In Re Kimler

233 P.2d 902, 37 Cal. 2d 568, 1951 Cal. LEXIS 311

• Court: California Supreme Court
• Decided: July 13, 1951
• Docket: Crim. 5046
• Status: Published

Opinions

EDMONDS, J.

By his petition for a writ of habeas corpus, Charles Walker Kimler is attacking the right of this state to continue his imprisonment after he was released upon parole. He asserts that, in effect, the parole granted to him was a pardon. He also relies upon a judgment in Missouri by which he was released from custody following his arrest upon a warrant of extradition.

After having been convicted in this state and sentenced to life imprisonment under each of three separate judgments, the sentences to run concurrently, he was released upon parole and delivered into the custody of officers of Illinois to complete a term of" imprisonment there. The condition of the parole was that, upon his release from imprisonment in Illinois, he would report to the parole officer of California. However, when released by Illinois, he refused to recognize the authority of California over him. In Missouri, he was arrested upon a warrant issued pursuant to extradition proceedings initiated by the Governor of California. He resisted extradition, and obtained his release upon a writ of habeas corpus. Later when he was found in Washington, he was extradited and returned to this state where he is now imprisoned under the judgments and sentences entered upon his convictions here.

As the basis for relief frojn his present imprisonment, Kimler asserts that the judgment in the Missouri proceeding is a final determination that the action of the California authorities in releasing him to Illinois was a pardon which bars his further imprisonment in this state. There are two answers to this contention. First, the Missouri court did not purport to determine the effect of Kimler’s release by the prison authorities of this state. In the second place, that question could not have been adjudicated; because of the limited scope of inquiry in a habeas corpus proceeding in connection with extradition, there was no jurisdiction to do so.

In Missouri, Kimler contended that “when the State of California attempted to parole him into the custody of the Illinois authorities, this act upon their part operated as a complete pardon for the crime he was sentenced for in California. ...” However, the court did not undertake to decide that question. Preliminarily, it pointed out “ . . . that this is not a new requisition on a new complaint, but a requisition on this old matter. ...” It then found that “ . . . the facts a/nd circumstances are not sufficient to justify the surrender and extradition of the petitioner to the State of California. ...” The judgment declared that “ ... no sufficient cause for the detention of said petitioner appearing, it is ordered . . . that the Writ of Habeas Corpus be sustained and made permanent, and that the petitioner . . . be . . . discharged from imprisonment and detention for the cause aforesaid.” (Italics added.)

By the clear language of the Missouri judgment, the only fact determined was that the “facts and circumstances are not sufficient to justify” extradition, and “no sufficient cause for the detention” of Kimler was shown. It does not purport to be a final adjudication that the parole to Illinois authorities was the equivalent of a pardon. No broader interpretation of the judgment is warranted. Furthermore, such a construction would be directly contrary to the fundamental principles relating to jurisdiction.

The scope of inquiry in a summary proceeding in habeas corpus to prevent extradition is necessarily narrow, and as a general rule it is necessary and proper to pass only on the legality of the requisition and rendition. The only inquiry to be made is whether the statutory prerequisites have been complied with.” (39 C.J.S. 549, 550.) “The courts in a Habeas Corpus proceeding of this kind, where the prisoner is arrested for extradition, cannot go into a trial of the merits of the cause. The proceeding is only an initiatory step to a trial in another State. As to the guilt of the prisoner, they are not allowed to inquire. Their judicial powers are limited to a determination on the sufficiency of the papers and the identity of the prisoner.” (Kurtz v. Florida, 22 Fla. 36,45 [1 Am.St.Rep. 173].)

The United States Supreme Court has described the nature of habeas corpus proceedings incident to extradition in the following language: “It is but one step in securing the presence of the defendant in the court in which he may be tried, and in no manner determines the question of guilt . . . the proceedings assimilate very closely those commenced in any State for the arrest and detention of an alleged criminal. They go upon the theory that extradition is but a mere step in securing the presence of the defendant in the court in which he may lawfully be tried.” (Matter of Strauss, 197 U.S. 324, 333 [25 S.Ct. 535, 49 L.Ed. 774].)

The contention made by Kimler before the Missouri court that he was not a fugitive because he had been pardoned is similar to the one considered in Drew v. Thaw, 235 U.S. 432, 439, 440 [35 S.Ct. 137, 59 L.Ed. 302], wherein Justice Holmes said: “But this is not Thaw’s trial. In extradition proceedings . . ., the purpose of the writ is not to substitute the judgment of another tribunal upon the facts or the law of the matter to be tried. . . . And even if it be true that the argument stated offers a nice question, it is a question as to the law of New York which the New York courts must decide. ’ ’

So in the present case, the merits of Kimler’s defense were not for the Missouri court to determine. The question as to whether Kimler violated his parole by going to Missouri after he was released from prison in Illinois is one for determination by the courts of California. “If the court on habeas corpus inquires into the merits of the charge against the prisoner or into the motives which inspired the prosecution in the demanding State, it exceeds its authority under the constitutional and statutory provisions regulating the extradition of criminals. The mandate of the constitution requires ‘a person charged in any State with a crime’ to be delivered by the asylum State to the State whose laws he has violated. That State alone can determine the guilt or innocence of the offending party. The theory and the intention of the constitutional and statutory provisions are that the offender shall be compelled to submit himself for trial to the courts of the State in which the offense was committed, and hence it would be usurpation of authority for the courts of another State to undertake to determine the question of his guilt in'a habeas corpus proceeding.” (Commonwealth v. Superintendent County Prison, 220 Pa. 401 [69 A. 916, 21 L.R.A.N.S. 939], as quoted in In re Ray, 215 Mich. 156, 165 [183 N.W. 774].)

Moreover, this court should not place upon the judgment a construction which is out of harmony with the decisions of the highest court of the state in which it was rendered. In State v. Hoffmeister, 336 Mo. 682 [80 S.W.2d 195], the Supreme Court of Missouri had before it an application for a writ of certiorari to quash a judgment in a habeas corpus proceeding which discharged a paroled convict from the agent’s custody. Rosenberg, an inmate of an Illinois penitentiary, had been given permission to reside temporarily and conditionally in Missouri. Upon information that he was under arrest upon a charge of having violated the law of Missouri, the warden of the Illinois institution ordered him returned to custody in the penitentiary pending a decision by the department of public welfare of Illinois upon the question of whether he had violated his parole. When arrested in Missouri upon an extradition warrant, Rosenberg attempted to securé his release in a habeas corpus proceeding. “At the trial it was admitted that the requisition conformed to the Federal statutes and presented a prima facie case. However, it was contended that Rosenberg had not violated his parole, and for that reason was not a fugitive from justice. The circuit court so found and discharged him. This was the only question presented. Illinois contends that the courts of an asylum state are without jurisdiction on habeas corpus to determine the question of the guilt or innocence of the person in the custody of the agent of the demanding state. The contention must be sustained. It has been so ruled by all the authorities. [18 U.S.C.A., § 662, note 61, pp. 329, 330, 331.] It follows that the proceedings and record of the Circuit Court of the City of St. Louis in the habeas corpus case should be quashed.” (State v. Hoffmeister, supra, at p. 684; quoted with approval in Ex parte Foster, 60 Okla. Cr. 50 [61 P.2d 37, 39, 40].)

In the Hoffmeister case, as here, the petitioner contended that he was not a parole violator. Rosenberg admitted his status as a parolee but argued that he had done nothing contrary to the terms of his parole. Kimler says he is not a parole violator, although substantially charged as such, because his parole became a pardon when the California authorities permitted him to be taken into custody by Illinois. The Supreme Court of Missouri held that Rosenberg’s rights were governed by the rule that the asylum state may not inquire into the guilt or innocence of the accused; the question presented was for the determination of the demanding state. This is equally true as to Kimler, and his discharge in habeas corpus in Missouri is not res judicata in the present proceeding.

Kimler also contends that California relinquished all jurisdiction to enforce completion of his unexpired term of imprisonment by releasing him to the State of Illinois. He states that he did not voluntarily accept the parole to further imprisonment in Illinois, and argues that statements appearing in his “Ticket of Leave,” which are contrary to his present position, were “evidently added after petitioner’s signature was placed thereon. ’ ’

Pursuant to an order of this court, a referee was appointed to hear and take testimony directed and responsive to the following questions:

(1) Did Kimler sign a “Ticket of Leave” which then stated: “You are being paroled into the custody of the Illinois State Authorities to be by them confined. In the event you are released from their custody prior to the expiration of your term of California imprisonment, you will contact the California State Parole Officer and abide by the instructions he will give you. ’ ’

(2) Did Kimler sign the “Ticket of Leave” in the presence of 0. C. Morehouse, and did 0. C. Morehouse affix his signature as a witness thereto at that time?

(3) Did Kimler sign a letter dated November 10, 1943, stating: “I understand that I am being paroled into the custody of Illinois State Authorities and should I be released by them before the expiration of my sentence I am to report to the Parole Officer. I also understand that failing to do so will constitute a violation of my parole.”

(4) Was the letter of November 10, 1943, signed by Kim-' ler in the presence of 0. C. Morehouse, and did O. C. More-house affix his signature as witness thereto at that time?

(5) Did the Board of Prison Terms and Paroles order the release of Kimler from the California State Prison at Folsom on parole to the custody of officers of the State of Illinois for the purpose of subjecting him to further imprisonment in that state ?

After hearing testimony, upon these issues, the referee made findings answering each question in the affirmative. The only objection to them made by Kimler concerns the determination that he was released in this state for the purpose of further imprisonment in Illinois.

Kimler’s argument may be summarized by the following excerpt from his counsel’s brief: “The testimony adduced before the Referee shows that Kimler was granted a parole and that he was extradited. Evidently the extradition would not have been made effective unless accompanied by a ‘parole.’ And, the ‘parole’ was not one that was accepted by or wanted by Kimler, as his testimony shows. Kimler had no desire to return to Joliet and complete there a term of imprisonment that he contended and still contends he was not legally required to complete. There is no question but what Kimler was extradited. The evidence and proof introduced before this Court’s Referee shows that beyond doubt. Parole is a false quantity inasmuch as Kimler was removed, tied up in chains and handcuffs, from Folsom state prison, and delivered over to Illinois agents who were armed, not with parole papers, but with extradition papers, towit a warrant of rendition, whereby the Governor surrendered Kimler to Illinois.”

Essentially the same position was taken by one Marzee who sought to be released from the state prison upon the ground that his parole “never in fact became effective.” Marzee also claimed that he “never was released on parole” but “was removed from said Folsom Prison by the authorities of New Mexico State Prison in their custody, and through and on account of extradition papers signed by the Governor of California.” Equally applicable to the present case, the court said: “But as Marzec went to the New Mexico prison voluntarily under a conditional parole, this state’s juris dietion over him continued. When he later refused to comply with the condition which had been imposed upon him, and his parole was revoked, he became a fugitive from justice within the meaning of the federal extradition statute.” (In re Marzec, 25 Cal.2d 794, 799 [154 P.2d 873].)

In the present case, the evidence fully supports the referee’s finding that Kimler, in connection with his application for parole, wrote a letter to Lyle Egan, who was then clerk of the State Board of Prison Directors and secretary to the Board of Prison Terms and Paroles, requesting a personal interview “relative to a detainer placed against” him. At the interview, Kimler requested that arrangements be made for his release from the Folsom prison to be returned to the Illinois prison. On November 10, 1943, an agent of Illinois took delivery of Kimler who signed the “Ticket of Leave” and his letter of that date setting forth the conditions of his parole.

Considering these facts, it is clear that Kimler went to the Illinois prison voluntarily under a conditional parole, and this state’s jurisdiction over him continued. (In re Marzec, supra.) He might have rejected the offer of parole, but once having elected to accept parole, he is bound by the express terms of the conditional release. (In re Tenner, 20 Cal.2d 670, 674 [128 P.2d 338].)

The exceptions to the findings of the referee are overruled, and his determinations are adopted as the findings of this court.

The order to show cause is discharged, and the application for the writ of habeas corpus is denied.

Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Traynor, J., Schauer, J., and Spence, J., concurred.