In Re Kirby Offshore Marine Operating LLC v. the State of Texas

Court of Appeals of Texas·Decided May 19, 2023·No. 13-22-00377-CV·Published

Opinion

NUMBER 13-22-00377-CV

COURT OF APPEALS

THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS CORPUS CHRISTI – EDINBURG

IN RE KIRBY OFFSHORE MARINE OPERATING, LLC

On Petition for Writ of Mandamus.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Before Justices Benavides, Silva, and Peña Memorandum Opinion by Justice Benavides1 Relator Kirby Offshore Marine Operating, LLC (Kirby) filed a petition for writ of

mandamus through which it asserts that the trial court2 abused its discretion by granting a motion for new trial in favor of the real party in interest, Southern Recycling, LLC

1 See TEX. R. APP. P. 52.8(d) (“When denying relief, the court may hand down an opinion but is not required to do so. When granting relief, the court must hand down an opinion as in any other case.”); id. R. 47.1 (requiring the appellate courts to “hand down a written opinion that is as brief as practicable but that addresses every issue raised and necessary to final disposition”); id. R. 47.4 (distinguishing opinions and memorandum opinions).

2 This original proceeding arises from trial court cause number 2019-DCL-03625 in the 444th

District Court of Cameron County, Texas, and the respondent is the Honorable David Sanchez. See id. R. 52.2.

(Southern). In summary, as will be explained in more detail, Kirby sold Southern a tank barge and its towing vessel for scrap. During shipbreaking, the tank barge caught fire and caused personal injury and death to the employees involved in the work. After resolution of the personal injury and wrongful death claims, Kirby and Southern litigated breach of contract and related claims against each other. The gravamen of the dispute was whether Kirby met its obligation under the parties’ agreement to appropriately clean the barge of hazardous materials prior to its sale.

Their claims were submitted to a jury, and the jury awarded damages to Kirby, but not to Southern. The trial court entered a take-nothing judgment against both Kirby and Southern, but later granted Southern’s motion for new trial. Kirby contends that the trial court’s articulated reasons for granting a new trial—that (1) there is an irreconcilable conflict in the jury’s verdict, and (2) the verdict is not supported by legally and factually sufficient evidence—are not supported by the record.

After conducting a merits-based review of the order granting a new trial, we agree with Kirby. Accordingly, we conditionally grant the petition for writ of mandamus.

I. BACKGROUND

In March of 2019, Kirby, which owns and operates a fleet of tug barges, decommissioned a tank barge, the DBL 134, and its towing vessel, the Viking. The tank barge was equipped with heating coils, or pipes, which encompassed the barge’s cargo tanks. The heating coils had previously been used to keep cargo hot during transportation; however, leading up to the sale, the heating coils were not in use, and the barge was being used to transport other substances, such as gasoline. Southern’s wholly

owned subsidiary, International Shipbreaking LLC (ISL) specializes in scrapping or shipbreaking marine vessels for recycling, and Southern intended for ISL to scrap the DBL 134 and Viking.

Kirby and Southern executed a purchase and sale letter agreement in which Southern agreed to pay Kirby seventy percent of the estimated aggregate purchase price of $908,424.00, or $635,896.80, within three days from the date of the agreement, with the aggregate purchase price to be adjusted and the remainder thereafter based on deadweight surveys of the vessels. Kirby agreed to deliver the vessels to Southern. The agreement contains seven enumerated paragraphs which contain the following provisions that are directly relevant to the parties’ dispute:

[Kirby] agrees that the Barge shall be delivered to [Southern] cleaned of all chemicals, petroleum products, and sludge. A Marine Chemist certificate will be sent to [Southern] where available.

[Southern] shall inspect the Vessels upon delivery by [Kirby], and, upon acceptance by [Southern], [Kirby] shall have no further obligation to [Southern] with respect to the Vessels, except as provided herein.

[Southern] specifically acknowledges that the Vessels are sold “as is, where is,” without warranty of seaworthiness, condition, fitness for purpose or intended use, merchantability, or any other warranty whatsoever by [Kirby], except as set forth herein.

[Kirby] acknowledges that [Southern] is not a hazardous waste disposal company, and, therefore, upon discovery of any toxic or hazardous substances on or in the Vessels, [Southern] shall immediately notify [Kirby]

in writing, and [Kirby] shall remove said substance at its cost. Should [Kirby]

fail or otherwise refuse to remove the substance within five (5) days from the date of such notification, [Southern] may immediately remove and dispose of the substance in compliance with all applicable laws and regulations, all at [Kirby’s] cost and expense.

Before Kirby delivered the barge to Southern, Kirby had the barge cleaned by Clean Water of New York, Inc. (Clean Water). After Clean Water’s work on the barge, Austin Montanti, a marine chemist3 employed by Independent Testing & Consulting, Inc. (IT&C), inspected the barge and issued a marine chemist certificate stating that the barge was safe for shipbreaking.

Southern made the initial payment for the barge, and Kirby sent the barge and tug to a shipbreaking facility belonging to ISL pursuant to Southern’s instructions. After the barge arrived at ISL’s facility, ISL employed another marine chemist, James Bell, employed by Maritime Chemists Services of the Coastal Bend of Texas, Inc. (Maritime), to inspect the barge. Bell issued a marine chemist certificate which also stated that the barge was safe for shipbreaking.

On May 14, 2019, after ISL had been shipbreaking the DBL 134 for approximately two weeks, its employees Jorge Loredo and Nestor Aguilar, who were pumpers,4 were working on the barge in cargo tank 2-S. Other employees had been sent home due to poor weather conditions. Loredo and Aguilar were using a Sawzall, an electrical reciprocating saw, to cut through the heating coils in the tank when the Sawzall ignited vapors emanating from the heating coils. The resulting fire seriously injured both employees, and Loredo ultimately died as a result of his injuries. Subsequent investigations determined that remnants of gasoline in the heating coils ignited during the

3According to trial testimony, a marine chemist is an “independent expert who inspects vessels and authorizes what work may or may not be performed.”

4 ISL’s various categories of workers include “laborers” who handle most tasks, such as removing

insulation or pipes, “pumpers,” such as Aguilar and Loredo, who drain pipes and tanks, and “cutters” who use torches to cut metal during the shipbreaking process.

shipbreaking process.

The personal injury plaintiffs 5 filed suit against Southern, Kirby, Clean Water, IT&C, Bell, and Maritime. They did not sue ISL, who employed Loredo and Aguilar, due to the workers compensation scheme. Southern and Kirby filed cross claims against each other. Southern sued Kirby for failing to adequately clean the vessel before delivering it to Southern seeking to recover: (1) the amount Southern paid to the personal injury plaintiffs in settlement ($8 million), (2) the attorney’s fees and legal expenses that Southern incurred in defending the personal injury lawsuit ($1,271,156), and (3) the consideration Southern had paid Kirby for the vessel ($635,896.80). Kirby denied liability and counter-sued Southern for the remaining payment due for the sale of the vessels.

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In Re Kirby Offshore Marine Operating LLC v. the State of Texas, (Tex. Ct. App. 2023).

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