In re J.M.

2025 Ohio 5318

Opinion

[Cite as In re J.M., 2025-Ohio-5318.]

STATE OF OHIO ) IN THE COURT OF APPEALS )ss: NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COUNTY OF SUMMIT )

IN RE: J.M. C.A. Nos. 31578 J.R. 31579

APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT ENTERED IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS COUNTY OF SUMMIT, OHIO CASE No. DN 23-12-1078 DN 23-12-1081

DECISION AND JOURNAL ENTRY

Dated: November 26, 2025

SUTTON, Judge.

{¶1} Appellant, T.N. (“Mother”), appeals from a judgment of the Summit County Court

of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division, that terminated her parental rights and placed her minor

children in the permanent custody of Summit County Children Services Board (CSB”). This Court

affirms.

I.

{¶2} Mother is the biological mother of J.M., born June 30, 2018; and J.R., 1 born

September 18, 2019. The children’s father had minimal involvement in the trial court proceedings

and did not appeal the trial court’s judgment. Mother gave birth to another child during this case.

1 J.R.’s name was corrected to J.M. during the trial court proceedings, but the trial court continued to refer to him as J.R. This Court will also refer to him as J.R. to distinguish him from his sibling. 2

That child was also removed from Mother’s custody and placed in the temporary custody of CSB

but is not a party to this appeal.

{¶3} Mother also has two older children who are not parties to this appeal, but the

juvenile cases pertaining to them are relevant to this case. More than ten years ago, Mother was

involved in a juvenile case in Summit County pertaining to her oldest child, D.P. Few details

about that child or case are included in the record except that the Summit County Juvenile Court

ultimately placed D.P. in the legal custody of the maternal great grandmother.

{¶4} During 2015, Stark County Department of Job and Family Services (SCDJFS)

opened a case pertaining to Mother’s then infant child, L.P. The child was born with amphetamine

in her system, and Mother had a history of drug abuse and an inability to care for her older child.

Mother and the child’s father also lacked stable housing or the ability to meet the child’s basic

needs. L.P. was later adjudicated a dependent child. The trial court initially permitted L.P. to live

with Mother in the home of a maternal relative under an order of protective supervision, but later

removed the child from that home because Mother did not cooperate with the relative who was

supervising her contact with L.P. SCDJFS ultimately moved for permanent custody of L.P. based

on several alternative grounds under R.C. 2151.414(E). See R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a). On May 24,

2016, the Stark County Juvenile Court involuntarily terminated Mother’s parental rights and

placed L.P. in the permanent custody of SCDJFS.

{¶5} When this case began, Mother was living with J.M., J.R., and her husband, who is

not the father of these children. CSB received a referral about ongoing drug use by Mother and

her husband and the unsafe and unsanitary condition of the children and the home. Police

conducted a welfare check of the home, and found it to be filthy and unsuitable for the children.

Among other problems, the family had eight dogs living inside, with feces spread all over the 3

home, and the smell of the home was described by numerous witnesses as unbearable. In lieu of

a Juv.R. 6 removal of the children, Mother agreed to engage in an out-of-home safety plan with

CSB, which required the children to live with an adult the family knew from their church. That

adult, the safety plan monitor, later informed CSB that he could no longer keep the children in his

home, and the parents did not identify any other adults to care for the children.

{¶6} On December 29, 2023, CSB filed complaints to allege that J.M. and J.R. were

neglected and dependent children because of suspected drug use by Mother, the unsafe and

unsanitary home conditions and potential eviction from that home, and Mother’s failure to meet

other basic needs of the children. Specifically, both children were filthy when CSB became

involved with the family; they were diagnosed with mental health and/or developmental disorders

but were not engaged in any services; they had suffered from medical and dental neglect and

required extensive dental treatment; and the school-aged child was not attending school. The

children also were not toilet trained and not meeting several other developmental milestones.

{¶7} The parents waived their rights to adjudicatory and dispositional hearings. Pursuant

to the parties’ stipulation, the trial court adjudicated J.M. and J.R. dependent under R.C.

2151.04(C), as alleged in the complaint. The parents also agreed that the trial court would place

the children in the temporary custody of CSB and adopt the case plan as an order of the court.

{¶8} The case plan required Mother to obtain a mental health and substance abuse

assessment and engage in recommended treatment, submit to regular drug screens, participate in

parenting instruction and other services to learn about her children’s special and basic needs, work

with service providers to repair dangers and clean up her home, and demonstrate that she could

provide a safe and sanitary home for her children. Mother did not consistently engage in mental 4

health or substance abuse treatment, did not submit to drug screening as required, and did not

engage in hands-on parenting instruction to learn how to meet her children’s needs.

{¶9} Mother also made minimal progress toward obtaining and maintaining a safe and

sanitary home. She moved into a different home near the beginning of this case, but it had many

safety hazards and Mother continued to own several large dogs that she kept inside and failed to

keep the home clean. Mother rehomed some of her dogs and enlisted the help of others to clean

her home and repair some of the safety hazards, but the home remained dirty, unsafe, and

unsuitable for her young children.

{¶10} Another problem at the beginning of this case was Mother’s failure to keep the

children clean and tend to her own personal hygiene. Mother’s personal hygiene remained a

problem throughout this case. Mother failed to regularly bathe and/or change and wash her clothes,

such that other parents complained to CSB about Mother’s presence at the indoor visitation center

due to the smell. The caseworker offered to supply Mother with soap and other hygiene products,

and to connect her with service agencies to assist her. Mother did not take advantage of those

services, and her personal hygiene did not improve during this case. When the weather permitted,

Mother’s supervised visits with J.M. and J.R. were moved to an outdoor park so that other families

did not have to be exposed to her unpleasant odor.

{¶11} On December 10, 2024, CSB moved for a first six-month extension of temporary

custody and Mother moved for legal custody, but Mother later withdrew her motion. Following a

hearing before a magistrate, the trial court denied the agency’s request to extend temporary

custody. Neither parent filed objections to that decision.

{¶12} CSB moved for permanent custody of J.M. and J.R., alleging numerous alternative

grounds under R.C. 2151.414(E) and that permanent custody was in the best interest of the 5

children. See R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a). Mother alternatively requested a six-month extension of

temporary custody. After an evidentiary hearing, the trial court terminated parental rights and

placed J.R. and J.M. in the permanent custody of CSB. Mother appeals and raises two assignments

of error. This Court will address them in reverse order to facilitate review.

II.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR II

A REVERSIBLE ERROR EXISTS BECAUSE AN ATTORNEY WAS NOT [] APPOINTED TO REPRESENT THE CHILDREN AT TRIAL WHEN A CONFLICT EXISTED BETWEEN THEIR EXPRESSED WISHES AND THE GAL’S RECOMMENDATION.

{¶13} Mother’s second assignment of error is that the trial court erred in failing to appoint

an attorney to represent the children because they wanted to go home but the guardian ad litem

recommended permanent custody to CSB. Children who are subjects of a permanent custody

proceeding may be entitled to independent counsel if their guardian ad litem recommends a

disposition that conflicts with the children’s wishes. In re J.P.-M., 2007-Ohio-5412, ¶ 53 (9th

Dist.), citing In re Williams, 2004-Ohio-1500, syllabus and ¶ 18. See also Juv.R. 4(C) (“If a person

is serving as Guardian ad litem for a child or ward, and the court finds a conflict exists between

the role of the Guardian ad litem and the interest or wishes of the child or the ward, the court shall

appoint counsel for the child or ward.”). “In determining whether to appoint independent counsel

for a child, the juvenile court should consider the particular circumstances of the case, including

the child’s maturity and whether the guardian ad litem can adequately represent the child.” In re

L.F., 2021-Ohio-3431, ¶ 17 (9th Dist.).

{¶14} This issue was raised for the first time at the permanent custody hearing during the

testimony of the guardian ad litem. According to the record, that was the first time that the parties

became aware that the children, then five and six years old, had told the guardian ad litem that they 6

missed Mother and wanted to return to her. The trial judge asked the guardian ad litem why she

had not requested the appointment of independent counsel for the children because their wishes

conflicted with her recommendation. The guardian ad litem explained that she had consulted

throughout this case with the children’s therapists and concluded that the children were too

immature to understand the concept of a permanent home. Therefore, she did not believe that there

was a conflict between the children’s expressed wishes and her recommendation that permanent

custody was in their best interest. Nevertheless, the trial court sua sponte appointed counsel to

represent the children and continued the hearing for a third day of testimony.

{¶15} Mother’s argument does not address the significant fact that the trial court did, in

fact, appoint an attorney to represent the children at the conclusion of the second hearing date. The

parties reconvened for an additional day of hearing approximately three weeks later. The

children’s attorney testified about her discussions with each of the children and explained that both

children expressed that they did not want to return to Mother’s home but wanted to stay where

they were. Mother’s counsel had the opportunity to cross-examine the children’s attorney but did

not. On appeal, Mother does not argue that the children’s attorney did not adequately protect their

interests in these proceedings. Mother’s second assignment of error is overruled accordingly.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR I

THE GRANTING OF PERMANENT CUSTODY WAS AGAINST THE MANIFEST WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE[.]

{¶16} Mother’s first assignment of error is that the trial court’s permanent custody

judgment is against the manifest weight of the evidence. Before a juvenile court may terminate

parental rights and award permanent custody of a child to a proper moving agency, it must find

clear and convincing evidence of both prongs of the permanent custody test: (1) that the child is

abandoned; orphaned; has been in the temporary custody of the agency for at least 12 months of a 7

consecutive 22-month period; the child or another child of the same parent has been adjudicated

abused, neglected, or dependent three times; or that the child cannot be placed with either parent,

based on an analysis under R.C. 2151.414(E); and (2) that the grant of permanent custody to the

agency is in the best interest of the child, based on an analysis under R.C. 2151.414(D)(1). R.C.

2151.414(B)(1) and 2151.414(B)(2); see also In re William S., 75 Ohio St.3d 95, 98-99 (1996).

{¶17} In considering whether the juvenile court’s judgment is against the manifest weight

of the evidence, this Court “weighs the evidence and all reasonable inferences, considers the

credibility of witnesses and determines whether in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the [finder

of fact] clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the [judgment]

must be reversed and a new [hearing] ordered.” (Internal quotations and citations omitted.)

Eastley v. Volkman, 2012-Ohio-2179, ¶ 20. When weighing the evidence, this Court “must always

be mindful of the presumption in favor of the finder of fact.” Id. at ¶ 21.

{¶18} On the first prong of the permanent custody test, the trial court found that the

children could not be returned to the custody of Mother within a reasonable time or should not be

returned to her custody based on the grounds set forth in R.C. 2151.414(E)(11). See R.C.

2151.414(B)(1)(a). CSB presented certified records from Stark County Juvenile Court, including

the 2016 involuntary termination of Mother’s parental rights to L.P., an older sibling of these

children. Based on the records and testimony presented at the hearing, the trial court found that

Mother had her parental rights involuntarily terminated as to a sibling of these children and failed

to prove that, “notwithstanding the prior termination, [she] can provide a legally secure permanent

placement and adequate care for the health, welfare, and safety of the child[ren].” R.C.

2151.414(E)(11). Mother does not challenge this significant finding by the trial court that she

currently could not provide for the wellbeing of her children. 8

{¶19} Although Mother does not challenge this finding, a brief review of the relevant

evidence is in order, as it also pertains to the children’s best interest. By the time of the hearing in

May 2025, Mother had the opportunity to work on reunification for nearly one and a half years,

yet she had not consistently engaged in any services. Her substance abuse and mental health

counselor testified that Mother needed consistent substance abuse and trauma counseling but that

she had not attended her sessions as scheduled. Between October 2024 and January 2025,

Mother’s attendance was so poor that she was terminated by the agency. She had just reengaged

in counseling a few months before the final hearing.

{¶20} Throughout this case, Mother failed to engage in hands-on parenting instruction to

learn how to meet the basic and special needs of her children. While the children had been in her

custody, she had failed to meet many of their basic needs yet failed to recognize her shortcomings

in that regard. They came into CSB custody at the ages of 4 and 5 but were not toilet trained and

were filthy; they had rotten teeth in their mouths that needed to be extracted; and each suffered

from significant behavioral problems that had not been addressed. Throughout this case, Mother

denied that her children had any behavioral problems.

{¶21} Mother also had not verified that she had a stable income, and she did not have

suitable housing. Despite receiving help from others to clean and repair her house, there were still

broken windows and other safety hazards that had not been repaired. Several witnesses testified

that Mother’s home was not as filthy as it was several months earlier, but that it was not clean

enough for young children. Mother still had several large dogs, and the home had visible feces

smeared on the floors and walls. The guardian ad litem testified that the smell in Mother’s home

was unlike any other home she had visited in the past. She explained that, even during her most 9

recent visit, “I have to wear a mask when I go there. I have to change my shoes. It is not just a

normal smells like dogs smell. It is horrific.”

{¶22} Next, the trial court found that permanent custody was in the best interest of the

children. When reviewing the trial court’s best interest determination, this Court focuses primarily

on the specific factors set forth in R.C. 2151.414(D). In re M.S., 2023-Ohio-1558, ¶ 25 (9th Dist.).

The trial court was required to consider the statutory best interest factors, which include: the

interaction and interrelationships of the children, their wishes, their custodial history, their need

for permanence and whether that can be achieved without a grant of permanent custody, and

whether any of the factors outlined in R.C. 2151.414(E)(7)-(11) apply. R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(a)-

(e); see also In re R.G., 2009-Ohio-6284, ¶ 11 (9th Dist.). Because the trial court found that the

factor set forth in R.C. 2151.414(E)(11) applied in this case, it was required to again consider that

factor in its best interest analysis.

{¶23} The children’s interaction with Mother during this case was limited to weekly

supervised visits. CSB never decreased the level of supervision because Mother failed to

consistently engage in case plan services or demonstrate that she was able to care for the children

without assistance. In addition to failing to consistently address her own mental health, Mother

did not engage in any hands-on parenting instruction with the children or attempt to stay informed

about their progress in counseling or other intervention services. Each child had mental health and

behavioral problems, yet Mother had not recognized or addressed those problems while they were

in her custody. In fact, she continued to deny that they had any problems. J.M. was diagnosed

with ADHD and autism, and J.R. was diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder and conduct

disorder. Because J.R. was extremely violent with others and sometimes engaged in self-harming 10

behavior, his counselor suspected that he might have a more serious mental illness, but he was still

too young for a diagnosis.

{¶24} The wishes of the children were initially expressed by the guardian ad litem. She

testified that the children wanted to return to Mother but that she did not believe that they

understood the concept of a permanent home. She opined that permanent custody was in their best

interest. As explained already, the trial court appointed independent counsel to represent the

children. The hearing continued several weeks later, after counsel had the opportunity to explore

the issue with the children. The children’s counsel testified on the final day of the hearing that the

children no longer wanted to return to Mother but wished to stay where they were.

{¶25} Throughout their short lives, the custodial history of these children included

spending their formative years in an unstable home with Mother, who failed to meet their basic

needs. During this case, the children were moved in and out of several homes because of their

highly aggressive behavior. Early in this case, J.M. was briefly placed in a residential treatment

center because “his behaviors were too extreme for a foster home.” Through ongoing counseling,

psychiatric medication, and the safety and security of their most recent foster homes, each child

was learning how to control his impulsiveness and was making progress reaching developmental

milestones. Their counselors opined that each child needed to remain in a stable and structured

environment, which Mother was unable to provide. CSB had not found any suitable relatives for

placement, so the trial court concluded that a legally secure permanent placement would be

achieved by placing the children in the permanent custody of CSB.

{¶26} Finally, the trial court was required to again consider that Mother previously had

her parental rights involuntarily terminated to an older sibling of these children and that, despite

that prior termination, Mother failed to demonstrate that she was able to provide the children with 11

a safe and secure home. See R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(e); R.C. 2151.414(E)(11). As previously

explained in detail, this finding was supported by substantial evidence. Notably, Mother has not

challenged this finding on appeal, that she failed to rebut the presumption that, because of the prior

termination of her parental rights, she remains unable to provide her children with a suitable home.

See, e.g., In re A.H., 2024-Ohio-502, ¶ 17 (9th Dist.); In re X.N., 2021-Ohio-3633, ¶ 26 (9th Dist.).

{¶27} Given all the evidence before the trial court, this Court cannot say that it lost its

way in terminating Mother’s parental rights and placing J.R. and J.M. in the permanent custody of

CSB. See Eastley at ¶ 20. Mother’s first assignment of error is overruled.

III.

{¶28} Mother’s assignments of error are overruled. The judgment of the Summit County

Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division, is affirmed.

Judgment affirmed.

There were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

We order that a special mandate issue out of this Court, directing the Court of Common

Pleas, County of Summit, State of Ohio, to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy

of this journal entry shall constitute the mandate, pursuant to App.R. 27.

Immediately upon the filing hereof, this document shall constitute the journal entry of

judgment, and it shall be file stamped by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals at which time the period

for review shall begin to run. App.R. 22(C). The Clerk of the Court of Appeals is instructed to

mail a notice of entry of this judgment to the parties and to make a notation of the mailing in the

docket, pursuant to App.R. 30. 12

Costs taxed to Appellant.

BETTY SUTTON FOR THE COURT

CARR, P. J. HENSAL, J. CONCUR.

APPEARANCES:

ALISA BOLES, Attorney at Law, for Appellant.

ELLIOT KOLKOVICH, Prosecuting Attorney, and ASHLEE JAMES, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for Appellee.