In Re Kincaid

316 B.R. 735, 2004 Bankr. LEXIS 1790
CourtUnited States Bankruptcy Court, E.D. California
DecidedOctober 8, 2004
Docket19-10351
StatusPublished
Cited by4 cases

This text of 316 B.R. 735 (In Re Kincaid) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Bankruptcy Court, E.D. California primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In Re Kincaid, 316 B.R. 735, 2004 Bankr. LEXIS 1790 (Cal. 2004).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM DECISION

MICHAEL S. MCMANUS, Chief Judge.

The chapter 13 trustee moves to dismiss the debtors’ chapter 13 petition on the ground that the debtors have not paid in full the secured claims of Red Shield Servicing, Inc., even though the 42-month plan term has expired.

The debtors failed to appear at the hearing on the trustee’s motion and they filed no written opposition to the motion. Consequently, their defaults will be entered.

Because the debtors’ plan required that Red Shield’s secured claims be paid in full, and because they have neither been paid nor disallowed, the trustee’s motion will be granted.

I

Red Shield Servicing, Inc., services two loans made to the debtors. These loans are memorialized by two promissory notes executed by the debtors. A timely proof of claim was filed for each loan. While Red Shield services these loans, the beneficial interest in them has been fractional-ized and is held by many individual investors.

The first promissory note is dated November 13, 1997, and is in the original sum of $105,000. It bears interest at 14% per annum. This note is secured by a first deed of trust against the debtors’ real property at 805 F Street, Sacramento. The debtors reside in a portion of this property and they rent out the other portions of it. This note matured on January 1, 2001. According to the proof of claim filed for this loan, the loan balance on the date of the petition was $135,762.12.

The second note, dated January 13, 1999, is in the original sum of $30,000. It bears interest at the rate of 15% per an-num. This note is secured by a second deed of trust against the debtors’ real property and it matured on February 20, 2001. According to the proof of claim filed for this loan, the loan balance on the date of the petition was $39,415.51.

The debtors’ chapter 13 plan provides that Red Shield’s secured claims will be *737 paid in full over 36 months. 1 This term could be extended up to six months if necessary to pay the dividends promised by the plan. 2

Red Shield’s secured claims, aggregating approximately $175,177.63 according to Red Shield’s two proofs of claim, are classified in Class 2. The plan provides that if these two claims are filed and allowed, they must be paid in full through the plan. 3

The plan, however, required that the debtors pay only $300 a month to the trustee. Even though it is a mathematical certainty that these monthly payments, whether made for 36 or 42 months, could not possibly yield enough to pay $175,177.62 to Red Shield, 4 neither Red Shield nor the trustee objected to confirmation of the plan. Consequently, the plan was confirmed on May 31, 2001.

Confirmation of the plan despite its inability to accomplish the stated of goal of paying Red Shield’s secured claims in full does not compel Red Shield to accept the plan dividend as payment in full of its claims. This is so because the plan specifically provided that Red Shield’s claims would be paid in full 5 over a period not to exceed 42 months, 6 and that its claims would be determined by its proofs of claim, *738 not by the plan. 7

The provision in the debtors’ plan specifically requiring that Red Shield’s claims be paid in full distinguishes it from the plan at issue in In re Pagano, 2001 WL 114366 (Bankr.N.D.Cal.2001), affirmed by 2002 WL 31159110 (N.D.Cal.2002).

In Pagano the debtor’s plan required him to pay $100 a month for 36 months. From this, the trustee was required to pay “priority creditors in the order prescribed by 11 U.S.C. § 507.” After the plan was confirmed without objection, a creditor filed a priority claim exceeding $150,000. Even though Mr. Pagano completed all plan payments, those payments were insufficient to pay the priority claim in full.

Because 11 U.S.C. § 1322(a)(2) requires that priority claims be paid in full, the trustee and the priority creditor objected to the entry of a discharge. They asserted that the plan, while failing to expressly require payment in full of the priority claim, did not provide that the claim would not be paid in full. They believed that construing the plan to not require payment in full of a priority claim would be contrary to section 1322(a)(2).

Both the bankruptcy court and the district court directed that Mr. Pagano receive a discharge even though the priority claim had not been paid in full. This interpretation of the plan admittedly conflicted with section 1322(a)(2). However, because no one had objected to the absence of a provision requiring payment in full of the priority claim, the courts in Pagano permitted the plan to contradict the requirements of section 1322(a)(2).

Other courts have not permitted debtors to escape the command of section 1322(a)(2) so easily. See e.g., In re Escobedo, 28 F.3d 34 (7th Cir.1994); In re Goude, 201 B.R. 275 (Bankr.D.Or.1996). However, this court need not explore the issue further in the context of 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B) (requiring payment in full of allowed secured claims) because the debtors’ plan, unlike Mr. Pagano’s plan, expressly provided that Red Shield’s secured claims, as demanded in its proofs of claim, had to be paid in full unless they were disallowed.

II

Rather than pay Red Shield’s claims, the debtors were hoping to disallow them. To accomplish this, the debtors filed two adversary proceedings (Adv. Nos. 01-2192 and 03-2260) seeking not only the disallowance of the claims, but an award of damages for what might be referred to as alleged predatory loan practices.

The debtors used the court’s standard plan applicable in chapter 13 cases filed on March 1, 2001 through June 30, 2003. See General Order 01-02, ¶ 2(a). That plan incorporates by reference General Order 01-02. Together, the plan and the General Order make clear that the plan confirmation process and the claim allowance process are separate and distinct.

For example, if a plan omits a claim, this does not mean the claim is disallowed. It means only that the claim is not provided for by the plan.

Also, if the plan provides for a secured claim totaling $1,000 with collateral worth $750, confirmation of the plan does not prevent the claim holder from asserting that its claim is more than $1,000 or that its collateral is worth more (or less) than $750.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
316 B.R. 735, 2004 Bankr. LEXIS 1790, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-kincaid-caeb-2004.