In Re Kennedy

137 B.R. 302, 26 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d 1265, 1992 Bankr. LEXIS 184, 1992 WL 42503
CourtUnited States Bankruptcy Court, E.D. Arkansas
DecidedMarch 3, 1992
DocketBankruptcy 90-42259S
StatusPublished
Cited by19 cases

This text of 137 B.R. 302 (In Re Kennedy) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Bankruptcy Court, E.D. Arkansas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In Re Kennedy, 137 B.R. 302, 26 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d 1265, 1992 Bankr. LEXIS 184, 1992 WL 42503 (Ark. 1992).

Opinion

ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR ORDER PURSUANT TO 11 U.S.C. § 521(2)

MARY D. SCOTT, Bankruptcy Judge.

THIS CAUSE is before the Court upon the “Motion for Order Requiring the Debtors to Perform Statement of Intentions Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 521(2)(B) and Order Requiring Trustee to Ensure that Debt- or Perform Intentions as Required by 11 U.S.C. § 704(3)” filed by the creditor Green Tree Acceptance, Inc., on December 6, 1991. At the hearing held on January 31, 1992, the motion was withdrawn as to the trustee.

Green Tree Acceptance, Inc. (“Green Tree”) is the first lien holder on the debtors’ mobile home. There is no dispute that the debtors are in compliance under the contract: insurance is in force and they are current with the monthly payments. The debtors have filed a statement of intentions as required by Bankruptcy Code section 521 in which they state that they will redeem the collateral. However, they intend to do so by continuing to make the regular contractual monthly payments.

Green Tree filed this motion seeking an order requiring the debtor to choose one of the three acts described in Bankruptcy Code section 521(2). Specifically, Green Tree asserts that if the debtors intend to redeem the collateral, they must do so by making a lump sum payment to Green Tree. The debtors argue that the choices enumerated in section 521(2) are not exclusive such that they may retain the collateral by making their regular monthly payments.

Section 521 lists the debtors’ duties upon filing a petition in bankruptcy. Section 521(2) lists the methods of, and time limits for, treating property in which a creditor has a security interest:

(2) if an individual debtor’s schedule of assets and liabilities includes consumer debts which are secured by property of the estate—
(A) within thirty days after the date of the filing of a petition under chapter 7 of this title or on or before the date of the meeting of creditors, whichever is earlier, or within such additional time as the court, for cause, within such period fixes, the debtor shall file with the clerk a statement of his intention with respect to the retention or surrender of such property and, if applicable, specifying that such property is claimed as exempt, that the debtor intends to redeem such property, or that the debtor intends to reaffirm debts secured by such property.

The dispute centers on the application of this paragraph. The issue is whether the methods of treatment — (1) surrendering the collateral; (2) redeeming the collateral; and (3) reaffirming the debt — are exclusive or, may a debtor choose, if current on the debt, to simply continue with the contract and make monthly payments.

Numerous bankruptcy courts and three circuit courts have ruled on this issue, with little consistency in results. There is no controlling authority in this district. The Tenth Circuit has decided that the three methods are not exclusive such that the bankruptcy court has discretion to permit debtors to retain collateral without redeeming or reaffirming the debt. Lowry Federal Credit Union v. West, 882 F.2d 1543 (10th Cir.1989). 1 This Court finds the rea- *304 soiling in In re Edwards, 901 F.2d 1383 (7th Cir.1990) and General Motors Acceptance Corporation v. Bell (In re Bell), 700 F.2d 1053 (6th Cir.1983) to be more persuasive.

Section 521(2)(A) first requires a debtor to state whether he will surrender or retain the collateral. The second clause of the paragraph instructs the debtor as to the options if he intends to retain the collateral. “If applicáble,” i.e., if the debtor chooses to retain the collateral, he must specify whether the collateral is exempt, whether it will be redeemed or the debt reaffirmed. 11 U.S.C. § 521(2)(A). Thereafter, section 521(2)(B) specifies the time in which the debtor must perform the stated intentions.

Were this Court to permit a debtor to retain the collateral without performing either redemption or reaffirmation, both of those alternatives are rendered nugatory. A Chapter 7 debtor would never have a reason to either reaffirm the debt or redeem the collateral if this or other alternatives existed. See Edwards, 901 F.2d at 1386, 1387; Bell, 700 F.2d at 1056 (“[I]f a debtor is authorized by the bankruptcy court to redeem by installments over the objection of the creditor, such practice would render the voluntary framework of § 524(c) an exercise in legislative futility.”). The rationales for requiring the debtor to comply with the mandatory provisions of section 521(2) have been exhaustively and cogently set forth in the Edwards and Bell opinions, and this Court will not repeat them here. It is sufficient to adopt those rationales and analyses.

This Court finds the language and reasoning in Lowry inherently inconsistent within itself and with the Bankruptcy Code. The Tenth Circuit states,

The creditor argues that the requirements of § 521(2) are mandatory. That is obvious. There is no room within the direct language of the section to presume otherwise. 2

Lowry, 882 F.2d at 1545 & n. 2 (emphasis added). Three paragraphs later, Lowry states,

The next question is whether 11 U.S.C. § 521 must be read to limit a debtor’s right to retain possession of collateral to redemption or reaffirmation. While a debtor may redeem property, subject to 11 U.S.C. § 722, or reaffirm a debt, subject to 11 U.S.C. § 524(c)(4), nothing within the Code makes either course exclusive.

Id. at 1546. Lowry concludes by stating that while the “provisions of Code § 521(b) [sic]” are mandatory,

[W]e do not believe those provisions make redemption or reaffirmation the exclusive means by which a bankruptcy court can allow a debtor to retain secured property. When the state of the evidence indicates neither the debtor nor the creditor would be prejudiced, a bankruptcy court may allow retention conditioned upon performance of the duties of the security agreement as a condition of retention.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
137 B.R. 302, 26 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d 1265, 1992 Bankr. LEXIS 184, 1992 WL 42503, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-kennedy-areb-1992.