OPINION OF THE COURT
(October 12, 2011)
Per curiam.
This Court, in an August 13, 2009 Order, required Leon A. Kendall, a judge of the Superior Court,2 to show cause as to why he should not be held in indirect criminal contempt.3 On December 18, [893]*8932009, this Court appointed the Honorable Edgar D. Ross, a retired Superior Court judge, to serve as a Special Master, with the authority to, among other things, conduct a show cause hearing and make and submit to this Court proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law. After presiding over the show cause hearing and considering the parties’ submissions, the Special Master has recommended that this Court acquit Kendall of all charges. After an exhaustive review of the record, including a transcript of the show cause hearing, a video of the majority of the proceedings, and numerous documents entered into evidence by both parties, we accept in part and reject in part the Special Master’s findings, conclusions, and recommendations.
I. RELEVANT FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The facts and circumstances from which this matter arises stem from a March 9, 2009 petition for writ of mandamus filed in this Court by the People of the Virgin Islands. In a May 13, 2009 Opinion and Order, this Court granted the petition and issued a writ of mandamus to Kendall — the nominal respondent to the mandamus action — directing that his oral and written orders compelling the People to enter into a plea bargain with Basheem Camal Ford and Jermaine S. Paris — the defendants in the underlying Superior Court case — were reversed and that he conduct future proceedings in that case in a matter consistent with the May 13, 2009 Opinion. See In re People of the V.I., 51 V.I. 374 (V.I. 2009). Almost two months after the issuance of that opinion and almost one month after this Court issued its June 10, 2009 mandate, on July 7, 2009, Kendall issued a thirty-one page opinion, designated as “for publication,” in which he, among other things, made numerous inflammatory remarks about this Court, stated that this Court’s issuance of a writ of mandamus “was [894]*894clearly improper,” found that the writ had been “issued to facilitate the Prosecution’s blatant misconduct and perpetrate a fraud on the [Superior] Court,” and recused himself from the case. See People v. Ford, 52 V.I. 30 (V.I. Super. Ct. 2009) (hereinafter “July 7, 2009 Opinion”).
On August 13, 2009, this Court required Kendall to show cause as to why he should not be held in indirect criminal contempt for obstructing the administration of justice, failing to comply with the May 13, 2009 Opinion and Order, and for misbehaving in his official transactions as an officer of the court. Subsequently, Kendall filed a motion to dismiss, which the Special Master, shortly after his appointment, proposed that this Court deny — a recommendation which this Court accepted — and thereafter scheduled a show cause hearing for April 12, 2010.
At the April 12, 2010 hearing, the Special Master heard opening statements, accepted the parties’ request to take judicial notice of numerous exhibits, and allowed the People to present its case. The People called, as its first witness, Assistant Attorney General Jesse M. Bethel, who was counsel for the People in the In re People matter. Due to the length of both direct and cross-examination of Bethel, the Special Master authorized a recess and allowed the hearing to reconvene the following day. Once cross-examination of Bethel concluded on April 13, 2010, the People called Janet Lloyd, the Superior Court’s librarian, who primarily testified on direct examination to the authenticity of Kendall’s July 7, 2009 Opinion and the significance of its “For Publication” designation. Lloyd was then cross-examined by Kendall. Thereafter, the People called its final witness, Stanley Perez, a Marshal for the Superior Court.
After the People rested its case, Kendall orally moved for a judgment of acquittal. However, recognizing that this Court’s December 18, 2009 Order only authorized the Special Master to make proposed recommendations with respect to dispositive motions, Kendall requested that the Special Master recess the show cause hearing to allow the parties to file proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law, for the Special Master to produce his written recommendation, and for this Court to then review the Special Master’s recommendation. The Special Master granted Kendall’s request, and recessed the hearing pending these events.
On April 16, 2010, both Kendall and the People submitted their proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law to the special master. On the same day, Kendall filed a written motion for judgment of acquittal or, in the alternative, a mistrial, which — among other things — argued that [895]*895the First Amendment prohibited this Court from holding him in contempt based on the contents of the July 7, 2009 Opinion absent a finding that its issuance created a “clear and present danger,” and that the People had introduced insufficient evidence to sustain the charges. The People filed its opposition to Kendall’s motion on April 19,2010. On May 4,2010, the Special Master submitted his proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law, and recommended that this Court deny Kendall’s motion for judgment of acquittal on the grounds that the July 7, 2009 Opinion was not protected by the First Amendment.
On May 18, 2010, Kendall timely filed an objection to the Special Master’s recommended disposition, in which he contended, among other things, that the Special Master erred in recommending that this Court deny his April 16, 2010 motion for judgment of acquittal because the Special Master’s “[Recommendation is fatally defective for ignoring, and failing even to address, the controlling [constitutional principles that govern the use of the contempt power against speech,” (Obj. at 2), and that the People failed to present evidence sufficient to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that Kendall is guilty of criminal contempt. Specifically, Kendall contended that the People were required to prove that the July 7, 2009 Opinion presented a “clear and present danger of [the] obstruction of the administration of justice,” (Obj. at 2-3), and that the Special Master had only found that the remarks in Kendall’s July 7, 2009 Opinion “prejudice this Court in public estimation,” tend to “destroy or call into doubt this Court’s function and position as the highest local court in the Virgin Islands,” and “reduce confidence in the administration of justice in the jurisdiction,” which Kendall also argued were threats “to the Court’s dignity and public esteem, not to the administration of justice.” (Obj. at 4 (quoting Rec. at 4).) But in a July 16, 2010 Order, this Court expressly rejected Kendall’s argument that the First Amendment required application of the clear and present danger standard. In re Kendall, S. Ct. Misc. No. 2009-0025, 2010 V.I. Supreme LEXIS 73, at *11 (V.I. July 16, 2010). In addition, the July 16, 2010 Order adopted the Special Master’s holding that the People introduced evidence sufficient for a reasonable trier of fact to hold Kendall in indirect criminal contempt on all three counts, as well as the Special Master’s recommendation that Kendall’s motion for mistrial be denied.
The Special Master resumed the show cause hearing on August 18, 2010. At the hearing, Kendall, through his counsel, introduced four [896]*896documents from the Ford and Paris matters into evidence, and then rested his case. Once the defense rested, the Special Master heard closing arguments, requested both parties to submit proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law, and adjourned the hearing. After considering the parties’ filings, the Special Master submitted his recommended findings of fact and conclusions of law on December 22, 2010. In the December 22, 2010 Recommendation, the Special Master found that the People had proved all of the conduct alleged in count one of the August 13, 2009 Order beyond a reasonable doubt. However, the Special Master explained that he now agreed with Kendall that the clear and present danger standard applied to count one, and that the People had to therefore also prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Kendall’s July 7, 2009 Opinion actually obstructed the administration of justice. Ultimately, the Special Master concluded that the People failed to prove an actual obstruction, and recommended that this Court acquit Kendall on this count. With respect to count two, the Special Master rejected Kendall’s argument that the May 13, 2009 Opinion and Order in In re People was not directed to him, but recommended that this Court find that the People failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Kendall recused himself to avoid compliance with this Court’s mandate because the evidence was equally consistent with the conclusion that Kendall recused himself because he was biased against Bethel. Finally, the Special Master recommended that this Court acquit Kendall on count three for the same reasons.
On December 30, 2010, the People filed an objection to the Special Master’s December 22, 2010 Recommendation, which Kendall opposed on January 10, 2011. In response to Kendall’s January 10, 2011 motion for a hearing, this Court required the parties to file briefs as to whether this Court should adopt the December 22, 2010 Recommendation. After the parties submitted their briefs, this Court, in a June 15, 2011 Order, required the parties to inform this Court as to (1) whether they wished for this Court to hold a hearing or submit the case on the present record, and (2) whether they desired supplemental briefing on the effect, if any, of the United States Supreme Court’s recent decision in Nevada Commission on Ethics v. Carrigan, 564 U.S. _, 131 S. Ct. 2343, 180 L. Ed. 2d 150 (2011). On June 24, 2011 and June 28, 2011, respectively, Kendall and the People both notified this Court that they did not desire for this Court to hold a hearing, and that they did not believe supplemental briefing was necessary. Accordingly, this Court, in a June 30, 2011 Order, stated that [897]*897it would consider the instant matter based on the parties’ briefs and the record.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Jurisdiction and Standard of Review
It is well established that this Court, as the highest local court in the Virgin Islands, has both the inherent and statutory authority “to protect its appellate jurisdiction” and “to issue all writs necessary to the complete exercise of its duties and jurisdiction,” including the right to issue and enforce orders granting a writ of mandamus. 4 V.I.C. § 32(b); see also 4 V.I.C. § 243(4) (“Every court shall have power . . . [t]o compel obedience to its judgments, orders, and process, and to the orders of a judge out of court, in all actions, or proceedings pending therein.”); 4 V.I.C. § 281 (“Every judicial officer shall have power . . . [t]o compel obedience to his lawful orders.”); 14 V.I.C. § 581; In re Burke, 50 V.I. 346, 350-51 (V.I. 2008). “Contempt is the common method of enforcing orders in the law actions of mandamus, prohibition, and habeas corpus.” Burton v. Wayne Circuit Judge, 325 Mich. 159, 37 N.W.2d 899, 902 (1949). See also United States v. Providence Journal Co., 485 U.S. 693, 701-02, 108 S. Ct. 1502, 99 L. Ed. 2d 785 (1988) (recognizing a court’s inherent authority to “initiate a criminal contempt proceeding for disobedience of its order”); Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S.A., 481 U.S. 787, 793, 107 S. Ct. 2124, 95 L. Ed. 2d 740 (1987) (“[I]t is long settled that courts possess inherent authority to initiate contempt proceedings for disobedience to their orders.”). Moreover, the Virgin Islands Legislature has recognized this inherent authority through codifying the crime of contempt:4
Every court of the Virgin Islands shall have power to punish by fine or imprisonment, at its discretion, such contempt of its authority, and none other as —
[898]*898(1) misbehavior of any person in its presence or so near thereto as to obstruct the administration of justice;
(2) misbehavior of any of its officers in their official transactions; or
(3) disobedience or resistance to its lawful writ, process, order, rule, decree, or command.
14 V.I.C. § 581. Finally, it is well established that trial court judges do not possess immunity from being held in contempt by a higher court, for “[s]uperior courts may enforce their judgments, decrees, mandates, and orders and compel obedience thereto by inferior courts by process of contempt.” 17 C.J.S. Contempt § 57 (collecting cases). See also Contempt for Disobedience of Mandamus, 30 A.L.R. 148 (1924) (noting that the practice of appellate courts holding trial court judges in contempt for failure to comply with a higher court’s mandamus order dates back to at least 1810) (collecting cases). Accordingly, this Court possessed jurisdiction to initiate these indirect criminal contempt proceedings.
“[Bjecause this Court exercises original jurisdiction over this criminal contempt matter, our review of the Special Master’s findings of fact and conclusions of law . . . must be de novo. ” Kendall, 2010 V.I. Supreme LEXIS 73, at *5-6 (citing Annenberg v. Commonwealth, 562 Pa. 581, 757 A.2d 338, 342-43 (2000)).
B. Obstruction of the Administration of Justice
The August 13, 2009 Order charged Kendall with obstruction of the administration of justice5 through
a. inflammatory remarks and other characterizations in his My 7,2009 opinion that appear calculated and intended to prejudice this Court in public estimation, destroy or call into doubt this Court’s function and position as the highest local court in the Virgin Islands, and to reduce confidence in the administration of justice in this jurisdiction; and
[899]*899b. purporting to review the validity and legality of this Court’s May 13,2009 opinion and order, including, but not limited to, stating that the issuance of this Court’s order was “clearly improper,” that its conclusions “make[] no sense” and are “erroneous,” and that this Court’s mandate should be given “no credence,” despite this Court’s status as the highest local court in the Virgin Islands.
(J.A. 1571-72.)6 In his December 22, 2010 Recommendation, the Special Master expressly found that the People met its high burden with respect to these allegations:
[903]*903Unhesitantly and beyond any reasonable doubt, the Special Master finds therefrom that Judge Kendall made inflammatory remarks and characterizations about the Supreme Court of the Virgin Islands that appeared calculated and intended to prejudice the Court in public estimation, destroy or call into doubt this Court’s function and position as the highest local court in the Virgin Islands, and to reduce confidence in the administration of justice in this jurisdiction. Additionally, the Special Master finds beyond a reasonable doubt that Judge Kendall purported to review the validity and legality of the Court’s opinion and order.
(J.A. 1426-27.) The People agree with this portion of the December22,2010 Recommendation in its brief, while Kendall, in his brief, objects to this finding on the grounds that his statements “consisted of nothing more than expressing reasoned disagreement on an important issue of law.” (Kendall Br. 18.) However, this Court, having independently reviewed the record, agrees [904]*904that the People met its burden,7 and that Kendall’s remarks rose far above the level of “reasoned disagreement.”8 Therefore, this Court accepts and adopts this portion of the December 22, 2010 Recommendation.9
Nevertheless, the Special Master ultimately chose to recommend that this Court acquit Kendall on the basis that the First Amendment provided limited protection for Kendall’s conduct, and therefore required the People to prove the additional element that an actual obstruction of the administration of justice occurred:
[I]n the matter sub judice, the charges brought against Judge Kendall were based on the contents of his memorandum opinion. As such, Judge Kendall retains limited First Amendment protection for [905]*905the statements themselves. However, while the civil proceedings cited by the parties invoked several different standards in ascertaining whether the judges’ statements were protected by the First Amendment, in this case, the People had to establish, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the conduct of making the inflammatory remarks and characterizations about the Supreme Court of the Virgin Islands actually constitutes an obstruction of the administration of justice.
(J.A. 1428.) Specifically, the Special Master found that “the First Amendment prohibits the use of the criminal contempt power against speech except in cases presenting a clear and present danger of obstructing the administration of justice.” (J.A. 1438.)
Unfortunately, it is not clear on what basis the Special Master arrived at these conclusions. Significantly, the December 22, 2010 Recommendation does not acknowledge that this Court, in its July 16, 2010 Order, had adopted the Special Master’s previous recommendation that the statements in the July 7, 2009 Opinion were not protected by the First Amendment, and, consequently, held that the People were not required to meet the “clear and present danger” standard or to otherwise prove that issuance of the July 7, 2009 Opinion caused an actual delay in the Ford matter or actually destroyed the public’s confidence in the Virgin Islands judicial system and the role of this Court. But, since both the Special Master’s May 4, 2010 Recommendation and this Court’s July 16, 2010 Order were issued in the context of a motion for judgment of acquittal, while the December 22, 2010 Recommendation relates to the ultimate decision of whether Kendall should be adjudicated guilty or not guilty, this Court shall consider this issue anew without providing any deference to its prior July 16, 2010 Order.
We agree with Kendall that “[a] judge does not surrender First Amendment rights upon becoming a member of the judiciary.” In re Sanders, 135 Wn.2d 175, 955 P.2d 369, 375 (1998). However, the pertinent issue in this case is not whether judges are generally protected by the First Amendment, but whether the First Amendment immunizes Kendall from criminal punishment for the contents of the July 7, 2009 [906]*906Opinion.10 First, we emphasize that this case does not involve a situation where a judge has made inflammatory statements while acting in his capacity as a private citizen. Had Kendall published the exact same statements in a newspaper, made them on a television show, or otherwise uttered them outside of his judicial capacity, there is absolutely no question that they would be entitled to the highest level of First Amendment protection, and the People would have been required to prove an actual obstruction to the administration of justice in order to obtain a conviction on count one. See, e.g., Scott v. Flowers, 910 F.2d 201, 211 (5th Cir. 1990) (holding judge’s “open letter” to county officials attacking county court and district attorney’s office was made in capacity as private citizen and thus protected under First Amendment); Mississippi Comm’n on Judicial Performance v. Wilkerson, 876 So.2d 1006, 1011 (Miss. 2004) (holding judge’s letter to the editor advocating against gay rights constituted speech fully protected by the First Amendment); Matter of Hey, 192 W. Va. 221, 452 S.E.2d 24, 29-30 (1994) (holding judge’s offensive comments made on television show fully protected by First Amendment).
However, Kendall did not make these statements in his capacity as a private citizen, but did so in a judicial opinion written while acting in his official capacity as the Superior Court judge presiding over the Ford matter, which, at his direction, was posted on the Superior Court’s website, published in the Virgin Islands Reports and on Westlaw and LexisNexis, and incorporated into Virgin Islands jurisprudence. As the United States Supreme Court has established in a trilogy of criminal contempt cases — Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 62 S. Ct. 190, [907]*90786 L. Ed. 192 (1941); Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331, 66 S. Ct. 1029, 90 L. Ed. 1295 (1946); and Gentile v. Nevada, 501 U.S. 1030, 111 S. Ct. 2720, 115 L. Ed. 2d 888 (1991) — the “clear and present danger” standard does not apply to all criminal contempt actions in which the First Amendment is implicated. Importantly, “[t]hese cases make it clear that statements about pending cases by non-lawyers are protected by the First Amendment under a ‘clear and present danger’ standard,” Smith v. Pace, 313 S.W.3d 124, 134 (Mo. 2010) (emphasis added), with a majority of the United States Supreme Court11 “rejecting] the contention that the same high standard applies to restrictions on speech by attorneys involved in the pending case” because “[m]embership in the bar is a privilege burdened with conditions,” with “lawyers voluntarily accepting] a ‘fiduciary relationship’ to the justice system and hav[ing] ‘a duty to protect its integrity.’ ” Comm’n for Lawyer Discipline v. Benton, 980 S.W.2d 425, 430 (Tex. 1998) (quoting Gentile, 501 U.S. at 1066, 1071, 1074, 1076). See also Black v. Blount, 938 S.W.2d 394, 399-401 (Tenn. 1996) (not applying the clear and present danger standard when attorney is charged with obstruction of the administration of justice). Rather, the Gentile majority held that, for attorneys, a rule requiring only a “substantial likelihood” of obstruction is acceptable given the State’s increased interest in controlling attorney’s speech and the attorney’s acceptance of the responsibilities of being a member of the Bar. 501 U.S. at 1074-75. In other words, while the fact that an attorney’s speech was impolite and disrespectful and uttered during an official court proceeding does not automatically bring that speech outside the protection of the First Amendment, see Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 672, 114 S. Ct. 1878, 128 L. Ed. 2d 686 (1994) (“The First Amendment demands a tolerance of ‘verbal tumult, discord, and even offensive utterance,’ as ‘necessary side effects of... the process of open debate.’ ”), attorneys are prohibited from using speech as a vehicle for “resisit[ing] a ruling . . . beyond the point necessary to preserve a claim for an appeal.” Gentile, 501 U.S. at 1071 (collecting cases).
[908]*908Given that judges are not only generally held to higher standards than lawyers, but, when acting in their official capacities, are performing official government functions, it is likely, when a judge is charged with the obstruction of the administration of justice due to the contents of a judicial opinion, that an even lower standard than a “substantial likelihood” of obstruction may apply. See, e.g., Halleck, 427 F. Supp. at 1239 (“The ABA Code of Judicial Conduct, adopted by the Joint Committee on Judicial Administration in the District of Columbia, reflects the limits on a judge’s right of free speech.”) (footnote omitted); Rome, 542 P.2d at 684 (“For a judge the right to speak freely is circumscribed by the code of judicial conduct, just as that of the lawyer is subject to the code of professional responsibility, and first amendment rights do not exempt a judge from discipline for proven judicial misconduct.”); cf. Corrigan, 131 S. Ct. at 2351 (“a legislator has no right to use official powers for expressive purposes”). But it is not necessary for this Court to resolve this issue of first impression, for the portion of the July 7, 2009 Opinion in which Kendall states that this Court issued its writ of mandamus “to facilitate the Prosecution’s blatant misconduct and perpetrate a fraud on the [Superior] Court,” Ford, 52 V.I. at 59, clearly satisfies the “substantial likelihood” standard, in that it does not merely express disagreement with this Court’s May 13, 2009 Opinion, but blatantly accuses, without proof, the Justices of this Court of gross dereliction of their sworn duties and of committing illegal acts, and thus called the very integrity of the In re People proceedings into question — a case in which Kendall himself had been a party.12 As the Tennessee Supreme Court succinctly explained in Black,
[909]*909[W]e explicitly hold that criminal contempt of court which obstructs the administration of justice includes all willful misconduct which embarrasses, hinders, or obstructs a court in its administration of justice or derogates the court’s authority or dignity, thereby bringing the administration of law into disrepute. We also emphasize that disrespectful conduct by an attorney has a greater impact upon the dignity of a court than does disrespectful conduct of a lay person. Public respect for the law derives in large measure from the image which the administration of justice presents. Lawyers play an integral role in the administration of justice and, as such, their conduct can have a great influence upon the extent to which the proceedings are perceived as fair and dignified by jurors, defendants, witnesses, and spectators. Accordingly, a lawyer’s allegations of inequity and unfairness are uniquely denigrating to the dignity of the proceedings____[T]he judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the trial court’s judgment finding Blount guilty of two counts of contempt is reinstated.
938 S.W.2d at 401. See also United States v. Engstrom, 16 F.3d 1006, 1011 (9th Cir. 1994) (“Although an allegation of judicial bias by a court officer, such as an attorney, necessarily undermines the court’s ability to regulate a trial, the same allegation by a non-court officer will not necessarily have the same effect.”); In re Kafantaris, 2009 Ohio 4814, ¶ 41 (Ohio Ct. App. 2009) (affirming trial court’s finding that attorney’s statement to jury members, after jury had announced its verdict and been discharged, that they had convicted the wrong man constituted “an unforgivable obstruction to the administration of justice” punishable as criminal contempt because “[i]t called the whole jury trial process into question” and “[t]he obvious proper course of action to contest the verdict is through the appellate process.”); Hirschfeld v. Superior Court, 184 Ariz. 208, 908 P.2d 22, 26 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1995) (“Conduct like Hirschfeld’s . .. lessens the dignity and authority of the court. There are a number of cases which support this conclusion: We pass over, without comment, those many cases in which the conduct actually disrupted or delayed court proceedings. The cases we do rely on all concern misbehavior that occurred while court was in recess.”). In other words, the [910]*910First Amendment does not bar holding Kendall in indirect criminal contempt for this portion of the July 7, 2009 Opinion.13
We recognize that Kendall contends that many of the authorities this Court has cited for the proposition that the pertinent language in Kendall’s July 7, 2009 Opinion were not protected by the First Amendment involved judicial discipline matters rather than criminal contempt cases. But as this Court first noted in its August 13, 2009 Order, there, unsurprisingly, have been very few instances of trial judges being required to show cause by a higher court as to why they should not be held in criminal contempt, and — in the few instances in which this has occurred — none of the judges asserted a First Amendment defense. See, e.g., In re Reed, 901 S.W.2d 604, 612-14 (Tex. App. 1995); State ex rel. Goldsmith v. Marion County Superior Court, 275 Ind. 545, 419 N.E.2d 109, 112 (1981); Palmer v. State, 275 Ind. 128, 418 N.E.2d 530, 532 (Ind. 1981). Moreover, we have been unable to find any authority — and Kendall has not provided us with any — that stands for the proposition that conduct or speech that would not be protected by the First Amendment in the civil context is nevertheless protected by the First Amendment in the criminal context. On the contrary, courts have [911]*911universally held that, if speech is unprotected by the First Amendment in the civil context, it may give rise to criminal liability without the need to establish any additional elements, provided that the beyond a reasonable doubt standard is met by the prosecution. Cf. Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 75, 85 S. Ct. 209, 13 L. Ed. 2d 125 (1964) (concluding, in criminal libel context, that criminal libel prosecutions are permissible so long as the malice standard of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 84 S. Ct. 710, 11 L. Ed. 2d 686 (1964) — a civil libel case — is met); Mink v. Knox, 613 F.3d 995, 1005 n.7 (10th Cir. 2010) (“Civil and criminal libel cases ‘are subject to the same constitutional limitations.’ ”) (quoting Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 157, 99 S. Ct. 1635, 60 L. Ed. 2d 115 & n.1 (1979)); In re Gronowicz, 764 F.2d 983, 988 & n.4 (3d Cir. 1985) (en banc) (holding that there is “[n]o distinction having any first amendment significance” between criminal libel and civil libel or criminal fraud and civil fraud, for libelous or fraudulent speech both have no First Amendment protection in either the civil or criminal context), cert, denied sub nom. Gronowicz v. United States, 474 U.S. 1055, 106 S. Ct. 793, 88 L. Ed. 2d 770 (1986).
For the reasons stated above, we reject the portion of the December 22, 2010 Recommendation that would hold that the People are required to prove a “clear and present danger” or an actual obstruction to the administration of justice. Accordingly, this Court finds Kendall guilty of indirect criminal contempt through obstruction of the administration of justice.
C. Failure to Comply with May 13, 2009 Opinion and Order
The August 13, 2009 Order also accused Kendall of failing to comply with this Court’s May 13, 2009 Opinion and Order. (J.A. 1572.) In his December 22, 2010 Recommendation, the Special Master found that the People had proved, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Kendall was aware that the May 13, 2009 Opinion and Order had been directed towards him personally, and was aware that this Court had instructed him to proceed to trial and, to minimize pre-trial publicity, consider a continuance or a change of venue:
Judge Kendall’s argument that the Supreme Court’s order was not directed to him has no merit. He presided over Superior Court Criminal Nos. 76/2008 and 109/2008, People v. Ford and People v. Paris. [912]*912When an appellate court, such as the Supreme Court of the Virgin Islands, reverses and remands a case, the appellate court does not issue an order to “the Superior Court of the Virgin Islands” to take further action on the case, nor does it use the name of the trial judge to carry out the order; the appellate court will issue the order for the trial judge that presided over the case to take the action that it ordered. It is clear that Judge Kendall’s July 7 opinion, where he refers to both himself and the Superior Court as “the Court,” that he had no trouble differentiating between himself and the Superior Court, and that he clearly understood that the Supreme Court ordered him to proceed to trial in a manner consistent with the Court’s May 13 opinion. See People v. Ford, 5[2] V.I. 30, 34 (V.I. Super. [Ct.] 2009) (“Based upon the reasons set forth below, the Court will recuse itself [from this matter] and return same to the Clerk of the Court for reassignment.”). That Order instructed him to consider a postponement of the trial or a change of venue in order to ensure that the Defendants received a fair trial.
(J.A. 1433.) Again, the People state in its brief that they agree with this portion of the December 22, 2010 Recommendation, while Kendall, in a footnote to his brief, objects to this conclusion on the grounds that the order itself did not mandate that Kendall consider a postponement or a change of venue.
We accept this portion of the Special Master’s recommendation. “To prove indirect criminal contempt, evidence must be sufficient to establish[] the court’s order was definite, clear, specific, and leaving no doubt in the person to whom it was addressed of the conduct prohibited.” Commonwealth v. McMullen, 599 Pa. 435, 961 A.2d 842, 849 (2008). It is well established that “[a] trial court must implement both the letter and the spirit of the mandate, taking into account the appellate court’s opinion and the circumstances it embraces. ‘Where the reviewing court in its mandate prescribes that the court shall proceed in accordance with the opinion of the reviewing court, such pronouncement operates to make the opinion a part of the mandate as completely as though the opinion had been set out at length.’ ” Blasband v. Rales, 979 F.2d 324, 327 (3d Cir. 1992) (quoting Bankers Trust Co. v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 761 F.2d 943, 949 (3d Cir. 1985)). Thus, while the May 13, 2009 Order did not itself direct Kendall to consider a postponement or a change of venue, it did remand the matter for proceedings consistent with the May [913]*91313, 2009 Opinion, (J.A. 22), which had expressly stated that United States Supreme Court and Third Circuit precedent precluded Kendall from concluding, before jury selection even began, that Ford and Paris could not obtain a fair trial due to pre-trial publicity without first considering a change of venue or a postponement. In re People, 51 V.I. at 391-92. Moreover, as the Special Master noted, Kendall, in his July 7, 2009 Opinion, wrote that this Court required him to “consider[] other curative measures such as [a] change of venue” or “continuing] the matter until the threat abates,” but nevertheless held that he would not consider these options because “the Supreme Court should have deferred to [his] findings” and that “continuing this matter . . . would surely be contrary to the well-settled law in the United States.” 52 V.I. at 58-59. Similarly, at a June 4, 2009 change of plea hearing in the Ford matter, Kendall, immediately after rejecting the parties’ plea agreement, expressly stated that this Court had ordered the matter to proceed to trial. (J.A. 108.) In addition, the In re People case was not an appeal from a Superior Court decision, but an original proceeding for a petition for writ of mandamus, in which Kendall himself was the nominal respondent, entered an appearance through counsel, and had the opportunity to file an answer and otherwise participate in the proceedings in this Court. See V.I.S.Ct.R. 13(b). Under these circumstances, there is no doubt that Kendall was aware of what was required by this Court’s May 13, 2009 Opinion and Order.
Nevertheless, the Special Master recommends that this Court acquit Kendall on the grounds that the People had failed to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Kendall recused himself from the Ford matter for the improper purpose of avoiding compliance with the May 13, 2009 Opinion and Order. Rather, the Special Master found that the evidence is equally consistent with the premise that Kendall recused himself because he believed Bethel had engaged in prosecutorial misconduct and “could not, and ethically should not, render decisions in the case, including decisions on curative measures,” (J.A. 1434), and that the People failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that this reason for recusal was a pretext.
Before considering this portion of the Special Master’s recommendation, we note that the pertinent part of the August 13, 2009 Order had charged Kendall with failing to comply with the May 13, 2009 Opinion and Order by
[914]*914a. refusing to schedule the matter for trial and proceeding to trial in the absence of a valid plea disposition;
b. refusing to consider a change of venue or a continuance to minimize pre-trial publicity in the underlying matter; and
c. recusing himself from the matter below for the purposes of avoiding future compliance with this Court’s mandate, leading to additional scheduling delays.
(J.A. 1572.) But while the August 13, 2009 Order uses conjunctive language, it is well established that a crime “may be alleged in an indictment in the conjunctive, and thereafter proven in the disjunctive.” United States v. Gunter, 546 F.2d 861, 868-69 (10th Cir. 1976). See also United States v. Moreno-Florean, 542 F.3d 445, 451 (5th Cir. 2008) (“[I]f the indictment alleges elements in the conjunctive, the defendant can be convicted if the evidence establishes any set of disjunctive elements that together constitute the criminal offense.”) (citations omitted). As explained earlier, any willful disobedience of a lawful order, if proven beyond a reasonable doubt, is sufficient to establish the crime of criminal contempt. See Providence Journal Co., 485 U.S. at 701-02. Thus, even if the Special Master is correct that the People failed to prove that Kendall recused himself for the purpose of avoiding compliance with this Court’s mandate, his finding that the People met its burden by proving, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Kendall had refused to proceed to trial, refused to consider a change of venue, and refused to consider a continuance, warrants finding Kendall guilty of indirect criminal contempt with respect to failing to comply with the May 13,2009 Opinion and Order. In other words, it appears that the Special Master recommended Kendall’s acquittal based on a mistaken belief that the People were required to prove all of the conduct identified in the August 13, 2009 Order as 2(a), 2(b), and 2(c), when the People were only required to meet one of these charges in order to obtain a conviction.
Nevertheless, we disagree that the evidence that Kendall recused himself for an improper purpose is equally consistent with Kendall’s claim that he recused himself for a proper purpose. Although the Special Master heavily relies on the fact that Kendall’s July 7, 2009 Opinion accused Bethel of prosecutorial misconduct, and that the Virgin Islands Code provides that “[n]o judge or justice shall sit or act as such in any action or proceeding . . . [w]hen it is made to appear probable that, by reason of bias or prejudice of such judge, a fair and impartial trial cannot [915]*915be had before him,” 4 V.I.C. § 284, the December 22, 2010 Recommendation does not acknowledge that, at the June 4, 2009 hearing, Kendall stated that he would issue a written opinion explaining why the plea agreement presented to him at that hearing was being rejected, (J.A. 108), and that the July 7, 2009 Opinion contains a lengthy discussion explaining that Kendall orally rejected the plea agreement because he believed there was no factual basis to support either defendant pleading to voluntary manslaughter. Ford, 52 V.I. at 42-46. Significantly, the Special Master agreed with Kendall that he had become aware of the purported prosecutorial misconduct on March 9, 2009, but had not been able to recuse himself at the time due to a stay this Court had put in place during the In re People proceedings. (J.A. 1435.) Yet Kendall not only presided over the June 4, 2009 hearing, but reached oral and written decisions on the merits with respect to whether the voluntary manslaughter plea should be accepted, including issuing the written decision in the July 7, 2009 Opinion itself. Moreover, the transcript of the June 4, 2009 hearing reflects that Kendall expressed no hesitancy in conducting the change of plea hearing and stated that, if the plea was accepted, he would preside over sentencing. (J.A. 80.) In addition, the Special Master expressly found that, at the June 4, 2009 hearing, Kendall “did not express any concerns” about misrepresentations or prosecutorial misconduct by Bethel, claim that he was unable to be impartial due to his feelings about Bethel, or mention “any concern about any matters of conscience.” (J.A. 1424.) Significantly, the July 7, 2009 Opinion also contains a lengthy discussion — located in the section following Kendall’s discussion of recusal — explaining why Kendall had sua sponte concluded that Ford and Paris could not obtain a fair trial due to pre-trial publicity, despite the holding of this Court’s May 13, 2009 Opinion. Ford, 52 V.I. at 53-59. Thus, the July 7, 2009 Opinion itself provides strong evidence that Kendall’s stated reason for recusal was a pretext, in that Kendall continued to issue rulings in the matter — including in the same document in which he announced his recusal — despite claiming to have been biased against one of the parties. Under these circumstances, we find Kendall guilty of indirect criminal contempt through failure to comply with the May 13, 2009 Opinion and Order. See Palmer, 418 N.E.2d at 532 (holding trial judge in indirect criminal contempt for recusing himself to avoid applying decision he disagreed with).
[916]*916D. Misbehaving in Official Transactions
Finally, the August 13, 2009 Order charged Kendall with misbehaving in his official transactions as an officer of the court by
a. failing to comply with this Court’s May 13, 2009 opinion and order in violation of Rule 1.1 of the American Bar Association’s Model Rules of Judicial Conduct, made applicable to Judge Kendall pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 205 and Virgin Islands Bar Association Bylaw X.8(D);
b. calling into question, through his July 7, 2009 opinion, the integrity of the Virgin Islands judiciary through inflammatory language directed at this Court and concluding that this Court’s May 13, 2009 opinion and order was “clearly improper,” that its conclusions “make[] no sense” and are “erroneous,” and that this Court’s mandate should be given “no credence,” in violation of Rule 1.2 of the American Bar Association’s Model Rules of Judicial Conduct, made applicable to Judge Kendall pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 205 and Virgin Islands Bar Association Bylaw X.8(D);
c. refusing to hear a matter properly assigned to him by recusing himself for reasons not authorized by law, in violation of Rule 2.11 of the American Bar Association’s Model Rules of Judicial Conduct, made applicable to Judge Kendall pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 205 and Virgin Islands Bar Association Bylaw X.8(D).
(J.A. 1573.) The Special Master, however, did not perform any independent analysis of these charges, but recommended that this Court acquit Kendall of 3(b) for the same reasons recommended with respect to the obstruction of the administration of justice charges, and that Kendall be acquitted of 3(a) and 3(c) for the same reasons recommended with respect to the failure to comply with the May 13, 2009 Opinion and Order charges. (J.A. 1438.) Moreover, the parties devote little argument to these charges in their briefs, but instead contend that this Court’s disposition of the obstruction of the administration of justice and failure to comply charges will also resolve this charge.
As this Court explained in the August 13, 2009 Order,
[T]his Court’s inherent powers grant this Court the authority to punish officers of the court who engage in misbehavior in their official trans[917]*917actions. See In re Petition of Judicial Conduct Committee, 151 N.H. 123, 855 A.2d 535, 538 (N.H. 2004); see also Kendall v. Russell, 572 F.3d 126, 52 V.I. 1021 (3d Cir. 2009). Judge Kendall, as both a Superior Court judge and a member of the Virgin Islands bar, has an obligation, pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 205 and Virgin Islands Bar Association Bylaw X.8(D), to comply with the provisions of both the American B ar Association’s Code of Judicial Conduct and Model Rules of Professional Responsibility. Rule 1.1 of the Code of Judicial Conduct requires that a judge comply with the law, while Rule 1.2, titled “Promoting Confidence in the Judiciary,” requires that “[a] judge... act at all times in a manner that promotes public confidence in the independence, integrity, and impartiality of the judiciary. . ..” Furthermore, Rule 2.7, titled “Responsibility to Decide,” mandates that “[a] judge shall hear and decide matters assigned to the judge, except when disqualification is required by Rule 2.11 or other law.” Moreover, Judge Kendall, in his role as a Superior Court judge, possesses the ministerial duty not only to comply with this Court’s mandate, but to follow all the decisions of this Court — established as the territory’s “court of last resort” pursuant to both section 21(b) of the Revised Organic Act and title four, section 2 of the Virgin Islands [Code] — as binding precedent regardless of his personal views of their correctness. State ex rel. Healey v. McMeans, 884 S.W.2d 772, 774 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994).
(J.A. 1569-71.) In other words, the conduct charged as 3(a), 3(b), and 3(c) differs from that charged as 1(a), 1(b),2(a),2(b),and2(c),in that this Court’s authority to hold Kendall in contempt stems not from his status as a party to the In re People proceedings in this Court, but from his position as an officer of this Court by virtue of his positions, at the time of the charged conduct, as a Superior Court judge and an attorney. However, because neither the December 22,2010 Recommendation nor the parties’ briefs have disputed or otherwise commented on the basis of this Court’s authority to hold Kendall in contempt, but have only addressed the substantive charges, we agree with the parties and the Special Master that this Court’s disposition of the obstruction of the administration of justice and failure to comply charges also dictates the disposition of the misbehaving in official transactions charge. Therefore, this Court accepts in part and rejects in part the Special Master’s Recommendations, and finds Kendall guilty of indirect criminal [918]*918contempt for misbehaving in his official transactions as a Superior Court judge.
III. CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, we find that the People proved, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Kendall is guilty of indirect criminal contempt by obstructing the administration of justice, failing to comply with the May 13, 2009 Opinion and Order, and misbehaving in his official transactions. Accordingly, we accept in part and reject in part the Special Master’s December 22, 2010 Recommendation, and shall set this matter for a sentencing hearing.