In re: Jennifer Ann Evans

• Court: United States Bankruptcy Appellate Panel for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: August 9, 2017
• Docket: CC-16-1356-KuFTa
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

FILED AUG 09 2017 1 NOT FOR PUBLICATION SUSAN M. SPRAUL, CLERK 2 U.S. BKCY. APP. PANEL OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT

3 UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY APPELLATE PANEL 4 OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT 5 In re: ) BAP No. CC-16-1356-KuFTa ) 6 JENNIFER ANN EVANS, ) Bk. No. 2:14-bk-22827-VZ ) 7 Debtor. ) Adv. No. 2:14-ap-01619-VZ ______________________________) 8 ) JEFFREY TRAINOR, ) 9 ) Appellant, ) 10 ) v. ) MEMORANDUM* 11 ) JENNIFER ANN EVANS, ) 12 ) Appellee. ) 13 ______________________________) 14 Argued and Submitted on May 18, 2017 at Pasadena, California 15 Filed – August 9, 2017 16 Appeal from the United States Bankruptcy Court 17 for the Central District of California 18 Honorable Vincent Zurzolo, Bankruptcy Judge, Presiding 19 Appearances: Peter Alan Davidson of Ervin Cohen and Jessup argued for appellant; Dennis McGoldrick argued for 20 appellee. 21 Before: KURTZ, FARIS and TAYLOR, Bankruptcy Judges. 22 23 24 25 26 * This disposition is not appropriate for publication. 27 Although it may be cited for whatever persuasive value it may have (see Fed. R. App. P. 32.1), it has no precedential value. 28 See 9th Cir. BAP Rule 8024-1. 1 INTRODUCTION 2 Jeffrey Trainor appeals from a judgment after trial in 3 favor of Chapter 71 debtor Jennifer Ann Evans, which judgment 4 denied him any relief on his objection to discharge complaint. 5 The bankruptcy court found that it had “significant issues” 6 with Evans’ credibility and also found that the bankruptcy 7 schedules Evans submitted on her own behalf and on behalf of her 8 wholly-owned company were among the worst the court had seen in 9 28 years on the bench – in terms of misstatements and omissions. 10 The bankruptcy court nonetheless ultimately found that Evans did 11 not harbor an intent to deceive her creditors or the bankruptcy 12 trustee when she knowingly made the material misstatements and 13 omissions. 14 Under the applicable clearly erroneous standard, we cannot 15 say that the bankruptcy court’s decision finding no intent to 16 deceive was illogical, implausible or without support in the 17 record. Accordingly, we AFFIRM. 18 FACTS 19 At one time, Trainor had both personal and business 20 relationships with Evans. Trainor initially was Evans’ business 21 partner, but the parties later took steps to recharacterize 22 Trainor’s equity investment in Evans’ clothing manufacturing 23 company – Evans Production Co-Op LLC – as a loan. Later, when 24 Evans did not repay the loan, Trainor sued the Co-Op in state 25 26 1 Unless specified otherwise, all chapter and section 27 references are to the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1532, and all "Rule" references are to the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy 28 Procedure, Rules 1001-9037.

2 1 court to recover the principal loan amount, interest and 2 attorney’s fees. 3 This litigation ultimately led to the Co-Op filing a 4 chapter 11 petition. Trainor filed a motion to dismiss or 5 convert the Co-Op’s chapter 11 case, which in turn resulted in 6 the conversion of the Co-Op’s bankruptcy case to chapter 7. The 7 motion to dismiss or convert was based in large part on asserted 8 errors and omissions in the Co-Op’s bankruptcy schedules and its 9 statement of financial affairs. Even though Evans knew of many 10 of the errors and omissions in the Co-Op’s schedules and 11 statement of financial affairs by no later than February 2014 – 12 when the Co-Op’s § 341(a) meeting of creditors was held – Evans 13 only filed amendments to the Co-Op’s bankruptcy commencement 14 documents after Trainor filed his May 2014 motion to dismiss or 15 convert. 16 In July 2014, around the same time Trainor’s motion to 17 convert was granted, Evans filed her personal bankruptcy case. 18 Trainor filed his objection to discharge complaint in September 19 2014. The sole relevant claim for relief sought to deny Evans 20 her discharge based on §§ 727(a)(4)(A) and 727(a)(7) and based on 21 the numerous errors and omissions in the Co-Op’s bankruptcy 22 commencement papers and in Evan’s personal bankruptcy 23 commencement papers.2 24 Roughly one year later, Trainor filed a summary judgment 25 motion which resulted in summary adjudication in favor of Trainor 26 2 27 Trainor’s complaint also stated a claim for relief under § 727(a)(6), but he has not challenged on appeal the bankruptcy 28 court’s ruling denying him relief under that subsection.

3 1 on all issues except for those regarding Evans’ state of mind – 2 whether she knowingly and fraudulently made the misstatements and 3 omissions in her own schedules and statement of financial affairs 4 and in the Co-Op’s filings. As the bankruptcy court put it: 5 Evans made multiple false statements under oath of material facts in Co-op’s Schedules and Statement of 6 Financial Affairs, its Amended Schedules and in her own Schedules; however, whether Evans made the statements 7 with fraudulent intent is a controverted issue of material fact which must be determined at trial . . . . 8 9 Findings Of Fact And Conclusions Of Law In Support Of Order On 10 Motion For Summary Judgment Or, In The Alternative, For Summary 11 Adjudication Of Issues (Nov. 23, 2015) at 14:6-9.3 12 The findings and conclusions contained a lengthy listing of 13 specific, admitted misstatements and omissions from Evans’ and 14 the Co-Op’s bankruptcy commencement documents. Most of these 15 same admissions were carried forward as admitted facts in the 16 parties’ joint pretrial stipulation.4 17 After a one-day trial on the state of mind issues, at which 18 only Evans testified, the bankruptcy court orally stated its 19 findings of fact from the bench.5 The bankruptcy court first 20 3 Neither party included the summary judgment findings of 21 fact and conclusions of law in their excerpts of record. But we 22 can take judicial notice of this document’s filing and contents. O'Rourke v. Seaboard Sur. Co. (In re E.R. Fegert, Inc.), 887 F.2d 23 955, 957–58 (9th Cir. 1989); Mullis v. Bankr. Ct., 828 F.2d 1385, 1388 & n.9 (9th Cir. 1987). 24 4 The specific misstatements and omissions are identified in 25 the discussion section set forth below. 26 5 The judgment refers to written findings of fact and 27 conclusions of law, but there were no such written findings and conclusions issued after trial. Perhaps the bankruptcy court was 28 (continued...)

4 1 gave a general assessment of Evans’ credibility. Without 2 specifying precisely on which subjects it found Evans credible 3 and which it did not, the court stated that Evans’ credibility 4 fell somewhere in the middle of the pack in terms of witnesses 5 who had testified before the court. At the same time, the court 6 also stated it had “significant issues” concerning Evans’ 7 credibility. The court offered the following explanation in 8 support of its general credibility finding: 9 There are many witnesses who have a very difficult time answering the question that is asked of them. They 10 attempt to avert or evade the question and offer sometimes an explanation, but sometimes not even an 11 explanation, an attempt to shunt away from the question itself and to place blame or responsibility for the 12 target of the question on somebody else and you [Evans] did that repeatedly. 13 14 Hr’g Tr. (Sept. 21, 2016) at 123:6-13. 15 Next, the bankruptcy court noted that the purpose of the 16 trial was to enable the court to determine whether Trainor could 17 establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Evans 18 knowingly and fraudulently made the admitted misstatements and 19 omissions. 20 The court found that Evans knew that at least several of her 21 material misrepresentations were false when she made them – 22 particularly those regarding the Co-Op’s income, the IRS’s levies 23 on property of the Co-Op, the amounts of the IRS’s claims, and 24 insider payments from the Co-Op to herself and her mother. The 25 5 26 (...continued) referring to the findings and conclusions it entered when it 27 granted summary adjudication in favor of Trainor. Regardless, the key findings we must examine were made orally on the record, 28 immediately following the trial.

5 1 court specifically pointed to: (1) Evans’ protestations of 2 ignorance as to the existence of her misstatements and omissions; 3 (2) her asserted reliance on others to fill in the schedules 4 correctly; and (3) her repeated inability to “notice” the extant 5 defects in the documents when she reviewed and signed them under 6 penalty of perjury. The bankruptcy court indicated that these 7 statements and conduct were inexplicable, not credible, reckless 8 or a combination of all three. On that basis, the court 9 determined that Evans knowingly made at least some of the 10 material misstatements and omissions. 11 On the same evidence, however, the bankruptcy court declined 12 to find an intent to deceive. The court gave significant weight 13 to what it perceived as a lack of motive. As the court 14 explained: 15 I looked very carefully in trying to understand what advantage or benefit Ms. Evans would gain from looking 16 at all of these false statements, especially in light of the fact that she knew she was being scrutinized, 17 not only by Mr. Trainor but by the IRS, which was a precipitating factor in the Co-op filing. I mean 18 sometimes when people are chased by creditors they lie and hide assets, but I just don’t see that kind of non- 19 disclosure or false statement of fact here that leads to the inference that she acted fraudulently. 20 21 Hr'g Tr. (Sept. 21, 2016) at 127:18-128:2. 22 The bankruptcy court conceded that it only could recall a 23 few instances in 28 years on the bench when it had seen worse 24 examples of misstatements and omissions in schedules and 25 statements of financial affairs. The bankruptcy court further 26 acknowledged Evans’ continuing obligation to correct the 27 documents once she admitted to learning of their inaccuracy and 28 her failure to do so. Notwithstanding these additional factors,

6 1 the court ultimately found that “[i]t’s very close, but I just 2 don’t see enough there to draw that inference” that Evans acted 3 fraudulently. Hr’g Tr. (Sept. 21, 2016) at 128:17-18. 4 The bankruptcy court entered its judgment in favor of Evans 5 on October 6, 2016, and Trainor timely appealed. 6 JURISDICTION 7 The bankruptcy court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 8 §§ 1334 and 157(b)(2)(J), and we have jurisdiction under 9 28 U.S.C. § 158. 10 ISSUE 11 Did the bankruptcy court commit reversible error when it 12 denied Trainor relief on his claim under §§ 727(a)(4)(A) and 13 727(a)(7)? 14 STANDARDS OF REVIEW 15 In objection to discharge appeals: “(1) the [bankruptcy] 16 court’s determinations of the historical facts are reviewed for 17 clear error; (2) the selection of the applicable legal rules 18 under § 727 is reviewed de novo; and (3) the application of the 19 facts to those rules requiring the exercise of judgments about 20 values animating the rules is reviewed de novo.” Retz v. Samson 21 (In re Retz), 606 F.3d 1189, 1196 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting 22 Searles v. Riley (In re Searles), 317 B.R. 368, 373 (9th Cir. BAP 23 2004) aff'd, 212 Fed. Appx. 589 (9th Cir. 2006)). 24 Whether a debtor has the requisite fraudulent intent is a 25 question of fact reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard. 26 See In re Retz, 606 F.3d at 1197. Under that standard, we only 27 can reverse if the bankruptcy court’s finding was illogical, 28 implausible or without support in the record. Id. at 1199.

7 1 DISCUSSION 2 Under § 727(a)(4)(A), the bankruptcy court must deny the 3 debtor a discharge when the debtor knowingly and fraudulently 4 makes a false oath or account in or in connection with the case. 5 Misstatements and omissions in the debtor’s bankruptcy schedules 6 or statement of financial affairs can qualify as false oaths for 7 purposes of § 727(a)(4)(A). In re Retz, 606 F.3d at 1196 (citing 8 Khalil v. Developers Sur. & Indem. Co. (In re Khalil), 379 B.R. 9 163, 172 (9th Cir. BAP 2007), aff’d and adopted, 578 F.3d 1167, 10 1168 (9th Cir. 2009)). Among other things, § 727(a)(7) bars the 11 debtor’s discharge when, during the pendency of the debtor’s 12 case, or within one year of the debtor’s petition filing, the 13 debtor engages in the same type of conduct prohibited by 14 § 727(a)(4)(A) in connection with another bankruptcy case. 15 A plaintiff bringing a claim under § 727(a)(4)(A) must prove 16 by a preponderance of the evidence that: “(1) the debtor made a 17 false oath in connection with the case; (2) the oath related to a 18 material fact; (3) the oath was made knowingly; and (4) the oath 19 was made fraudulently.” In re Retz, 606 F.3d at 1197 (quoting 20 Roberts v. Erhard (In re Roberts), 331 B.R. 876, 882 (9th Cir. 21 BAP 2005)). To establish a § 727(a)(7) claim based on the same 22 type of conduct, the same elements logically are required, albeit 23 the “false oath” must be made in another bankruptcy case. 24 Here, the only issue in dispute on appeal is whether Evans 25 fraudulently made the bankruptcy commencement document 26 misstatements and omissions in her own bankruptcy case and in the 27 Co-Op’s case. All of the other elements in support of Trainor’s 28 §§ 727(a)(4)(A) and (a)(7) claims were established during the

8 1 course of the adversary proceeding by summary adjudication or 2 after trial, and Evans has not cross-appealed the bankruptcy 3 court’s other rulings. 4 The fraudulent intent required is the same type of actual 5 fraudulent intent that would be required to prove a common law 6 fraud claim. In re Roberts, 331 B.R. at 884. Constructive 7 fraudulent intent will not suffice. Id. Accord In re Khalil, 8 379 B.R. at 172. To establish the debtor’s fraudulent intent, 9 the plaintiff must show: (1) that the debtor made the 10 misstatements or omissions; (2) that he or she knew they were 11 false at the time he or she made them; and “(3) that he [or she] 12 made them with the intention and purpose of deceiving the 13 creditors.” In re Khalil, 379 B.R. at 173 (citing In re Roberts, 14 331 B.R. at 884) (emphasis added). 15 This appeal hinges on the third factor. The bankruptcy 16 court’s ruling on the other § 727(a)(4)(A) elements established 17 the existence of the first two intent factors. Seldom do 18 fraudfeasors break down and admit that they intended to deceive. 19 Instead, intent to deceive typically is inferred from 20 circumstantial evidence regarding the debtor’s conduct, demeanor 21 and the nature and extent of his or her misstatements and 22 omissions. In re Roberts, 331 B.R. at 884. For instance, a 23 pattern of falsity, a reckless indifference to the truth and a 24 failure to amend bankruptcy commencement documents to correct 25 known errors and omissions all can be probative of intent to 26 deceive – but none of these types of conduct, in isolation, is 27 the equivalent of an intent to deceive. See In re Khalil, 28 379 B.R. at 174-76. Indeed, in Khalil, this panel adopted the

9 1 reasoning from Garcia v. Coombs (In re Coombs), 193 B.R. 557 2 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1996), which stated in part: 3 Neither sloppiness nor an absence of effort by the debtor supports, by itself, an inference of fraud. 4 Courts which hold otherwise are simply devising a court-made prophylactic rule that the debtor must make 5 substantial effort to provide accurate and complete schedules. Had the Congress intended to make such a 6 rule, it could have done so easily . . . . 7 The essential point is that there must be something about the adduced facts and circumstances which suggest 8 that the debtor intended to defraud creditors or the estate. For instance, multiple omissions of material 9 assets or information may well support an inference of fraud if the nature of the assets or transactions 10 suggests that the debtor was aware of them at the time of preparing the schedules and that there was something 11 about the assets or transactions which, because of their size or nature, a debtor might want to conceal. 12 13 In re Coombs, 193 B.R. at 565 (emphasis added). 14 That being said, we also stated in Khalil that, while proof 15 of the debtor’s motivation to deceive can be probative of the 16 debtor’s intent to deceive, such proof is not a pre-requisite for 17 finding an intent to deceive. As we explained in Khalil: 18 Motive can support a finding of knowing and fraudulent intent, but it is not indispensable. A bankruptcy 19 court might find that a debtor's reckless indifference to the truth is part of an attempt to fly “below the 20 trustee’s radar screen” . . . or to protect family or friends from intrusive discovery or preference or 21 fraudulent transfer actions, or simply to make investigation difficult for the bankruptcy trustee or 22 creditors. Alternatively, the court might never know the debtor's motive, but the number of misstatements or 23 omissions, or the size or nature of a single one, might suffice to support a finding that a debtor knowingly 24 and fraudulently made a false oath or account. 25 In re Khalil, 379 B.R. at 176 (citing Hansen v. Moore 26 (In re Hansen), 368 B.R. 868, 878 (9th Cir. BAP 2007)). 27 On appeal, Trainor argues that the bankruptcy court 28 committed an error of law by effectively requiring a showing of

10 1 Evans’ motivation for allegedly wanting to deceive her creditors 2 and the Co-Op’s creditors. We understand why Trainor makes this 3 argument. When the bankruptcy court declined to find an intent 4 to deceive, it distinguished this case from other cases where an 5 intent to deceive had been found by noting the absence, here, of 6 any apparent advantage or benefit that Evans might have derived 7 from the nature and extent of the misstatements and omissions she 8 made. 9 Even so, we simply do not read the bankruptcy court’s 10 reasoning as based on a per se rule that it would not or could 11 not find an intent to deceive absent an apparent motivation for 12 deception. Instead, when read in context, we understand the 13 court’s reasoning to mean that, given the facts and circumstances 14 of this particular case, including Evans’ testimony, her demeanor 15 on the stand, and the nature and extent of her admitted 16 misstatements and omissions, and because it did not perceive 17 anything in the misstatements and omissions suggesting that Evans 18 wanted to conceal the true facts from her creditors or the 19 Co-Op’s creditors, the court could not find an intent to deceive. 20 In this sense, the bankruptcy court’s reasoning here echoes the 21 reasoning Khalil adopted from Coombs; the court’s reasoning did 22 not impose motive to defraud as a prerequisite to finding an 23 intent to deceive – as Khalil warned against. 24 Alternately, Trainor argues on appeal that the bankruptcy 25 court’s factual findings that Evans had no motive to defraud and 26 no intent to deceive were clearly erroneous. 27 We acknowledge that there was ample evidence in the record 28 that would have supported findings of a motive to defraud and an

11 1 intent to deceive. As the bankruptcy court pointed out, Evans’ 2 bankruptcy filing and the Co-Op’s bankruptcy filing were among 3 the worst bankruptcy filings the court had ever seen in terms of 4 errors and omissions. The bankruptcy court also correctly 5 recognized that Evans’ failure to correct the Co-Op’s and her own 6 schedules by amendment also could help support a finding of 7 intent to deceive. On top of these circumstances weighing in 8 favor of a fraudulent intent finding, there were the 9 misstatements and omissions themselves. 10 Some of the misstatements and omissions seem relatively 11 innocuous in terms of assessing Evans’ motive and intent. These 12 include: (1) an omission of a minor balance in the Co-Op’s bank 13 account; (2) deviations in the valuing of the Co-Op’s inventory 14 and furniture; (3) the failure to report one lawsuit against the 15 Co-Op; (4) the failure to report one or two executory contracts; 16 (5) an error in the listing of the Co-Op’s twenty largest 17 creditors; and (6) the failure to correctly report in the Co-Op's 18 bankruptcy commencement documents Evans’ personal items held at 19 the Co-Op. None of these misstatements and omissions are 20 necessarily indicative of fraudulent motive or an intent to 21 deceive. 22 But there were a number of other misstatements and omissions 23 that could be considered quite indicative of fraudulent motive 24 and intent to deceive. These include: (1) erroneous reporting of 25 the Co-Op's 2012 “business income” as $60,061.00 when it actually 26 was $734,963.52; (2) erroneous reporting of the Co-op's 2013 27 “business income” as $52,188.00 when it actually was $707,540.00; 28 (3) numerous unreported out-of-the-ordinary-course transfers and

12 1 payments from the Co-Op to Evans during the two years prior to 2 the Co-Op’s bankruptcy; (4) omission or erroneous reporting of 3 payments to other family members; (5) omission from the Co-Op’s 4 schedules of the Co-Op’s claims against Evans; (6) scheduling of 5 Evans as a creditor of the Co-Op when she was not a creditor; 6 (7) Evans not scheduling the Co-Op as one of her creditors; 7 (8) erroneous reporting of the IRS’s secured claim against the 8 Co-Op in the amount of $253,678 when it actually was $116,302.34; 9 (9) omitting the IRS’s unsecured priority claim in the amount of 10 $13,757.11; (10) misstating the amounts the Co-Op owed to Evans’ 11 mother, stepfather and grandmother; and (11) omitting from the 12 Co-Op’s schedules Evans’ status as a co-debtor on a number of 13 debts owed to the IRS, the Employment Development Department and 14 others. 15 In terms of assessing Evans’ motive and intent, there were 16 yet other misstatements and omissions that fall somewhere in 17 between the two extremes set forth above. These include: 18 (1) omitting from the Co-Op’s Schedule F some of its unsecured 19 creditors; (2) failing to list any secured creditors on the 20 Co-Op’s amended schedules; (3) not listing a particular unsecured 21 creditor – Richard Avila – who was paid postpetition for a 22 prepetition debt; (4) not listing payments to a particular 23 creditor – Dan Taylor – who was paid within the 90-day preference 24 period; (5) erroneously identifying the date the Co-Op paid a law 25 firm retainer as January 13, 2013, when the retainer actually was 26 paid in 2014; and (6) mis-scheduling of the IRS’s and Employment 27 Development Department’s claims as unsecured claims in Evans’ 28 personal schedules.

13 1 Our acknowledgment of the existence of substantial evidence 2 permitting the bankruptcy court to reasonably infer Evans’ motive 3 to defraud and intent to deceive, however, does not mandate 4 reversal. The critical question we must answer is whether, on 5 the record presented, it was unreasonable for the court to infer 6 that Evans did not have a motive to defraud and an intent to 7 deceive despite all the evidence available that would have 8 permitted such inferences. See generally United States v. 9 Hinkson, 585 F.3d 1247, 1263 (9th Cir. 2009) (en banc) 10 (identifying third clearly erroneous factor as whether the 11 subject finding is “without support in inferences that may be 12 drawn from the record”). We hold that the bankruptcy court’s 13 inference that Evans had no motive to defraud or intent to 14 deceive was not unreasonable. 15 Even though the bankruptcy court expressed some concern 16 regarding the credibility of some of Evans’ statements, it 17 obviously credited Evans’ testimony in which she expressed 18 confusion over the meaning of a number of terms like “co-debtor,” 19 “insider” and “executory contract” and how that confusion 20 negatively affected the information she provided in her schedules 21 and statement of financial affairs. For instance, as result of 22 her confusion, Evans did not disclose in her initial statement of 23 financial affairs certain insider payments made to herself and 24 her sister-in-law (who for a time was employed by the Co-Op as 25 its bookkeeper). As Evans testified: 26 I did not think of myself [or my sister-in-law] as an insider. I didn’t understand the term. I thought an 27 insider was -- it sounds naive, but I thought it was someone scandalous that you were passing things to. I 28 didn’t know it was myself as the CEO or the formal

14 1 bookkeeper who was paid formally. 2 Trial Tr. (Sept. 21, 2016) at 80:7-12. 3 Similarly, the following colloquy between Evans and 4 plaintiff’s counsel demonstrates her confusion over the term 5 executory contract and how that confusion led to conflicting 6 answers regarding whether a certain advertising contract needed 7 to be listed as an executory contract: 8 Q. When you amended the schedules in Schedule G, you didn’t list MnM Publishing. Why was that? 9 A. . . . For the revised schedules, it would have been 10 changed due to the attorney saying it needed to be done differently. I was very up front about what it was. I 11 wasn’t sure what -- how it should be handled and I took their advice on it and I signed based on their advice 12 on filling out the schedules. 13 Q. But you knew that you did have an executory contract with MnM Publishing when – 14 A. I don’t what an executive -- 15 Q. -- when co-op filed bankruptcy, correct? 16 A. I still do not know what an executory contract is. 17 18 Trial Tr. (Sept. 21, 2016) at 64:3-65:2. 19 At bottom, time and time again, Evans in essence claimed 20 ignorance, confusion, naivete, and haplessness as explanations 21 for her many errors and omissions. The bankruptcy court 22 obviously credited many of these explanations, as nothing else 23 explains the bankruptcy court’s finding on Evans’ lack of 24 deceitful intent. “‘[W]henever, from facts found, other facts 25 may be inferred which will support the judgment, such inferences 26 will be deemed to have been drawn. The findings of fact by a 27 trial court must receive such a construction as will uphold, 28 rather than defeat, its judgment.’” Brock v. Big Bear Market

15 1 No. 3, 825 F.2d 1381, 1384 (9th Cir. 1987) (quoting Wells Benz, 2 Inc. v. United States, 333 F.2d 89 (9th Cir. 1964)). 3 As an appellate review panel, we are not entitled to 4 substitute our view of the evidence for that of the bankruptcy 5 court. Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 573 6 (1985). “Where there are two permissible views of the evidence, 7 the factfinder's choice between them cannot be clearly 8 erroneous.” Id. at 574. It makes no difference that we likely 9 would have decided the case differently. Id. at 573. The 10 limitations on our appellate review are clear: we cannot reverse 11 unless one or more of the factual findings underpinning the 12 bankruptcy court’s decision were illogical, implausible or 13 unsupported by the record. See In re Retz, 606 F.3d at 1199. We 14 perceive no such reversible error here. The bankruptcy court 15 considered all of the evidence before it, which included Evans’ 16 course of conduct, her knowledge that she was being aggressively 17 pursued by both Trainor and the IRS, her numerous misstatements 18 and omissions, her testimony at trial, her demeanor on the stand, 19 her apparent level of financial sophistication (both as an 20 individual and as a business person), her excuses for not 21 providing more accurate bankruptcy commencement documents, and 22 her sometimes mediocre credibility in that regard. The 23 bankruptcy court effectively concluded that Evans had acted 24 cavalierly but not with a motive to defraud or an intent to 25 deceive. We cannot say that this conclusion was illogical, 26 implausible or without support in the record, so we must affirm. 27 CONCLUSION 28 For the reasons set forth above, we AFFIRM the bankruptcy

16 1 court’s judgment after trial in favor of Evans. 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28