Opinion
BISHOP, J.
The respondent mother
of the minor child, Kaleb, appeals from the judgment of the trial court committing Kaleb to the custody of the petitioner, the commissioner of children and families. The respondent claims that she was deprived of her due process rights when the court denied her counsel’s request for a competency examination at a hearing on a motion filed by the respondent to revoke Kaleb’s commitment to the custody of the petitioner.
We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
The following factual and procedural history is relevant to the respondent’s claim on appeal. Kaleb was bom on February 25, 2005. In March, 2009, the respondent was involved in an incident of domestic violence with the father of Kaleb’s siblings.
Consequently, the respondent participated in various services offered by the department of children and families in an effort to improve her parenting skills. On March 19, 2010, the petitioner filed a neglect petition as to Kaleb on the ground that he was being denied proper care and supervision, that his medical and educational needs were not being met, that he was exposed to domestic violence in the home and that he was being permitted to live under circumstances injurious to his well-being. On May 20, 2010, the respondent pleaded nolo contendere to the allegations of neglect. Consequently, Kaleb was adjudicated neglected, and the court ordered six months of protective supervision.
On June 15, 2010, the petitioner invoked a ninety-six hour hold; see General Statutes § 17a-101g; on Kaleb following the respondent’s arrest for risk of injury to a child that stemmed from Kaleb’s unsupervised absence from his home, for several hours, without the respondent’s knowledge that Kaleb had left the home. On June 18, 2010, the court issued an order of temporary custody, placing Kaleb in the custody of the petitioner. On June 24,2010, the petitioner filed a motion to modify the child’s disposition from protective supervision to commitment. On June 25, 2010, on the basis of an agreement between the petitioner and the respondent, the court sustained the order of temporary custody. At that time, the respondent again was canvassed and
affirmed that she understood her rights, stating that she would comply with the department’s requirements to get her children back. The court also ordered, based on an agreement of the parties, a psychological and psychiatric examination of the respondent, which was performed by Robert H. Neems, a psychologist.
On January 3, 2011, the respondent filed a motion to revoke the commitment and a motion for a new psychological evaluation, claiming that her test was “inaccurate as it was the first time she had taken a psychological evaluation and she was overwhelmed.” In addition, the respondent claimed that she did not have ample time to counter or explain the allegations made by the petitioner and, therefore, the results of the evaluation did not “reflect an accurate portrayal of her as a parent.”
On February 25, 2011, a hearing commenced on the respondent’s motions, as well as a motion filed by Kaleb’s father to transfer guardianship of Kaleb to his paternal grandmother or aunt. At the beginning of the hearing, counsel for the respondent then indicated to the court that the respondent had informed her that she never agreed that Kaleb was neglected. On that basis, counsel indicated that she was uncertain that the respondent would be able to assist in her defense. The court explained to the respondent that she had previously agreed to the neglect adjudication and the order of protective supervision. Counsel then requested that the respondent’s competence be evaluated on the basis that the respondent claimed that she did not know what she was signing when she agreed to the neglect adjudication. The court indicated that it had read the psychological reports authored by Neems and that those reports did not support the claims of the respondent’s incompetency. The court, however, advised counsel that she could inquire of Neems whether he had an opinion regarding the respondent’s competency.
The court then proceeded with the hearing regarding the commitment of Kaleb.
Following the hearing, the
court committed Kaleb to the custody of the petitioner.
This appeal followed.
On appeal, the respondent claims that the court’s denial of her request for a competency evaluation deprived her of her constitutional right to due process. In support of her claim, the respondent relies on
In re Alexander V.,
223 Conn. 557, 613 A.2d 780 (1992). In
In re Alexander V.,
a termination of parental rights case, the court utilized a two-pronged approach in deciding the issues raised in that appeal. The court considered whether “the due process clause of the federal constitution requires a trial court to order a competency hearing for a parent whose parental rights the state seeks to terminate,” and then “whether the trial court, sua sponte, should have ordered a hearing concerning the respondent’s competency . . . .” Id., 559.
In that case, the court concluded: “[D]ue process does not require a competency hearing in all termination cases but only when (1) the parent’s attorney requests such a hearing, or (2) in the absence of such a request, the conduct of the parent reasonably suggests to the court, in the exercise of its discretion, the desirability of ordering such a hearing sua sponte.
In either case,
the standard for the court to employ is whether the record before the court contains specific factual allegations that, if true, would constitute substantial evidence of mental impairment. . . . Evidence is substantial if it raises a reasonable doubt about the [parent’s] competency . . . .” (Citations omitted; emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 566. Because the respondent in
In re Alexander V.
failed to raise a reasonable doubt as to her competence, the court determined that she was not deprived of her due process rights by the court’s failure to order a competency evaluation.
Here, the respondent seeks to extend the Supreme Court’s holding in
In re Alexander V.
to commitment proceedings, claiming that the same constitutional right to a competency evaluation exists in these proceedings due to the potential modification or limitation they may have on fundamental parental rights. Because we conclude, however, that the respondent did not assert any specific factual allegations that raised a reasonable
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Opinion
BISHOP, J.
The respondent mother
of the minor child, Kaleb, appeals from the judgment of the trial court committing Kaleb to the custody of the petitioner, the commissioner of children and families. The respondent claims that she was deprived of her due process rights when the court denied her counsel’s request for a competency examination at a hearing on a motion filed by the respondent to revoke Kaleb’s commitment to the custody of the petitioner.
We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
The following factual and procedural history is relevant to the respondent’s claim on appeal. Kaleb was bom on February 25, 2005. In March, 2009, the respondent was involved in an incident of domestic violence with the father of Kaleb’s siblings.
Consequently, the respondent participated in various services offered by the department of children and families in an effort to improve her parenting skills. On March 19, 2010, the petitioner filed a neglect petition as to Kaleb on the ground that he was being denied proper care and supervision, that his medical and educational needs were not being met, that he was exposed to domestic violence in the home and that he was being permitted to live under circumstances injurious to his well-being. On May 20, 2010, the respondent pleaded nolo contendere to the allegations of neglect. Consequently, Kaleb was adjudicated neglected, and the court ordered six months of protective supervision.
On June 15, 2010, the petitioner invoked a ninety-six hour hold; see General Statutes § 17a-101g; on Kaleb following the respondent’s arrest for risk of injury to a child that stemmed from Kaleb’s unsupervised absence from his home, for several hours, without the respondent’s knowledge that Kaleb had left the home. On June 18, 2010, the court issued an order of temporary custody, placing Kaleb in the custody of the petitioner. On June 24,2010, the petitioner filed a motion to modify the child’s disposition from protective supervision to commitment. On June 25, 2010, on the basis of an agreement between the petitioner and the respondent, the court sustained the order of temporary custody. At that time, the respondent again was canvassed and
affirmed that she understood her rights, stating that she would comply with the department’s requirements to get her children back. The court also ordered, based on an agreement of the parties, a psychological and psychiatric examination of the respondent, which was performed by Robert H. Neems, a psychologist.
On January 3, 2011, the respondent filed a motion to revoke the commitment and a motion for a new psychological evaluation, claiming that her test was “inaccurate as it was the first time she had taken a psychological evaluation and she was overwhelmed.” In addition, the respondent claimed that she did not have ample time to counter or explain the allegations made by the petitioner and, therefore, the results of the evaluation did not “reflect an accurate portrayal of her as a parent.”
On February 25, 2011, a hearing commenced on the respondent’s motions, as well as a motion filed by Kaleb’s father to transfer guardianship of Kaleb to his paternal grandmother or aunt. At the beginning of the hearing, counsel for the respondent then indicated to the court that the respondent had informed her that she never agreed that Kaleb was neglected. On that basis, counsel indicated that she was uncertain that the respondent would be able to assist in her defense. The court explained to the respondent that she had previously agreed to the neglect adjudication and the order of protective supervision. Counsel then requested that the respondent’s competence be evaluated on the basis that the respondent claimed that she did not know what she was signing when she agreed to the neglect adjudication. The court indicated that it had read the psychological reports authored by Neems and that those reports did not support the claims of the respondent’s incompetency. The court, however, advised counsel that she could inquire of Neems whether he had an opinion regarding the respondent’s competency.
The court then proceeded with the hearing regarding the commitment of Kaleb.
Following the hearing, the
court committed Kaleb to the custody of the petitioner.
This appeal followed.
On appeal, the respondent claims that the court’s denial of her request for a competency evaluation deprived her of her constitutional right to due process. In support of her claim, the respondent relies on
In re Alexander V.,
223 Conn. 557, 613 A.2d 780 (1992). In
In re Alexander V.,
a termination of parental rights case, the court utilized a two-pronged approach in deciding the issues raised in that appeal. The court considered whether “the due process clause of the federal constitution requires a trial court to order a competency hearing for a parent whose parental rights the state seeks to terminate,” and then “whether the trial court, sua sponte, should have ordered a hearing concerning the respondent’s competency . . . .” Id., 559.
In that case, the court concluded: “[D]ue process does not require a competency hearing in all termination cases but only when (1) the parent’s attorney requests such a hearing, or (2) in the absence of such a request, the conduct of the parent reasonably suggests to the court, in the exercise of its discretion, the desirability of ordering such a hearing sua sponte.
In either case,
the standard for the court to employ is whether the record before the court contains specific factual allegations that, if true, would constitute substantial evidence of mental impairment. . . . Evidence is substantial if it raises a reasonable doubt about the [parent’s] competency . . . .” (Citations omitted; emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 566. Because the respondent in
In re Alexander V.
failed to raise a reasonable doubt as to her competence, the court determined that she was not deprived of her due process rights by the court’s failure to order a competency evaluation.
Here, the respondent seeks to extend the Supreme Court’s holding in
In re Alexander V.
to commitment proceedings, claiming that the same constitutional right to a competency evaluation exists in these proceedings due to the potential modification or limitation they may have on fundamental parental rights. Because we conclude, however, that the respondent did not assert any specific factual allegations that raised a reasonable
doubt as to her competency, we leave for another day the question of whether the same due process right to a competency evaluation that exists in termination proceedings also pertains to commitment proceedings.
“We review the court’s ruling on a motion for a competency evaluation under the abuse of discretion standard. ... In determining whether the trial court [has] abused its discretion, this court must make every reasonable presumption in favor of [the correctness of] its action. . . . Our review of a trial court’s exercise of the legal discretion vested in it is limited to the questions of whether the trial court correctly applied the law and could reasonably have reached the conclusion that it did.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)
State
v.
Kendall,
123 Conn. App. 625, 651, 2 A.3d 990, cert. denied, 299 Conn. 902, 10 A.3d 521 (2010). “The trial court should carefully weigh the need for a hearing in each case, but this is not to say that a hearing should be available on demand. . . . [T]he trial judge is in a particularly advantageous position to observe a defendant’s conduct during a trial and has a unique opportunity to assess a defendant’s competency. A trial court’s opinion, therefore, of the competency of a defendant is highly significant.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)
State
v.
Connor,
292 Conn. 483, 523-24, 973 A.2d 627 (2009).
Applying these principles, we conclude that the respondent failed to make specific factual allegations sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt as to her competence. In support of her request for a competency examination of the respondent, counsel relied on the respondent’s contention that she never agreed to the prior neglect adjudication. This bald assertion, giving rise to counsel’s expression of doubt as to the respondent’s ability to assist in the proceeding, constitutes nothing more than a conclusory allegation that is, by itself, insufficient to raise a reasonable doubt regarding
the respondent’s incompetence to stand trial. See id., 524 (lack of legal and communication skills does not necessarily give rise to competency hearing);
In re Alexander V.,
supra, 223 Conn. 567 (court did not err in not ordering competency examination due to lack of reasonable doubt despite evidence that respondent suffered from personality disorder and was in state of “constant instability”);
State
v.
Lloyd,
199 Conn. 359, 363, 507 A.2d 992 (1986) (evidence of defendant’s involvement in drugs and his medical report were relevant but did not, alone, support vague, conclusory allegations of incompetency);
State
v.
Kendall,
supra, 123 Conn. App. 653 (court did not abuse discretion when it determined that defendant’s belief in divine intervention did not create reasonable doubt as to competency), cert. denied, 299 Conn. 902, 10 A.3d 521 (2010);
State
v.
Bigelow,
120 Conn. App. 632, 642-43, 994 A.2d 204 (fact that defendant was receiving medication and would require medication during course of trial does not render him incompetent), cert. denied, 297 Conn. 916, 996 A.2d 278 (2010);
State
v.
Collazo,
113 Conn. App. 651, 662, 967 A.2d 597 (defendant not entitled to competency hearing when allegations were nothing more than brief, unsubstantiated references to psychiatric problems and use of medication), cert. denied, 293 Conn. 904, 976 A.2d 705 (2009).
Although testing of the respondent revealed her to have mild mental retardation, her diminished mental capacity, as noted, did not necessarily implicate her competence to assist in the commitment proceeding. Additionally, our review of the transcripts of proceedings occurring prior to the date of the commitment hearing reveals that the respondent appeared before the same trial judge on May 20 and November 10, 2010. Thus, the trial judge was “entitled to rely on his own observations of the [respondent’s] responses during the canvassing, in light of the [respondent’s] demeanor,
tone, attitude and other expressive characteristics. The trial court was in the best position to assess whether the [respondent] behaved rationally at that time.”
State
v.
Collazo,
supra, 113 Conn. App. 663 n.6.
On the basis of the foregoing, we cannot conclude that the record contained specific factual allegations that raised a reasonable doubt as to the respondent’s competency. Accordingly, we conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion in denying the respondent’s motion for a competency evaluation.
The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.