In re J.L.C.

2023 Ohio 4081

• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals
• Decided: November 13, 2023
• Docket: CA2022-05-046
• Status: Published

Opinion

[Cite as In re J.L.C., 2023-Ohio-4081.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

TWELFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO

BUTLER COUNTY

IN RE: : CASE NO. CA2022-05-046 J.L.C. : OPINION : 11/13/2023

:

APPEAL FROM BUTLER COUNTY COURT OF COMMON PLEAS JUVENILE DIVISION Case No. JS2014-0963

Michael R. Bassett, for appellant.

Rapier & Bowling Co., L.P.A., and Kyle M. Rapier, for appellee.

Jeannine C. Barbeau, guardian ad litem.

BYRNE, J.

{¶ 1} Mother appeals from a decision of the Butler County Court of Common Pleas,

Juvenile Division, which granted a change in custody of her son "Jonathan," 1 a juvenile.

1. "Jonathan" is a pseudonym adopted in this opinion for purposes of privacy and readability. In re D.P., 12th Dist. Clermont Nos. CA2022-08-043 and CA2022-08-044, 2022-Ohio-4553, ¶ 1, fn.1. Butler CA2022-05-046

Mother previously had custody of Jonathan and was the residential parent, but the court's

decision awarded custody of Jonathan to Father and made Father the residential parent.

For the reasons described, we affirm the juvenile court's decision.

I. Facts and Procedural History

{¶ 2} The record in this case is voluminous. The evidentiary hearing alone resulted

in over 1,500 pages of transcribed testimony and nearly 1,500 pages of exhibits. The

following summary of the key facts in this case is not intended to be comprehensive of all

testimony and exhibits. However, having reviewed the record and having conducted our

analysis based on the information available in the record, we believe the following summary

provides the key information the reader needs to understand our analysis.

{¶ 3} Jonathan was born in April 2014. Mother and Father were not married, and

their relationship had ended before Jonathan was born. Later that year, Father asked the

juvenile court for shared parenting or custody, but the court granted Mother custody and

Father visitation. Not long after, Father was married. More recently, Mother too was

married.

{¶ 4} In 2016, when Jonathan was only a toddler, Mother began reporting to

children services that, during visits, Father and especially Jonathan's half-sister "Ashley,"2

who lived with Father, were abusing Jonathan. Mother claimed that it was Jonathan who

had disclosed the abuse to her. Mother alleged that Ashley—who is only a few years older

than Jonathan—was sexually abusing Jonathan, often in rather shocking ways. Mother

claimed that Jonathan had made a "staggering" number of these allegations and had told

her that Ashley had made him do incredibly bizarre things, like eat feces. Mother also

claimed that Jonathan was acting out at home after his visits and was afraid of visiting

2. Another pseudonym to protect the privacy of a minor child.

-2- Butler CA2022-05-046

Father. Mother continued to report similar allegations over the years that followed. Many

of the allegations concerned sexual abuse by Ashley, but some involved verbal or physical

abuse by Father. Eventually Mother even alleged that Father's wife (Jonathan's

stepmother) abused Jonathan.

{¶ 5} But several different children services agencies who were involved with the

family (two in Ohio and two in Kentucky) investigated Mother's many reports of abuse and

could never substantiate any of them. One agency initially determined that abuse was

"indicated." But the agency later dismissed the case after finding that Jonathan appeared

to have been coached by Mother. Mother stopped making abuse reports in late 2017, but

a few months later the reports began again, this time coming mostly from Jonathan's

therapist based on what Jonathan told her during sessions.

{¶ 6} Over the next couple of years, Mother and Father each filed several motions

with the juvenile court. Relevant here are Mother's motion to modify or restrict Father's

visitation, Mother’s motion to modify child support, and Father's motion for a change of

custody. A hearing was held before a magistrate on these motions over eight days, spread

out over more than a year from August 2020 to September 2021. Many witnesses testified

and many exhibits were presented. Besides Mother and Father, six witnesses in particular

shed the most light on the question of who should have custody of Jonathan.

{¶ 7} The first was Dr. M. Douglas Reed, a forensic psychologist, who was

appointed by the juvenile court to provide an independent evaluation of the parents. Dr.

Reed separately evaluated both Mother and Father and submitted an extensive report for

each. While Dr. Reed's evaluation of Father revealed little of note, the same was not true

for Mother. Dr. Reed described Mother as having delusional thinking for continuing to

believe Jonathan's abuse claims despite no claim ever having been substantiated. Reed

also diagnosed Mother with "Other Specified Personality Disorder," which features

-3- Butler CA2022-05-046

symptoms that cause significant distress or impairment but do not meet the criteria for a

specific personality disorder. He found that Mother had mixed features of histrionic,

borderline, paranoid, and narcissistic personality disorders. It was Dr. Reed's opinion that

maladaptive thoughts, moods, and behaviors prevented Mother from being an effective

parent. Mother, he wrote in his report, was more focused on winning her battle with Father

than on protecting her child.

{¶ 8} Pamela Miller, an expert in childhood trauma and sexual abuse retained by

Father, evaluated Ashley in an effort to determine the veracity of the claim that Ashley was

sexually abusing Jonathan. She submitted a written report. After talking to both Ashley

and Jonathan, Miller concluded that while Jonathan may have been abused by someone at

some point, Father and Ashley were not the ones who committed the abuse. Miller found

that Jonathan showed a pattern of fantasizing and of difficulty distinguishing between reality

and fantasy. Miller also noted that Jonathan had told her that he used to lie about Ashley—

particularly with regard to his statements that Ashley had touched him inappropriately—and

that he was sorry for those lies. Miller concluded that Jonathan's allegations against Ashley

appeared to be the product of his imagination or of coaching. Another witness, Brenda

Patton, the family's reunification therapist, testified that she believed Mother had coached

Jonathan to make false allegations of abuse.

{¶ 9} The guardian ad litem ("GAL") filed a report and testified at the hearing. She

had met with Jonathan on several occasions and found no evidence that he had been

abused by Father or Ashley. The GAL too believed that Mother had coached Jonathan to

make false allegations. In her report, the GAL discussed the concept of parental alienation

and the harm that such alienating behavior can have on children. She believed that Mother

was trying to alienate Jonathan from Father, to Jonathan's detriment, by repeatedly making

abuse reports to children services and otherwise interfering with the relationship between

-4- Butler CA2022-05-046

Father and Jonathan. The GAL described Jonathan as having a good relationship with

Father and as interacting positively with Father during visits—contrary to Mother's depiction

of Jonathan as anxiety-ridden and sobbing during visits with Father. The GAL

recommended that Father be given custody of Jonathan.

{¶ 10} Jonathan's therapist, Kim Rosenzweig, a clinical psychologist, testified that

she believed what Jonathan said and believed that Ashley was sexually abusing him.

Rosenzweig admitted, though, that she had never met, interviewed, or evaluated Ashley

and based her belief solely on Jonathan's statements.

{¶ 11} Finally, Mother presented the testimony and written report of a psychologist,

Dr. Ed Connor. Mother had asked Dr. Connor to review Dr. Reed's report and to perform

his own psychological evaluation of Mother. Dr. Connor testified that he had serious

concerns with Dr. Reed's evaluation. Dr. Connor found Mother's mental state to be quite

normal and found no indication of any personality disorder. After conducting his

evaluation—which he admitted was brief—it was Dr. Connor's opinion that Mother was an

effective parent. He had no concerns about her emotional stability or capability to parent

well.

{¶ 12} As for Mother's and Father's testimony, perhaps most pertinent was their

admission that in late 2017 they had an affair. They met for sex, they exchanged sexually

graphic texts and images, including nude photographs, and on a couple of occasions they

got drunk together. Sometimes Jonathan was present when they were together. According

to Mother, she engaged in the affair hoping that Father would leave his wife for her and

Jonathan so that she could protect Jonathan from Father and Ashley. The affair ended

after a few months, and Father stayed with his wife. Throughout the affair, Jonathan was

seeing his therapist to receive counseling for the "abuse" that Mother had alleged was

occurring in Father's home. Curiously, Mother's reports of abuse stopped during the affair

-5- Butler CA2022-05-046

but resumed after the affair ended.

{¶ 13} In November 2021, after the change-in-custody hearing, the magistrate

entered a lengthy and detailed decision recommending that the juvenile court modify its

custody order and give legal custody of Jonathan and residential parent status to Father.

The magistrate found Dr. Reed's and Miller's opinions more credible than those of

Rozensweig and Dr. Connor. The magistrate noted that despite multiple investigations no

claim of abuse had ever been substantiated and that multiple witnesses suspected that

Mother had coached Jonathan to make the abuse allegations, in part because Jonathan's

descriptions of the alleged abuse did not use language that a typical seven-year-old would

come up with on his own. Among the magistrate's proposed orders was a requirement that

the parents attend a therapeutic program to address parental alienation. After completing

certain steps set forth in the order, Mother would at first have supervised visitation with

Jonathan, and later visitation per the court's standard parenting order. On the issue of child

support, the magistrate ended Father's support obligation and placed a support obligation

on Mother, basing the amount on financial information jointly submitted by the parties.

{¶ 14} Mother filed objections to the magistrate's decision. On April 8, 2022, the

juvenile court overruled Mother's objections and adopted the magistrate's decision, making

only a few changes to some of the proposed orders, none of which are relevant here.

{¶ 15} Mother appealed.

II. Analysis

{¶ 16} Mother assigns five errors to the trial court. The first two relate to the concept

of parental alienation that the GAL introduced. We will address the first two assignments

of error together. The third has to do with rebuttal witnesses. The fourth concerns child

support. And the fifth presents a manifest-weight-of-the-evidence challenge to the decision

to change custody. We will address the final three assignments of error out of the order

-6- Butler CA2022-05-046

presented.

A. Parental Alienation

{¶ 17} Mother's Assignment of Error No. 1 states:

{¶ 18} EVEN WERE PARENTAL ALIENATION SCIENTIFICALLY ACCEPTED,

THE GUARDIAN WAS NOT QUALIFIED TO OFFER AN OPINION AS TO WHETHER THIS

WAS A CASE OF IT, OR APPROPRIATE REMEDIES THEREOF.

{¶ 19} Mother's Assignment of Error No. 2 states:

{¶ 20} THE DECISION WAS FOUNDED UPON THE ERRONEOUS PREMISE

THAT APPELLANT HAD ENGAGED IN PARENTAL ALIENATION, A WHOLLY

INADMISSIBLE THEORY WHICH DOES NOT MEET THE EVIDENTIARY STANDARDS

FOR ADMISSION.

{¶ 21} Mother contends in her first assignment of error that the GAL was not qualified

as an expert to testify about parental alienation. Mother contends in her second assignment

of error that the GAL's testimony about parental alienation was inadmissible because the

concept is not based on reliable and scientifically valid principles.

1. Applicable Law and Standard of Review

{¶ 22} Evid.R. 702 governs the admissibility of expert testimony, setting out the

criteria for admissibility. The basic rule is that a witness may testify as an expert about a

subject beyond the knowledge of lay persons if the witness is a qualified expert and the

testimony is reliable, that is, "based on reliable scientific, technical, or other specialized

information." Evid.R. 702(C).

{¶ 23} Evid.R. 701, on the other hand, governs opinion testimony by lay witness.

That rule states, "If the witness is not testifying as an expert, the witness' testimony in the

form of opinions or inferences is limited to those opinions or inferences which are (1)

rationally based on the perception of the witness and (2) helpful to a clear understanding of

-7- Butler CA2022-05-046

the witness' testimony or the determination of a fact in issue."

{¶ 24} "Decisions regarding the admissibility of evidence are within the broad

discretion of the trial court. A decision to admit or exclude evidence will be upheld absent

an abuse of discretion. Even in the event of an abuse of discretion, a judgment will not be

disturbed unless the abuse affected the substantial rights of the adverse party or is

inconsistent with substantial justice." (Citations omitted.) Beard v. Meridia Huron Hosp.,

106 Ohio St.3d 237, 2005-Ohio-4787, ¶ 20.

2. Analysis

{¶ 25} In her appellate brief, Mother provides an extended discussion of "parental

alienation syndrome," which she describes as a diagnosis proposed by child psychiatrist

Richard Garner in the 1980s. She also describes the history of courts and scientific bodies

rejecting that diagnosis as scientifically invalid and as "junk science." We need not grapple

with that history or with the admissibility of the diagnosis under the standard for the

admissibility of expert testimony under Evid.R. 702 and Daubert v. Merrell Dow

Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 113 S.Ct. 2786 (1993), because the GAL did not testify

or make any recommendation regarding "parental alienation syndrome," and the magistrate

and trial court likewise did not address "parental alienation syndrome."

{¶ 26} Mother suggests that "parental alienation" as referenced by the GAL and the

juvenile court "stems from the discredited 'parental alienation syndrome.'" She points out

that "there is no universal or scientific definition of parental alienation." We understand the

concept of "parental alienation," which is sometimes relied on by parties in juvenile custody

cases, as generally referring to a situation in which one parent attempts to damage the

relationship between a child and the other parent. This can take the form of "badmouthing"

the other parent, limiting access to the child, or encouraging the child to reject the other

parent. The concern is that this behavior can have serious negative effects on the child

-8- Butler CA2022-05-046

and the relationship between the parents.3

{¶ 27} It is true that the GAL in this case, in her report, said that she "has researched

this issue [parental alienation] and is recommending that this family participate in a

therapeutic intervention program to address parental alienation here." The GAL believed

that Mother had tried—and would continue trying—to alienate Jonathan from Father and

that Jonathan was suffering as a result.

{¶ 28} At the hearing, the GAL was asked about the discussion of parental alienation

in her report. She conceded that she was not an expert and said that she was not making

a diagnosis. Rather, explained the GAL, she mentioned parental alienation because she

believed that a program addressing the matter could help the family. When Mother objected

to this testimony on the grounds that the GAL was not an expert, the magistrate assured

Mother that he would not rely on the GAL's opinion regarding parental alienation.

{¶ 29} Mother now contends that—despite the magistrate's statement to the

contrary—the magistrate did rely on the GAL's parental alienation testimony in making the

custody decision.

{¶ 30} We disagree. The GAL's testimony regarding parental alienation was not

presented as expert opinion, and the magistrate explicitly said that he would not take it as

such. In addition, the magistrate never made a finding of parental alienation. On the

contrary, the magistrate was clearly agnostic on the matter, saying in his decision only that

there "may" be parental alienation in this case. Mother is complaining about a finding that

was never made and about testimony that the magistrate specifically declined to consider

as expert testimony. In fact it does not appear that the GAL's testimony regarding parental

3. We have quoted a marriage and family therapist's explanation that the concept of parental alienation refers to a "'highly dysfunctional cross-generational alliance between the child and the triangulating parent to the disruption, dismissal and sometimes utter rejection of the child's other parent absent a bona fide protective reason.'" Romohr v. Singer, 12th Dist. Clinton No. CA2021-06-019, 2022-Ohio-50, ¶ 13 (quoting witness testimony).

-9- Butler CA2022-05-046

alienation had any affect at all on the custody decision. The basis of that decision was

plainly the magistrate's finding that Jonathan's allegations of abuse were likely false and

that Mother's behavior was harming Jonathan. The magistrate explained:

The conflict caused by the incessant referrals is not good for the child, it never has been, but that does not seem to limit the flow of them. Allegations of abuse against Father and his family has become a cottage industry. It is self-perpetuating. It must stop for the sake of the child.

Mother is unhappy with the reports and testimony of Dr. Reed and Ms. Miller and the testimony of Brenda Patton. During the pendency of this case, Mother has filed complaints with the licensing boards of Dr. Reed, Ms. Miller and Brenda Patton.

It is this magistrate's belief that as long as [Jonathan] remains in the current environment, allegations of abuse will continue unabated until Mother has eliminated Father from [Jonathan]'s life. Mother may be knowingly engaged in a form of parental alienation or she may well think the abuse is real and ongoing when it is not. It could be a combination of these. Regardless, it is not good for [Jonathan].

(Emphasis added.) It was for these reasons—which do not involve acceptance of the

concept of parental alienation—that the magistrate concluded that making Father the legal

custodian and residential parent was in Jonathan's best interest. The mere use of the

phrase "parental alienation" by the GAL and the court does not mean the court permitted

inadmissible expert testimony or improperly relied on that testimony. See George S. v.

Megan L., 5th Dist. Licking No. 18 CA 0020, 2018-Ohio-4088, ¶ 46-51 (affirming a

determination that a change of circumstances had occurred based in part on the trial court's

reasoning that "[t]he Magistrate found that the Defendant [Appellant] is committing acts

which can be characterized as parental alienation, denying the Plaintiff court ordered

visitation and overall failing to work with the Plaintiff such that shared parenting was no

longer 'workable'").

{¶ 31} Nor does the order that Mother and Father engage in a therapeutic program

- 10 - Butler CA2022-05-046

regarding parental alienation mean that the court accepted the validity of parental alienation

as a scientific concept. This counseling was merely something that the court believed would

help the family. See Batty v. Batty, 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2017-10-151, 2018-Ohio-4934,

¶ 18 (finding no problem with trial court orders that reflected the court's goal to reduce the

risk of parental alienation).

{¶ 32} The juvenile court did not abuse its discretion with regard to its decisions

concerning the GAL's references to parental alienation. The first and second assignments

of error are overruled.

B. Rebuttal Witnesses

{¶ 33} Mother's Assignment of Error No. 3 states:

{¶ 34} THE TRIAL COURT DENIED MOTHER'S UNCONDITIONAL RIGHT TO

PRESENT REBUTTAL WITNESSES.

{¶ 35} Mother contends in the third assignment of error that she was prevented from

presenting witnesses to rebut the GAL's report, particularly on the issue of parental

alienation.

{¶ 36} An abuse-of-discretion standard also applies to our review of this assignment

of error. See Beard, 106 Ohio St.3d 237, 2005-Ohio-4787, at ¶ 20. "Decisions regarding

the admissibility of evidence are within the broad discretion of the trial court. * * * A decision

to admit or exclude evidence will be upheld absent an abuse of discretion." Id.

{¶ 37} A few days before the final day of the hearing, Mother filed a motion asking

the magistrate for more time to prepare for the GAL's cross-examination and for permission

to call rebuttal witnesses. The GAL had just filed a report in which she mentioned the

concept of parental alienation, which had never been mentioned before in the proceedings.

Mother asserted that she was not prepared to respond and did not have enough time to

prepare a response.

- 11 - Butler CA2022-05-046

{¶ 38} At the hearing, the magistrate overruled the motion, and Mother proceeded to

cross-examine the GAL. After the cross-examination, the following exchange occurred

between Mother's attorney and the magistrate:

[MOTHER'S ATTORNEY]: And just, just so that you're aware, I, I probably will follow up a motion in regards to the rebuttal witnesses I would call based upon what I've heard here but I know you've already indicated you would not grant that.

BY THE COURT: Well, here's the problem we have… March is when I'm available. Do we really want this child to sit in limbo or do you want me to issue a temporary order between now and March? I mean, I'd have to, I'd have to start moving cases to try and coordinate and... three (3) lawyers and guardian's schedule.

***

BY THE COURT: Obviously, I can't keep you from filing motions…

[MOTHER'S ATTORNEY]: I didn't want you to become angry when one arrives in your box.

{¶ 39} A couple of weeks after the hearing, Mother submitted a proffer of rebuttal

testimony from two of Jonathan's school teachers as well as from her husband. But the

bulk of the proffered testimony rebutting the GAL's report came from Jonathan's therapist,

Kim Rosenzweig, who would have testified, in essence, contrary to all the GAL's

recommendations.

{¶ 40} Mother fails to convince us that the magistrate abused his discretion in

denying Mother's request to present this rebuttal testimony. The magistrate specifically

noted in his written decision that he had reviewed and considered the proffered rebuttal

testimony.4 We note too that because Rosenzweig had already testified at the hearing, the

magistrate was likely well aware of her opinions on the key matters in this case. Perhaps

4. The magistrate refers to the testimony of a "Dr. Strasser." We are not sure who Dr. Strasser is. That name is not in the proffered rebuttal testimony or in any other documents in the record that we have seen.

- 12 - Butler CA2022-05-046

most important, though, is that despite Mother's argument in support of her third assignment

of error that she needed to rebut the GAL's report and testimony on the issue of parental

alienation, parental alienation is not mentioned anywhere in the proffered rebuttal

testimony. Finally, as we have already noted, no finding of parental alienation was ever

actually made. We see no abuse of discretion.

{¶ 41} Lastly, Mother filed a motion for supplemental briefing, citing the Fifth District's

then recently issued decision in In re R.G.M., 5th Dist. Muskingum Nos. CT2022-0046 and

0047, 2023-Ohio-685. Mother contended that she believed that In re R.G.M. may be

important for our decision in the case before us, saying that a conflicting decision from us

could create a conflict between the districts. We denied Mother's motion, stating that we

would consider the relevance of the Fifth District's decision in this case, which we do now.

{¶ 42} In In re R.G.M., the Fifth District held that the admission of a doctor's

psychological report violated the mother's right to procedural due process because she did

not have the opportunity to cross-examine the doctor. The appellate court relied on In re

Hoffman, 97 Ohio St.3d 92, 2002-Ohio-5368, in which the Ohio Supreme Court concluded

that "[i]n a permanent custody proceeding in which the guardian ad litem's report will be a

factor in the trial court's decision, parties to the proceeding have the right to cross-examine

the guardian ad litem concerning the contents of the report and the basis for a custody

recommendation." Hoffman at the syllabus.

{¶ 43} Mother did not specify in her motion how In re R.G.M. applies here. That case

concerned the admission of a psychological report in the face of a party's inability to cross-

examine the authoring doctor. Here, Mother was able to cross-exam all the witnesses. The

only relevance of the case we can see is to a contention that Mother was denied the

opportunity to prepare an adequate cross-examine of the GAL as to the parental-alienation

concept discussed in the GAL's report. But Mother had the opportunity to cross-examine

- 13 - Butler CA2022-05-046

the GAL about it. That Mother thinks she did not have adequate time to prepare for the

cross-examination is a different issue, which she did not specifically raise but to which our

discussions above largely apply.

{¶ 44} The third assignment of error is overruled.

C. Weight of the Evidence

{¶ 45} Mother's Assignment of Error No. 5 states:

{¶ 46} THE DECISION WAS AGAINST THE MANIFEST WEIGHT OF THE

EVIDENCE.

{¶ 47} In her fifth assignment of error, Mother argues that the trial court's decision to

award custody of Jonathan to Father was against the manifest weight of the evidence.

1. The Law Governing Custody Modification

{¶ 48} R.C. 3109.04 governs the modification of custody in this case. The statute

provides:

(a) The court shall not modify a prior decree allocating parental rights and responsibilities for the care of children unless it finds, based on facts that have arisen since the prior decree or that were unknown to the court at the time of the prior decree, that a change has occurred in the circumstances of the child, the child’s residential parent, or either of the parents subject to a shared parenting decree, and that the modification is necessary to serve the best interest of the child. In applying these standards, the court shall retain the residential parent designated by the prior decree or the prior shared parenting decree, unless a modification is in the best interest of the child and one of the following applies:

(i) The residential parent agrees to a change in the residential parent or both parents under a shared parenting decree agree to a change in the designation of residential parent.

(ii) The child, with the consent of the residential parent or of both parents under a shared parenting decree, has been integrated into the family of the person seeking to become the residential parent.

- 14 - Butler CA2022-05-046

(iii) The harm likely to be caused by a change of environment is outweighed by the advantages of the change of environment to the child.

R.C. 3109.04(E)(1)(a). The circumstances described in subsections (i) and (ii) do not apply

in this case. So the juvenile court in this case was permitted to modify Jonathan's residential

parent and legal custodian under the statute if it made three findings: (1) that a "change has

occurred in the circumstances" of Jonathan or Mother, the residential parent; (2) that the

modification is in the "best interest" of Jonathan; and (3) that the advantages of the "change

of environment" outweigh any likely harm from the change. R.C. 3109.04(E)(1)(a); Forney

v. Forney, 12th Dist. Clermont No. CA2011-08-057, 2012-Ohio-3427, ¶ 23 (stating that once

a court finds that there has been a change in circumstances, "the trial court can modify

custody only if 'the modification is necessary to serve the best interest of the child'").

{¶ 49} In determining a child's best interest, the statute directs the court to consider

all relevant factors, including these: the wishes of the parents; the interaction and

interrelationship with the child's parents, siblings, and any other person who may

significantly affect the child's best interest; the child's adjustment to the child's home, school,

and community; and the mental and physical health of all persons involved. R.C.

3109.04(F)(1)(a)-(j).

2. Standard of Review

{¶ 50} The discretion that a trial court enjoys in custody matters "'should be accorded

the utmost respect, given the nature of the proceeding and the impact the court's

determination will have on the lives of the parties concerned.'" In re J.M., 12th Dist. Warren

No. CA2008-12-148, 2009-Ohio-4824, ¶ 17, quoting Miller v. Miller, 37 Ohio St.3d 71, 74

(1988). Accordingly, "[a] juvenile court's custody decision will not be reversed absent an

abuse of discretion." (Citation omitted.) In re D.M., 196 Ohio App.3d 50, 2011-Ohio-3918,

¶ 25 (12th Dist.). See also Davis v. Flickinger, 77 Ohio St.3d 415, 418 (1997) ("[A] trial

- 15 - Butler CA2022-05-046

judge must have wide latitude in considering all the evidence before him or her * * * and

such a decision must not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion"). "When applying the

abuse-of-discretion standard, an appellate court's role is to ascertain whether the award of

custody is supported by competent and credible evidence." Id., citing Flickinger. "In

reviewing a custody determination, an appellate court must 'review the record to determine

whether there is any evidence in support of the prevailing party.'" Lyle v. Kersey, 12th Dist.

Fayette No. CA99-11-031, 2000 WL 895268, *1 (Jun. 30, 2000), quoting Ross v. Ross, 64

Ohio St.2d 203, 206 (1980); Romohr v. Singer, 12th Dist. Clinton CA2021-06-019, 2022-

Ohio-50, ¶ 26 (quoting the same). "No abuse of discretion will be found provided there is a

substantial amount of credible and competent evidence to support the trial court's findings."

Id., citing Bechtol v. Bechtol, 49 Ohio St.3d 21, 23 (1990).

{¶ 51} An appellate court must review the evidence bearing in mind that the trial court

is better equipped to examine and weigh the evidence and to make decisions about

custody. Sallee v. Sallee, 142 Ohio App.3d 366, 370 (12th Dist.2001); Miller at 74. For this

reason, deference is given to the trial court's determinations of credibility and of the

appropriate weight to be given to the various best-interest factors. See Mack v. Mack, 12th

Dist. Butler No. CA2018-09-179, 2019-Ohio-2379, ¶ 33.

{¶ 52} A final note on our review before we begin. Mother asserts as error that the

custody decision was against the manifest weight of the evidence, though she argues that

it constitutes an abuse of discretion. Nevertheless, we still apply the competent-and-

credible-evidence test. See Ross at 204 ("This court does not undertake to weigh the

evidence and pass upon its sufficiency but will ascertain from the record whether there is

some competent evidence to sustain the findings of the trial court"). Accordingly, if the

custody decision is supported by a substantial amount of credible and competent evidence,

we will not reverse it as being against the weight of the evidence. In re R., 12th Dist.

- 16 - Butler CA2022-05-046

Madison No. CA2018-04-012, 2019-Ohio-1198, ¶ 16, citing Flickinger at 418.

3. The Magistrate's Decision

{¶ 53} As we have already noted, the record in this case is voluminous. The

evidentiary hearing resulted in over 1,500 pages of testimony and almost as many exhibit

pages. The magistrate evaluated all this evidence and distilled it into an over 30-page

decision that the juvenile court adopted. The discussion and analysis in the decision shows

that the magistrate considered all the pertinent evidence and made all the requisite statutory

findings. Where the evidence was in conflict, the magistrate stated which it found more

credible. Based on the credible evidence, the magistrate made all three relevant R.C.

3109.04(E)(1) change-in-custody findings—that a change in circumstances had occurred,

that the change was in Jonathan's best interest, and that the advantages of the change

outweighed the likely harm. And the magistrate specifically outlined the statutory best-

interest factors and made findings of fact related to each of them.

4. Analysis of Mother's Arguments

{¶ 54} Mother's argument here does not explicitly focus on any particular statutory

requirement or best interest factor. Rather, she in essence challenges the credibility of the

evidence that the magistrate relied on and, implicitly, the magistrate's credibility

determinations.

{¶ 55} First, Mother says that the evidence "clearly and overwhelmingly" shows that

Jonathan suffered significant abuse in Father's home. The evidence of abuse came mostly

from the testimony of Mother and Kim Rosenzweig, Jonathan's therapist. They testified

that Jonathan had told them—among other things—that his half-sister Ashley had sexually

abused him, and that they believed him. But there is substantial credible evidence that

these abuse allegations were untrue and may have been the product of Mother's coaching.

Multiple children services agencies investigated the allegations and none could substantiate

- 17 - Butler CA2022-05-046

any abuse. The GAL testified that she did not believe the allegations. Jonathan had never

said anything to her about abuse, nor had she seen any indication that Father or any

member of his family had abused Jonathan. Rather, the GAL believed that Mother had

coached Jonathan to make the allegations. In fact, Mother reported that Ashley had abused

Jonathan on a day that the GAL was present in Father's home, so the GAL knew that Ashley

was not home that day and could not possibly have abused Jonathan then. The family's

reunification therapist, Brenda Patton, also believed that Mother had coached Jonathan to

make the allegations.

{¶ 56} Perhaps most pertinent was testimony of Pamela Miller, the expert in

childhood trauma and sexual abuse who had evaluated Ashley and had interviewed

Jonathan. She also found little reason to credit the abuse allegations, at least to the extent

those allegations concerned Father and Ashley. In her report, Miller noted that Jonathan

had told her some obviously false stories and that "[t]his pattern of fantastical story-telling

and seamless oscillation between truth and fantasy is consistent with [Jonathan]'s

disclosures about [Ashley][.]" Indeed, wrote Miller, "[t]he most concerning part of

[Jonathan]'s presentation is his trouble with memory and reality orientation, and he has

some self-awareness of this." Miller noted that all Jonathan's fantastical statements were

made "spontaneously," not in response to pointed questions but to "open-ended prompts"

asking about himself or his family. "All of [Jonathan]'s statements about his trouble with

reality, memory, and lying, combined with the fantastical story he told about his pets being

systemically murdered by other children," wrote Miller, "makes clear that [Jonathan] does

not know the difference between reality and unreality, truth and fantasy, or honesty and

lying. He seamlessly oscillates between telling true stories and telling untrue stories." Miller

noted in her report that, based on her own observations, "combined with the fact that the

reunification therapist and the GAL believe Mother coached [Jonathan] to make allegations

- 18 - Butler CA2022-05-046

against [Ashley], combined with the fact that Dr. Reed found Mother to be personality

disordered, highly delusional, and out of touch with reality, combined with the fact that

Mother never mentioned [Ashley] to Dr. Reed, combined with the science of juvenile sex

offenders [which Miller had discussed earlier in her report]," led to the conclusion that "it is

more likely that [Jonathan]'s allegations against [Ashley] are the product of coaching,

fantasy, or both." (Emphasis sic.). And of course, Jonathan himself told Miller that he was

sorry for having lied about Ashley in the past. Upon our review of the evidence, we conclude

that Mother's argument that the evidence "clearly and overwhelmingly" shows that Jonathan

suffered abuse in Father's home is incorrect. The evidence does not support such a

conclusion. On the other hand, competent and credible evidence supported the juvenile

court's determination that neither Father nor Ashley (nor his stepmother) abused Jonathan.

{¶ 57} Second, Mother says that Father presented a facade meant to (mis)lead the

court into believing that he was a good parent but that the evidence showed that he was

not. Mother is referring here to Father's drug and alcohol use. Father had told Dr. Reed

that he had stopped using both, which Dr. Reed mentioned in his report. But Father was

not entirely forthcoming with Dr. Reed. While Dr. Reed believed Father stopped using

alcohol and drugs in 2012 or 2013, in fact Father tested positive for oxycodone,

noroxycodone, and amphetamines in 2020, during the custody proceedings. 5 And the

evidence plainly showed that Father continued to drink alcohol on at least some occasions.

But the magistrate recognized that Father had lied to Dr. Reed about his drug and alcohol

use and explicitly discounted Dr. Reed's (inaccurate) opinions on this matter. In fact, the

magistrate ordered Father to undergo a drug and alcohol assessment and to obtain any

5. According to the lab technician who testified regarding Father's 2020 12-panel drug and alcohol test results, noroxycodone is the major metabolite of oxycodone. In other words, oxycodone breaks down into noroxycodone in the body.

- 19 - Butler CA2022-05-046

recommended treatment. (We will return to Father's drug and alcohol use below.)

{¶ 58} Third, Mother argues that there was much testimony presented that when

Jonathan did not have visits with Father his negative behaviors abated and he was much

calmer. But once again, there was also evidence showing just the opposite. The GAL's

descriptions of how Jonathan interacted with Father contrasted sharply with how Mother

believed Jonathan felt during his visits with Father. Contrary to the anxiety-ridden, sobbing

child depicted by Mother, the GAL said that she had seen Jonathan run into Father's arms

and that they passed their time together happily. It was this evidence that the magistrate

weighed more heavily.

{¶ 59} Fourth, Mother argues that the trial court should not have relied on many of

Dr. Reed's opinions. She challenges Dr. Reed's opinions in three ways. First, she argues

his opinions were flawed in that he had improperly diagnosed her with four personality

disorders—histrionic, borderline, paranoid, and narcissistic. Second, Mother argues that

Dr. Reed's opinions were biased against her, as he claimed that she was "delusional"

because she had believed Jonathan's disclosures of abuse. And third, Mother argues that

Dr. Reed betrayed an unprofessional and bizarre obsession with her appearance,

suggesting that she was narcissistic because she dressed well, was a model and

cheerleader, and had worked as a waitress for a Hooters restaurant. Moreover, argues

Mother, Dr. Reed expressed the sexist opinion that her decision to engage in sexual activity

at the age of sixteen had been the first step down a path that had led to her rape in high

school and also caused him to diagnose her with borderline-personality disorder.

{¶ 60} These arguments are largely based on the opinions of Dr. Conner, the expert

that Mother hired to evaluate and review Dr. Reed's evaluation. Dr. Conner concluded that

Dr. Reed's personality-disorder diagnoses were improper. According to Dr. Conner, Dr.

Reed merely pointed to personality traits that Mother shared with people who actually have

- 20 - Butler CA2022-05-046

these disorders. Dr. Conner disagreed that Mother was "delusional" for believing

Jonathan's allegations of abuse. It was his opinion that believing one's child is simply a

hallmark of a good parent.

{¶ 61} But Dr. Conner's criticisms of Dr. Reed's opinions fail to engage Dr. Reed's

opinions fully. After reviewing Dr. Reed's report, we find that Dr. Conner's criticisms often

seem to be based on over-simplifications of Dr. Reed's opinions, to the point of distortion,

as though Dr. Conner did not spend much time trying to understand them. For example,

Dr. Reed did not diagnose Mother with histrionic or borderline or paranoid or narcissistic

personality disorder. He diagnosed her with "Other Specified Personality Disorder," which

Dr. Reed explained in his report with a quotation from the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual

of Mental Disorders, Fifth Edition ("DSM-5").6 "This designation," Reed wrote, "'applies to

presentations in which symptoms characteristic of a personality disorder that cause

clinically significant distress or impairment in social, occupational, or other important areas

of functioning predominate, but do not meet the 'full criteria' for any specific personality

disorder.'" Dr. Reed was very clear in his report and testimony that he was saying only that

Mother had features of several personality disorders, "which doesn't mean she has that

[disorder]. She has features of that, which means some part of that is, is true for her."

{¶ 62} We do agree with Mother that Dr. Reed's comments regarding her sexual

history, how she dresses, her experiences as a cheerleader and model, and her work at

Hooter's can appear inappropriate, or even sexist, when read in isolation. However, when

questioned about these comments Dr. Reed explained that he mentioned these items in his

report because they potentially related to certain psychological factors he was reviewing,

and that because they were part of Mother's "history" he included them in his description of

6. The DSM-5 is published by the American Psychiatric Association and is "one of the basic texts used by psychiatrists and other experts." Hall v. Florida, 572 U.S. 701, 704, 134 S.Ct. 1986 (2014).

- 21 - Butler CA2022-05-046

Mother. At trial, Reed explained that Mother's modeling, work at Hooters, and manner of

dress were relevant to his "Other Specified Personality Disorder" diagnosis, which was

based in part on his finding that Mother displayed characteristics of histrionic personality

disorder. Dr. Reed's report, which appears to paraphrase the DSM-5, states that this

disorder is characterized by "[a] pervasive pattern of emotionality and attention seeking,

beginning by early adulthood." The report then lists several specific characteristic

behaviors, including "[s]ome interactions are characterized by inappropriate sexually

seductive or provocative behavior" and "[c]onsistently uses her physical appearance to

draw attention to herself." Dr. Reed explained that Hooters models and servers are

"sexually glamorized." And the way that Mother dresses is a factor, said Reed, because

"[i]t draws attention." In his testimony, Dr. Reed made it clear that these are simply factors

that make histrionic personality disorder a possibility. Dr. Reed also explained that none of

his comments were intended to blame Mother for her experience of rape, or to suggest that

because she was raped she had borderline personality disorder. Even if some of Dr. Reed's

comments were questionable, we cannot conclude that the juvenile court erred as a matter

of law by viewing Dr. Reed's comments in a more benign light based on Dr. Reed's defense

of those comments during his testimony.

{¶ 63} It was reasonable for the magistrate to find Dr. Reed's opinions more credible

than those of Dr. Conner. Dr. Reed was selected by the court to provide an independent

expert opinion, while Dr. Conner was hired by Mother. Dr. Reed had Mother complete

multiple psychometric tests and he conducted several other standard evaluations of her,

which he summarized in a 28-page report. Dr. Conner, as the magistrate pointed out,

reached his conclusions after interviewing Mother only once and after conducting only one

psychometric test. Thus, finding that Dr. Reed's evaluation was very thorough, the

magistrate "place[d] the appropriate weight [on] his opinions." As for Dr. Connor's

- 22 - Butler CA2022-05-046

evaluation, the magistrate stated that the concluding paragraph of his relatively short written

report said it all: "[Dr. Connor's] assessment of Mother was, in his own words, brief." Mother

fails to convince us that the magistrate should have accepted Dr. Conner's opinions over

Dr. Reed's.

{¶ 64} Although Mother thinks that the magistrate should have believed the

testimony given by her witnesses, "[w]e are mindful that the 'knowledge a trial court gains

through observing the witnesses and the parties in a custody proceeding cannot be

conveyed to a reviewing court by a printed record, and the reviewing court should be guided

by the presumption that the trial court's findings are correct.'" Forney, 2012-Ohio-3427 at ¶

28, citing Kenney v. Kenney, 12th Dist. Warren No. CA2003-07-078, 2004-Ohio-3912, ¶ 7;

see also Miller, 37 Ohio St.3d at 74. Mother has not rebutted that presumption here. We

see little reason to disturb the magistrate's credibility determinations or the weight that the

magistrate assigned to the various statutory factors. Mother challenges the trial court's view

of the evidence, but "the mere fact that the trial court chose to rely on other evidence in the

record does not equate to the trial court clearly losing its way and creating a manifest

miscarriage of justice." Romohr, 2022-Ohio-50 at ¶ 40.

{¶ 65} We pause here to note that Father—to whom the juvenile court awarded

custody and designated as a residential parent—has a history of drug and alcohol abuse,

and that he was not fully honest with Dr. Reed about that history. Father tested positive for

oxycodone, noroxycodone, and amphetamines in 2020, as mentioned above. However,

there is also evidence in the record mitigating these facts. First, Father testified that he had

a prescription for Adderall, which contains amphetamine, at the time of or before his testing

in 2020.7 Father also testified that in the months before the 2020 drug test he took two

7. Based on the lab technician's testimony, because the 2020 test was conducted using Father's body hair—

- 23 - Butler CA2022-05-046

oxycodone pills that he obtained with a valid prescription for pain-relief medication (though

Father admitted that this was an old prescription). Second, Father was tested for drugs and

alcohol again later during the trial, in June 2021, and that test was negative with regard to

all substances. Third, while not exculpatory of Father's more recent drug use and

dishonesty with Dr. Reed, witness testimony suggests that Mother too has a history of using

cocaine and abusing alcohol. And, according to Dr. Reed's report, on the Substance Abuse

Subtle Screening Inventory-4 psychometric test that Reed administered to her, Mother

"scored as someone with a 'High Probability' to have a Substance Use Disorder." Bottom

line: neither Mother nor Father appears to be a perfect parent—far from it. But the juvenile

court was aware of Father's history of abusing alcohol and drugs and nevertheless

concluded that it was in Jonathan's best interest to be in Father's custody. Also, the statute

governing a custody change, R.C. 3109.04, which the juvenile court applied, implicitly

acknowledges that a court may award custody to a parent who, like Father, has faults. The

statute provides that the juvenile court may change a child's residential parent if it finds that

the change is in the child's best interest and that "[t]he harm likely to be caused by a change

of environment is outweighed by the advantages of the change of environment to the child."

R.C. 3109.04(E)(1)(a)(iii). Here, the juvenile court determined the potential harm that might

come from Jonathan residing with Father was outweighed by the harm to Jonathan caused

by Mother. We note too that the court also directed Father to complete an alcohol

assessment and to follow up on treatment as recommended by the assessor.

{¶ 66} We conclude that the juvenile court's decision to award custody to Father was

"supported by a substantial amount of credible and competent evidence," so we do not

reverse that decision as being against the manifest weight of the evidence. In re R., 2019-

rather than head hair or urine—as the tested material, the test results potentially showed substances used during a period of time that stretched farther back in the past than is the case with many such tests.

- 24 - Butler CA2022-05-046

Ohio-1198 at ¶ 16. The juvenile court did not abuse its discretion.

{¶ 67} The fifth assignment of error is overruled.

D. Child Support

{¶ 68} Mother's Assignment of Error No. 4 states:

{¶ 69} THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING MOTHER'S MOTION TO MODIFY

CHILD SUPPORT.

{¶ 70} Mother contends that the juvenile court overruled her motion to modify child

support without ever addressing it. She argues that, even if the custody modification is

affirmed, Father's child-support obligation should have been increased at the time her

motion was filed in March 2019. The juvenile court, Mother says, should have ordered a

retroactive increase in Father's support obligation for the over two-and-a-half-year period

between the date Mother's motion was filed and the date the order giving Father legal

custody was entered in November 2021.

{¶ 71} In the custody decision, the magistrate terminated Father's child-support

obligation and imposed a support obligation on Mother. The magistrate's child-support

worksheet (attached to the custody decision) was based on a worksheet jointly submitted

by the parties. The magistrate included health-insurance expenses in the calculation but

not childcare expenses, explaining that "the cost of child care was taken out as Mother will

not incur daycare and no information regarding Father having daycare was provided." The

worksheet calculations show that if Father had been ordered to pay support instead of

Mother, the amount would have been higher than what he had been paying before winning

custody. The juvenile court did not discuss Mother's objection regarding child support,

saying simply that the magistrate's child-support orders would stand.

{¶ 72} A few things stand out here. First, Mother's original motion to modify child

support requested modification based on her claim that the amount she was paying for

- 25 - Butler CA2022-05-046

Jonathan's health insurance and childcare were not included in the child-support

calculation. Her objection to the custody decision, though, added another basis, referring

to evidence showing each parent's "accurate income[]."

{¶ 73} More importantly, though, Mother does not explain precisely why there should

have been an increase in Father's support obligation beginning in March 2019. The

information in the worksheet can be assumed valid only as of the worksheet date,

November 15, 2021. Mother cites no evidence, or reason to think, that the worksheet

information was also valid over two-and-a-half years earlier, when Mother filed her motion

for a modification. While her argument vaguely suggests that such evidence was submitted,

Mother does not identify where it is in the record. We decline to do Mother's legwork for

her by searching for the evidence in the voluminous record before us.

{¶ 74} "Matters involving child support are reviewed under an abuse-of-discretion

standard." (Citation omitted.) Morrow v. Becker, 138 Ohio St.3d 11, 2013-Ohio-4542, ¶ 9.

We find no abuse of discretion as to this matter.

{¶ 75} The fourth assignment of error is overruled.

III. Conclusion

{¶ 76} We do not underestimate nor are we indifferent to the many nuances in this

complex case. But Mother fails to convince us that the juvenile court erred in its decision

to grant Father's motion to change custody. Having overruled all the assignments of error

presented, the trial court's judgment is affirmed.

PIPER, P.J., and HENDRICKSON, J., concur.

- 26 -