In re Jones-Joseph

181 So. 3d 651, 2015 La. LEXIS 2158, 2015 WL 5919596
CourtSupreme Court of Louisiana
DecidedOctober 9, 2015
DocketNo. 2015-B-1549
StatusPublished

This text of 181 So. 3d 651 (In re Jones-Joseph) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Louisiana primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In re Jones-Joseph, 181 So. 3d 651, 2015 La. LEXIS 2158, 2015 WL 5919596 (La. 2015).

Opinions

PER CURIAM.

_[jThis disciplinary matter arises from formal charges filed by the Office of Disciplinary Counsel (“ODC”) against respondent, Keisha M. Jones-Joseph, a disbarred attorney.

PRIOR DISCIPLINARY HISTORY

Before we address the current matter, we find it helpful to review respondent’s prior disciplinary history. Respondent was admitted to the practice of law in Louisiana in 1998. In 2014, respondent was disbarred for neglecting her clients’ legal matters, failing to communicate with her clients, failing to refund unearned fees, and failing to cooperate with the ODC in its investigation. In re: Jones-Joseph, 14-0061 (La.2/26/14), 134 So.3d 1153 (“Jones-Joseph I”). The misconduct at issue in Jones-Joseph I occurred between 2007 and 2010.

• Against this backdrop, we now turn to a consideration of the misconduct at issue in the present proceeding.

FORMAL CHARGES

Count I — The Geer Matter

In November 2012, Patty Jo Bowers Geer hired respondent to handle a family law matter, for which she paid respondent $1,000. Thereafter, Ms. Geer made numerous attempts to contact respondent but was unsuccessful. Eventually, | respondent’s phone was disconnected. Respondent did not perform the work for which she had been hired, and she did not account for or refund the unearned fee.

In March 2013, Ms. Geer filed a complaint against respondent with the ODC. The ODC sent notice of the complaint to [653]*653three of respondent’s known addresses via certified mail. -Although the return receipt card indicates notice was delivered to her secondary bar registration address on August 31, 2013, respondent failed to provide a response to the complaint.

Count II — The Davis Matter

In February 2013, Jarika Davis retained respondent to obtain an expungement of her criminal record, for which she paid respondent $1,100. Respondent was to contact Ms. Davis two weeks later to provide a status update. When she failed to do so, Ms. Davis contacted respondent. At that time,' respondent told Ms. Davis that she had filed the expungement. Ms. Davis later learned this statement was untrue. Despite repeated efforts, Ms. Davis was only able to .speak with respondent about the case through a third party. As of December 2013, Ms. Davis was unable to communicate in any way with respondent. Respondent did not perform the work for which she had been hired, and she did not account for or refund the unearned fee.

In July 2013, Ms. Davis filed a complaint against respondent with the ODC. The ODC sent notice of the complaint to respondent’s primary bar registration address and another known address via certified mail. The notices were returned marked “return to sender.” No response was ever received ft-om respondent.

In October 2013, Ms. Davis filed a claim against respondent with the Louisiana State Bar Association’s Client Assistance Fund. The Client Assistance Fund subsequently approved Ms. Davis’s claim and reimbursed her $1,100.

I «DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS

In August 2014, the ODC filed formál charges against respondent, alleging that her conduct as set forth ‘ above violated Rules 1.3 (failure to act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client), 1.4 (failure to-communicate with a client),-. 1.5(f)(5) (failure to refund an unearned fee), 1.16(d) (obligations upon termination of the representation), 3.2 (failure to make reasonable efforts to expedite litigation), 8.1(b) (knowing-failure to respond to a lawful demand for information from a disciplinary authority), 8.1(c) (failure to cooperate with the ODC in its investigation), 8.4(a) (violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct), and 8.4(c) (engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, , deceit, or misrepresentation) of the Rules of Professional Conduct.

Respondent failed to answer the formal charges. Accordingly, the factual allegations contained therein were deemed admitted and proven by clear and convincing evidence pursuant to Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 11(E)(3). No formal hearing was held, but the parties were given an opportunity to file with the hearing committee written arguments and documentary evidence on the issue of sanctions. Respondent filed nothing for the hearing committee’s consideration.

Hearing Committeé Report

After reviewing the ODC’s deemed admitted submission, the hearing committee found that the factual allegations in the formal charges were deemed admitted and proven by clear and convincing evidence. Based on these facts, the committee found respondent violated the Rules of Professional Conduct as alleged in the formal charges.

The committee determined respondent violated duties owed to her clients, the public, the legal system, and the legal profession. Respondent acted knowingly and intentionally, causing'actual-injury. Based on the ABA’s Standards for | ¿Imposing Lawyer Sanctions, ,⅛ committee determined the applicable baseline sanction ranges from suspension to disbarment.

[654]*654In aggravation, the committee found a prior disciplinary record, a dishonest or selfish motive, a pattern of misconduct, multiple offenses, bad faith obstruction of the disciplinary proceeding by intentionally failing to comply with the rules or orders of the disciplinary agency, refusal to acknowledge the wrongful nature of the conduct, vulnerability of the victims, substantial experience in the practice of law (admitted 1998), and indifference to making restitution. The committee found no mitigating factors are present.

After considering the court’s ruling in Jones-Joseph I, which involved nine counts of similar misconduct by respondent, the committee recommended respondent be disbarred. The committee also recommended respondent be required to make restitution to her clients.

Neither respondent nor the ODC filed an objection to the hearing committee’s report.

Disciplinary Board Recommendation

After review, the disciplinary board determined the hearing committee’s factual findings in this deemed admitted matter are supported by the factual allegations in the formal charges and/or by the evidence submitted in support of those allegations. The board also found respondent violated the Rules of Professional Conduct as alleged in the formal charges.

The board determined respondent knowingly, if not intentionally, violated duties owed to her clients, the legal system, and the legal profession. Respondent caused significant actual harm to her clients. Aside from not receiving the legal services for which they paid, her clients have not been able to retain other counsel to com-píete their legal matters because in order to do so, they need a refund of the | ¡¡money they paid to respondent. Based on the ABA’s Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions, the board determined the applicable baseline sanction is disbarment. The board adopted the aggravating factors found by the committee. The board agreed that no mitigating factors are present.

Turning to the issue of an appropriate sanction, the board noted that because the misconduct in the present matter occurred in 2012 and 2013, well after the misconduct for which respondent was disbarred in Jones-Joseph I, the approach established by this court in Louisiana State Bar Ass’n v. Chatelain,

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Bluebook (online)
181 So. 3d 651, 2015 La. LEXIS 2158, 2015 WL 5919596, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-jones-joseph-la-2015.