In re K.H. CA4/2

• Court: California Court of Appeal
• Decided: December 4, 2025
• Docket: E084599
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

Filed 12/4/25 In re K.H. CA4/2

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

In re K.H. et al., Persons Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law.

RIVERSIDE COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SOCIAL SERVICES, E084599

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super.Ct.No. SWJ1300837)

v. OPINION

B.M.,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Elizabeth E. Tucker,

Temporary Judge. (Pursuant to Cal. Const., art. VI, § 21.) Affirmed with directions.

Roni Keller, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and

Appellant.

Minh C. Tran, County Counsel, Teresa K.B. Beecham and Julie Jarvi, Deputy

County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

1 INTRODUCTION

Blanca M. (Mother) appeals from an order made at a family maintenance review

hearing conducted pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code1 section 364, at which the

juvenile court ordered removal of her children. On appeal, Mother argues the children

were erroneously removed pursuant to section 364 and that reversal is required because

compliance with the inquiry obligations of the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (ICWA;

25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.) has not been completed. We affirm with directions.

BACKGROUND

On May 8, 2023, the Riverside County Department of Public Social Services

(DPSS or Department) received a referral alleging general neglect of the children,

Isaa.M. (Minor 1), Isai.M. (Minor 2),2 both age 8 at the inception of this dependency,

C.M. (Minor 3, age 7), Kah.H. (Minor 4, age 5), and Kar.M. (Minor 5, age 2), by the

parents Mother and William H. (Father). It was reported that Minor 1 and Minor 2 had

been absent from school for a few days. When Minor 1 returned to school, he reported

that his parents were working on the car when Minor 3 hit Minor 1 on the head with a

crowbar and Mother dropped a car jack on Minor 1’s foot. Then Minor 1 stated the

Father ran over his foot with the car.

Minor 3 denied hitting Minor 1 with a crowbar but indicated he had tried to

remove a board and Minor 1 got in the way. Regarding Minor 1’s complaint that Mother

1 All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code except where otherwise indicated.

2 Minor 1 and Minor 2 are twins.

2 dropped a car jack on Minor 1’s foot, both Minor 1 and Minor 3 told the social worker

that while moving the car, Father had run over Minor 1’s foot, although there were no

apparent injuries. The social worker examined Minor 1’s foot and found no bruises or

marks on it. Minor 1 later denied that Mother dropped a car jack on him in speaking to

the social worker but continued to state that Minor 3 accidentally hit Minor 1 in the head

with a crowbar.

On August 16, 2023, DPSS received a secondary referral regarding the family

because Minor 3 had missed four days of school. The children’s schools indicated that

Minor 1 and Minor 2 had also missed four days of school. When Minor 3 returned to

school, Minor 3 had multiple visible injuries on his face and arms, consisting primarily of

healing bruises. Minor 3 attributed the injuries to his siblings, including a cut above one

eye which he indicated was caused when one of his siblings broke a broom causing a

piece to fly up and hit Minor 3. There was also a report that Minor 3 had walked,

unescorted, to the school bus from the home, when, as Mother explained, the maternal

uncle (Mother’s brother) was supposed to accompany Minor 3.

Subsequent investigation revealed that the children had missed a significant

amount of school the previous year. Mother explained that if one child were sick, she

would keep the other children home because they would get each other sick. The

jurisdiction report concluded that the children played together in a rough manner and

often ended up with bruises and injuries as a result, because the parents failed to

adequately supervise the rambunctious children.

3 The social worker interviewed Mother who was pregnant with a child by a

different father, in which Mother indicated she planned to relinquish the unborn baby for

adoption because she was unable to provide or care for another child. Mother identified

Father as the Father of the five children involved in the current referral.

At the time of the referrals, Father reported he did not live in the home, and only

visited to see the children and help the Mother with projects. When the social worker

asked him to submit to a drug test, Father declined, so the social worker contacted his

probation officer, who ordered two drug tests, both of which were positive for

methamphetamine.

The family had a prior welfare history that included a 2013 dependency involving

Mother’s four older children (identified in the record as L.A., A.A., R.A., and A.M.)

along with Minor 1, Minor 2, and Minor 3, based on allegations relating to Mother’s

substance abuse and neglect. The parents successfully reunified with the children,

resulting in termination of the dependency in November 2015. Another dependency was

initiated in 2017 based on allegations of inappropriate corporal punishment of A.M. and

neglect by Mother and the father of the four oldest children. In connection with the 2017

dependency, Mother was charged with child cruelty and was incarcerated. Mother’s

parental rights to A.M. were terminated in that dependency, while the father of L.A.,

A.A., and R.A. regained legal and physical custody of those three children. Mother

regained sole legal and physical custody of Minor 1, Minor 2, and Minor 3 upon the

termination of that dependency in 2019.

4 Respecting the current circumstances, the social worker interviewed Minor 3, who

was playing with a plastic hanger that he had found outside, trying to put it over his head

and around his neck; during the interview Minor 3 tended to go off topic. When the

social worker commented about Minor 3’s interview to Mother, Mother informed the

social worker that he was diagnosed with ADHD (attention deficit hyperactivity

disorder), but Minor 3 had not taken his medication due to a shortage of Adderall.

Although the social worker advised Mother to consult Minor 3’s doctor about an

alternative medication, the doctor advised Mother against changing Minor 3’s

medication.

Mother also reported that Minor 3 was in special education with an IEP

(Individualized Educational Program) with notes that Minor 3 lacks safety awareness and

is impulsive. A neighbor came to Mother’s home during the social worker’s visit and

reported that while Minor 3 is protective of younger children, Minor 3 fights with his

siblings in front of the neighbor and the Mother, and they have to tell the boys to stop.

During the social worker’s home visit, Minor 3 had a meltdown in the master bedroom,

banging his head against the wall and kicking it. While the social worker spoke to the

Mother, Minor 3 exited the house smiling. Mother also reported that Minor 3 kills lizards

by stabbing them in the eye with sticks.

Mother informed the social worker that while she was incarcerated in connection

with the prior child cruelty charges, she was diagnosed with depression, but she was not

currently receiving services for the condition. During the interview, the social worker

5 also inquired about a complaint that Mother and the children were at a gas station asking

for money, which Mother denied.

The Department was concerned about Father’s drug use and Mother’s inability to

protect the children, given the numerous injuries they sustained, as well as Mother’s

ability to supervise them. After investigating the referrals, the social worker informed

Mother that the children would remain out of custody in her care but would be removed

from Father.

The detention report also indicated that the social worker asked Mother about

Native American heritage, but that Mother denied having Indian ancestry. Mother and

her family moved to the United States from Mexico when Mother was seven years old;

the maternal grandmother returned to Mexico, where she has remained. The report

indicates that one of Mother’s brothers, Edwin C., lived with Mother, one brother lives in

Mexico and a third brother was incarcerated. The maternal great-grandmother, who was

recently deceased, had also lived in Mexico. Although the Department interviewed the

Father and Edwin C., while investigating the current referrals, there is no indication that

the Department asked those parties about Native American ancestry.

On September 18, 2023, the Department filed a new dependency petition alleging

child abuse and neglect against Mother and Father under section 300, subdivisions (a),

(b)(1) and (j) based on the Father’s act of running over Minor 1’s foot (paragraphs a-1

and b-1); Father’s unresolved history of abusing controlled substances (paragraph b-2);

Mother’s history of unresolved mental health issues which allegedly resulted in the

6 children missing school or being injury prone (paragraph b-3); Mother’s inability to

exercise effective control over Minor 3, who has ADHD, Mother’s inconsistent

administration of Minor 3’s medication leading him to have melt downs and being injury

prone, Father’s act of running over Minor 1’s foot, Minor 5 receiving a cut on her hand

that required stitches, and the children’s conduct of throwing rocks at each other

(paragraph b-4); Mother’s prior dependency history related to substance abuse and

neglect (paragraph b-5); Father’s previous dependency history related to his substance

abuse (paragraph b-6); Mother’s prior conviction for child cruelty in 2017 (paragraph b-

7); Father’s criminal history for child cruelty in 2017 (paragraph b-8); and the fact that

Minor 1’s siblings were at risk of injury due to abuse or neglect (paragraph j-1).

At the detention hearing on September 19, 2023, the children were detained from

the Father and left in the custody of the Mother. Mother was present at the hearing, but

Father was not, when the court found that DPSS had asked each participant whether they

know or have reason to know that the children are Indian children, and it found there was

no reason to believe or to know that the children were Indian children; it concluded that

ICWA did not apply. The children were detained from Father, but maintained in their

placement with Mother.

The petition was amended on October 24, 2023, to strike out the allegations of

paragraphs b-3 (the allegation relating to Mother’s mental health) and b-4 (alleging

Mother’s inability to exercise effective control over Minor 3), and adding allegations that

Mother has a history of depression and is apathetic toward parenting, lacking structure

7 and boundaries for the children (paragraph b-9), that Father has failed to provide

adequate supervision or a structured environment (paragraph b-10), and that Mother

should have known of Father’s substance abuse but was unable to recognize the signs of

use and allowed Father to have access to the children (paragraph b-11).

Prior to the jurisdiction hearing, the social worker filed an addendum report in

which she recommended that, in addition to striking paragraphs b-3 and b-4, the court

should find the allegations pursuant to section 300, subdivisions (a) and (j) (paragraphs a-

1 and j-1) be found not true. The report indicates that the social worker interviewed the

children, all of whom reported they felt safe with Mother. Minor 3 had a black eye that

he attributed to tripping and falling on a rock while playing with his siblings. Minor 3

indicated that Mother put an ice pack on his eye. The social worker expressed continued

concern about Mother’s ability to provide a structured environment for the children.

When the jurisdiction hearing was again continued to await results of Father’s hair

follicle testing, the social worker submitted another addendum report. This report

revealed that an immediate response referral had been received regarding suspected

physical abuse of Minor 3, who came to school with another black eye on the same eye

that had been injured previously. On this occasion, Minor 3 reported the injury was

sustained when he got into a fight with one of his siblings, but the reporting party was

concerned about multiple black eyes during the year. The reporting party also indicated

Minor 3 had fallen asleep at school.

8 When interviewed by the emergency response social worker, Minor 3 reported that

a school friend had pushed him off the monkey bars and that he fell on his face. Minor 3

also stated that he had fallen off a trampoline when pushed by Minor 4 and Minor 3 had

cuts on his hand from hitting a tree. Minor 3 also indicated that his uncle, Edwin C. had

accidentally given Minor 3 a white pill, which is normally taken at night to help Minor 3

fall asleep, in the morning by mistake making Minor 3 sleepy at school. Edwin C.

corroborated this information about Minor 3’s injuries. Edwin C. also indicated that the

children are very hyperactive and always getting themselves hurt by running and falling.

A subsequent child abuse medical exam noted Minor 3 had numerous cuts, scrapes,

bruises and scars, so the nurse practitioner who conducted the exam recommended a

forensic interview, which took place the next day. In that interview Minor 3 maintained

he had sustained all injuries due to rough housing with his siblings.

The social worker also indicated that Mother had reported taking Minor 4 to the

emergency department because Minor 3 had taken a metal bar from the bedframe and

threw it like a spear, which, when it hit the concrete, ricocheted and hit Minor 4 in the

face, causing a cut and a black eye. The day before this incident, Mother had to take

Minor 3 to urgent care because he had been hit in the face with the bathroom door while

fighting with Minor 2, sustaining another black eye as well as a vertical cut that ran from

Minor 3’s forehead to his lip. During a video chat with the children, the social worker

could hear them fighting in the background. On December 28, 2023, the social worker

9 made an unannounced visit and noted that the children had each received a bicycle for

Christmas and that every child had crashed on their bikes.

The contested jurisdiction/disposition hearing took place on January 18, 2024.

The court struck out the allegations of paragraphs b-3 and b-4 (relating to Mother’s

alleged history of mental health issues and her inability to exercise effective control over

Minor 3) and found the allegations of paragraphs a-1, b-1, and j-1 (relating to alleged

abuse of Minor 1 when Father ran over his foot and concomitant risk to his siblings) were

not true. The remaining allegations were found true, and the children were declared

dependents of the court with physical custody of the children maintained by Mother

subject to DPSS supervision under a plan of family maintenance services. The children

were removed from Father’s custody, and he was denied reunification services.

On July 5, 2024, the social worker submitted a family maintenance status review

report pursuant to section 364, recommending that the children remain placed with

Mother and that she receive an additional six months of services. The report included

continuing concern regarding Minor 3 having bruises or cuts due to rough play and being

outside, in addition to Minor 3’s diagnosis of ADHD for which he is prescribed Adderall

and Clonidine. The social worker described Minor 3 as energetic and accident prone, and

indicated Minor 3’s therapist was concerned about Minor 3’s attention span and his

ability to focus.

The report also indicated that in May 2024, DPSS received a referral regarding

physical abuse and poor supervision, but the referral was closed as unfounded. The

10 report also noted that Mother was unable to participate in therapy or counseling due to

the closure of the location to which she had been referred and the lack of reliable internet

connection access. Mother continued working with the wrap-around team and parent

partners but felt overwhelmed with caring for and supervising the needs of her children.

Mother had extended family support but felt her duties as a single parent go beyond her

capacity to ensure the safety of the children.

The report also commented that the desert landscape where the family resides

poses safety risks and the home needed significant repairs for which there are no services

available because Mother did not qualify for housing assistance. Wrap-around services

assisted with home repairs that posed a safety risk, such as, broken windows and a

punctured sewage pipe, but other home conditions had delayed Mother’s progress in

services. The social worker indicated Mother needed additional support services to

develop skills for establishing boundaries and enforcing consequences, as well as creating

a structured environment for the children’s safety. Additionally, the social worker

suggested behavioral therapy to address the marks and bruises on the children resulting

from unsupervised and dangerous play.

On July 18, 2024, the matter was called for hearing on the family maintenance

status review. After Mother submitted based on the report and the social worker’s

recommendations, new counsel was substituted for the minors’ previous counsel.

Minors’ counsel indicated that her investigator, a former child protective services worker

and Palm Springs police officer had visited the home and reported the home was in

11 deplorable conditions and infested with rodents, and that the children had bruises all over

their bodies. Counsel also relayed that the investigator was stricken by the fact Mother

would bite Minor 5’s face whenever the child cried. The investigator did not believe the

children were safe in the home.

The court described that minors’ counsel was making an oral section 388 motion

to modify the prior order of placement and to remove the children, but the request could

not proceed as an oral application unless all counsel waived the requirement of a verified

petition. Based on Mother’s objection, the court denied the oral motion to modify the

placement of the children.

On July 23, 2024, the matter was again continued, pending receipt of results of a

forensic examination. At this hearing, minors’ counsel indicated she had e-filed a formal

petition requesting that the children be removed from Mother’s custody.3 An addendum

report filed on the date of this hearing continued to recommend that the children remain

placed with Mother with an additional six months of family maintenance services. The

report did not mention a petition filed by minors’ counsel and the court did not refer to it

in commencing the hearing as a matter pending before it.

On August 12, 2024, another addendum report was filed, and it, too, recommended

that the children remain placed with Mother with additional family maintenance services.

At the hearing conducted on August 13, the Department submitted on its reports and the

recommendation of its most recent addendum report. The report did not refer to any

3 This document is not included in the record on appeal.

12 motion or petition filed by minors’ counsel. Minors’ counsel objected to the

recommendation of the social worker and requested that the matter be continued for

receipt of the forensic examination reports.

On September 4, 2024, the date set for the continued family maintenance status

review hearing, the court conducted an evidentiary hearing. On that date, the social

worker submitted an amended recommendation attachment (with no new addendum

report), now recommending that the court detain the children from Mother. The court

noted it had reviewed the medical reports relating to Minor 4 and Minor 5, as well as

some photographs. No reference was made by the court or any of the parties to a pending

section 388 petition. However, minors’ counsel, in referring to the exhibits submitted to

the court, indicated the photographs were submitted on “the date that I was asking for

removal and then we set it for contested.”

At the hearing, the Court inquired if everyone was prepared to move forward, and

all counsel indicated they were. The court noted that the social worker’s report

recommended continued family maintenance services and supervision with custody

maintained with Mother, but counsel for the Department stated it now supported the

request by minors’ counsel to remove the children. At this point, Mother’s counsel

inquired if a section 387 petition was going to be filed, to which the court responded it

did not think so. Mother’s counsel then reminded the court that the last report

recommended continued family maintenance, and that, unless something was filed that

counsel had missed, there was no new addendum recommending removal from Mother.

13 The court, noting that the Department had recommended removal in its amended

recommendations filed on the date of the hearing, agreed that, procedurally, if the

Department were requesting removal, “they should be filing a 387 [petition],” although it

acknowledged that minors’ counsel had made a request for removal at the July hearing.

At that point, the Department’s counsel, acknowledging the procedural anomaly, clarified

that the request for removal was not made by the Department, but that, considering the

new information provided by minors’ counsel, the Department now supported that

request for removal. With no further objection by Mother, the court allowed minors’

counsel to proceed with the contested request for removal.

Minor’s counsel called her investigator who testified about observations made

during a visit to Mother’s residence to interview the children on July 16, 2024. This

investigator has work experience as an emergency response unit member for child

protective services in two counties before becoming a police officer, and after her

retirement from the police department, she became a private investigator. The

investigator went to the family’s residence where she found all the children were covered

in bruises. Some of the bruises were obvious grab marks; Minor 5 had bruises on the

inside of her thigh, Minor 4 had bruises on her side just above her hips, and Minor 3 had

bruising from his head to his ankles. Also, the home was not clean.

While at the residence, the investigator gave Mother one of her business cards,

which Minor 5 put into her mouth. The Mother yelled at Minor 5 to spit it out, chased

Minor 5 around the house, finally caught her, sat down at the table where the investigator

14 was sitting, had Minor 5 sit on her lap and yelled at the child to, ‘“Spit it out,”’ but Minor

5 refused. The Mother leaned forward and bit Minor 5 on the cheek. The investigator

indicated she could see Minor 5’s cheek between Mother’s teeth, eliminating any

ambiguity about what she observed, and denying that it was a loving nuzzle from Mother.

The investigator observed Mother doing this four times, at which point the investigator

told Mother to stop. After this visit, the investigator contacted the social worker.

At a second visit, the children revealed that a male named “Ted” was living in the

residence, but that Mother had instructed the children not to reveal any names. The

investigator did not see a man in the home on either visit, and Mother indicated that Ted

was the name of her church friend’s husband. The home was just as dirty with debris and

trash on the floor, dirty dishes overflowing from the kitchen sink, and exposed wiring

from an outlet in the bathroom. The investigator also learned that Minor 3 had missed an

entire week of school because he had been bitten by a dog. The other children had also

missed a significant amount of school.

At the conclusion of the hearing, the court adopted the amended recommendations

submitted by the social worker and granted minors’ counsel’s request to have the children

removed from Mother’s custody. The court ordered Mother to release the children to

DPSS. The court found that the children were not Indian children. The court ordered

family reunification services for Mother and approved a request for a psychological

evaluation of Mother.

15 On September 6, 2024, a supplemental petition was filed pursuant to section 387,

alleging the previous disposition had been ineffective in the protection or rehabilitation of

the children. Specifically, the supplemental petition alleged the Mother continued to

show poor parenting and supervision, such that while in the care of the Mother, the

children continue to present with multiple injuries including bruising, cuts, and scratches

throughout their faces and bodies; in addition, the “Child Physical Abuse and Neglect”

exams of Minor 4 and Minor 5 indicated that the injuries were suspicious for inflicted

trauma and physical abuse (paragraph s-1). The petition also alleged that despite services

granted, the Mother has failed to construct a setting where the children have rules,

consistency, and limits which results in the children missing school, getting hurt, and

running amok, and that such conditions endanger the children’s safety (paragraph s-2).

A detention report filed the same day (two days after the actual hearing at which

the children were ordered detained) indicated that Minor 1, Minor 2, and Minor 3 were

placed with a maternal aunt, while Minor 4 and Minor 5 were placed in a foster home.

The report indicated that Mother had tried to care for the children but was overwhelmed

at times. The family lived in a remote area where the children were allowed considerable

freedom in their play and the Mother’s inconsistent supervision allowed them to roam

unsupervised. Additionally, the children’s rough play in the isolated setting has led to

exposure of the children to environmental hazards resulting in physical injuries.

Mother denied any physical abuse of the children and the children corroborated

her denials, but the social worker stated the situation nonetheless requires significant

16 concern. Attached to the detention report was a report of the bone survey performed on

Minor 5 which revealed no fractures, new, or healing.

On September 9, 2024, the court conducted the detention hearing, at which Mother

denied the allegations of the supplemental petition.4 The court found a prima facie

showing had been made respecting the supplemental petition and concluded that

continuance in the Mother’s home was contrary to each child’s welfare and that there was

a substantial danger to the physical health of the children. The court also found there is

no reason to believe or reason to know the child is an Indian child and that ICWA did not

apply.

4 Mother appeared at this hearing for which there is no reporter’s transcript included in the appellate record. We therefore cannot tell if Mother acquiesced in the continued detention of the children out of her home. On February 10, 2025, we granted Mother’s request for judicial notice of two postjudgment minute orders, which includes a minute order from October 29, 2024, at which the supplemental petition was dismissed on the court’s own motion on October 29, 2024, due to procedural errors regarding the filing of the section 387 petition. The appellate record does not provide information about the procedural basis for an order for reunification services, given the dismissal of the supplemental petition prior to adjudication of the claims forming the basis for the allegation that the previous disposition had been ineffective. The record also does not include a petition to modify a prior court order, such as is required to elevate the level of placement. (See In re Anna S. (2010) 180 Cal.App.4th 1489, 1501–1502, noting that the “Agency . . . may detain a child and file a section 387 petition to place the child in a higher level of care if it believes the prior placement has not been effective in protecting the child,” and that “Minor’s counsel, the parents and other interested parties may also file a petition under section 388” to seek a modification.) As an order removing custody without exigent circumstances, a protective custody warrant, or an adjudicated supplemental petition, the order directing Mother to release her children is distinctively unusual, no matter how wanting Mother’s parenting skills may be.

17 Mother appealed from the orders made at the family maintenance review hearing

on September 4, 2024.5

DISCUSSION

1. Whether the Minors Were Improperly Removed at the Family Maintenance Status

Review Hearing

a. The Parties’ Positions and Additional Background

Mother argues that at the six-month status review of a family maintenance plan,

the court lacked authority to order removal or detention of the children. Mother also

argues that a section 388 petition is a necessary prerequisite to modification of the

disposition order maintaining a child with his or her parent. (In re Natasha A. (1996) 42

Cal.App.4th 28, 34–35.)

The Department does not address this point but, instead, argues that whether

section 364 contemplates only a decision to either dismiss the dependency or continue

family maintenance services is immaterial because removal of children is governed by

section 361, and the juvenile court in this case removed the children under that authority,

for their protection. We disagree with the Department’s reliance on section 361, but agree

the juvenile court had authority to make its order at the family maintenance review

hearing.

5 We also take judicial notice of the minute orders dated October 1, 2024, October 29, 2024, and March 4, 2025, that were attached to this court’s order filed July 1, 2025.

18 Mother is correct in arguing that a modification petition pursuant to section 388 is

normally required as the procedural vehicle for a request by minors to modify the

disposition order which maintained the children in Mother’s custody. The parties were

apparently aware of this when, on July 18, 2024, minors’ counsel informed the court of

the findings of her private investigator and requested an evidentiary hearing. At that

time, the court informed counsel of the need to file a section 388 petition to change the

placement unless all parties waived the requirement. Mother did not waive the

requirement, so minors’ counsel indicated she “would ask we set this for a formal hearing

then.”

The court denied the oral request to modify the placement, inviting minors’

counsel to “file something.” Minors’ counsel indicated she planned to do so, and the

matter was continued to July 23, 2024. No petition or written motion was filed, and,

while the hearing was conducted as a contested matter, the preceding minute orders do

not reflect the setting of a contest. Thus, the record on appeal includes no section 388

petition by minors’ counsel, although minors’ counsel submitted forensic reports,

photographs and a witness. Nor was a supplemental petition pursuant to section 387 filed

by the Department, or an application for protective custody warrants to support the

removal of the children. As Princess Buttercup acknowledged in “The Princess Bride”6

they “sort of skipped that part.”

6 William Goldman, The Princess Bride (1973) Ballantine Books (film released by 20th Century Fox 1987).

19 We requested supplemental briefing to obtain responses to the following

questions: (1) Is the current appeal moot by reason of subsequent procedural events

relating to the change of Mother’s case plan from family maintenance to family

reunification and her participation in family reunification services? (2) Is the legality of

the children’s detention from Mother’s care and custody independently reviewable on

direct appeal? (See In re B.P. (2020) 49 Cal.App.5th 886, 889–890 [detention order made

in connection with a subsequent petition pursuant to section 342 is interlocutory and

nonappealable].) (3) Has Mother forfeited any claim of error regarding the interlocutory

detention orders by acquiescing in the continued out-of-home placement and failing to

request return of the children upon dismissal of the supplemental (§ 387) petition, as well

as her participation in reunification services? (4) Is the continued out-of-home placement

of the children proper absent a jurisdictional or dispositional ruling on the supplemental

petition, where the detention was grounded on facts alleged in the supplemental petition

which was dismissed? (5) Have any other postappeal orders been made at which

continued removal of the children and a plan of family reunification has been ordered?

b. General Legal Principles Relating to Section 364

Section 364 governs the conduct of review hearings in cases where the children

were maintained in parental custody. That section establishes procedures for review

hearings for a minor who has been adjudged a dependent but has been placed back in the

custody of one parent. (In re Gabriel L. (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 644, 650.) “When

proceeding under section 364, because the child is in placement with a parent, the

20 [juvenile] court is not concerned with reunification, but with determining whether

continued supervision is necessary in the family home.” (Ibid., citing § 364, subd. (c).)

At the section 364 review hearing dependency jurisdiction must be terminated

unless the conditions that created the need for supervision still exist or are likely to exist

if supervision is discontinued. (§ 364, subd. (c); In re T.S. (2020) 52 Cal.App.5th 503,

512; see In re Gabriel L., supra, 172 Cal.App.4th at p. 650, citing Cal. Rules of Ct., rule

5.710(e)(2).)

The juvenile court makes its determination based on the totality of the evidence

before it, including the reports of the social worker, who is required to make a

recommendation concerning the necessity of continued supervision. (In re N.O. (2019)

31 Cal.App.5th 899, 922–923.)

c. The Court’s Authority to Modify Previous Orders at a Family Maintenance

Mother argues that at a section 364 review hearing, the juvenile court lacks

authority to do anything except that which is provided in section 364, subdivision (c), that

is, either terminate jurisdiction or extend family maintenance services for an additional

six months, and that it lacks authority to remove children at such a hearing without a

prerequisite supplemental petition under section 387. This statement is correct to the

extent that ordinarily a court either terminates jurisdiction or extends maintenance

services at a section 364 hearing, as a general matter, but this is not universally true.

21 “The Legislature has defined the juvenile court's statutory authority to modify its

previous orders in Welfare and Institutions Code, article 12, sections 385 through 391.”

(Nickolas F. v. Superior Court (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 92, 111 (Nickolas F.).) In

Nickolas F., the juvenile court terminated services and ordered a section 366.26 hearing

based on the social worker’s report recommending that action due to the discovery of the

true nature of the father’s physical abuse of half-siblings of the minor in Arizona, for

which he was incarcerated. (Nickolas F., supra, at pp. 98–99.)

In Nickolas F., despite the failure to file a section 388 petition, the Agency argued

that the modification was properly ordered based on new evidence, and that even if that

were not a proper basis, section 385 provided the juvenile court with authority. (Nickolas

F., supra, 144 Cal.App.4th at p. 105.) The reviewing court agreed, concluding that “the

juvenile court has the authority pursuant to section 385 to change, modify or set aside its

prior orders sua sponte.” (Id., at p. 116.)

Section 385 provides that “Any order made by the court in the case of any person

subject to its jurisdiction may at any time be changed, modified, or set aside, as the judge

deems meet and proper,7 subject to such procedural requirements as are imposed by this

7 We observe that the phrase “meet and proper,” which is so deeply embedded in the law as to have evaded interpretation, is vague. It is found in legislation relating to default judgments and dismissals of civil actions (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 580, 581) as well as in sections 385 and 775. Respecting civil actions, the language is commonly included in the prayer for relief in legal pleadings, where litigants pray for any and all relief which is “meet and proper.” In this context, it has been held to mean that ““‘[t]he relief granted to the plaintiff, if there be no answer, cannot exceed, that which he shall have demanded in his complaint; but in any other case, the court may grant him any relief consistent with

22 article.” In Nickolas F., the reviewing court observed that “All courts have inherent

powers that enable them to carry out their duties and ensure the orderly administration of

justice. The inherent powers of courts are derived from California Constitution, article

VI, section 1, and are not dependent on statute. [Citations.] The juvenile court derives its

general judicial authority from the California Constitution.” (Nickolas F., supra, 144

Cal.App.4th at p. 110.)

The court reasoned in Nickolas F. that “When the juvenile court contemplates

modifying a previous order, either pursuant to a request by a party or on the court's own

motion, section 385 does not impose any particular procedural requirement described in

the case made by the complaint and embraced within the issue.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 580.)’” (Valenzuela v. Valenzuela (1959) 168 Cal.App.2d 565, 567.) This interpretation is consistent with the definition of the term “proper” as found in Black’s Law Dictionary (6th ed. 1990): “That which is fit, suitable, appropriate, adapted, correct. Reasonably sufficient. Peculiar; naturally or essentially belonging to a person or thing; not common; appropriate; one’s own. See also, Reasonable.” For further explication of this archaic but still commonly-used phrase, we turned to the internet, where we learned the following: “Something is meet which is not only suitable but nicely adapted to the particular situation, need, or circumstances; the word usually suggests rightness or justness rather than an absence of incongruity; thus, a punishment of a childish offense may be suitable if it is in accord with the years and mentality of the child, but it is not meet unless it suggests due proportion between the offense and its penalty. [¶] Something is proper (see also DECOROUS ) which belongs to a thing on some justifiable grounds (as by nature, by custom, or by right reason). When, as often happens, fitness or suitability is stressed rather than natural or rightful association, proper then implies determination of fitness or suitability by logic, reasonableness, or good judgment.” (https://www.writingtips.cc/fit-vs-suitable-vs-meet- vs-proper-vs-appropriate-vs-fitting-vs-apt-vs-happy-vs-felicitous/ [As of Nov. 21, 2025].) This is a long way of saying that, in our interpretation, the phrase “meet and proper” as used in section 385, imports that the juvenile court has broad discretion, which must be exercised consistently with due process notice and opportunity to be heard, and must be reasonable under the circumstances.

23 Welfare and Institutions Code, article 12.” (Nickolas F., supra, 144 Cal.App.4th at

p. 113.) The only proviso is that the juvenile court must provide the parties with notice

and an opportunity to be heard before reconsidering or modifying an order. (Id., at p. 98;

see In re R.M. (2025) 111 Cal.App.5th 119, 133.) “Where, as here, the court

independently recognizes that it improvidently directed the Agency to provide

reunification services to a parent, requiring that a party file a petition under section 388

before the court may modify the order, or worse, requiring that the parties comply with

the erroneous order, would constitute a waste of time and resources. [Citation.] We

conclude that in dependency proceedings, when the court recognizes that a previous order

was erroneously, inadvertently or improvidently granted, it is not necessary that a party

file a section 388 petition to provide the court with the authority to modify that order.”

(Nickolas F., at p. 110.)

This court has adopted this reasoning, holding that a ruling based on an oral

motion made by minor’s counsel to terminate visits by grandparents was harmless under

state law. (In re R.M., supra, 111 Cal.App.5th at p. 132.) In R.M., the juvenile court

found that continued visits between children and their maternal grandmother would be

detrimental to the children’s physical or emotional well-being and ordered that maternal

grandmother have no further visits. The grandmother filed a section 388 petition to

reinstate visits, but the petition was summarily denied on the grounds she had not stated

any new evidence or changed circumstances, or that visits with her would be in the best

interest of the children. On appeal, the grandmother claimed the juvenile court erred in

24 terminating her visits upon the oral motion requesting that action was made by minors’

counsel. (In re R.M., at pp. 130–132.) We disagreed there, and we now disagree here.

Section 385 authorizes the juvenile court to reconsider its previous orders

providing that the parties received notice and an opportunity to respond. Here, Mother

received notice when minors’ counsel made the oral motion in July 2024, and at

subsequent hearings where minors’ counsel reaffirmed that intention of proceeding,

although she failed to follow through with the filing of a section 388 petition as directed

by the court. Nevertheless, Mother had two months of advance notice that a contested

(that is, evidentiary) hearing would take place based on that oral request, and she had the

ability to present evidence on her behalf.

We agree that the Department should have given advance notification of its

intention to change its recommendation and to support the request for detention, as well

as its failure to seek, predetention, issuance of protective custody warrants, or at a

minimum, a detention report, prior to the hearing. We also conclude that in light of the

11th hour and 59th second submission of the Department’s amended recommendations, a

continuance was in order. The observance of these preremoval procedural requirements

would have provided Mother with a more realistic idea of the type of evidence she would

need to present or address at the hearing. Nevertheless, while we do not condone the

actions taken here, because of subsequent events, we find that the procedural errors were

harmless in this matter, as will be more fully addressed in the next section.

25 The conclusion that the juvenile court had authority to order the detention at the

section 364 hearing obviates the need to determine whether continued out-of-home

placement is proper in the absence of a valid jurisdictional or dispositional ruling on the

supplemental petition.

We now examine whether Mother’s failure to promptly file a section 388 petition

to seek return of the children, or to orally request prompt return of the children upon the

dismissal of the supplemental petition, or even to request the children’s return at the

subsequent section 366.21 status review hearing, signaled her acquiescence in the

removal.

d. Mootness and Forfeiture

We requested supplemental briefing on the potential issues of mootness and

forfeiture based on postjudgment minute orders, copies of which we served on the

parties. We have taken judicial notice of those minute orders. (Evid. Code, §§ 452,

subd. (d), 459.) The minute order of March 4, 2025, reflects that the juvenile court

conducted a six-month review hearing, continued the children in out-of-home placements

due to findings that return of the children to Mother’s custody would create a substantial

risk of detriment and found that Mother’s progress in alleviating or mitigating the causes

necessitating placement was minimal. There is no indication that Mother objected to

continued out-of-home placement or requested return of the children after dismissal of

the supplemental petition, or that during the interim she filed a motion to reconsider the

order of removal, or to modify it.

26 In response to our request for supplemental briefing, Mother argues that there was

a standing objection to the removal, directing our attention to the filing of her notice of

appeal, and arguing that the court’s extension of reunification services was a “win” for

the Mother. The Department argues Mother forfeited the claim because she did not

object or raise the issue that the children should have been returned to her care when the

section 387 petition was dismissed, and that she acquiesced in the removal by failing to

challenge the factual basis for removal and receiving reunification services. We agree

with the Department.

As we indicated in our request for additional briefing, we are concerned that the

irregular removal proceeding may have been rendered moot by subsequent events, most

notably, the subsequent hearing on October 29, 2024, at which Mother did not object to

or appeal from the continued removal upon the dismissal of the supplemental petition, at

which the court continued the out-of-home placement of the children, and the hearing on

March 4, 2025, where Mother appears (in the absence of a reporter’s transcript) to have

acquiesced in the findings made at the six-month status review hearing pursuant to

section 366.21, subdivision (e).

Mother describes the orders made at the section 366.21 status review hearing as a

“win” because the court did not set a section 366.26 hearing. Far from being a “win,” the

subsequent findings of detriment precluding return of the children to her care undermines

her argument that the original detention was erroneous, which is now moot.

27 It is well settled that when no effective relief can be granted, an appeal is moot and

is subject to dismissal. (In re Jessica K. (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 1313, 1315.) ‘“On a

case-by-case basis, the reviewing court decides whether subsequent events in a

dependency case have rendered the appeal moot and whether its decision would affect the

outcome of the case in a subsequent proceeding.”’ (In re A.B. (2014) 225 Cal.App.4th

1358, 1364, citing In re Esperanza C. (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1042, 1055.)

“A case becomes moot when events ‘“render[] it impossible for [a] court, if it

should decide the case in favor of plaintiff, to grant him any effect[ive] relief.’”

[Citation.] For relief to be ‘effective,’ two requirements must be met. First, the plaintiff

must complain of an ongoing harm. Second, the harm must be redressable or capable of

being rectified by the outcome the plaintiff seeks. [Citation.] [¶] This rule applies in the

dependency context. [Citation.] A reviewing court must ‘“decide on a case-by-case basis

whether subsequent events in a juvenile dependency matter make a case moot and

whether [its] decision would affect the outcome in a subsequent proceeding.’” [Citation.]

We review de novo the Court of Appeal’s determination that this case is moot.” (In re

D.P. (2023) 14 Cal.5th 266, 276, citing, among other authorities, In re N.S. (2016) 245

Cal.App.4th 53, 60, and In re Anna S. (2010) 180 Cal.App.4th 1489, 1498.)

In the seminal case of In re Jessica K., the mother’s section 388 petition seeking

return of her child was denied; at a subsequent hearing, mother’s parental rights were

terminated, and the mother appealed, indicating she was challenging the summary denial

of the section 388 petition. Because the order terminating parental rights was not

28 challenged, it became final, and the reviewing court concluded that the subsequent order

precluded it from granting relief on the denial of the section 388 petition due to mootness.

The court stated, “In this case, mother appealed from the order summarily denying her

section 388 petition, but did not appeal from the order terminating parental rights,

allowing the termination order to become final. The failure to file a timely notice of

appeal from the termination of parental rights order deprives us of appellate jurisdiction

to modify that order. Accordingly, the parental rights termination order may not be

vacated. No effective relief may be afforded mother even were we to find her appeal of

the denial of the section 388 petition meritorious. Thus, the appeal is moot.” (In re

Jessica K., supra, 79 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1316–1317.)

Other courts agree with the basic principle involved here. (See In re A.B., supra,

225 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1364–1365 [mother appealed from an original

jurisdictional/dispositional finding and order, but before the appeal from that judgment

could be decided, a subsequent petition pursuant to section 342, was filed and

adjudicated].) In In re A.B., the court concluded that no effective relief could be provided

to mother by reversing jurisdiction under the original petition because jurisdiction was

established independently under the subsequent petition on entirely new and independent

facts. (In re A.B., at p. 1364.)

Mother opposed the removal of the children at the family maintenance review

hearing and appealed that order. However, subsequent thereto, the juvenile court made

findings that return of the children to Mother’s custody would be detrimental and that

29 Mother’s progress in mitigating or alleviating the causes that led to removal had been

minimal. Those findings still stand. The children have been placed out-of-home for

nearly a year now, and it would be improper for us to reverse the removal in light of the

more recent findings that return to Mother would pose a serious and substantial risk of

harm to their well-being. Nevertheless, we have ‘“inherent discretion”’ to reach the

merits of the dispute (In re D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 282) and have done so here to

prevent, so far as is practical, future deviations from procedural prerequisites, given the

importance of the interests of all involved.

This conclusion obviates the need for us to determine whether the legality of the

detention is independently reviewable, as well as whether there have been other

postappeal orders made in which continued removal of the children and a plan of family

reunification has been ordered.

The findings and orders made at the six-month review hearing following removal

of the children are now final and preclude us from providing effective relief.

e. Whether Remand is Required Because Compliance with ICWA is Incomplete

Mother argues the juvenile court’s finding that ICWA does not apply must be

conditionally reversed due to inadequate inquiry of extended relatives. The Department

argues that a conditional reversal is unnecessary because Mother’s family was from

Mexico and this appeal was not taken from a termination of parental rights. The

Department has the better argument though for different reasons.

30 ICWA reflects a congressional determination to protect Indian children and to

promote the stability and security of Indian tribes and families by establishing minimum

federal standards that a state court, except in emergencies, must follow before removing

an Indian child from his or her family. (25 U.S.C. § 1902; see In re Isaiah W. (2016) 1

Cal.5th 1, 7–8.) In any “proceeding for the foster care placement of, or termination of

parental rights to, an Indian child,” the Indian custodian and the Indian child’s tribe have

the right to intervene and may petition the court to invalidate any foster care placement of

an Indian child made in violation of ICWA (25 U.S.C. §§ 1911, subd. (c), 1914; see

§ 224, subd. (e)).

Under ICWA, a ‘“foster care placement”’ means “any action removing an Indian

child from its parent or Indian custodian for temporary placement in a foster home or

institution or the home of a guardian or conservator where the parent or Indian custodian

cannot have the child returned upon demand, but where parental rights have not been

terminated.” (25 U.S.C. § 1903 (1)(i).) In other words, ICWA requirements apply only

when a child is to be placed in foster care—by whatever means—and not when a child

remains in the parental home.

Section 224.2 codifies and expands on ICWA’s duty of inquiry to determine

whether a child is an Indian child. “Agencies and juvenile courts have ‘an affirmative

and continuing duty’ in every dependency proceeding to determine whether ICWA

applies by inquiring whether a child is or may be an Indian child. (§ 224.2, subd. (a).)

This ‘duty to inquire begins with the initial contact, including, but not limited to, asking

31 the party reporting child abuse or neglect whether the party has any information that the

child may be an Indian child.’” (In re Dezi C. (2024) 16 Cal.5th 1112, 1131–1132.)

Under current California law, the “duty to inquire begins with [the] initial contact

[citation] and obligates the juvenile court and child protective agencies to ask all relevant

involved individuals whether the child may be an Indian child.” (In re T.G. (2020) 58

Cal.App.5th 275, 290, citing § 224.2, subds. (a)-(c).) That duty to inquire is not limited

to asking the reporting party if they have information that the child may be an Indian

child. (§ 224.2, subd. (a).) The Department is required to ask extended relatives about

possible Native American ancestry where the “child is placed into the temporary custody

of a county probation department pursuant to” sections 306 or 307, or by a protective

custody warrant pursuant to section 340. (§ 224.2, subd. (b)(2).)

Section 306, subdivision (b), requires departmental inquiry into Indian heritage

pursuant to section 224.2, “[u]pon receiving temporary custody of a child.” Here, the

children were originally placed with Mother, so Department received temporary custody

of the children pursuant to section 306 when Mother surrendered them to the Department

upon the juvenile court’s order of detention. At that point, the Department’s inquiry duty

under section 224.2, subdivision (b) was triggered.

Removal of children from their parents and the receipt of the children by the

Department is the true triggering event for inquiry into possible Native American

ancestry, as seen by the plain language of both ICWA and Cal-ICWA. By its plain

language, ICWA states that it applies when a child is placed in foster care or an adoptive

32 placement: “The Congress hereby declares that it is the policy of this Nation to protect

the best interests of Indian children and to promote the stability and security of Indian

tribes and families by the establishment of minimum Federal standards for the removal of

Indian children from their families and the placement of such children in foster or

adoptive homes which will reflect the unique values of Indian culture, and by providing

for assistance to Indian tribes in the operation of child and family service programs.”

(25 U.S.C. § 1902, italics added.)

Because the children were not removed from Mother’s custody or received by the

Department until September 2024, the Department’s duty of inquiry was triggered only in

September 2024. We assume that the Department will inquire in earnest of Father’s and

Mother’s relatives now that the children have been received by and under the supervision

of the Department. The court ordered reunification services for Mother, so a conditional

reversal is not necessary at this stage. “[W]hen a social services agency accepts its

obligation to satisfy its inquiry obligations under ICWA, a reversal of an early

dependency order is not warranted simply because a parent has shown that those ongoing

obligations had not yet been satisfied as of the time the parent appealed.” (In re S.H.

(2022) 82 Cal.App.5th 166, 171.)

We therefore direct the juvenile court to vacate the finding that ICWA does not

33 DISPOSITION

The order detaining the children made at the family maintenance review hearing is

affirmed. The juvenile court is directed to vacate the finding made at the family

maintenance review hearing that ICWA does not apply. The Department and the juvenile

court are directed to continue inquiry in possible Native American ancestry with maternal

and paternal relatives.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS RAMIREZ P. J.

We concur:

CODRINGTON J. FIELDS J.