover, courts have defined “unma-tured” in the same way. See, e.g., In re *268 Thrifty Oil, 249 B.R. 537, 543 (S.D.Cal.2000) (“Interest is ‘unmatured’ when it was not yet due and payable at the time the debtor filed its bankruptcy petition.”); In re McMurray, 218 B.R. 867, 870 (Bankr.E.D.Tenn.1998) (“This statute ‘establishes a general rule that interest on a debt is collectible from the bankruptcy estate only to the extent it is earned before the filing of the bankruptcy petition ... Payment of postpetition interest on prepetition unsecured claims is prohibited; interest is computed as of the day of the filing of the petition and stops on that day.’ ”) (citations omitted); Ridgemont Apartment Assoc. v. Atlanta English Village, Ltd., 110 B.R. 77, 82 (N.D.Ga.), aff'd, 890 F.2d 1166 (11th Cir.1989) (“Under the bankruptcy code, only claims for interest that existed at the date of filing the petition are allowed to be recovered against a debtor. 11 U.S.C. § 502(b).”). See also In re Chateaugay Corporation, 961 F.2d 378, 380-81 (2d Cir.1992) and cases cited therein (original interest discount disallowed to the extent it was unamortized on the petition date).

THE NATURE OF THE CLAIM

Defining “unmatured interest” as “interest not yet due and payable” may not resolve the issue, however, as the question becomes what does it mean that interest was not yet due and payable as of the petition date. In other words, can interest that would otherwise be due and owing on the underlying claim actually be due and owing “as of the petition date” if, on the petition date, the underlying claim is disputed or unliquidated or contingent? The answer, at least in those instances in which the underlying claim becomes fixed and liquidated during the bankruptcy, is yes.

Pursuant to Section 101(5) of the Bankruptcy Code, a claim is defined as a

(A) right to payment, whether or not such right is reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or unsecured;
(B) right to an equitable remedy for breach of performance if such breach gives rise to a right to payment, whether or not such right to an equitable remedy is reduced to judgment, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, secured, or unsecured;

“All words and provisions of statutes are intended to have meaning and are to be given effect, and no construction should be adopted which would render statutory words or phrases meaningless, redundant or superfluous.” Couvertier, 173 F.3d at 453. Thus there is a difference between claims that are unmatured and those that are contingent or disputed or unliquidated. That Congress understood the difference between these words is evidenced in other parts of the Bankruptcy Code where Congress chose to use some but not all of these words. For example, section 502(b)(1) prohibits the disallowance of contingent or unmatured claims if the disallowance is based solely on the contingent or unmatured nature of the claim; section 502(b)(2) disallows only unmatured interest. If Congress intended that contingent claims for interest be disallowed, the language of section 502(b)(2) would have included both the words “contingent” and “unliquidated”. See also 11 U.S.C. § 303(b)(1); In re First Energy Leasing Corp., 38 B.R. 577, 584 (Bankr.E.D.N.Y.1984) (creditors holding contin *269 gent or disputed claims cannot be petitioning creditors but Bankruptcy Code is silent as to creditors holding unmatured claims, therefore creditors holding unma-tured claims eligible to be petitioning creditors).

Courts have generally recognized that each of these words describes a different type of claim although often a claim may fall into more than one category.

[A] claim is contingent if it becomes due only on the occurrence of a future event. In re M.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

In re Porter
498 B.R. 609 (E.D. Louisiana, 2013)
In Re Arcade Publishing, Inc.
455 B.R. 373 (S.D. New York, 2011)
Hamel v. Malden Mills Industries, Inc.
17 Mass. L. Rptr. 535 (Massachusetts Superior Court, 2003)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
269 B.R. 266, 47 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d 426, 2001 Bankr. LEXIS 1459, 38 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 177, 2001 WL 1410419, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-lamarre-mab-2001.